State v. Deandre M. Smith

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
November 27, 2019
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2018AP1835-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2015CF207

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

DEANDRE M. SMITH,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for Dane
County: WILLIAM E. HANRAHAN, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Blanchard, Kloppenburg, and Graham, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2018AP1835-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Deandre Smith appeals a judgment convicting him
of battery and felon in possession of a firearm, as acts of domestic abuse, and an
order denying his postconviction motions to vacate the judgment of conviction.
Smith argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial
attorney mishandled both the victim’s testimony and an unduly prejudicial
photograph of a gun. He also argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict
him of the felon in possession charge. Finally, he argues that the interests of
justice warrant a new trial. We reject Smith’s arguments and affirm the circuit
court.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2014, Smith lived part-time with his then-girlfriend, B.M.J. In
December 2014, B.M.J. gave statements to police about Smith’s alleged pattern of
domestic abuse. Among other things, B.M.J. described an incident that she said
had occurred in her apartment two months earlier. B.M.J. told the police that on
October 28, 2014, she and Smith got into an argument, that Smith retrieved a
handgun from a kitchen cabinet and used it to threaten her, and that the gun went
off, sending one round through B.M.J.’s arm and into a wall.

¶3 The police investigated B.M.J.’s allegations, and officers took
photographs of what B.M.J. described as the bullet wound in her arm and the
bullet hole in the apartment wall. At some point during the investigation, B.M.J.
also provided the police with a photograph of what appeared to be a black
handgun resting on bright red fabric along with what appeared to be a portion of a
belt and an ammunition clip with one visible round.

¶4 The State charged Smith with multiple counts, including battery and
felon in possession of a firearm. Smith’s trial counsel filed a motion in limine

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No. 2018AP1835-CR

seeking to prohibit the State from introducing the photograph “of the purported
gun involved[.]” The sole asserted basis for this motion was that the State would
lack a sufficient foundation to support admission of the photo.

¶5 The circuit court denied the motion at a pretrial hearing. During the
hearing, the State described the gun photo as “demonstrative” evidence, but the
court did not acknowledge or address this characterization and instead ruled on the
foundation objection, deciding that the gun photo would “come in” if the State
could establish a foundation. We discuss additional facts about the gun photo, the
motion in limine hearing, and the court’s pretrial ruling in the discussion section
below.

¶6 The State called B.M.J. to the stand, and prior to her testimony, the
State asked the circuit court to declare her a “hostile witness” for purposes of the
rules of evidence. Trial counsel did not object, and the court granted the motion.

¶7 During her direct examination, B.M.J. made a blanket denial that the
abuse she reported to the police had actually occurred, and she maintained that she
had fabricated the allegations out of anger at alleged infidelities by Smith. The
State asked a series of leading questions to elicit the contents of B.M.J.’s prior
inculpatory statements to law enforcement, and trial counsel did not object to this
method of questioning. B.M.J. admitted that she provided the gun photo to law
enforcement, the State offered it into evidence, and trial counsel did not object.

¶8 On cross-examination, trial counsel focused on B.M.J.’s allegedly
contentious relationship with Smith in an effort to undermine the credibility of the
accusations she had made to police. Trial counsel’s tactic reinforced B.M.J’s
testimony that she had given false inculpatory statements because of Smith’s
alleged infidelity.

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No. 2018AP1835-CR

¶9 During its deliberations, the jury asked to review several exhibits,
including photos of B.M.J.’s injuries, photos of the alleged bullet hole in the wall,
and the gun photo. Trial counsel did not object to any of these exhibits going to
the jury.

¶10 The jury convicted Smith of one count of misdemeanor battery, one
count of strangulation and suffocation, and one count of felon in possession of a
firearm. The jury found Smith not guilty of the remaining counts, and the
strangulation and suffocation count was later vacated on grounds not pertinent to
this appeal.

¶11 Nearly three years after the trial, Smith filed a supplemental post-
conviction motion challenging the remaining two convictions. The circuit court
held a Machner hearing,1 and both B.M.J. and trial counsel testified. The court
concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective and dismissed Smith’s motion in
its entirety.

DISCUSSION

¶12 Smith challenges the circuit court’s rulings regarding ineffective
assistance of counsel. He also challenges sufficiency of the evidence to convict

1
See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App.1979).

4
No. 2018AP1835-CR

him of felon in possession of a firearm,2 and he asks us to grant a new trial in the
interests of justice. We address each argument in turn.

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶13 We first address Smith’s argument that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the
defendant suffered prejudice as a result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
700, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶18, 264 Wis. 2d 571,
665 N.W.2d 305. To satisfy the first prong, deficient performance, a defendant
must show that counsel’s performance fell “below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶19. To
satisfy the second prong, prejudice, a defendant must show a “reasonable
probability” that, absent the errors, “the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A court need not address both prongs “if
the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 697.

¶14 An ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a mixed question
of fact and law. Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶21. Findings of fact include “the
circumstances of the case and the counsel’s conduct and strategy” and we uphold
the circuit court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous. State v. Knight, 168
Wis. 2d 509, 514 n.2, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992). “Whether counsel's performance

2
Ordinarily, we would address a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence before
turning to issues that might require a new trial or other lesser remedies, in part because the
remedy when the evidence is insufficient is prohibition of retrial. In this case, however, we
reverse the usual order in the interest of clarity of presentation because the facts underlying
Smith’s somewhat involved ineffective assistance of counsel argument are central to his less
involved sufficiency argument.

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No. 2018AP1835-CR

satisfies the constitutional standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is a
question of law,” which we review independently of the determination of the
circuit court. Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶21. We address Smith’s arguments about
B.M.J.’s testimony and the gun photo in turn.

A. B.M.J.’s Testimony

¶15 Smith argues that trial counsel mishandled B.M.J.’s testimony in
three ways. For the reasons we now explain, we conclude that Smith fails to show
that trial counsel was ineffective in any of the three ways.

¶16 First, Smith contends that trial counsel should have objected to the
State’s request to declare B.M.J. a “hostile” witness for evidentiary purposes. He
argues that an objection was called for because the State asked the court to declare
B.M.J. a “hostile” witness before she actually testified. According to Smith, WIS.
STAT. § 972.09 (2017-18)3 dictates that a witness may be declared hostile only
after offering testimony inconsistent with a prior statement.4

¶17 We need not decide whether Smith’s interpretation of WIS. STAT.
§ 972.09 is correct or whether the failure to object constituted deficient
performance, since we conclude that Smith fails to show that he was prejudiced by
the lack of an objection. The record reflects that as soon as B.M.J. started

3
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise
noted.
4
WISCONSIN STAT. § 972.09 pertains to “criminal actions.” It provides in pertinent part:
“Where testimony of a witness … is inconsistent with a statement previously made by the
witness, the witness may be regarded as a hostile witness and examined as an adverse witness,
and the party producing the witness may impeach the witness by evidence of such prior
contradictory statement.”

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No. 2018AP1835-CR

testifying, it was immediately apparent that her testimony would be inconsistent
with the statements she had previously made to the police. Thus, if trial counsel
had objected to the State’s request on the grounds that it was premature, he would
have only delayed an inevitable ruling that B.M.J. could reasonably be deemed
“hostile” to the prosecution for this purpose. Under these circumstances, Smith
has not shown a “reasonable probability” that the result would have been different
if trial counsel had objected. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

¶18 Second, Smith argues that trial counsel should have objected “to the
State’s use of leading questions and inadmissible hearsay” during B.M.J.’s direct
examination on the grounds that these questions violated the rules of evidence
regarding hearsay and prior inconsistent statements.5 The essence of Smith’s
argument appears to be that trial counsel could have and should have prevented
the jury from learning about B.M.J’s inculpatory prior statements to the police by
making proper objections. Smith acknowledges that a witness may be impeached
with prior statements that are not consistent with the witness’s trial testimony.
What was improper, according to Smith, was that the prosecutor elicited the
substance of B.M.J.’s prior statements without first eliciting B.M.J.’s trial
testimony on the same topics.

¶19 Putting aside other potential problems with Smith’s argument, Smith
fails to show that trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s method of
questioning B.M.J. was deficient, much less that it prejudiced his defense.

5
“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” WIS. STAT.
§ 908.01(3). Prior inconsistent statements are not hearsay and are admissible if the declarant
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and
the statement is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony. WIS. STAT. § 908.01(4)(a)1.

7
No. 2018AP1835-CR

¶20 As to deficiency, the circuit court concluded that trial counsel’s
decision not to object was based on reasonable trial strategy. Courts “will not
second-guess a reasonable trial strategy unless it was based on an irrational trial
tactic or based upon caprice rather than upon judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689; State v. Breitzman, 2017 WI 100, ¶65, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93.
Here, trial counsel testified that he thought the State’s performance was coming
across poorly to the jury because the State appeared to be forcing B.M.J. to say
“only what [the prosecutor] wanted to hear.” He testified that he decided not to
object because he thought the State’s questioning was ineffective, and that making
numerous formal objections would have alienated the jury. We agree with the
circuit court that this was reasonable trial strategy.

¶21 As to prejudice, Smith fails to show that his defense was prejudiced
because he does not explain how trial counsel could have prevented the jury from
learning about B.M.J.’s prior statements to the police by objecting. If trial counsel
had objected and the circuit court had sustained the objection, the State could have
readily cured any problem by simply changing the order of its questioning.
Specifically, the prosecutor could have first asked B.M.J. whether the incidents
she reported to the police had occurred, and then impeached her with her prior
statements. Smith does not identify a single statement that B.M.J. made to the
police that could not have been properly admitted in this manner.

¶22 Third, Smith argues that during cross examination, trial counsel
should have asked B.M.J. to tell “her story” about what “actually happened” on
the dates of the alleged domestic abuse and how she actually got her injuries.
Initially, we note that this argument rests on a false premise. Trial counsel did ask
questions about B.M.J.’s injuries when, as he later explained at the Machner
hearing, there was “verification or some substantiation that [Smith] was not

8
No. 2018AP1835-CR

responsible for the injuries[.]” For example, trial counsel knew that B.M.J. told
her doctor that an injury to her eye had been caused by her infant son, and trial
counsel asked B.M.J. about that incident. Thus, although trial counsel did not ask
many questions about the incidents, he did ask questions when he had a basis to
anticipate an exculpatory favorable answer.

¶23 Additionally, Smith fails to show that trial counsel’s decision not to
ask questions about the other incidents was deficient performance. During the
Machner hearing, trial counsel testified that B.M.J. had refused to meet with him
at his request before trial, and therefore, he could not anticipate what she would
say at trial about many of the alleged incidents of abuse. Trial counsel explained
that he declined to ask questions when he did not know the answers because it
risked eliciting surprise testimony damaging to Smith and would have opened the
door to a potentially damaging redirect. And trial counsel had another excellent
reason to ask few questions about B.M.J.’s story—her testimony during direct
examination was favorable to his client. B.M.J. had already denied that any of the
alleged incidents occurred, testified that she lied about the incidents to the police,
and offered jealousy as her motive for lying. As the circuit court aptly noted, “[i]t
doesn’t get much better than that” for a defense attorney. The court concluded
that trial counsel’s strategy was reasonable, and we agree.

¶24 For the above reasons, we conclude that Smith fails to show that trial
counsel was ineffective in his handling of B.M.J.’s testimony.

B. Gun Photo

¶25 Smith contends that trial counsel should have opposed admission of
the gun photo on the grounds that it was not relevant and unduly prejudicial, and
further, that trial counsel should have taken steps during trial to prevent the jury

9
No. 2018AP1835-CR

from inferring that the photo depicted the gun that Smith was charged with
possessing. For reasons we now explain, we conclude that Smith’s arguments
about the gun photo fail because they are built around an erroneous interpretation
of the transcript from the pretrial hearing.

¶26 According to Smith, the circuit court imposed a limitation on the
State’s use of the gun photo by specifically ruling that the photo was admissible as
demonstrative evidence only.6 We recognize the basis for Smith’s belief—during
the course of discussion in the pretrial hearing, the prosecutor referred to the photo
as “demonstrative” and then said “[w]e’re not claiming that it was the gun” but
rather that the gun was “consistent with” the photo.

¶27 The State’s reference to the photo as “demonstrative” is puzzling,
given the reported source of the photo, its appearance, and the nature of the felon
in possession charge against Smith. Under the circumstances, we have difficulty
seeing how this photo could reasonably have been presented to the jury as mere
demonstrative evidence, and the State’s reference may well have puzzled the
circuit court for the same reasons.

¶28 More importantly, our independent review of the record reveals that
the circuit court did not understand the prosecutor to be stipulating that the gun
photo would be merely “demonstrative” evidence, and we conclude that no
reasonable attorney in trial counsel’s position would have believed that the court
limited the photo to demonstrative use. Instead, a reasonable attorney, knowing

6
The term “demonstrative evidence” generally refers to evidence “used simply to lend
clarity and interest to oral testimony” and “in lieu of [substantive] evidence.” Anderson v. State,
66 Wis. 2d 233, 248, 223 N.W.2d 879 (1974) (citations omitted).

10
No. 2018AP1835-CR

what trial counsel knew at the time and having heard the circuit court’s ruling,
would have concluded that the photo was admissible as substantive evidence,
provided that the State was able to establish foundation. We now explain in more
detail why the record supports this conclusion, and then show how a proper
reading of the record disposes of Smith’s arguments.

¶29 First, it is apparent from the record that trial counsel knew that
B.M.J. had told the police that the photo depicted the gun Smith had threatened
her with—not some unknown gun that was merely “consistent” with that gun. In
accordance with what he appeared to understand at this time, trial counsel’s
motion in limine described the gun photo as a photograph “of the purported gun
involved.” Then, during the motion hearing, trial counsel explained his
understanding of the facts: “the alleged victim here e-mailed [the detective] a
picture of a gun that she purported was the gun that was used in the incident.”
Thus, it is apparent that trial counsel understood and represented to the circuit
court that the State would not offer the photo merely as demonstrative evidence,
but instead as substantive evidence depicting the gun that B.M.J. accused Smith of
possessing.

¶30 Second, it is also apparent from the transcript7 that the circuit court
based its admissibility ruling on the foundation grounds argued by trial counsel—

7
The transcript of the exchange provides in pertinent part:

(continued)

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No. 2018AP1835-CR

not on any possible stipulation by the State about how it intended to refer to the
photo once it was in evidence. The court asked how the photograph would be
authenticated, and the prosecutor represented that B.M.J. would provide the
foundation. The prosecutor then made the puzzling assertion that the photo was
“demonstrative,” but the court did not acknowledge this comment. Instead, the
court ruled on the topic that had been presented to it, namely, foundation. On that
topic, the court ruled that the photo could be admitted if the State established that

[TRIAL COUNSEL]: There was a sequence of events
in which the alleged victim here e-mailed Officer Peterson a
picture of a gun that she purported was the gun that was used in
the incident. There was no identifying markers on that picture.
It was something that she pulled from an Instagram account that
was not associated with my client in any way. The user name
was gibberish if nothing else. It was some kind of fictional
name, and so there was no opportunity for us to inquire as to
what the source of that picture fundamentally was. So those
were our primary concerns with introducing that photograph of
some otherwise unknown picture of a gun and trying to tie it to
my client.

….

THE COURT: All right. This photograph, is there
someone that’s going to authenticate that photograph, or is it just
at random?

STATE ATTORNEY: Yes. We do intend to
authenticate it through [B.M.J.], and it’s demonstrative, just
saying that the gun was consistent with that. We’re not claiming
that it was the gun, but that she—she gave the photograph to say
that the gun was consistent with this gun.

THE COURT: Is she the one that sent the photograph?

STATE ATTORNEY: She did. She e-mailed it to our
detective.

THE COURT: And, if that can be established
foundationally, then the photograph comes in. If it can’t be, the
photograph is out.

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No. 2018AP1835-CR

B.M.J. provided it to police.8 Thus, there is no suggestion that the court
understood the State to be stipulating that it would use the gun photo exclusively
as “demonstrative” evidence or that the court limited the gun photo to
demonstrative use, and trial counsel had no basis to think that the photo was in fact
admitted only for demonstrative purposes.

¶31 The Machner hearing was not held until more than three years after
the trial. During that hearing, Smith’s new postconviction counsel asserted that
the circuit court had limited the State’s use of the gun photo to demonstrative
purposes only, and no one challenged that characterization. Postconviction
counsel represented that “the State repeatedly assured the Court that it was only
going to use this photo as demonstrative evidence,” and that “the Court, relying on
[the State’s] assertions, said it would be admissible for that purpose ….”
(Emphasis added.) As shown above, postconviction counsel’s summary does not
accurately reflect the transcript of the pretrial hearing. And as explained below, it
appears that the circuit court and trial counsel both accepted postconviction
counsel’s representation about the nature of the court’s pretrial ruling at face
value, without examining the relevant portions of the transcript.

¶32 For its part, the circuit court seemed puzzled by postconviction
counsel’s representations about the record,9 and did not appear to have any
independent recollection of limiting the State’s use of the gun photo to

8
Smith does not point us to any other occasion in the trial record where the gun photo
was referred to as “demonstrative,” and we have found none.
9
During the Machner hearing, the court asked postconviction counsel: “Would
[Smith’s trial counsel have had] a good reason for [objecting to the photo on grounds of relevance
and prejudice]? I’m not tracking here. Do you think that the gun that this witness, the female
witness, identified as [being] his gun that was on her couch is not relevant in a shooting case?”

13
No. 2018AP1835-CR

demonstrative use. Although the circuit court eventually referred to the gun photo
as a “demonstrative” exhibit later in the same hearing, it did so without apparent
reference to the transcript and without making any findings about the nature of its
pretrial ruling. Instead, the circuit court appeared to rely on postconviction
counsel’s mistaken representations about the record.

¶33 For his part, trial counsel testified that he believed that the circuit
court had ruled that the gun photo could be admitted only as demonstrative
evidence, but that trial counsel had not considered whether the State’s use of the
photo during trial violated the court’s ruling or whether he should object. It is not
surprising that trial counsel could not recall considering an objection since, as we
have explained, the court did not actually limit the use of the gun photo. If trial
counsel really did believe at the time of trial that the pretrial ruling had imposed
that limitation, his subjective belief would not control our objective analysis—we
consider instead what reasonable counsel in trial counsel’s position would have
believed.10 More likely, by the time of the Machner hearing, trial counsel
mistakenly assumed that postconviction counsel’s interpretation of the transcript
was accurate since the photo was only a small part of a fact-intensive trial that had
concluded three years earlier.

¶34 For the reasons explained above, we conclude that a reasonable
attorney in trial counsel’s position would not have believed that the pretrial ruling
limited the use of the gun photo to demonstrative evidence. We now explain why

10
See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 110, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) (we do not
evaluate trial counsel’s actions based on counsel’s subjective state of mind, but based on an
objective standard of reasonableness); State v. Koller, 2001 WI App 253, ¶8, 248 Wis. 2d 259,
635 N.W.2d 838 (we may “rely on reasoning which trial counsel overlooked or even
disavowed”).

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No. 2018AP1835-CR

this determination resolves Smith’s remaining ineffective assistance arguments.
Smith makes several arguments about trial counsel’s handling of the gun photo,
but each depends on the premise that the photo was admissible as demonstrative
evidence only—a premise that we have expressly rejected.

¶35 First, Smith argues that trial counsel should have objected to the gun
photo on the basis of relevance and prejudice. He argues that a photograph merely
“demonstrative” of the gun that Smith was charged with possessing could have
only marginal relevance, and any relevance is outweighed by undue prejudice
because jurors would erroneously believe it to be a photo of the gun Smith
possessed. Given that trial counsel knew that B.M.J. told police that the picture
was of “the gun that was used in the incident,” we conclude that Smith fails to
show that his failure to make these arguments was deficient performance.

¶36 Second, Smith makes various arguments asserting that trial counsel
erred by failing to ensure that the State used the gun photo for demonstrative
purposes only. Smith argues that trial counsel should have objected to the State’s
direct examination of B.M.J, which arguably raised the inference that the photo
showed the gun Smith allegedly possessed when he allegedly used it to threaten
her.11 He argues that trial counsel should have objected when a police officer
testified that the gun in the photo “might be the gun that was used by the defendant
in the October 28th incident … [b]ut, at a minimum, it resembled the gun.”

11
During this examination, the State asked B.M.J. whether she had described the gun
Smith used to threaten her on October 28, 2014, to a detective, and B.M.J. testified she had
described “a gun.” The State asked B.M.J. whether she told the detective that “a friend of
[Smith] had taken a picture of a gun while it was sitting on your couch” and had posted it on
social media. B.M.J. admitted that she told the detective that “they took a picture of a gun … or
they had a picture of a gun on their wall,” and that she had emailed “that picture of a gun” to the
detective.

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No. 2018AP1835-CR

Finally, he argues that trial counsel should have objected to the gun photo’s
submission to the jury during deliberations and requested a limiting instruction
directing the jury to consider the gun photo only as demonstrative evidence. All
of these arguments fail, since the pretrial ruling did not limit the use of the photo
to demonstrative evidence.

¶37 For the reasons stated above, we have concluded that Smith fails to
show that trial counsel’s performance regarding the gun photo fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Although we could resolve all of Smith’s
arguments about this gun photo on this basis, we also conclude that Smith fails to
show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s handling of the gun photo. As with
his arguments about deficiency, Smith’s prejudice arguments depend on the
assumption that the circuit court restricted the use of the gun photo. Specifically,
Smith argues that the jury was led to consider the gun photo as substantive
evidence, rather than demonstrative evidence, and this may have factored into its
verdict. Even if true, it would only be prejudicial had the circuit court actually
restricted the gun photo to demonstrative use. Smith’s prejudice argument fails
for the same reasons as his argument about deficient performance.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶38 We now turn to Smith’s argument that there was insufficient
evidence to convict him of felon in possession of a firearm. To support the
conviction, there must be sufficient evidence that Smith (1) had previously been
convicted of a felony, and (2) possessed a firearm on or about October 28, 2014.
See WIS. STAT. § 941.29(1m)(a). Smith disputes the sufficiency of the evidence of
the second element.

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No. 2018AP1835-CR

¶39 We may only reverse a conviction for insufficiency of evidence
when “the evidence, viewed most favorably to the state and the conviction, is so
insufficient in probative value and force that it can be said as a matter of law that
no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). We
review independently whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict.
State v. Grandberry, 2018 WI 29, ¶10, 380 Wis. 2d 541, 910 N.W.2d 214.

¶40 Smith contends that the evidence offered to show he possessed a
firearm consists solely of B.M.J.’s uncorroborated prior inconsistent statements.
He acknowledges that unsworn prior inconsistent statements are admissible as
substantive evidence to support a conviction. Vogel v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 372, 386,
291 N.W.2d 838 (1980). However, he asserts that Wisconsin law is unsettled as to
whether such evidence alone, without corroboration, can prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. He asserts that in other jurisdictions, prior inconsistent
statements are not, by themselves, sufficient to support a criminal conviction, and
he asks us to adopt a similar rule.

¶41 We need not decide whether Smith correctly characterizes the law,
because he incorrectly characterizes the evidence. There was ample evidence
introduced at trial to corroborate B.M.J.’s prior statement to police that Smith
possessed a firearm, including photos of B.M.J.’s alleged bullet wound, photos of
the alleged bullet hole, and the gun photo. Smith contends that these items do not
corroborate B.M.J.’s statements to the police because they “get their only
relevance” from B.M.J.’s recanted accusation. But Smith does not explain why
that matters. He cites no authority for the proposition that once a victim recants
inculpatory statements, evidence that would be relevant to corroborate the original
statement is no longer admissible. If this were true, domestic abuse cases would

17
No. 2018AP1835-CR

regularly fail for lack of evidence, because such cases often involve recanting
accusers. See, e.g., State v. Schaller, 199 Wis. 2d 23, 42, 544 N.W.2d 247 (Ct.
App. 1995) (noting that domestic abuse cases often involve alleged victims who
recant the original statements to police, requiring factfinders to decide whether the
original statement or the recantation is more credible). We conclude that the
circuit court did not err by ruling that the evidence was sufficient to convict Smith
on the felon in possession of a firearm count.

III. Interests of Justice

¶42 Smith’s final argument is that he is entitled to a new trial in the
interests of justice. This court may in its discretion set aside a verdict and order a
new trial in the interests of justice where “it appears from the record that the real
controversy has not been fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has for any
reason miscarried ….” WIS. STAT. § 752.35.

¶43 Smith argues that the “real controversy” was not tried because trial
counsel did not elicit additional testimony from B.M.J. about how she really
sustained her injuries. Smith quotes State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 160, 549
N.W.2d 435 (1996), which held that the “real controversy” is not tried if the jury is
“erroneously not given the opportunity to hear important testimony that bore on an
important issue of the case.” We have already concluded that trial counsel’s
choice not to elicit this testimony was not erroneous, but instead based on
reasonable trial strategy.

¶44 Additionally, the record suggests that B.M.J. would not provide the
testimony he seeks at a new trial. During the Machner hearing, Smith’s
postconviction counsel questioned B.M.J. about the alleged incidents of alleged
abuse, and B.M.J. repeatedly denied any recollection of the incidents. We have no

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No. 2018AP1835-CR

reason to believe that B.M.J. would provide at a new trial the testimony she
declined to provide at the Machner hearing. Smith identifies only one concrete
detail that B.M.J. might testify to: during presentence investigations and at the
sentencing hearing, B.M.J. stated that she received the scars on her arm not from a
bullet wound but when a woman stabbed her with a grilling fork. Notably,
however, these were not sworn statements. Even assuming that B.M.J. would say
the same under oath, this new testimony would merely add context to more
relevant testimony she gave at trial—that Smith did not shoot her in the arm on
October 28, 2014 as the State alleged. See State v. Avery, 2013 WI 13, ¶18, 345
Wis. 2d 407, 826 N.W.2d 60 (new evidence that “merely chipped away” at the
State’s case was insufficient to warrant a new trial under WIS. STAT. § 752.35).

¶45 Typically, when courts grant new trials based on missing evidence,
the value of the evidence is clear and compelling.12 Smith identifies no case
granting a new trial where, as here, the value of the missing evidence is instead
almost entirely speculative. On these facts, we conclude that Smith fails to show
that “the real controversy” has not been tried and that he is entitled to a new trial
in the interests of justice.

¶46 For the reasons stated above, we affirm.

12
See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119, 283 Wis. 2d 639, 700 N.W.2d 98
(granting a new trial where DNA evidence would have excluded the defendant as a DNA match
for hair and semen samples used at trial to identify the defendant as the perpetrator); State v.
Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996) (granting a new trial where DNA evidence
would have excluded the defendant as a DNA match for a hair specimen used at trial to identify
the defendant as the perpetrator); State v. Jeffrey A.W., 2010 WI App 29, 323 Wis. 2d 541, 780
N.W.2d 231 (granting a new trial in a sexual assault case where the perpetrator was alleged to
have infected the victim with herpes and new evidence showed that the defendant did not have
herpes).

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No. 2018AP1835-CR

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE
809.23(1)(b)5.

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