State v. Sarah J. Katula-Talle

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
October 6, 2020
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2019AP1622-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2018CM50

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

SARAH J. KATULA-TALLE,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Buffalo County:
JOSEPH D. BOLES, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 STARK, P.J.1 Sarah Katula-Talle appeals a judgment of conviction,
entered upon her guilty plea to misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. She
argues the circuit court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2017-18). All
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2019AP1622-CR

during a traffic stop because the police officer lacked the reasonable suspicion
necessary to stop her vehicle. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The State charged Katula-Talle with one count of possession of drug
paraphernalia, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 961.573, due to evidence found during a
traffic stop of her vehicle. She moved to suppress that evidence, arguing that
Mondovi Police Department officer Cole Tenold lacked reasonable suspicion to
stop her vehicle. The circuit court held a hearing on her motion, at which Tenold
testified to the following facts.2

¶3 Tenold first had contact with Katula-Talle on February 18, 2018.
Tenold was dispatched to a domestic disturbance at which Katula-Talle was present.
His department’s standard protocol when responding to a domestic disturbance “is
to run every party involved through our dispatch center, and what they tell us is the
driver’s license status, the wants or warrants check and probation status, and if
somebody is, per se, suspended or revoked, our dispatch will tell us that.”

¶4 Police dispatch notified Tenold on February 18 that Katula-Talle’s
driving privileges were revoked. Tenold also learned that her revocation was for an
incident related to operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI). Tenold knew
a revocation due to OWI generally lasts six months.

¶5 Two weeks later, on March 3, 2018, Tenold observed Katula-Talle
drive into a grocery store parking lot. Tenold recognized her from their prior contact

2
We admonish the State for violating WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19(3)(a)2. by failing to
provide citations to the appellate record in its response brief. We observe that the assistant district
attorney in this case has other matters pending before us, and we caution him that future violations
of our appellate rules could result in sanctions. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.83(2).

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No. 2019AP1622-CR

on February 18. Tenold then stopped Katula-Talle’s vehicle because he “had
previous knowledge” that she “had a revoked driver’s license” and that at the time
of the stop, her driving privileges had been revoked for approximately two months.
Tenold did not, however, check Katula-Talle’s driving status on March 3 before he
stopped her vehicle. He also did not know precisely when her revocation period
started or when she was eligible for reinstatement. Tenold ultimately discovered
drug paraphernalia during the stop.

¶6 The circuit court denied Katula-Talle’s motion. The court
acknowledged that Tenold “could have called and probably made certain” that
Katula-Talle’s driving privileges were still revoked at the time of the stop.
Nonetheless, the court determined his failure to do so

[d]oesn’t detract from the fact that he was given the
information he had, which was that she was … [r]evoked
two weeks earlier, and that it was an alcohol revocation. I
think that’s a reasonable suspicion that she was still revoked
on [March] 3rd. He may have been wrong, and that would
have been easily remedied by … her giving her valid license
to him when he pulled her over. But I think there is a
reasonable suspicion that [Tenold] had that she was driving
while revoked, and so that the stop was proper, and so I deny
your motion.

¶7 Katula-Talle subsequently pleaded guilty to the drug paraphernalia
charge. She now appeals her conviction.3

DISCUSSION

¶8 The sole issue on appeal is whether Tenold reasonably suspected that
Katula-Talle was operating a motor vehicle on March 3, 2018, while her privileges

3
A circuit court’s order denying a motion to suppress evidence may be reviewed on appeal
from a judgment of conviction notwithstanding a defendant’s guilty plea. See WIS. STAT.
§ 971.31(10).

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No. 2019AP1622-CR

were revoked, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 343.44(1)(b). Whether there was reasonable
suspicion to conduct a traffic stop is a question of constitutional fact, which is a
mixed question of law and fact to which we apply a two-step standard of review.
State v. Anagnos, 2012 WI 64, ¶21, 341 Wis. 2d 576, 815 N.W.2d 675. We will
uphold the court’s findings of historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.
However, we independently apply those facts to constitutional principles. Id.

¶9 A traffic stop constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. See State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶10, 301 Wis. 2d 1,
733 N.W.2d 634. The Fourth Amendment permits a law enforcement officer to stop
a vehicle when the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe a crime or traffic
violation has been or will be committed by the vehicle’s occupants. See State v.
Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ¶21, 364 Wis. 2d 234, 868 N.W.2d 143. This standard
requires that the stop be based on more than an officer’s “inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶10 (quoting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). Rather, an officer’s reasonable suspicion must be
supported by articulable facts indicating that wrongful activity may be afoot. United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). “The crucial question is whether the facts
of the case would warrant a reasonable police officer, in light of his or her training
and experience, to suspect that the individual has committed, was committing, or is
about to commit a crime.” Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶13.

¶10 Determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion for a traffic
stop is a common sense test that turns on the totality of the facts and circumstances.
Id. An officer is not required to draw a reasonable inference that favors innocence
when there also is a reasonable inference that wrongful activity might be afoot. See
State v. Nieves, 2007 WI App 189, ¶14, 304 Wis. 2d 182, 738 N.W.2d 125.

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No. 2019AP1622-CR

¶11 Katula-Talle argues Tenold stopped her vehicle on a hunch that her
driver’s license was still revoked, and, therefore, he lacked the reasonable suspicion
necessary to stop her vehicle. She contends Tenold had neither “affirmative
knowledge” nor “any current information” regarding her driving status. Essentially,
Katula-Talle reasons that Tenold’s failure to confirm her driving status before
stopping her means he lacked the specific and articulable facts necessary for him to
reasonably suspect her of wrongful conduct.

¶12 We reject Katula-Talle’s argument. Tenold was not required to be
absolutely certain that Katula-Talle’s driving privileges were still revoked for him
to reasonably suspect that she was driving with a revoked license. “[T]he
requirement of reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute
certainty: ‘sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment ....’” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 346 (1985)
(citation omitted).

¶13 We conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, Tenold had
reasonable suspicion to believe that Katula-Talle had violated WIS. STAT.
§ 343.44(1)(b) by driving with revoked privileges. Tenold testified that at the time
of the traffic stop, he knew: (1) Katula-Talle’s driving privileges were revoked on
February 18, 2018, two weeks before the stop; (2) her driving privileges were
revoked due to an OWI-related incident; (3) OWI-related revocations generally last
at least six months; and (4) her revocation had been in effect for approximately two
months. Therefore, under the totality of these circumstances, Tenold could
reasonably suspect that Katula-Talle’s license remained revoked when he saw her
driving on March 3.

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No. 2019AP1622-CR

¶14 Katula-Talle additionally argues that the traffic stop was unreasonable
because Tenold did not know “whether it was possible that she could have [had] an
occupational license at the time of the stop.” We disagree that Tenold was required
to confirm whether Katula-Talle had an occupational license before he could have
reasonable suspicion to stop her. While Tenold could have reasonably inferred that
Katula-Talle had an occupational driver’s license when he saw her driving two
weeks after learning she had a revoked license, he was not required to draw this
inference favoring innocence. See Nieves, 304 Wis. 2d 182, ¶14. For the reasons
explained above, Tenold could also reasonably infer from the totality of the facts
known to him that Katula-Talle was driving while her license was still revoked.
Katula-Talle’s argument that Tenold could not have had reasonable suspicion to
stop her without first confirming whether she had an occupational license therefore
lacks merit.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE
809.23(1)(b)4.

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