State v. Angela Marie Oliver

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WISCONSIN COURT OF APPEALS
110 EAST MAIN STREET, SUITE 215
P.O. BOX 1688
MADISON, WISCONSIN 53701-1688
Telephone (608) 266-1880
TTY: (800) 947-3529
Facsimile (608) 267-0640
Web Site: www.wicourts.gov
DISTRICT I
November 3, 2026
To:
Hon. Jonathan D. Richards
Circuit Court Judge
Electronic Notice
Anna Hodges
Clerk of Circuit Court
Milwaukee County Safety Building
Electronic Notice
John W. Kellis
Electronic Notice
Basil M. Loeb
Electronic Notice
You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following opinion and order:
2025AP762-CR State of Wisconsin v. Angela Marie Oliver (L.C. # 2024CF2269)
Before Donald, C.J., Colón, P.J., and Geenen, J.
Summary disposition orders may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or
authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
Angela Marie Oliver appeals a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle
while intoxicated (OWI) as a sixth offense. She also appeals an order denying her motion for
postconviction relief. Oliver seeks sentence modification on two grounds. First, she asserts the
existence of a new factor, namely, a determination by the Department of Corrections (DOC) that
she is not suitable for admission to the Wisconsin substance abuse program (SAP), a prison
treatment program. Second, she asserts that her evenly bifurcated four-year term of
imprisonment is unduly harsh. The circuit court rejected those claims, and Oliver renews them
here. Based upon our review of the briefs and record, we conclude at conference that this case is

No. 2025AP762-CR
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appropriate for summary disposition. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.21 (2023-24).1 We summarily
affirm.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Oliver pled guilty to OWI as a sixth offense. In exchange,
the State agreed to recommend an evenly bifurcated four-year term of imprisonment and an
$1,800 fine.2 Oliver was free to argue for a different sentence. The matter proceeded to
sentencing, where Oliver faced a maximum penalty of 10 years of imprisonment and a $25,000
fine, a presumptive minimum of 18 months of initial confinement, and a mandatory minimum of
1 year of initial confinement. See WIS. STAT. §§ 346.63(1), 346.65(2)(am)5., 939.50(3)(g); State
v. Shirikian, 2023 WI App 13, ¶¶24-27, 406 Wis. 2d 633, 987 N.W.2d 819. Because Oliver had
a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .222 at the time of the offense, she also faced a
mandatory minimum $1,800 fine. See § 346.65(2)(am)5., (2)(g). Oliver asked the circuit court
either to impose the mandatory 1-year minimum term of initial confinement, or, alternatively,
allow her to serve an 18-month term concurrently with the confinement that she was already
serving following revocation of her extended supervision for her fifth OWI conviction. She also
asked the circuit court to find her eligible for SAP.
The circuit court made extensive sentencing remarks before pronouncing sentence. The
circuit court considered the gravity of the offense, finding that Oliver committed her instant sixth
OWI while on extended supervision for her fifth and that her BAC was “high.” The circuit court
found that the crime was further aggravated by the unremitting and repetitive nature of Oliver’s
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
2 The plea agreement also included some charge concessions and provided that the State would
recommend certain limitations on Oliver’s driving privileges.

No. 2025AP762-CR
3
criminal driving behavior, which continued even after she had served a prison term for similar
conduct. The circuit court also noted with concern that Oliver was arrested in a school parking
lot and that when police approached her, she drove her car forward and then in reverse, creating
a risk of harm to the police and to the public.
The circuit court acknowledged that Oliver had a troubled past, had experienced physical
abuse, and that she struggled with an alcohol addiction. The circuit court recognized that she
nonetheless had developed professional skills as a cosmetician and that she provided emotional
support to those around her. Ultimately, however, the circuit court concluded that Oliver’s
recidivism and the risks that her criminal behavior posed to the community required her to serve
a longer term of initial confinement than the presumptive 18-month minimum. Accordingly, the
circuit court imposed the evenly bifurcated four-year term of imprisonment that the State
recommended. The circuit court further concluded that Oliver’s revocation sentence for her fifth
OWI was a “bill [she] needed to pay” and therefore ordered her to serve a consecutive sentence
in this case. The circuit court also imposed the mandatory minimum $1,800 fine and found
Oliver eligible for SAP after serving 18 months of initial confinement.
Oliver moved for sentence modification. She asserted that, although she was eligible for
SAP, the DOC would not admit her to the program because she would not have enough time to
complete it during the 6 months of confinement remaining after she served her first 18 months.
She argued that her inability to participate in SAP constituted a new factor warranting a sentence
modification. Separately, she asserted that her sentence was unduly harsh in light of her
character strengths and her nearly three years of stability between her most recent release from
prison in August 2021, and her arrest in this case in May 2024. The circuit court denied the
motion, and Oliver appeals.

No. 2025AP762-CR
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Oliver first renews her claim that a new factor warrants sentence modification. A new
factor is “a fact or set of facts highly relevant to the imposition of sentence, but not known to the
trial judge at the time of original sentencing, either because it was not then in existence or
because ... it was unknowingly overlooked by all of the parties.” State v. Harbor, 2011 WI 28,
¶40, 333 Wis. 2d 53, 797 N.W.2d 828 (citation omitted). A two-prong analysis governs the
claim. Id., ¶36. The defendant must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that a new
factor exists. Id. This presents a question of law for our de novo review. Id., ¶33. If a new
factor exists, the defendant must demonstrate that it justifies sentence modification. Id., ¶38.
This determination rests in the circuit court’s discretion. Id., ¶33. The defendant must satisfy
both prongs of the analysis to prevail. Id., ¶38.
According to Oliver, her inability to participate in SAP constitutes a new factor. Inmates
who successfully complete that program may obtain early release from initial confinement. State
v. Lynch, 2006 WI App 231, ¶4, 297 Wis. 2d 51, 724 N.W.2d 656; WIS. STAT. § 302.05(3)(c)2.;
but see State v. Gramza, 2020 WI App 81, ¶3, 395 Wis. 2d 215, 952 N.W.2d 836 (holding that
an inmate must complete any mandatory minimum term of initial confinement before the person
may be granted early release from the confinement portion of a sentence). A circuit court
determines at sentencing whether a defendant is eligible for SAP and when such eligibility
begins. See WIS. STAT. § 973.01(3g);3 State v. White, 2004 WI App 237, ¶2, 277 Wis. 2d 580,
690 N.W.2d 880. However, the DOC determines whether an otherwise eligible defendant is
suitable for admission to the program. See State ex rel. Treat v. Puckett, 2002 WI App 58, ¶7,
3 The Wisconsin substance abuse program was formerly known as the earned release program.
Effective August 3, 2011, the legislature renamed the program. See 2011 Wis. Act 38, § 19; WIS. STAT.
§ 991.11. Both names remain in use. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 302.05; 973.01(3g).

No. 2025AP762-CR
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252 Wis. 2d 404, 643 N.W.2d 515; WIS. ADMIN CODE § DOC 302.39(3), (4) (Nov. 2024).
Oliver argues that the DOC’s decision to exclude her from SAP constitutes a new factor and
warrants sentence modification.
Oliver fails to satisfy the first prong of the new factor analysis because she does not show
that participation in SAP was “highly relevant” to the imposition of her sentence. We rely on a
sentencing court’s “ʻactual words’” to determine whether an alleged new factor was highly
relevant to the sentencing decision. State v. Carroll, 2012 WI App 83, ¶10, 343 Wis. 2d 509,
819 N.W.2d 343 (citation omitted). Here, the court briefly mentioned SAP twice during
sentencing, once to state that Oliver would be eligible “after serving a period of time,” and again
when the court stated that she would be eligible for SAP “after 18 months of initial
confinement.” These passing mentions did not suggest that participation in SAP was a
significant sentencing consideration, let alone highly relevant to the sentence imposed.
Moreover, a circuit court has an additional opportunity during postconviction
proceedings to clarify its sentencing remarks and to state the factors considered when imposing
sentence. State v. Fuerst, 181 Wis. 2d 903, 915, 512 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1994). In this case,
the circuit court’s postconviction order explicitly clarified that “the court did not factor [Oliver’s]
participation in the substance abuse program into the length of [Oliver’s] initial confinement or
the consecutive designation.” Because participation in SAP was not highly relevant to the
sentence selected, Oliver’s inability to participate is not a new factor within the meaning of
Harbor. Further discussion of this issue is not required. See id., 333 Wis. 2d 53, ¶38.
Oliver next contends that the circuit court erroneously rejected her claim that she
received an unduly harsh sentence. When a circuit court concludes that it imposed a sentence

No. 2025AP762-CR
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that was not unduly harsh, we review that decision for an erroneous exercise of discretion. State
v. Grindemann, 2002 WI App 106, ¶30, 255 Wis. 2d 632, 648 N.W.2d 507. A sentence is
unduly harsh “only where the sentence is so excessive and unusual and so disproportionate to the
offense committed as to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable people
concerning what is right and proper under the circumstances.” Id., ¶31 (citation omitted). A
sentence well within the statutory limits, however, is presumptively not unduly harsh. Id., ¶32.
Here, the four-year term of imprisonment that the circuit court imposed was far less than the
maximum ten-year term of imprisonment that Oliver faced. Accordingly, she cannot prevail
unless she overcomes the presumption that her sentence is not unduly harsh.
Oliver argues that her sentence is unduly harsh “due to all of the mitigating factors in the
case,” including the positive aspects of her character and her not-quite-three years of pro-social
conduct following her release from prison in 2021. We reject this argument. A circuit court
exercises its sentencing discretion guided by well-established standards. See State v. Gallion,
2004 WI 42, ¶¶37-38, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197. The circuit court must consider the
mandatory sentencing factors of “the gravity of the offense, the character of the defendant, and
the need to protect the public,” and may also consider a wide range of other factors relating to
the defendant, the offense and the community. See State v. Ziegler, 2006 WI App 49, ¶23, 289
Wis. 2d 594, 712 N.W.2d 76. However, the weight to assign to the relevant factors rests in the
circuit court’s discretion, and the circuit court is not required to give mitigating factors
overriding significance. State v. Stenzel, 2004 WI App 181, ¶16, 276 Wis. 2d 224, 688 N.W.2d
20. Thus, in a case such as this one, a circuit court may recognize a defendant’s outstanding
qualities and nonetheless impose a stiff sentence to emphasize the gravity of drunk driving,
which society views as a “scourge” and a “plague.” See id., ¶¶12-13, 15.

No. 2025AP762-CR
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The circuit court’s sentencing remarks here reflect that the circuit court considered the
mandatory sentencing factors along with other appropriate factors that it deemed relevant in
fashioning a sentence for Oliver. Specifically, the circuit court considered the gravity of the
offense, noting Oliver’s elevated BAC, and discussed the risk that Oliver posed to the police and
to the public by driving a car while significantly impaired. The circuit court also recognized that
Oliver had faced substantial obstacles and nonetheless had worked to battle her addiction and to
achieve professional goals. The circuit court found, however, that Oliver’s repetitive, dangerous
behavior behind the wheel required a prison sentence somewhat longer than the presumptive
mandatory minimum because the court did not “have any assurance whatsoever that ... anything
has changed .... [T]here is a protection of the community factor that comes in here.”
The circuit court thus considered proper factors, did not consider any inappropriate
factors, and imposed a sentence well within the maximum permitted by law for a defendant who
has repeatedly committed the same dangerous crime. Accordingly, the circuit court did not
erroneously exercise its discretion by rejecting Oliver’s claim that her sentence was unduly
harsh. See State v. Pal, 2017 WI 44, ¶36, 374 Wis. 2d 759, 893 N.W.2d 848. For all the
foregoing reasons, we affirm.
IT IS ORDERED that the judgment and order are summarily affirmed. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.21.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this summary disposition order will not be published.
Samuel A. Christensen
Clerk of Court of Appeals