State v. Charlie L. New

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
February 26, 2020
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2018AP2171-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2014CF121

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

CHARLIE L. NEW,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Green Lake County: MARK T. SLATE, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Reilly, P.J., Gundrum and Davis, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2018AP2171-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Charlie L. New appeals a judgment convicting
him, upon his no-contest pleas, of substantial battery, strangulation and
suffocation, false imprisonment, and victim intimidation. New also appeals the
order denying his postconviction motion in which he sought either (1) plea
withdrawal, claiming counsel was ineffective for misadvising him that a charge
dismissed “outright” could not be considered at sentencing or (2) sentence
modification. On appeal, he again seeks plea withdrawal but now asks for
resentencing. We deny both requests and affirm the judgment and order.

I. Factual Background

¶2 New’s girlfriend reported to police that, over a period of two days,
New punched, kicked, choked, and sexually assaulted her, leaving her with a
concussion, multiple bruises, black eyes, a broken nose, and a broken tooth. The
State charged New with three counts of substantial battery (counts one through
three), strangulation and suffocation (count four), false imprisonment (count five),
felony witness intimidation (count six), and second-degree sexual assault (count
seven). All charges except count six were charged as domestic abuse, infliction of
physical pain or injury, under WIS. STAT. § 968.075(1)(a)1. (2017-18).1

¶3 New pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect (NGI).
Court-appointed psychologist Kent Berney, Ph.D., concluded that New did not
satisfy NGI criteria, noting specifically that his use of a prescribed medication,
Lyrica, might support an involuntary intoxication defense but it did not constitute
a mental disease or defect for the purpose of an NGI plea under WIS. STAT.

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless noted.

2
No. 2018AP2171-CR

§ 971.15(1), as he was capable of distinguishing right from wrong. See State v.
Anderson, 2014 WI 93, ¶29, 357 Wis. 2d 337, 851 N.W.2d 760. New withdrew
his NGI plea and pled no contest to counts three through six. The State agreed to
dismiss and read in counts one and two and to dismiss count seven, the most
serious charge, “outright.”2

II. Postconviction

¶4 New faced twenty-five and one-half years’ imprisonment on the four
counts to which he pled. Calling the victim’s ordeal “horrific” and referencing
details of the sexual assault, the court described New as “evil.” Exceeding the
seventeen-year terms the PSI writer and the State recommended, the court
sentenced him to a global twenty-one-year sentence.

¶5 New later moved to withdraw his no-contest pleas on three grounds
related to count seven being dismissed “outright.” He contended: (1) his pleas
were not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily entered because he was misled
about the sentencing consequences; (2) his due process rights were violated
because his reasonable expectation about the consequences of an outright
dismissal was not met; and (3) defense counsel, Attorney Jeffrey Haase, provided
ineffective assistance by informing him that the court would not consider count
seven at sentencing, as it was dismissed “outright.” In the alternative, New sought
sentence modification on grounds of a new factor, i.e., “involuntary intoxication”
due to behavioral side effects, such as aggression and irritability, of the Lyrica he
had been prescribed for chronic pain.

2
Three counts from two other cases also were dismissed and read in. Those charges are
not at issue here.

3
No. 2018AP2171-CR

¶6 Haase withdrew after the plea hearing. Attorney William Lennon
then briefly represented New, and Attorney Paul Zilles represented New at the
sentencing hearing. All three attorneys testified at the Machner3 hearing that they
were unfamiliar with State v. Frey, 2012 WI 99, 343 Wis. 2d 358, 817 N.W.2d
436, a case preceding New’s 2016 sentencing. Frey holds that the sentencing
court may consider charges that are dismissed outright. Id., ¶¶4-5.4

¶7 Attorney James Rebholz was appointed to represent New as
postconviction counsel. Rebholz contacted Dr. Steven Oakes, an assistant
professor of pharmacology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, to consider
New’s use of Lyrica in light of the concept of involuntary intoxication. Oakes
testified at the postconviction hearing that “a small subset” of people experience
“substantial aggression and irritability” when taking or withdrawing from Lyrica
and New’s dosage change and sudden stoppage “could” have adversely affected
him at the time of his criminal conduct.

¶8 New testified at the hearing that Lyrica made him hostile and
aggressive. He said he began taking it in May 2014, that his doctor adjusted the
dosage over the next months due to his complaints about the side effects, and that
he stopped taking it on his own two or three days before the incidents at issue
because “[t]he side effects were getting too worse.” He also testified that he

3
See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979).
4
There is a distinction between charges that are “dismissed and read in” and those that
are “dismissed.” State v. Frey, 2012 WI 99, ¶43, 343 Wis. 2d 358, 817 N.W.2d 436. Read-in
charges are acknowledged as true, are subject to restitution, and may not be prosecuted separately
in the future. Id. Dismissed charges may be considered by the court at sentencing, but are not
subject to restitution, and whether they ever may be prosecuted depends on the terms of any plea
agreement and considerations of due process. Id. For the circuit court at sentencing, there is no
distinction between charges that are “dismissed” or “dismissed outright.” Id.

4
No. 2018AP2171-CR

would have rejected the plea agreement and proceeded to trial if Haase had agreed
to present an involuntary intoxication defense and if he had been fully informed
that the court could consider at sentencing the allegations of a count that is
dismissed outright. The court denied his motion. New appeals.

III. Appeal

A. Plea Withdrawal Due to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶9 A plea may be withdrawn post-sentencing only if necessary to
correct a manifest injustice. State v. Booth, 142 Wis. 2d 232, 235, 418 N.W.2d 20
(Ct. App. 1987). The manifest injustice test can be satisfied by a showing that the
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Bentley, 201
Wis. 2d 303, 311, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).5 A defendant has the burden of proving
a manifest injustice by clear and convincing evidence. Id.

¶10 Whether counsel was ineffective is a question of constitutional fact.
See State v. Jimothy Jenkins, 2014 WI 59, ¶38, 355 Wis. 2d 180, 848 N.W.2d 786
(“Jenkins”). “An appellate court upholds the circuit court’s findings of fact unless
they are clearly erroneous” but independently determines whether those historical
facts meet the constitutional standard for ineffective assistance of counsel. State v.
Dillard, 2014 WI 123, ¶86, 358 Wis. 2d 543, 859 N.W.2d 44. The clearly
erroneous standard also applies to credibility determinations. State v. Barry
Jenkins, 2007 WI 96, ¶33, 303 Wis. 2d 157, 736 N.W.2d 24.

5
New invokes State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 274, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986),
suggesting a defect in the plea colloquy. He argues, however, that his plea is infirm due to
ineffective assistance of counsel, a factor extrinsic to the plea colloquy. See State v. Howell,
2007 WI 75, ¶74, 301 Wis. 2d 350, 734 N.W.2d 48.

5
No. 2018AP2171-CR

¶11 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must establish both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that
the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984); Jenkins, 355 Wis. 2d 180, ¶35. To establish deficient performance,
the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness considering all the circumstances. Jenkins, 355
Wis. 2d 180, ¶36. The test for prejudice is whether “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id., ¶37 (citation omitted).
Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s acts in the context of an ineffective-assistance claim
is “highly deferential.” State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 637, 369 N.W.2d 711
(1985). We “judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the
facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Id. at 636
(citation omitted).

1. “Dismissed Outright”

a. Deficient Performance

¶12 In his affidavit in support of his postconviction motion, New averred
that he “firmly believed” the court was precluded from considering the sexual-
assault count. Haase and New both testified that Haase told New the court would
not consider a “dismissed outright” charge at sentencing, that Lennon and Zilles
likewise testified that they did not explain the implications of an outright
dismissal, and that none of the three were familiar with Frey. We will assume for
purposes of this decision that such performance was deficient.

6
No. 2018AP2171-CR

b. Prejudice

¶13 Neither Haase’s concession that he misinformed New nor the other
attorneys’ failures to correct that inaccuracy relieves New of clearing the hurdle of
proving that the error was prejudicial.

¶14 Without the plea deal, New faced over seventy-two years’
imprisonment, forty of them from count seven. With the plea, he faced twenty-
five and one-half years, and was sentenced to twenty-one. New told the court he
understood the plea offer and that the court was not bound by it. He also did not
speak up at sentencing when the court referred to the sexual assault, although he
had interjected earlier when the court misidentified someone.

¶15 Further, while he contends that, had he known the court could
consider count seven, he would not have accepted the plea offer, as it was “worth
the risk of conviction and additional imprisonment” to tell the jury that the victim
was lying about the sexual assault, he points to nothing casting doubt on the
victim’s report of the sexual assault. A conclusory assertion is not evidence.

¶16 Beyond that, New’s sentence did not depend on count seven. The
court acknowledged the allegations but also carefully examined the proper
sentencing factors: protection of the public; the seriousness of the offenses; and
New’s character, as shown by his criminal history, his failure to accept
responsibility for his actions, and his blaming the victim. Just as a court may
consider uncharged and unproven offenses and facts related to offenses resulting
in acquittal so as to acquire “full knowledge” of a defendant’s character before
imposing sentence, State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶45, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646

7
No. 2018AP2171-CR

N.W.2d 341 (citation omitted), so, too, may it consider charges that are dismissed
outright, Frey, 343 Wis. 2d 358, ¶43.6

¶17 Had New gone to trial on all of the charges, the result almost
certainly “would have been different,” but likely not to his advantage, and not
such that our confidence in the outcome is undermined. See Jenkins, 355 Wis. 2d
180, ¶37. He points to nothing in the record to support his claim that he would not
have pled and instead would have gone to trial. We conclude New did not prove
the prejudice component.

2. Involuntary Intoxication Defense

a. Deficient Performance

¶18 New also argues that his attorneys were ineffective for not
advancing an involuntary intoxication defense based on Lyrica’s “intolerable” side
effects.7 Involuntary intoxication is established if a defendant’s intoxicated or
drugged condition is involuntarily produced and either renders the defendant
incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong or negates the existence of a
state of mind essential to the crime. WIS. STAT. § 939.42; Anderson, 357 Wis. 2d

6
Frey teaches that when considering dismissed charges, it is the “better practice” “to
acknowledge and discuss [them] … giving them appropriate weight and describing their
relationship to a defendant’s character and behavioral pattern, or to the incident that serves as the
basis for a plea” and to give the defendant an opportunity to explain or dispute them. Frey, 343
Wis. 2d 358, ¶54. We build on Frey and recommend that, if the court intends to consider
dismissed charges at sentencing, it should give the parties prior notice, ideally during the plea
colloquy, of its potential reliance on such charges.
7
Below, New sought sentence modification on grounds that involuntary intoxication
constituted a new factor, necessary for a claim of sentence modification. Here, he casts the issue
as counsel’s ineffective assistance for failure to raise the defense.

8
No. 2018AP2171-CR

337, ¶22. The use of prescription medication can form the basis of an involuntary
intoxication defense under § 939.42. Anderson, 357 Wis. 2d 337, ¶29.

¶19 To place intoxication in issue, the defendant must present evidence
beyond a mere statement of impairment. State v. Schulz, 102 Wis. 2d 423, 430,
307 N.W.2d 151 (1981). The evidence must be both credible and sufficient to
warrant consideration of whether he or she was impaired to the extent it materially
affected the ability to form the requisite intent. Id. The test is whether, construing
all the evidence most favorably to the defendant, a reasonable juror could
conclude that the person’s condition negated the existence of a state of mind
essential to the crime. Id.

¶20 Haase, Lennon and Zilles testified that they discussed with New
information he provided to them about Lyrica’s side effects. None of the three
deemed it a viable defense strategy or a workable basis for plea withdrawal.

¶21 Zilles, however, used the argument at sentencing. After pointing out
the victim’s statement in the PSI that she believed New’s various medications
played a role in his actions, Zilles emphasized that “the main culprit” was Lyrica,
noting label warnings about the potential for suicidal ideation, self-harm, changes
in mood or behavior, anger, irritability, agitation, aggression, dangerous impulses,
or violence.

¶22 Yet New asserts that his attorneys should have done additional
forensic investigation before determining that the defense was not viable. “‘[A]
defendant who alleges a failure to investigate on the part of his counsel must
allege with specificity what the investigation would have revealed and how it
would have altered the outcome of the trial.’” State v. Flynn, 190 Wis. 2d 31, 48,
527 N.W.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted).

9
No. 2018AP2171-CR

¶23 Oakes testified that Lyrica may lead to “substantial aggression and
irritability” in “a small subset” of people and that New’s dosage change or
cessation of it “could be responsible” for his self-reported behavioral changes that
led him to engage in criminal conduct. Berney’s report similarly indicated that
New’s increased anger and aggression due to his Lyrica use were based only on
New’s self-reports. Berney also said it was not apparent to him that New shared
his concerns with his medical providers, as New provided no corroborating
reports, and that, in his opinion, New was capable of appreciating the
wrongfulness of his conduct and conforming his conduct to the requirements of
the law. So while Oakes was more persuaded of Lyrica’s possible untoward
effects than was Berney, even Oakes’ conclusions were based on New’s self-
reports and studies showing effects only on a “small subset” of those studied.

¶24 The record supports the court’s findings that all three attorneys
reviewed the Lyrica material with New and reasonably determined that
involuntary intoxication was not an appropriate defense or would support plea
withdrawal. The court itself rejected New’s position that Lyrica made him “angry
and aggressive and out of control,” as that implied that he simply acted out of
character on this occasion, when his criminal record included, among other
offenses, numerous batteries, one a substantial battery. The court found Zilles’
sentencing argument that Lyrica was “the main culprit”—the argument New
advanced—was more convincing than Oakes’ testimony that Lyrica “could” have
been a cause of New’s aggression. The court thus concluded it did not know how
Zilles could have been more effective even had a forensic pharmacologist like
Oakes been involved earlier.

¶25 The court had before it the Lyrica side-effect information he
provided to his attorneys, Oakes’ report and testimony, and the PSI, which

10
No. 2018AP2171-CR

indicated that both the victim and a long-time friend of New’s reported that they
believed his medications adversely affect his behavior. New does not specify
what further forensic investigation would have revealed.

b. Prejudice

¶26 Construing all the evidence most favorably to New, a reasonable
juror likely would not conclude that his state of intoxication negated the existence
of a state of mind essential to the crime. Schulz, 102 Wis. 2d at 430. “We will
not second guess trial counsel’s selection of trial tactics or strategies in the face of
alternatives that he or she has considered.” State v. Nielsen, 2001 WI App 192,
¶44, 247 Wis. 2d 466, 634 N.W.2d 325. New disagrees with his attorneys’
assessments, but he has not shown he was prejudiced by additional investigation
about Lyrica’s side effects.

B. Resentencing

¶27 As an alternative to plea withdrawal, New asks for resentencing,
apparently abandoning the request for sentence modification he advanced below.8
Resentencing generally is the proper method to correct a sentencing error. State v.
Holloway, 202 Wis. 2d 694, 700, 551 N.W.2d 841 (Ct. App. 1996).

8
If New has not abandoned his sentence modification argument, it still necessarily fails.
A sentence may be modified if a defendant shows a “new factor,” which is “‘a fact or set of facts
highly relevant to the imposition of sentence, but not known to the trial judge at the time of
original sentencing, either because it was not then in existence or because, even though it was
then in existence, it was unknowingly overlooked by all of the parties.’” State v. Franklin, 148
Wis. 2d 1, 8, 434 N.W.2d 609 (1989) (citation omitted). As noted, New no longer frames his
claim of involuntary intoxication as a new factor. But even if he did, while Oakes’ report may
have been new, its underlying premise that Lyrica could have contributed to New’s criminal
conduct already was known to the court and the parties at the time of sentencing and was argued
there.

11
No. 2018AP2171-CR

¶28 New contends here that resentencing is warranted because he was
sentenced in reliance on Berney’s “inaccurate” report. Berney wrote that “in [his]
review of the literature on Lyrica, there is not information that indicates that
increased agitation, irritability or ideas of aggression have been found to be side
effects from this medication.” Oakes’ forensic report opined that New “clear[ly]
… was severely affected by the increased dose of [Lyrica] shortly prior to the
criminal act due to his cessation of taking the drug” due to its “intolerable” side
effects. That one expert opinion is more persuasive than another does not
necessarily make an opinion to the contrary “wrong.” State v. Combs, 2006 WI
App 137, ¶29, 295 Wis. 2d 457, 720 N.W.2d 684. New has not shown that he was
sentenced on inaccurate information.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE
809.23(1)(b)5.

12