State v. Justin L. Douglas

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
August 20, 2020
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2019AP804-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2016CF167

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

JUSTIN L. DOUGLAS,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Dodge County: JOSEPH G. SCIASCIA, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Blanchard, Graham, and Nashold, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2019AP804-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Justin Douglas appeals a judgment of conviction
and an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. On the day scheduled
for trial, the circuit court made decisions that would have led to Douglas going to
trial in jail clothing and with visible restraints. Shortly thereafter, Douglas
accepted the State’s plea offer and pled no contest to one count of expelling bodily
substance by a prisoner. Douglas now argues that he should be permitted to
withdraw his no-contest plea on the ground that it was coerced by the circuit
court’s pretrial rulings. The dispositive issue is whether Douglas has shown a
legal basis for withdrawing his plea. We conclude that he has not, and we
therefore affirm.

¶2 After sentencing, a defendant may withdraw a no contest plea only
upon a showing of “manifest injustice.” State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶18, 293
Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906. One way to meet this burden is to show that the
plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Id.

¶3 Douglas argues that his plea was coerced, and therefore involuntary,
because the court’s pretrial decisions would have resulted in an unfair trial,
leaving him no reasonable alternative but to accept the State’s offer. However,
Douglas does not cite any case law to support the proposition that pretrial
decisions like this can be considered a form of coercion that renders a plea
involuntary. Nor does he explain how his argument is consistent with the guilty
plea waiver rule, discussed below.

¶4 Douglas’ use of “reasonableness” as the pertinent test appears to be
drawn entirely from a single sentence in State v. Rahhal, 52 Wis. 2d 144, 187
N.W. 2d 800 (1971). In that case, Rahhal sought to withdraw his plea on the
ground that the trial judge threatened him with a greater sentence if he went to trial

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instead of accepting a plea offer. Id. at 151-52. Our supreme court agreed that
such a threat would be coercive, but concluded that the record did not show such a
threat was made. Id. In conclusion, the court stated: “When the defendant is not
given a fair or reasonable alternative to choose from, the choice is legally coerced.
This record does not show any basis for a claim of a differential sentencing or
other coercion.” Id.

¶5 Rahhal does not stand for the proposition that a pretrial ruling can
be considered a form of coercion simply because the defendant believes that it was
“unreasonable.” A threat to impose a higher sentence is not the same thing as a
pretrial ruling about how the trial will be conducted.

¶6 Although Douglas argues that an unreasonable pretrial ruling can be
coercive, he does not explain how we would measure the reasonableness or
coerciveness of pretrial rulings. It would be untenable for Douglas to argue that
legally sound pretrial decisions can be unreasonable and coercive, because then
potentially every guilty plea could be withdrawn if made after an unfavorable
pretrial ruling. Instead, it seems clear from his argument that he is claiming the
court’s pretrial decisions here were unreasonable because they were legally
unsound.

¶7 The State accurately points out that Douglas waived his right to
review of most pretrial decisions, including decisions that are legally unsound, by
pleading guilty. Under the guilty plea waiver rule, with certain exceptions, a
defendant who pleads no contest to charges waives the right to raise almost all
claims of constitutional error on appeal. See State v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, ¶18 &
n.11, 294 Wis. 2d 62, 716 N.W.2d 886; County of Racine v. Smith, 122 Wis. 2d
431, 434, 362 N.W.2d 439 (Ct. App. 1984). If we were to review the soundness of

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No. 2019AP804-CR

the circuit court’s pretrial decisions, conclude they were unsound, and allow
Douglas to withdraw his plea and return to his pre-plea status, the result would be
indistinguishable from a direct review of those decisions. In other words, in its
practical effect, Douglas’s coercion argument, if considered, would circumvent the
guilty plea waiver rule.

¶8 Douglas does not have any reply to this point, other than to assert
that we “need not overturn the circuit court’s rulings or decide an issue that was
waived by Mr. Douglas’ guilty plea.” Yet, substantial portions of his opening and
reply briefs are devoted to arguing those issues. If we need not decide them, it is
not clear why those arguments are in the briefs. Douglas cannot have it both
ways. Either we need not decide those issues, which would then leave us with no
other suggested measurement to conclude that the pretrial decisions were
“unreasonable,” or we must decide those issues, in which case Douglas will have
successfully evaded the guilty plea waiver rule.

¶9 Douglas also argues that the pretrial rulings in his case should be
treated differently than other pretrial decisions because they created a risk of jury
bias and disregard for the presumption of innocence. However, he cites no legal
authority for the proposition that the analysis above would change depending on
the nature of the pretrial decision that is claimed to be coercive.

¶10 In short, Douglas has not shown that there is any legal authority
under which a defendant is permitted to claim that a court’s pretrial rulings,
whether legally sound or unsound, reasonable or unreasonable, are a form of
coercion that would allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea entered after those
rulings. His legal theory appears to be inconsistent with the guilty-plea waiver
rule, and he does not attempt to reconcile the two. Accordingly, we conclude that

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No. 2019AP804-CR

he has not shown a legal basis for his postconviction motion, and we do not further
consider his arguments about the soundness of the court’s pretrial rulings.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE
809.23(1)(b)5. (2017-18).

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