State Of Washington, Respondent V. Marty Leshawn Kime, Appellant

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, 	) 	No. 79439-6-I
)
Respondent, 	)
) 	DIVISION ONE
v. 	)
)
MARTY LESHAWN KIME, 	)
) 	UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant. 	)
)
MANN , C.J. — Marty Kime appeals his convictions for murder in the second
degree and two counts of assault in the first degree, arising from a gang-related
shooting that resulted in the death of a one-year-old child. Kime raises several
arguments, including that comments made by a prospective juror tainted the jury panel.
Kime also contends that the trial court erred by: admitting emotional and graphic
evidence; denying two motions for mistrial; prohibiting jurors from considering evidence
for purposes beyond impeachment; denying his motion for a new trial based on
prosecutorial misconduct; denying his motion for a new trial based on a First
Amendment challenge; and admitting ballistics evidence without conducting a Frye

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hearing.1 Kime finally asserts that he should be granted a new trial based on
cumulative error.2 We affirm.
FACTS
The Shooting:
On April 16, 2015, Lisa Lynch was driving home from work. Her partner, Martrice
Grant-Walker, was seated in the front passenger seat and their one-year-old daughter,
Malijha, was in the backseat of the car strapped into a car seat. As Lynch approached
their apartment off Lake Fenwick Road in Kent, she heard gunshots.
Lynch saw a dark car with tinted windows. The passenger window was down,
and Lynch observed two African American males, one “light-skinned” and one “dark-
skinned” in the car. She saw a black handgun pointed out of the passenger seat
window. Grant-Walker grabbed Lynch’s head and told her to duck, then he took the
steering wheel, and ran the car onto the curb. Lynch heard a second round of
gunshots.
The dark car drove away quickly, heading south. Lynch rushed to check on
Malijha and discovered she was bleeding from her right ear. Malijha had been shot in
the head. Lynch pulled Malijha from her car seat and a bystander began CPR. Police
responded and rushed Malijha to Harborview Medical Center. Her parents removed her
from life support two days later.
Dr. Richard Harruff of the King County Medical Examiner’s Office performed
Malijha’s autopsy. Dr. Harruff determined that a bullet went through the car seat, hit
1 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2 Kime also submitted a statement of additional grounds that raises no issue of merit.

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Malijha’s right ear, and went through her skull and brain. Dr. Harruff recovered the
bullet from the left side of Malijha’s scalp.
The Investigation:
Because Grant-Walker had ties to Deuce 8, a gang from Seattle’s Central
District, Kent police believed that the shooting was gang-related. The gangs Deuce 8
and Deuce 0 generally ran together and were considered friendly with each other.
Deuce 8 and Low Profile, another Central District gang, were in ongoing conflict with
one another.
Kent Police detectives collected eight .40 caliber shell casings at the scene of
Malijha’s shooting. A ballistics expert compared firing-pin marks, ejector marks, and
tool marks on the casings. The expert concluded that all of the .40 caliber casings at
the scene came from the same weapon. The expert determined that the rectangular
firing-pin aperture was common to a Glock as well as to a Smith & Wesson Sigma
series from the 1990s. By comparing the “class characteristics” of the casings, which
included “the number of lands and grooves in a barrel, the width of those lands and
grooves . . . [t]he size of the aperture of the firing-pin hole . . . [and the] general shape of
that firing pin,” the expert opined that the casings came from a Smith & Wesson Sigma
series.
Police entered the casings in a national ballistics database to compare them to
casings collected from other crimes. This resulted in two leads. The first database hit
was a tentative match to .40 caliber shell casings left behind in a drive-by shooting on
March 23, 2015, in South Seattle. Witnesses described a Toyota or Lexus sedan
involved in the shooting, but police had no suspects. The second database hit was to a

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shooting in the Central District on April 15, 2015. Police connected this shooting to two
teenagers, Vyshwan Warr and Abdifatah Mohamed, both who were affiliated with Low
Profile. The ballistics expert concluded that the casings from both of these shootings
came from the same gun used in Malijha’s murder.
Warr and Mohamed became persons of interest in Malijha’s murder, prompting
police to investigate their phone records.3 Mohamed told a friend he was going to Kent
the night of the shooting. Mohamed was acting “tougher” and “different” when he
returned that night. At trial, the defense called a witness, Kia Dewberry, who claimed
that Mohamed told her that “I think I shot a baby in the head. We got that nigger. I think
I just shot a kid.”
Dewberry disclosed this conversation with Mohamed to detectives. On cross-
examination, Dewberry acknowledged that she had given police Mohamed’s version of
events, which were inconsistent with the facts. Dewberry testified that Mohamed was in
a white car, three different guns were involved, and Mohamed fired backwards at the
victims as they fled. Dewberry additionally testified that the baby’s father was out of the
car retrieving the child in the car seat, but dropped the child back into the seat when he
heard a shot, after which he crawled under the car to hide.
On April 18, 2015, police learned that a Low Profile member, Jean Paul Mitchell-
Jones, had been shot the day after Malijha’s murder. Mitchell-Jones also became a
person of interest in the case, and police obtained his phone records. Based on the
three persons of interest, police investigated anyone with affiliations to Low Profile.
3 Detectives later concluded that Warr had an alibi on the day of Malijha’s shooting.

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Police explained that because of the connection with the murder weapon on April 15
and the subsequent shooting of a Low Profile member in Kent, they needed to
investigate any Low Profile connections to the case. Mitchell-Jones allegedly later
disclosed to a friend, Heirius Howell, that he was the driver of the car when Malijha was
murdered.
Meanwhile, police attempted to identify the car used by Malijha’s shooter based
on varied witness descriptions of a black sedan. An eyewitness took a photo of the car
fleeing south, but the image only captured an indistinct glimpse of a dark car. The
photo also showed a silver Pontiac behind the fleeing car. Police looked for home
surveillance cameras along Lake Fenwick Road and found one on a residence just
south of the murder scene. The video captured a dark blue car with tinted windows
speeding south on Lake Fenwick Road minutes after the shooting. The next car to pass
was a silver Pontiac. Detectives sent the footage to Harvard Gunderson, a lifelong auto
wrecker, who identified the suspect car as a 2009 to 2014 Chevrolet Cruze.
Police released still images of the dark sedan to the media on May 4, 2015.
Ciara Guiden called her mother Robin Cockerhern, when she recognized the car on the
news. Cockerhern purchased the car for Guiden and Guiden had the windows tinted.
Cockerhern called the police, and identified the car as a dark blue 2014 Chevrolet
Cruze. Detectives seized the Cruze.
Police drove the Cruze past the surveillance camera that captured the fleeing
vehicle after the murder and observed that the vehicles looked very similar on camera.
Police later discovered surveillance video picturing the Cruze nearby while Lynch ran

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errands, and Lynch’s car passing by heading west, followed by the Cruze, less than a
minute before Malijha was shot. Guiden identified the Cruze at trial.
Guiden told police that she had loaned the Cruze to her boyfriend, Marty Kime,
on April 16, 2015, the day of the shooting. She noted that the car was clean and
vacuumed out when Kime returned it to her. Guiden told police that she dropped Kime
off at his cousin’s house on 9015 Canyon Drive in Kent after he borrowed the Cruze on
April 16, 2015. Police focused on Kime after discovering that he was a member of Low
Profile.
In March 2015, John Williams, a Low Profile leader, was shot. Williams was
hospitalized for weeks until he died on March 22, 2015. Kime and Williams were close
friends. Williams was presumed to have been shot by Deuce 8. The police believed
that the primary motive for the murder of Malijha was retribution for Williams’s murder.
On May 15, 2015, police searched 9015 Canyon Drive.4 Detectives recovered
19 cellphones belonging to various people at the residence, which investigators used to
piece together Kime’s whereabouts at the time of the shooting. Detectives also
recovered a box of .40 caliber ammunition in a bedroom and a single round on the
kitchen counter. Firearms experts determined that five of the casings from the murder
scene had the same bunter marks5 as the bullet recovered from the kitchen. Three of
the casings from Malijha’s murder had the same bunter marks as the casings in the box.
The rounds recovered from the April 15, 2015, shooting linked to Warr and Mohammed
had the same bunter marks as the ammunition in the box.
4 The road is named Canyon Drive, but was often referred to as Canyon Road in testimony.
Gwendolyn Mayo, a relation of Williams, lived in the house. Williams sometimes stayed there. Mitchell-
Jones also stayed in the house.
5 Bunter marks are unique marks stamped by the manufacturer.

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On one of the phones seized, officers discovered a photo of Kime in a car,
pointing a handgun with a visible bullet in the chamber into the camera. A firearm
examiner determined the gun most closely resembled a Smith & Wesson Sigma series
handgun, after comparing it to an extensive reference collection. Police ultimately never
recovered the murder weapon.
Phone records showed Kime in the general vicinity of the murder scene during
the day of Malijha’s murder. The police believed that after borrowing Guiden’s car,
Kime retrieved the gun used by Mohamed and Warr. Police based this theory on
messages Kime sent to his brother Isiah Woods.
In September 2015, police arrested a Low Profile member, Lugene Slade, for a
federal gun charge. He agreed to cooperate with police in exchange for leniency.
Slade testified that he met up with Kime to smoke after Malijha’s murder. Although
things seemed normal at first, Slade said “I asked him did he kill the baby. And that’s
when everything changed. He got quiet. He didn’t say anything. More standoffish.
And it was just—it was an awkward silence for a while.” Slade testified that Kime
neither confirmed nor denied his involvement in the shooting.
In December 2015, the lead detective visited Kime at the federal detention center
in SeaTac, where Kime was serving time on a gun charge. The detective informed
Kime that the police were charging him with Malijha’s murder.
David Harrison, an avowed white supremacist skinhead, was serving a six-year
sentence for felony possession of a firearm in that same detention center as Kime in
December 2015. Harrison reached out to his lawyer with information about Kime,
hoping to reduce his sentence and because “it was the right thing to do.” Harrison

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spoke with police in early 2016, soon after Kime was charged. Harrison testified that
after Kime spoke with detectives, he was worried about the shooting, and Kime asked
Harrison about firearms and forensics. Kime asked Harrison if he could be charged if
the police did not have a gun. After Harrison read an article about Malijha’s murder, he
asked Kime about it. Kime said it was an accident. Kime also told Harrison that he was
worried his “little homies” would give him up and that he was nervous because he
signed for a hotel card in the area. Kime said police would not find the gun.
Police questioned Eric Little, a son of Mayo who lived at 9015 Canyon Drive in
2015. In 2015, Little said he did not know anything about Malijha’s murder, only that
there were rumors that Low Profile was involved. However, after Little was charged
with two counts of first degree assault for a drive-by shooting, he decided to testify
against Kime in exchange for a plea deal and spoke with police in May 2018. Little said
that he had gone out looking for Deuce 8 members on March 22, 2015, the day Williams
died. On March 23, 2018, Little was in a friend’s Lexus when someone shot at him,
knocking out the Lexus’s window. Little testified that when he returned home to 9015
Canyon Road, Kime and his friend Vicky Rogers were there, and they said that they had
fired upon Little after mistaking him for someone else. Little’s testimony was consistent
with the facts of the shooting in South Seattle where police first found .40 casings
matching the database results of those found at Malijha’s shooting.
Little said that Kime, Woods, Mohamed, and Warr went to the 9015 Canyon
Drive house on April 15, 2015. Kime showed Little a .40-caliber Smith & Wesson. Little
provided Kime with some .40-caliber rounds. On the day of Malijha’s shooting, Little
testified that he was with Rogers, and that Kime called Rogers. Kime told them that he

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saw an older guy, “Fast”6 from Deuce 8 at Safeway with his family. Kime tried to get
Little to come meet him, but Little said he did not condone attacking someone with their
family present. Little testified that when he returned to 9015 Canyon Drive, Kime was
there and “acting weird.”
In 2018, police found videos shot on Woods’s phone that showed Kime and
Woods driving in Guiden’s car near the Renton CVS where Grant-Walker and Lynch
stopped. In one video, Kime sees someone and asks, “Is that Malcom?” Kime reached
down to the floor beneath the driver’s seat, and Woods replies “no.” Kime said “Oh, I
thought we had him.” In other videos, Kime and Woods rapped along to a song about
“trying to catch a body.”
The Trial:
The State charged Kime with second degree felony murder, and two counts of
first degree assault, all with firearm enhancements. Slade, Harrison, and Little testified
against Kime. The State theorized that Kime drove the car, provided the weapon used
to kill Malijha, and followed Grant-Walker. The State charged Kime through accomplice
liability, and was ultimately unable to identify whether Mohamed, Woods, or someone
else fired the gun and killed Malijha. Kime’s defense focused on blaming Mitchell-Jones
and Mohamed for the murder, and challenging Slade, Harrison, and Little’s credibility.
Defense moved for a new trial on two different grounds, both of which the court denied.
The jury convicted Kime of murder in the second degree and two counts of
assault in the first degree, all with firearm enhancements. The trial court imposed a
sentence of 582 months.
6 Fast is Grant-Walker’s nickname.

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Kime appeals.
ANALYSIS
A. Tainted Jury Panel
Kime argues first that during jury selection a potential juror tainted the jury pool
with negative remarks aimed at Kime and his potential trial defense, thus denying him of
a fair trial. We disagree.
Prospective jurors were given questionnaires concerning their abilities to serve.
One question read: “Is there any other reason you can think of that would make it
difficult for you to be objective in a case involving loss of life?” Juror 19 answered “yes,”
explaining: “I worked in a state prison. All or vertuly [sic] all inmates say ‘I did not do it.”’
Defense counsel requested individual questioning of juror 19 based on this answer,
calling the response “extreme bias.” The trial court denied the request. In general voir
dire, the State discussed the purpose of a jury, and asked “Anybody in this group . . .
have a different opinion about juries; think juries are not the best way to do it?” The
following exchange occurred:
JUROR 19: I think more than likely what it is, is two opposing teams
making an argument to a jury of people that they don’t have no idea what
they are interested in. They could just take it to the judge. The judge
knows everything about what’s going on here and could make a decision
that is fair. Basically, whoever argues the best wins.
MS. MCCOY: And if you are selected to be a juror, how would you
make sure that your jury gives the Defendant a fair trial?
JUROR 19: I can’t make sure of that.
MS. MCCOY: Why not?
JUROR 19: Because I’m looking at the Defendant, and I can
already see a convicted felon with no alibi.
The State did not follow up.

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The trial court allowed juror 19 to be questioned individually without the
remaining jury panel. Juror 19 opined that Kime would not be in court if he had an alibi.
When the State asked if he could listen to the court’s instructions about not making
assumptions as a juror, juror 19 said “I don’t think I can. I worked too many years in the
State of California for the Department of Corrections, and I’ve seen it so many [sic] that I
don’t think I can make that kind of decision.” The State asked “so do you think that you
can be a fair and impartial jury in this case?” Juror 19 said “I do not.” The court granted
the defense’s subsequent motion to remove juror 19 for cause. Defense counsel did
not voice any concern about juror 19’s statement tainting the panel and did not request
a new venire.
As voir dire continued, juror 43, an African American woman, stressed the
importance of giving Kime a fair trial, “with the intent knowing that he comes to court
innocent until he’s proven guilty.” Juror 43 served on Kime’s jury. The next day, the
State asked if, based on the previous discussions about biases, if jurors could think of a
reason why some communities may not cooperate with police. Juror 53, an African
American man, said “I applaud Juror 43 with her courage yesterday,” while he
discussed growing up in a community with a widespread distrust of police. Juror 53
added:
Yesterday a person said something along the lines of they can’t see
anything but a convicted felon. And in my head or in my opinion, that
goes down a road that I don't think the Court really wants to go. When I
came in here on Tuesday, there was a video about implicit bias. And that
was not only a demonstration of implicit bias, but explicit bias to me.
Juror 53 criticized the court for not speaking up about juror 19’s comment. The State
explained that the court could not comment on remarks made during jury selection, but

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the purpose of such discussions was to make sure Kime got a fair trial. Juror 53 did not
serve on the jury.
During defense’s discussion of burden of proof with the panelist, juror 63 agreed
that it was better to have 100 guilty people go free than convict an innocent person.
Juror 63 served on Kime’s jury. Juror 64 agreed that it should not be easier to convict
people. Juror 64 also served on Kime’s jury. Juror 125, a Puerto Rican individual, said
that the “system is already tainted,” and they did not want to be part of the system
“because I see it’s already stacked against him.” Juror 125 did not serve on Kime’s jury.
We review a trial court’s decision on voir dire for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Davis, 141 Wn.2d 798, 826, 10 P.3d 977 (2000). “Therefore, absent an abuse of
discretion and a showing that the rights of an accused have been substantially
prejudiced, a trial court’s ruling on the scope and content of voir dire will not be
disturbed on appeal.” Davis, 141 Wn.2d at 826.
A defendant is guaranteed the right to a trial by an impartial jury under the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Davis, 141 Wn.2d at
824. In Washington, the right to a jury trial includes the right to an unbiased and
unprejudiced jury. Davis, 141 Wn.2d at 824. Seating an actually biased juror is a
manifest constitutional error requiring reversal. State v. Irby, 187 Wn. App. 183, 197,
347 P.3d 1103 (2015). A party may raise a manifest constitutional error affecting a
constitutional right for the first time on appeal. Irby, 187 Wn. App. at 192. A defendant
establishes a manifest error by demonstrating practical and identifiable consequences
in the trial as a result of the error. State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 935, 155 P.3d 125
(2007).

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In State v. Guevara Diaz, 11 Wn. App. 2d 843, 861, 456 P.3d 869 (2020), this
court reversed based on actual bias when the defendant was charged with rape, and
one of the jurors said she could not be fair to both sides in a case involving sexual
assault or abuse. Although neither the State nor the defense questioned the juror
individually if she could be fair, the juror sat on the jury and deliberated. Guevara Diaz,
11 Wn. App. 2d at 858. This court opined that “the trial court should have addressed
this actual bias by questioning juror 23 or allowing defense counsel to question her
outside the hearing of other jurors.” Guevara Diaz, 11 Wn. App. 2d at 858. The court
held that the record clearly demonstrated that a seated juror exhibited actual bias and
“nothing occurred during voir dire to provide any assurance of her impartiality.”
Guevara Diaz, 11 Wn. App. 2d at 861.
Guevara Diaz is distinguishable from this case because juror 19 did not serve on
Kime’s jury. Had juror 19 participated in convicting Kime, this comment could have
served as an example of actual bias. However, Kime’s argument centers on these
comments tainting the entire panel of potential jurors.
Because Kime raises the issue of juror 19’s comments tainting the jury for the
first time on appeal, he must demonstrate that these comments resulted in a manifest
constitutional error. Kime is unable to meet this burden. Indeed, the record
demonstrates the opposite. The other potential jurors used Juror 19’s comments as a
tool to discuss the importance of setting aside biases and ensuring that Kime received a
fair trial. The record demonstrates that the other jury panelists did not accept juror 19’s
statement as truthful, or as proof of Kime’s guilt, but rather used this dialogue as a way
to ensure that biased jurors did not convict Kime. Kime is unable to demonstrate that a

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biased juror actually deliberated in his case, or that juror 19’s comments tainted the
panel.
Kime’s argues that the trial judge should have conducted the rest of juror 19’s
questioning individually after reading juror 19’s initial survey. However, the trial court
has considerable discretion in conducting voir dire. State v. Munzanreder, 199 Wn.
App. 162, 175, 398 P.3d 1160 (2017). Kime has not demonstrated that the trial court
abused its discretion by questioning juror 19 in general voir dire after the response to
the survey.
B. Admission of Evidence
Kime next contends that admission of irrelevant, inflammatory, and improperly
prejudicial evidence denied him a fair trial. We disagree.
We review evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion. State v. Castellanos,
132 Wn.2d 94, 97, 935 P.2d 1353 (1997). Improperly admitted evidence is only
reversible if it results in prejudice. State v. Hatch, 165 Wn. App. 212, 219, 267 P.3d 473
(2011). Prejudice occurs when a reasonable probability exists that the evidence
materially affected the outcome of the trial. Hatch, 165 Wn. App. at 219. The trial court
conducts a balancing test to determine whether the probative value of proffered
evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect under ER 403. Erickson v. Robert F.
Kerr, M.D., P.S., Inc., 125 Wn.2d 183, 191, 883 P.2d 313 (1994). “The trial judge has
wide discretion in balancing the probative value of evidence against its potential
prejudicial impact.” Cole v. Harveyland, LLC, 163 Wn. App. 199, 213, 258 P.3d 70
(2011).

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1. 	Heart Surgeries/Disneyland
During Lynch’s testimony, she testified that Malijha was born with a small heart,
and that she had two open heart surgeries as a baby. Lynch testified that the family
took a trip to Disneyland around Malijha’s first birthday. Defense counsel’s objections to
this line of questioning were overruled.
Kime argues that Malijha’s struggles at birth and celebratory trip were irrelevant
and highly prejudicial, merely serving to arouse an emotional response in the jury. Kime
fails, however, to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the
testimony. The State had the burden to demonstrate that Malijha’s heart condition
played no role in her death. Lynch’s testimony demonstrated that although Malijha was
born with a heart condition, she was well enough to travel before her death.7 The State
later elicited testimony from the medical examiner stating that Malijha’s prior surgeries
and heart condition played no role in her death. If the defense had stipulated to
Malijha’s cause of death, Lynch’s testimony might have proven irrelevant. There was
no such stipulation.
Kime cannot demonstrate that any prejudice outweighed the probative value of
this testimony. Further, Kime cannot demonstrate that this brief line of questioning
materially affected the outcome of the trial.
2. 	Autopsy Photos
The State offered 18 photographs from Malijha’s autopsy. The trial court
carefully considered each offered photograph and asked the State to articulate the
7 The State bears the burden to prove all the essential elements of the crime charged, including
the cause of the victim’s death. See State v. Imokawa, 194 Wn.2d 391, 402, 450 P.3d 159 (2019).
Because the State presents its case first and was required to prove Malijha’s cause of death, this
evidence was potentially relevant.

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relevance of each. The court ultimately admitted 12 photographs. Photos A and B8 are
x-ray images of the bullet in Malijha’s skull. The State explained that these images are
relevant because
the State has to prove manner of death. The State also has to prove
where that bullet came from because that bullet is relevant to the forensic
evidence in the case as far as the type of firearm that the State argues
was used as the murder weapon, having never been recovered.
The court also confirmed that these photographs illustrated the direction of which
way the bullet came from. The court declined to admit pretrial photo C, which
was a full body photograph of Malijha.9
Admitted photo C (pretrial photo F) shows where the medical examiner
recovered the bullet on the left side of Malijha’s forehead. The court declined to admit
pretrial photo E, which pictured Malijha’s face, because pretrial photo F was a closer
view of the same picture and pretrial photo E was “more emotionally disturbing.” While
the State offered four photographs to show the entry wound by Malijha’s right ear, the
court admitted only two, admitted photos D and E.10 Similarly, while the State offered
four photos of Malijha’s opened skull cavity and brain during autopsy, the court limited
them to admitted photos F, G, and H.11 Admitted photo I12 shows the fibrous material
and Styrofoam that was carried into Malijha’s brain by the bullet, corresponding with the
bullet hole on the right ride of her rear-facing car seat. Admitted photos J, K, and L13
8 Pretrial photos A and B.
9 Although the court initially admitted a full body, naked photo of Malijha on the autopsy table, it
later reversed its ruling, concluding that pretrial photo “D is duplicative and cumulative of the other
evidence that I had ordered admissible and has a very significant prejudicial quality to it.”
10 The State offered pretrial photos G through J; the court admitted pretrial photos H and J.
11 The State offered pretrial photos K through N; the court admitted pretrial photos L through N.
12 Pretrial photo O.
13 Pretrial photos P through R.

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depict the bullet recovered from Malijha’s head. The court carefully explained its ruling
in detail:
I am going to allow some but not all of these photographs to be
admitted into evidence. The ones that I am allowing to be admitted I find
have probative value that outweighs their potential prejudicial effect.
In making this decision, I am aware that the State is entitled to
enter probative evidence and that there’s certainly no per se bar of the use
of autopsy or other gruesome photographs, but that the Court needs to be
particularly mindful that the probative value of each one of those
photographs does, in fact, outweigh its prejudicial effect, and that there is
a significant prejudicial effect associated with photographs of the
deceased in this case. In this case the deceased was a one-year-old
baby, and the prejudicial effect is significant.
The first two photographs, A and B, of State’s proposed
Exhibit 20 I will admit. They are both X-rays. They show from two
separate angles the entrance point into the skull of the baby. Neither of
them is terribly gruesome in nature. The prejudicial effect is fairly limited.
They are highly probative in that they show the entrance wound.
And it is the Court’s understanding based on the pretrial
argument of both parties that there will be significant dispute and
argument at this trial over the angle and trajectory of the shootings and
what inferences the trier of fact should draw from those forensics in terms
of who would or would not have had a believable or likely vantage point to
have committed the shootings.
Exhibit C or subsection C to Exhibit 20 is a photograph of Malijha
that the Court is excluding. It is almost duplicative to D. The only
difference is that in C the baby is clothed and in D the baby is not clothed.
Her wounds are covered in C, they are uncovered in D. The Court finds
that the cumulative nature of the photos renders one of them unnecessary
and ultimately prejudicial, but the one where she is not clothed the Court
finds is admissible in order to show the two separate injuries that she
sustained to two separate places on her head, which, again, is relevant to
the State’s proof—or not proof, but the State’s theory as to both the
different volleys of bullets and the different vantage points of shooter or
shooters.
The Court is similarly excluding E, which is a close-up photo of the
baby’s face, but is allowing F. In making those—in that decision, the
Court is excluding E, but admitting F, because they both show the same
graze wound to Malijha’s forehead. E shows her entire face, and it is a
more prejudicial photograph. As a result, F is a more clinical photograph
showing her face only from the bridge of her nose to the crown of her
head and focuses more exclusively on the nature of her injury.

No. 79439-6-I/18
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Photograph number 4 is a close-up of the baby’s ear, and it is
almost entirely duplicative of photograph H. H is a slightly more close-up
shot of the same injury. The Court is allowing H and J because they show
both the initial entrance point of the penetrating—of the bullet, the
penetrating bullet, I should say, there’s two bullet injuries, as well as the
place where the bullet actually penetrated the skull. The Court is
excluding G and I because they are largely duplicative of H and J.
. . . .
Exhibits O, P, Q, and R, have very limited prejudicial effect.
They’re the cotton stuffing from the car seat and the bullet. The Court
finds that they are probative and have very little prejudicial value.
The photos were admitted during the testimony of medical examiner Dr. Harruff.
Kime contends that photos F, G, and H (the overhead shots of Malijha’s skull
cavity) were particularly gruesome. But Kime does not demonstrate that photos F, G,
and H were unduly prejudicial. “Evidence is not rendered inadmissible
under ER 403 just because it may be prejudicial. We note, for example, that accurate
but graphic photographs are admissible even when repulsive or gruesome if their
probative value outweighs their prejudicial effect.” Carson v. Fine, 123 Wn.2d 206, 224,
867 P.2d 610 (1994).
The State offered photos F, G, and H to show the bullet’s trajectory, the brain
injury which resulted, and where the bullet came to rest, all of which were relevant to
proving the manner of death. The court limited the number of photos of the skull cavity
to only those necessary to prove trajectory. This evidence was necessary to prove that
the bullet struck Malijha from her right side, which was the driver’s side of the car, as
she was in a rear-facing car seat, after passing through the car seat. The photographs
match the testimony from eyewitness accounts that the shooter fired from alongside
Lynch’s car.

No. 79439-6-I/19
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The trajectory of the bullet was important because Kime’s defense was to blame
Mohamed for the murder. The photos were necessary to prove that the bullet struck
Malijha from her right side, which was inconsistent with Mohamed’s account of the
shooting because he claimed to fire backwards at the car, and that Grant-Walker had
Malijha out of the car when he shot her. Ultimately, this was a highly emotional trial
involving the death of a baby, and the admission of these photographs did not change
the jury’s outcome. The court conducted an extensive ER 403 balancing test and
carefully weighed each photograph for prejudice. For these reasons, Kime cannot
demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in admitting the photos.
C. Motions for Mistrial
Kime moved for mistrial twice. The first instance was after Lynch positively
identified the shooter’s car, and the second was after Deante May offered surprise
testimony. Kime argues that the court erred by denying both motions for mistrial. We
disagree.
We review the trial court’s denial of a mistrial for abuse of discretion, and we find
abuse only “when no reasonable judge would have reached the same conclusion.”
State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 765, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). The trial court should grant
a mistrial only when the defendant has been so prejudiced that nothing short of a new
trial can ensure that the defendant will be fairly tried. State v. Hopson, 113 Wn.2d 273,
284, 778 P.2d 1014 (1989). “In determining the effect of an irregularity, we examine (1)
its seriousness; (2) whether it involved cumulative evidence; and (3) whether the trial
court properly instructed the jury to disregard it.” Emery, 174 Wn.2d at 765.

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1. 	Lynch Identification
Prior to trial, defense counsel obtained an order limiting Guiden and her mother,
Cockerhern, as the only witnesses who could identify the car in the surveillance video
as the Cruze. During trial, however, Lynch testified that the image of the car released
by police from the surveillance footage was the car that shot at her. The exchange
occurred as follows:
Q: And in that news conference, did the police put out a description of the car?
A. Yes.
Q. I’m sorry. That was—did they put out an image of a car?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you see the image that went out on the media?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you think?
A. That was the car.
The defense moved for a mistrial. The court denied the motion for mistrial, but
instead gave a limiting instructing telling the jury to disregard Lynch’s testimony
identifying the car as the shooter’s car. The court instructed the jury: “You are to
disregard the testimony of Ms. Lynch that Exhibit 17 is an image of the car from which
shots were fired on April 16, 2015. You should not consider that testimony for any
purpose.”
The State then elicited testimony from Lynch that the car looked like the car she
saw on April 16. On cross-examination, Lynch testified that it was her impression that
detectives believed the car belonged to the shooter.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the requested mistrial.
Lynch’s testimony was properly cured through the curative instruction. “A jury is
presumed to follow the court’s instructions and that presumption will prevail until it is

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overcome by a showing otherwise.” Carnation Co. v. Hill, 115 Wn.2d 184, 187, 796
P.2d 416 (1990). Kime cannot overcome the presumption that the curative instruction
was sufficient.
2. 	Deante May Testimony
The State theorized that Kime and Woods were out “hunting” rival gang members
before Malijha’s murder. To support this theory, the State pointed to the video where
Kime thought that he spotted someone named Malcom. The State was unable to
identify the Malcom in the video. There was evidence of two different Malcoms
presented pretrial.14 There was a Deuce 8 Malcom and a Deuce 0 Malcolm, both
described with different attributes and different connections to Kime. The defense
believed that the individual was someone named Malcolm Simon, and that Kime did not
hold any animosity toward him. The defense found and contacted Malcolm Simon. The
defense planned to call Malcolm Simon to testify to dismiss any theories that Kime was
“hunting” Malcolm Simon.
At trial, May, a former member of Low Profile, testified about relations between
the gangs in the area, and said that after Williams’s shooting, Kime asked May to take
him to downtown Seattle to enact revenge. May testified that individuals posted
disrespectful comments about John Williams after he was shot. May specifically
14 During pretrial, the State explained:
We have in our investigation turned up two different Malcolms who are Central District
folks. There’s a Malcolm Beaver that Rhyheem Bellvie talks about, and then there’s a
Malcolm Simon that Detective Wade Jones told us about. We still have some more work
to do to try and figure out if we can pin down a particular identity for somebody who
would be in this area, but there are two Malcolms that we’re aware of who are Central
District-affiliated people.

No. 79439-6-I/22
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identified someone, Malcom, a Deuce 0 member, who said “Fuck John. Fuck LP. Pull
the plug on that bitch-ass nigger.”
Defense did not object to this testimony, but moved for mistrial after the State
completed direct examination, arguing that this testimony about the comment from
Malcolm was a surprise. The court denied the motion, instead allowing defense counsel
to interview May. After interviewing May and learning that there was no evidence that
Kime saw the post, defense counsel again moved for mistrial, which the court again
denied. During cross-examination, May testified that he never saw Malcom or Kime
together, he did not know if Kime knew Malcom, and he did not know if Kime ever saw
or learned about the post.
Malcolm Simon later testified for the defense that he was a friend of Kime and
Williams, and that he did not have a conflict with either of them. He said that he had
only posted good things about Williams on Facebook.
Any issue with May’s testimony was sufficiently cured through cross-examination,
and through Malcolm Simon’s later testimony. The issue of Malcolm, although
contested by the parties, was not a central issue of the case. The significance of the
video where Kime thought he saw someone he called Malcom evidenced that Kime and
Woods were out looking for rival gang members in the area. Although the defense
claimed that the issue of Malcom was significant to the State’s argument about Kime’s
state of mind, the video simply added evidence of Kime’s intent to target rival gang
members. Therefore, the identity of Malcom is ultimately insignificant to the case. The
State demonstrated Kime’s motive through sufficient evidence outside of the Malcolm
video.

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The court properly cured any surprise from May’s testimony by allowing the
defense to interview May and fully cross-examine him after the interview. The defense
acknowledged that this would cure the record. Further, the defense had Malcolm Simon
testify as a witness, resolving any concerns with the Malcom issue. For these reasons,
the trial court properly denied both motions for mistrial.
D. Evidence for Impeachment Purposes Only
Defense witness Heirius Howell was best friends with Mitchell-Jones. Kime
argues that the court erred by limiting Howell’s testimony at trial to be considered for
impeachment purposes only. We disagree.
Based on pretrial interviews, the defense expected Howell to testify that several
months after Malijha’s murder, Mitchell-Jones told Howell that he was the driver in the
shooting. However, Howell initially refused to testify at trial. The defense then
attempted to introduce evidence of interviews between Howell and a defense
investigator in which Howell said that Mitchell-Jones told him that he was the driver.
Only one interview was recorded and the other two interviews were memorialized only
by defense notes; none were sworn depositions and the State was not present for any
of the interviews.
Defense counsel wanted to present these interviews to the jury to show that
Mitchell-Jones, not Kime, was driving the car. To make this argument, defense also
pointed to the cellphone records showing Mitchell-Jones in the area of the shooting,
with his phone off during the murder. Defense also highlighted that Mitchell-Jones
called Kime 15 minutes after Malijha’s shooting to potentially demonstrate that they
were not together. Defense argued that because Mitchell-Jones confessed to being the

No. 79439-6-I/24
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driver, and that Kime was not with Mitchell-Jones 15 minutes after the murder, the jury
should conclude that Kime was not involved in Malijha’s murder.
The trial court noted that the defense witness refused to testify, stating “I cannot
conceive of a way that I would provide to the jury the information you’re asking me to
provide to them without commenting on the evidence, nor did you cite any authority.”
The court denied the motion to admit the hearsay statements, stating that “those
statements are not corroborated and the Defense has made no record to suggest that
they are reliably corroborated.”
Howell eventually agreed to testify. At trial, Howell initially denied speaking to
the investigator, and defense counsel used a 2017 interview transcript to impeach him.
Defense counsel then continued to ask Howell about information from the transcript.
This questioning included eliciting substantive information about Mitchell-Jones telling
Howell he was the driver and that the other people in the car were his “little homies.”
After the State’s motion for a limiting instruction, the court instructed the jury that
Howell’s testimony was admitted for impeachment purposes only. Defense did not
object to the instruction.
We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Mohamed, 186 Wn.2d 235, 241, 375 P.3d 1068 (2016). Extrinsic evidence may be
used to impeach a witness with a prior out-of-court statement of material fact that is
inconsistent with their trial testimony. ER 613(b). Hearsay, a statement made by
someone other than the declarant that is offered for the truth of the matter asserted, is
inadmissible absent a recognized exception. ER 801, 802. “Hearsay included within

No. 79439-6-I/25
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hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements
conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules.” ER 805.
Kime cannot demonstrate abuse of discretion because none of the substantive
information from the interview should have been admitted. When Howell denied the
conversation with the investigator, the defense could impeach Howell with the transcript
to confirm that Howell did speak with the investigator only. The court did not err
because the transcript of the interview was hearsay and, more importantly, the
substance of what Mitchell-Jones told Howell was hearsay. There is no exception to the
hearsay rule which would allow the transcript to be admitted as substantive evidence.
Therefore, the transcript was inadmissible for any purposes beyond confirming that
Howell did speak with the investigator. For these reasons, there was no harm because
nothing of substance should have been presented to the jury for any purpose.
E. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Kime next contends that the trial court erred when denying his motion for a new
trial based on prosecutorial misconduct. We disagree.
As discussed above, there was evidence of two different individuals named
Malcom presented at trial. The subject of Malcom also arose during Lugene Slade’s
testimony, where Slade testified that he had seen Kime and Malcolm together. During
closing, the prosecutor argued:
Slade also told you another important thing, and that
is there’s two Malcolms. There’s Malcolm Simon. I’ll talk
about him in a second. There’s also Malcolm Beaver who's
a Deuce 8, not a Deuce 0. And Malcolm Beaver hangs out
at Third and Pine. So there’s another Malcolm.
But, again, Slade’s testimony is just one piece of
evidence. You should not convict the Defendant based on

No. 79439-6-I/26
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Lugene Slade’s testimony alone. You should convict the
Defendant based on all the evidence including Lugene
Slade’s testimony. [15]
This was the first time the jury heard the name of the second Malcolm as Malcolm
Beaver.
The defense did not object during closing argument. Later, defense counsel
moved for a mistrial based on a misstatement of the evidence. The court denied the
motion, finding that any misconduct could have been neutralized with a defense
objection and curative instruction.
A trial judge has broad discretion in granting motions for new trial, and we will not
upset that ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Mohamed, 186 Wn.2d at 240-41. To
demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must prove that the prosecutor’s
conduct was both improper and prejudicial. Emery, 174 Wn.2d at 756. “If the
defendant objected at trial, the defendant must show that the prosecutor’s misconduct
resulted in prejudice that had a substantial likelihood of affecting the jury’s verdict.”
Emery, 174 Wn.2d at 760. If the defendant did not object, any error is waived unless
the prosecutor’s conduct was “so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction could not
have cured the resulting prejudice.” Emery, 174 Wn.2d at 760. The defendant must
show that (1) no curative instruction would have alleviated any prejudicial effect on the
jury and (2) the misconduct resulted in prejudice that had a substantial likelihood of
affecting the jury’s verdict. Emery, 174 Wn.2d at 760-61. “The prosecutor has wide
latitude in closing argument to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and to
15 During pretrial, the State identified Malcolm Beaver as someone the State witness Ryheem
Bellvie would discuss. But the State elected not to call Bellvie as a witness so the name Malcolm Beaver
was never before the jury.

No. 79439-6-I/27
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express such inferences to the jury.” In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647,
716, 101 P.3d 1 (2004).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Although the
judge agreed that this statement was in error, this statement did not rise to the level of
flagrant and ill-intentioned conduct required when the defendant failed to object at trial.
The court explained:
I was deeply impressed by the work of both the State and the
defense was the incredible—the incredibly nuanced and rich
understanding that both parties had of the record. And considering how
factually detailed this case was, it’s actually a little bit amazing to me that
we really had very few of these moments where something that we talked
about in pretrial sort of got leaked over into trial by accident.
I agree, though, it was error. It should not have happened. It was
not permissible. I don’t have any reason to find that it was malevolent in
any way. The fact that there was not an objection at the time is really the
starting point for the Court’s analysis. I don’t find that the error was
flagrant or ill-intentioned, and I do find that it could easily have been
neutralized by a curative instruction, had I been given the opportunity to
do so in real time.
As discussed above, the issue of Malcolm is not dispositive of the outcome of the
case because the State presented sufficient evidence of Kime’s motivation for the
shooting. The mention of the name Malcolm Beaver actually lends credibility to the
defense’s argument that there are two individuals named Malcolm, and that Malcolm
Simon did not have an issue with Kime or Williams.
Kime also contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this
statement made during closing argument. Washington follows the Strickland16 test to
determine if defense counsel was deficient. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant is required to show that: (1) defense counsel’s representation was
16 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

No. 79439-6-I/28
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deficient, falling below an objective standard of reasonableness based on consideration
of all the circumstances; and (2) defense counsel’s deficient representation prejudiced
the defendant. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).
We have a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.
State v. Brett, 126 Wn.2d 136, 198, 892 P.2d 29 (1995). The defendant must show the
absence of a legitimate strategic or tactical reason supporting the challenged conduct
by counsel. State v. Mannering, 150 Wn.2d 277, 286, 75 P.3d 961 (2003).
Kime cannot meet the first prong of the Strickland test. Although defense counsel did
not object, this statement was made during the State’s closing argument. It is rare for
counsel to object during closing argument, therefore choosing not to object is a
legitimate strategy. Further, counsel’s objection could have highlighted the Malcolm
issue and confused jurors. Because defense counsel had a legitimate strategy by not
objecting during closing argument, Kime cannot demonstrate his counsel was
ineffective.
F. First Amendment Challenge
Kime next argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial
based on his First Amendment challenge to the accomplice liability statute and
corresponding pattern jury instruction. We disagree.
The trial court used the State’s proposed jury instruction on accomplice liability:
A person is guilty of a crime if it is committed by the conduct of
another person for which he is legally accountable. A person is legally
accountable for the conduct of another person when he is an accomplice
of such other person in the commission of the crime.
A person is an accomplice in the commission of a crime if, with
knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he
aids another person in committing the crime.

No. 79439-6-I/29
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The word “aid” means all assistance whether given by words, acts,
encouragement, support, or presence. A person who is present at the
scene and ready to assist by his presence is aiding in the commission of
the crime. However, more than mere presence and knowledge of the
criminal activity of another must be shown to establish that a person
present is an accomplice. [17]
(Emphasis added).
Under RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a)(ii), a person is an accomplice to commit a crime if
they act “with knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime,”
and “aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it.” The trial
court also instructed the jury on knowledge:
A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge with respect
to a fact, circumstance or result when he is aware of that fact,
circumstance or result. It is not necessary that the person know that the
fact, circumstance or result is defined by law as being unlawful or an
element of a crime.
If a person has information that would lead a reasonable person in
the same situation to believe that a fact exists, the jury is permitted but not
required to find that he or she acted with knowledge of that fact.
When acting knowingly as to a particular fact is required to
establish an element of a crime, the element is also established if a
person acts intentionally as to that fact.
After the verdict, defense moved for a new trial, arguing that accomplice liability
law and the corresponding jury instruction violated the First Amendment because of the
use of the words “encourage” and “support” in the definition of aid. Defense counsel
argued that using these terms in the definition created the possibility that Kime could be
convicted based on his words alone, specifically, the words from his Facebook posts.18
17 This instruction is identical to WPIC 10.51, except it excluded the language: “A person who is
an accomplice in the commission of a crime is guilty of that crime whether present at the scene or not.”
18 Kime made Facebook posts in which he expressed sorrow for Williams’s death and a desire for
revenge.

No. 79439-6-I/30
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We review a trial court’s denial for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Rodriguez, 146 Wn.2d 260, 269, 45 P.3d 541 (2002). “A law criminalizing speech is
unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment ‘if it sweeps within its
prohibitions constitutionally protected free speech activities.’” State v. Johnston, 156
Wn.2d 355, 363, 127 P.3d 707 (2006) (quoting City of Bellevue v. Lorang, 140 Wn.2d
19, 26, 992 P.2d 496 (2000)).
This court has previously rejected the argument that the accomplice liability
instruction violates the First Amendment. In State v. Coleman, 155 Wn. App. 951, 962,
231 P.3d 212 (2010), we held that the knowledge aspect of accomplice liability requires
the defendant to act knowingly, with specific criminal mens rea. “Therefore, by the
statute’s text, its sweep avoids protected speech activities that are not performed in aid
of a crime and that only consequentially further the crime.” Coleman, 155 Wn. App. at
961. The other divisions of this court have also rejected this First Amendment over-
breadth challenge. See State v. Ferguson, 164 Wn. App. 370, 375, 264 P.3d 575
(2011); State v. Holcomb, 180 Wn. App. 583, 590, 321 P.3d 1288 (2014); State v.
McPherson, 186 Wn. App. 114, 121, 344 P.3d 1283 (2015). While Kime contends that
the Washington Supreme Court has not addressed this argument, the court has
declined to review the opinions affirming the constitutionality of the accomplice liability
statute. See State v. Coleman, 170 Wn.2d 1016, 245 P.3d 772 (2011); State v.
Ferguson, 173 Wn.2d 1035, 277 P.3d 669 (2012); State v. Holcomb, 180 Wn.2d 1029,
331 P.3d 1172 (2014); State v. McPherson, 183 Wn.2d 1012, 352 P.3d 188 (2015).
Because the accomplice liability statute applies only when the accomplice acts
with the knowledge of the specific crime charged, and does not criminalize words alone,

No. 79439-6-I/31
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Kime’s argument fails. We follow our previous decisions and reject Kime’s First
Amendment challenge. The trial court thus properly denied the motion for a new trial.
G. Ballistics Identification Analysis and Frye
Kime contends that the expert testimony on ballistic identification evidence was
inadmissible and the trial court should have excluded it. We disagree.
Kime sought a hearing under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir.
1923), to examine the State’s forensic evidence. The defense opposed the ballistics
evidence, arguing that there was no statistical reality to the State’s claim that bullets and
shell casings could be a match. The trial court ruled that no Frye hearing was
necessary because ballistic evidence has been generally accepted for a significant
period of time. The court did not allow the experts to testify to a hundred percent
degree of certainty, and said that defense could address any questions of methods and
certainty under cross examination.
We review the trial court’s decision to hold a Frye hearing de novo. State v.
Pigott, 181 Wn. App. 247, 249, 325 P.3d 247 (2014). Washington courts employ the
“general acceptance” standard set forth in Frye. Pigott, 181 Wn. App. at 249. “Under
Frye, novel scientific evidence is admissible if it is based on a theory or principle that is
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, but not admissible if qualified
experts have significant disputes as to its validity.” Pigott, 181 Wn. App. at 249.
“Evidence not involving new methods of proof or new scientific principles, is not subject
to examination under Frye.” Pigott, 181 Wn. App. at 249.
In State v. DeJesus, 7 Wn. App. 2d 849, 858, 436 P.3d 834 (2019), this court
reviewed a case where a crime analyst examined cartridge casings from the scene of a

No. 79439-6-I/32
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shooting with another cartridge case recovered from the suspect’s home. The analyst
concluded that based on consistent markings from the casings, they were fired from the
same gun. DeJesus, 7 Wn. App. 2d at 858. The appellant argued that there was a
significant dispute among scientists about the validity of toolmark analysis of ballistic
evidence for firearm identification. DeJesus, 7 Wn. App. 2d at 860. The court rejected
this argument, noting that all of DeJesus’s challenges concerned the weight of the
testimony, not its admissibility. DeJesus, 7 Wn. App. 2d at 865. The court held that
“courts from around the country have universally held that toolmark analysis is generally
accepted,” and held that the court did not err in admitting the ballistics evidence.
DeJesus, 7 Wn. App. 2d at 865.
While Kime contends that DeJesus was wrongly decided, the Washington
Supreme Court denied review.19 Because the scientific technique at issue in DeJesus
is identical to the ballistics evidence challenge Kime raises here, we follow the
reasoning in DeJesus, and hold that the court did not err by not holding a Frye hearing
because ballistic evidence is generally accepted. Kime cannot demonstrate the court
abused its discretion by admitting the ballistic evidence.
H. Cumulative Error
Finally, Kime argues that the cumulative impact of multiple errors denied his right
to a fair trial. We disagree.
Under the cumulative error doctrine, the defendant must show that while multiple
errors, when standing alone, are insufficient grounds for reversal, the combined effect of
19 State v. DeJesus, 193 Wn.2d 1024, 448 P.3d 54 (2019).

No. 79439-6-I/33
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these errors requires a new trial. State v. Clark, 187 Wn.2d 641, 649, 389 P.3d 462
(2017).
As discussed in-depth above, none of the issues that Kime raised constituted an
error. Because the trial court did not err, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: