Lincoln County v. Benjamin Joseph Dale Reppert

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WISCONSIN COURT OF APPEALS
110 EAST MAIN STREET, SUITE 215
P.O. BOX 1688
MADISON, WISCONSIN 53701-1688
Telephone (608) 266-1880
TTY: (800) 947-3529
Facsimile (608) 267-0640
Web Site: www.wicourts.gov
DISTRICT III
September 29, 2026
To:
Hon. Galen Bayne-Allison
Circuit Court Judge
Electronic Notice
Thomas S. Barker
Clerk of Circuit Court
Lincoln County Courthouse
Electronic Notice
Kristopher R. Ellis
Electronic Notice
Benjamin Joseph Dale Reppert
1746 Bass Bay Ln.
Eagle River, WI 54521
You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following opinion and order:
2024AP851 Lincoln County v. Benjamin Joseph Dale Reppert
(L. C. No. 2023TR1246)
Before Hruz, J.1
Summary disposition orders may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or
authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
Benjamin Joseph Dale Reppert, pro se, appeals an order denying his motion to reopen a
traffic forfeiture for speeding and, it appears, the underlying default judgment entered upon his
nonappearance at a final pretrial conference.2 As relevant to the issues we address, Reppert
1 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2023-24). All
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
2 It is unclear given the nature of Reppert’s appellate briefing, especially in juxtaposition to the
text of his notice of appeal, whether Reppert is, in fact, also appealing from the default judgment itself.
For purposes of this opinion, we will assume that he also appeals the judgment as well as the subsequent
order denying his motion to reopen that judgment.

No. 2024AP851
2
essentially argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by failing to grant his
motion to reopen the default judgment because he was self-represented in the circuit court and
his failure to appear in person at his final pretrial conference was due to mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect. He further contends that the circuit court erroneously exercised
its discretion by entering a default judgment against him. Based upon our review of the briefs
and record, we conclude that this case is appropriate for summary disposition. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.21. We summarily affirm.
On September 9, 2023, Lincoln County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Conner Monk
observed a vehicle traveling at 95-miles-per-hour (mph) in a 65-mph zone on U.S. Highway 51.
Monk subsequently issued the driver, identified as Reppert, a citation for speeding in violation of
Lincoln County Ordinance 7.03, which adopted WIS. STAT. § 346.57(4)(gm)1. Reppert filed a
not-guilty plea and a jury demand on October 13, 2023. The case was set for a final pretrial
conference on April 9, 2024, and a jury trial on May 15, 2024. Reppert was never represented by
counsel in this case.
On December 28, 2023, a notice of hearing was mailed to the address Reppert had on file
with the circuit court. The notice stated the above dates for the final pretrial conference and jury
trial, the former of which was followed by a statement reading, “Defendant to be in person for
[final pretrial].” Reppert failed to appear for the final pretrial conference, and based on his
failure to appear, the court entered a default judgment against Reppert, which included a 30-day
drivers’ license suspension and a forfeiture of $326.50.
Reppert filed a motion to reopen, first asserting that he was not, in fact, served with the
notice of the final pretrial conference, but principally arguing that the circuit court’s entry of a

No. 2024AP851
3
default judgment based upon his failure to appear at the final pretrial conference violated his due
process rights and was based upon mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
Reppert asserted that he was advised by an assistant district attorney (ADA) and judicial assistant
(JA) that he could appear at the final pretrial conference by phone and that he attempted to attend
the hearing via telephone, as he had done for prior telephone scheduling conferences, but he
received no answer when he contacted the circuit court on the date of the final pretrial
conference.
The circuit court denied the motion after determining that Reppert did not sufficiently
show that his failure to appear was due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
Reppert now appeals, challenging the denial of his motion to reopen the judgment and, we
assume, the entry of the default judgment in the first instance.
Reppert argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by denying his
motion to reopen the default judgment against him based upon his mistake. We conclude that his
argument in his brief-in-chief is undeveloped. It reads, in full:
The Court’s use of default judgment to dismiss was inconsistent
with existing case law and state statutes. The relief of judgment
sought met stipulated requirements and the Court abused its
discretion in refusing to consider whether the defendant had
committed an excusable mistake. The Court’s ruling [is] devoid of
any reason why, and the Court didn’t apply [a] correct legal
standard to defaulting the Defendant-Appellant. Wisconsin
Stats. [§] 806.07 has [a] presumption against defaults. The matter
presented issues that could be handled at the local level and
because the Court refused acknowledgment of justified relief, the
matter was given default judgment. See Blazel v. Bradley, 698 F.
Supp. 756 (W.D. Wis. 1988). The case involved a lay person,
Benjamin Reppert, who mistakenly attempted telephonic presence
when no order was demanded otherwise, he acted as a reasonably
prudent person unfamiliar with legal procedures might. See Maier
Constr., Inc. v. Ryan, 81 Wis. 2d 463, 260 N.W.2d 700 (1978).

No. 2024AP851
4
(Citations modified.)
Both the entry of the default judgment itself and the denial of Reppert’s motion to reopen
the judgment involve the exercise of the circuit court’s discretion. See Brandon Apparel Grp.,
Inc. v. Pearson Props., Ltd., 2001 WI App 205, ¶10, 247 Wis. 2d 521, 634 N.W.2d 544
(regarding review of a circuit court’s decision to grant a default judgment); Franke v. Franke,
2004 WI 8, ¶54, 268 Wis. 2d 360, 674 N.W.2d 832 (regarding review of a decision not to reopen
a judgment under WIS. STAT. § 806.07(1)). On appeal, we will not set aside a discretionary
decision unless the court erroneously exercised its discretion. Werner v. Hendree, 2011 WI 10,
¶59, 331 Wis. 2d 511, 795 N.W.2d 423. A court “erroneously exercises its discretion when it
applies the wrong legal standard or if the facts of record fail to support the … court’s decision.”
Id.
In determining whether the circuit court properly entered a default judgment or denied
Reppert’s motion to reopen the judgment, we are mindful to balance the law’s disfavor of default
judgments and its preference, whenever reasonably possible, to afford litigants a day in court.
See Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins., 109 Wis. 2d 461, 469, 326 N.W.2d 727 (1982). However, Reppert
gives us no basis to reverse the court’s rulings.
Reppert’s appeal fails because he has not provided this court, in his initial appellant’s
brief, with any developed explanation for why the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion by entering a default judgment or refusing to reopen the judgment. An appellant bears
the burden to demonstrate that the court erred. Gaethke v. Pozder, 2017 WI App 38, ¶36, 376
Wis. 2d 448, 899 N.W.2d 381. Pro se litigants, such as Reppert, are not immune to this burden,

No. 2024AP851
5
and they must still reasonably abide by the same rules required of attorneys. See Waushara
County v. Graf, 166 Wis. 2d 442, 452, 480 N.W.2d 16 (1992).
Generally, “[w]e will not address undeveloped arguments,” Clean Wis., Inc. v. PSC,
2005 WI 93, ¶180 n.40, 282 Wis. 2d 250, 700 N.W.2d 768, and we cannot properly serve as both
advocate and judge, State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 647, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).
Thus, it is inappropriate for us to “abandon our neutrality to develop arguments” for Reppert.
See Industrial Risk Insurers v. American Eng’g Testing, Inc., 2009 WI App 62, ¶25, 318
Wis. 2d 148, 769 N.W.2d 82. Moreover, we decline to consider the arguments Reppert raises for
the first time in his reply brief that could have, and should have, been first raised in his initial
brief. See State v. Chu, 2002 WI App 98, ¶42 n.5, 253 Wis. 2d 666, 643 N.W.2d 878 (noting
that we will generally not address issues raised for the first time in a reply brief).
As noted above, Reppert first argues that the circuit court’s entry of default judgment was
inconsistent with existing case law and state statutes. Reppert, however, fails to adequately cite
to the record or develop an argument as to why he believes this is the case.3 Reppert next
contends that “[t]he relief of judgment sought met stipulated requirements and the [circuit c]ourt
abused its discretion in refusing to consider whether the defendant had committed an excusable
mistake. The [c]ourt’s ruling [is] devoid of any reason why, and the [c]ourt didn’t apply [a]
correct legal standard to defaulting the Defendant-Appellant.” While Reppert appears to fault
the court for not making factual findings in its order denying his motion to reopen the judgment,
3 We note that Reppert does not challenge the circuit court’s denial of his motion to dismiss filed
earlier in the case, and he did not argue in his initial appellate brief that the notice of the final pretrial
hearing was improperly served on him or that he otherwise did not receive notice of it. In fact, his
argument, both below and on appeal, is that he attempted to attend the hearing, albeit by telephone.

No. 2024AP851
6
he fails to acknowledge that, in the absence of factual findings from the court, we “may search
the record to determine if it supports the court’s discretionary decision.”4 Randall v. Randall,
2000 WI App 98, ¶7, 235 Wis. 2d 1, 612 N.W.2d 737. Here, the court gave a reason for why it
entered a default judgment and denied Reppert’s motion to reopen the judgment—namely,
Reppert’s failure to appear at the final pretrial conference despite his being pro se, as the pretrial
hearing notice clearly stated that he was required to do so. By failing to address and refute the
court’s reasoning, Reppert has not explained why, under governing law, the court erroneously
exercised its discretion by entering the judgment and by denying his motion. Reppert
additionally fails to explain the significance of his cited authority and connect it to the facts of
his case.
Reppert fails to develop any argument in support of his claims that the circuit court
erroneously exercised its discretion by entering the default judgment or refusing to reopen the
judgment. Because Reppert failed to satisfy his burden in presenting his reasoning in his initial
brief, we must reject his argument.
Upon the foregoing,
4 In our review of the record to support the circuit court’s exercise of discretion, see Randall v.
Randall, 2000 WI App 98, ¶7, 235 Wis. 2d 1, 612 N.W.2d 737, we note some key discrepancies between
Reppert’s circuit court filings and his appellate briefs. In a letter attached to his motion to reopen the
judgment, Reppert asserts that he was affirmatively informed by the ADA and by the court’s JA that he
could attend the final pretrial hearing by telephone. Reppert does not mention in his reply brief being
permitted by the ADA or JA to appear at the final pretrial hearing by telephone. Rather, Reppert suggests
that he merely relied on past practice when he called into the court the day of the hearing. We note,
however, that the notices for the first two pretrial hearings in this matter stated that the case was
scheduled for a “[t]elephone scheduling conference” and that the JA would call the parties by phone.
Conversely, the notice for the final pretrial hearing—for which Reppert failed to appear—did not mention
appearing by telephone, did not state that a JA would call, and specified that Reppert was required to be
in person.

No. 2024AP851
7
IT IS ORDERED that the judgment and order are summarily affirmed pursuant to WIS.
STAT. RULE 809.21.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this summary disposition order will not be published.
Samuel A. Christensen
Clerk of Court of Appeals