State Of Washington, Respondent V. Randolph W. Wood, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 49425-6-II
Respondent,
v.
RANDOLPH WEBSTER WOOD, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
WORSWICK, P.J. — Randolph Webster Wood appeals his conviction for attempting to
elude a pursuing police vehicle. Wood argues that (1) the trial court erred in admitting an
officer’s testimony regarding a victim’s statements when the officer responded to two 911 calls
from her residence, (2) the trial court erred in admitting a police database photo of Wood, (3) the
trial court abused its discretion in denying Wood’s motion for mistrial, (4) the trial court erred in
giving the jury an instruction regarding expert testimony, (5) the prosecutor committed
misconduct, and (6) the cumulative effect of these alleged errors deprived Wood of a fair trial.
We affirm Wood’s conviction.
FACTS
I. BACKGROUND
On September 25, 2015, Anna Hall’s daughter called 911 to report a domestic violence
incident. Officer Michael Johnson was dispatched to Hall’s residence and responded
approximately 10 minutes after the 911 call was placed. Hall told Officer Johnson that her
boyfriend, Wood, had assaulted her and that he left in an older green vehicle. After Officer
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
February 6, 2018

No. 49425-6-II
2
Johnson’s conversation with Hall, he obtained a police database photo of Wood and searched the
area around Hall’s residence.
Approximately three hours later, Hall called 911 to report that Wood had returned to her
home. Officer Johnson was again dispatched to Hall’s residence. As Officer Johnson neared
Hall’s residence, he recognized a vehicle matching the description of the vehicle Hall had said
Wood was driving. As he passed the vehicle, Officer Johnson recognized Wood as the driver.
Officer Johnson then activated his emergency lights and sirens. A high-speed chase ensued and
the driver later crashed the vehicle into a wooded area. The driver exited the vehicle before
police arrived and was not apprehended at that time. The State subsequently charged Wood with
attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle.1
II. PRETRIAL
Prior to trial, Wood filed a motion in limine to exclude all of Hall’s out-of-court
statements, including the statements made to Officer Johnson after he responded to the first 911
call and Hall’s statements in the second 911 call, as testimonial hearsay. Wood did not object on
relevance grounds or under ER 404(b). The State presented Officer Johnson’s testimony in an
offer of proof.
Officer Johnson testified that he responded to Hall’s residence approximately 10 minutes
after the first 911 call. When he arrived, Hall was crying and “[i]t was obvious that she had just
been in some sort of a fight.” 2 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 158. Hall had red
marks on her forehead and an injury to her lip. Hall told Officer Johnson that Wood assaulted
her, and she provided a description of the vehicle he left in. Hall also told Officer Johnson that
1 RCW 46.61.024(1).

No. 49425-6-II
3
there were prior no-contact orders between her and Wood and that Wood was potentially
watching her home from a nearby apartment complex. Officer Johnson stated that there was
some concern that Wood would return. Officer Johnson also testified that Hall called 911
approximately three hours later to report that Wood had, in fact, returned.
The trial court denied Wood’s motion, ruling:
The Court’s finding that at the time . . . some of the statements that were
made were an excited utterance.
. . . .
So, as a result of that . . . that information is going to be allowed in, and the
Court is finding that it is not barred by Crawford [2] as being testimonial.
It is also provided for . . . the non-hearsay purpose as to why the law
enforcement officers were looking for the defendant.
3 VRP at 195-96.
Wood also filed a motion in limine to exclude admission of the recordings of the two 911
calls. The State agreed that it would not introduce the content of the 911 calls, and the trial court
granted Wood’s motion in limine.
Also during the pretrial hearing, Wood objected to the admission of the police database
photograph of Wood that Officer Johnson obtained as a result of his conversation with Hall and
any testimony about the photograph. The trial court denied Wood’s motion, determining that the
photograph was obtained pursuant to an excited utterance and that testimony about the
photograph would be admitted only to show why Officer Johnson attempted to stop Wood.
III. TRIAL
During her opening statement, the prosecutor said:
2 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).

No. 49425-6-II
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At the time that the Lakewood police arrived that night, the first call, the
defendant had already left the scene. Ms. Hall reported he had already left the
scene. . . . So they had no contact with him at that time.
Officers then were called back to the scene in the early morning hours . . . .
And Officer Johnson again responded. Ms. Hall had called to indicate that the
defendant had returned.
3 VRP at 203-04. Wood moved for mistrial, arguing that the prosecutor’s reference to the
second 911 call violated an order in limine, and the statements made during the second 911 call
were inadmissible hearsay. The trial court denied Wood’s motion.
Hall did not testify at trial. Officer Johnson testified that he was dispatched to Hall’s
residence to respond to a call about a misdemeanor incident. Officer Johnson stated that when
he responded to her residence, Hall identified Wood and said that he left in an older green
vehicle. Officer Johnson testified that he located a photograph of Wood in a police database
after his conversation with Hall. The trial court admitted the photograph into evidence.
Officer Johnson also testified that he received a call notifying him that Wood had
returned to Hall’s residence. Officer Johnson located a vehicle matching Hall’s description,
identified Wood as the driver of the car, and activated his lights and sirens. Sergeant Matt
Brown testified to the above facts regarding law enforcement’s pursuit of the older green vehicle.
Before closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury:
Certain evidence has been admitted in this case for only a limited purpose.
This evidence consists of witness testimony regarding statements made by Anna
Hall and may be considered by you only for the purpose of understanding why law
enforcement officers were called . . . and were provided the name Randolph Wood.
You may not consider it for any other purpose.
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 44. The trial court also provided an expert witness instruction over
Wood’s objection. That instruction stated:

No. 49425-6-II
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A witness who has special training, education, or experience may be
allowed to express an opinion in addition to giving testimony as to facts.
You are not, however, required to accept his or her opinion. To determine
the credibility and weight to be given to this type of evidence, you may consider,
among other things, the education, training, experience, knowledge, and ability of
the witness. You may also consider the reasons given for the opinion and the
sources of his or her information, as well as considering the factors already given
to you for evaluating the testimony of any another witness.
CP at 51.
During closing argument, the prosecutor provided that the officers were “trained
observers . . . . These are not lay witnesses where they glance at a car going by and they’re in an
emotional state.” 5 VRP at 386. The prosecutor also noted: “You can also reasonably infer from
the evidence that the defendant knew that the police were behind him to arrest him on a
misdemeanor charge, and that was the reason that he was trying to flee from the police.” 5 VRP
at 350. Wood objected, arguing that the prosecutor’s remarks went beyond the scope of the
court’s limiting instruction. The trial court denied Wood’s objection. Later, the prosecutor
provided:
You know just that [the reason the police were called was for] a
misdemeanor. It doesn’t matter what it was. You’re only to use the information
about the fact that the officers had a basis to arrest him on the misdemeanor to
provide context as to why the officers responded that night to [Hall’s residence]
and were looking for the defendant . . . . You cannot use that information for any
other reason.
5 VRP at 360.
The jury returned its verdict finding Wood guilty of attempting to elude a pursuing police
vehicle. Wood appeals.

No. 49425-6-II
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ANALYSIS
I. ADMISSION OF HALL’S STATEMENTS TO POLICE
Wood argues that the trial court erred in admitting Officer Johnson’s testimony regarding
Hall’s statements when he responded to the 911 calls because Hall’s statements violated Wood’s
right to confrontation, were irrelevant, and were improper character evidence.3 We hold that
evidence of Hall’s statements did not violate Wood’s right to confrontation and further hold that
Wood failed to preserve his remaining arguments.
A. Testimonial Evidence
First, Wood argues that the trial court erred in admitting Officer Johnson’s testimony
regarding Hall’s statements when he responded to Hall’s 911 calls because her statements
violated Wood’s right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. We disagree.
We review de novo an alleged violation of a defendant’s right to confront witnesses.
State v. Koslowski, 166 Wn.2d 409, 417, 209 P.3d 479 (2009). The confrontation clause “bars
‘admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was
unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.’”
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) (quoting Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004)). However, nontestimonial statements
3 Wood also argues that the trial court erred in admitting Officer Johnson’s testimony regarding
Hall’s statements because Hall’s statements were inadmissible hearsay and were not subject to a
hearsay exception. Although the trial court ruled that some of Hall’s statements were excited
utterances, Hall’s statements clearly were not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. This
is evidenced by the trial court’s limiting instruction: “. . . witness testimony regarding statements
made by Anna Hall and may be considered by you only for the purpose of understanding why
law enforcement officers were called . . . and were provided the name Randolph Wood. You
may not consider it for any other purpose.” CP at 44. Accordingly, we do not consider Wood’s
argument because Hall’s statements were not admitted as excited utterances.

No. 49425-6-II
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are admissible under the Sixth Amendment subject to only the rules of evidence. State v. Pugh,
167 Wn.2d 825, 831-32, 225 P.3d 892 (2009).
“Where the police are involved in procuring an unconfronted statement, whether the
statement is testimonial depends upon the ‘primary purpose’ for the interrogation during which
the statement was made.” State v. Reed, 168 Wn. App. 553, 562, 278 P.3d 203 (2012) (quoting
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). When the circumstances of a police interrogation objectively show that
there was no ongoing emergency and that the primary purpose of the interrogation was to
establish past events that may be relevant to future criminal prosecution, the product of the
interrogation is necessarily testimonial. Pugh, 167 Wn.2d at 832. On the other hand, statements
are nontestimonial when they were made under circumstances that objectively indicate that the
primary purpose of the interrogation was to enable the police to assist in an ongoing emergency.
167 Wn.2d at 832.
To determine whether the primary purpose of police interrogation was to enable the
police to assist in an ongoing emergency, we consider:
(1) whether the speaker is speaking of events as they are actually occurring or
instead describing past events; (2) whether a reasonable listener would recognize
that the speaker is facing an ongoing emergency; (3) whether the questions and
answers show that the statements were necessary to resolve the present emergency
or instead to learn what had happened in the past; and (4) the level of formality of
the interrogation.
167 Wn.2d at 832. Statements made within minutes of an assault may be properly considered as
statements that are contemporaneous with the events that occurred. State v. Ohlson, 162 Wn.2d
1, 17, 168 P.3d 1273 (2007).
During a pretrial hearing, Officer Johnson testified that he responded to Hall’s residence
approximately 10 minutes after the first 911 call. When he arrived, Officer Johnson saw Hall

No. 49425-6-II
8
crying, observed injuries, and reasoned that “[i]t was obvious that she had just been in some sort
of a fight.” 2 VRP at 158.
Officer Johnson spoke with Hall in her home, and during that conversation, Hall told
Officer Johnson that Wood assaulted her and left in an older green vehicle. Hall also disclosed
that there were prior no-contact orders between her and Wood and that Wood may have been
watching her home from a nearby apartment complex. Officer Johnson testified that he was
concerned that Wood would return. He further testified that Hall called 911 approximately three
hours later to report that Wood did in fact return.
The circumstances of Officer Johnson’s conversation with Hall after the first 911 call
objectively show that the primary purpose of the conversation was to assist Hall in an ongoing
emergency. Officer Johnson’s conversation with Hall was in Hall’s home and appeared
informal. Because Officer Johnson responded within minutes of the 911 call, we consider Hall’s
statements as being made contemporaneously with the assault. Ohlson, 162 Wn.2d at 17. In
addition, a reasonable listener would clearly understand that Hall faced an ongoing emergency.
When Officer Johnson responded, it was clear that Hall had been assaulted. Hall disclosed that
she had previous no-contact orders against Wood, and Officer Johnson noted that there was
concern that Wood would return.
That Hall was facing an ongoing emergency is further evidenced by the fact that Wood
returned to her residence shortly after the assault. Further, questions and answers regarding
Wood’s name and the vehicle he was driving were necessary to locate Wood and to end the
ongoing emergency. As a result, the primary purpose of Officer Johnson’s conversation with
Hall was to assist in an ongoing emergency, and Hall’s statements were nontestimonial.

No. 49425-6-II
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Therefore, the trial court did not violate Wood’s right to confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment by admitting Hall’s statements to Officer Johnson.
Moreover, Hall’s statement during the second 911 call was made for the primary purpose
of obtaining assistance in an ongoing emergency. Hall called 911 when Wood returned to her
home. Given the previous 911 call and assault that evening, a reasonable listener would
understand that Hall was facing a continuing emergency and that her statement was necessary to
obtain help from law enforcement to end the emergency. Accordingly, the primary purpose of
Hall’s statement was to obtain assistance in an ongoing emergency, and her statement was
nontestimonial. Thus, the trial court did not violate Wood’s right to confrontation by admitting
Hall’s statement during the second 911 call.
B. Relevance & Improper Character Evidence
Wood argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting Officer
Johnson’s testimony regarding Hall’s statements when he responded to two 911 calls from her
residence because Hall’s statements were irrelevant and were improper character evidence under
ER 404(b). Generally, we will not review issues raised for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a).
In addition, a party arguing an evidentiary error must assign error on appeal only on the specific
grounds argued at trial. DeHaven v. Gant, 42 Wn. App. 666, 669, 713 P.2d 149 (1986). Wood
failed to object to the admission of Hall’s statements on relevance grounds or under ER 404(b).
Accordingly, we do not review Wood’s arguments that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting irrelevant evidence and improper character evidence under ER 404(b). See State v.
Mason, 160 Wn.2d 910, 931, 162 P.3d 396 (2007).

No. 49425-6-II
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II. ADMISSIBILITY OF PHOTOGRAPH
Wood also argues without authority that the trial court erred in admitting a police
database photo of Wood because admission of the photo was based on Hall’s testimonial hearsay
statements to Officer Johnson. We disagree.
Hall’s statements to Officer Johnson were properly admitted. Because Hall’s statements
to Officer Johnson were admissible, the foundation necessary to admit the photograph was also
admissible. Therefore, admission of the photograph was proper.
III. MISTRIAL
Wood also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Wood’s motion for
mistrial because the prosecutor violated an order in limine during opening argument by referring
to Hall’s second 911 call. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s decision denying a motion for mistrial for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 765, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). A trial court abuses its
discretion when no reasonable judge would have reached the same conclusion. 174 Wn.2d at
765. “The trial court should grant a mistrial only when the defendant has been so prejudiced that
nothing short of a new trial can ensure that the defendant will be fairly tried.” 174 Wn.2d at 765.
To determine the effect of a trial irregularity, we examine (1) its seriousness, (2) whether it
involved cumulative evidence, and (3) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury to
disregard it. 174 Wn.2d at 765.
The trial court denied Wood’s motion in limine to exclude all of Hall’s out-of-court
statements but granted his motion in limine to exclude recordings of the two 911 calls. In her
opening statement, the prosecutor said:

No. 49425-6-II
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At the time that the Lakewood police arrived that night, the first call, the
defendant had already left the scene. Ms. Hall reported he had already left the
scene. . . . So they had no contact with him at that time.
Officers then were called back to the scene in the early morning hours . . . .
And Officer Johnson again responded. Ms. Hall had called to indicate that the
defendant had returned.
3 VRP at 203-04. Based on these comments, Wood moved for mistrial, arguing violation of the
order in limine and inadmissible hearsay. The trial court denied Wood’s motion, reasoning that
the prosecutor’s reference to the second 911 call did not violate the previous order in limine, and
that it provided background information for law enforcement’s involvement.
At the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury:
Certain evidence has been admitted in this case for only a limited purpose.
This evidence consists of witness testimony regarding statements made by Anna
Hall and may be considered by you only for the purpose of understanding why law
enforcement officers were called . . . and were provided the name Randolph Wood.
You may not consider it for any other purpose.
CP at 44.
The prosecutor’s remark that there was a second call where Hall reported that Wood had
returned was inconsequential. The trial court previously ruled that the statement was admissible,
and the prosecutor did not violate an order in limine by referring to the second call. Moreover,
the trial court’s limiting instruction directed the jury to consider Hall’s statements only for the
purpose of understanding why law enforcement was called. This instruction was consistent with
the trial court’s pretrial rulings and helped to eliminate any resulting prejudice. As a result,
Wood cannot show that the prosecutor’s comment during opening argument was so prejudicial
that nothing short of a new trial could ensure that he would be fairly tried. Accordingly, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wood’s motion for mistrial.

No. 49425-6-II
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IV. INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR
Wood also argues that the trial court erred in giving the jury an instruction regarding
expert testimony because the instruction misled the jury in that no expert witnesses testified at
trial. We determine that the expert testimony instruction was erroneous but nevertheless
conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
We review alleged errors of law in jury instructions de novo. State v. Willis, 153 Wn.2d
366, 370, 103 P.3d 1213 (2005). Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to
argue their theories of the case, do not mislead the jury, and properly inform the jury of the
applicable law. 153 Wn.2d at 370. A jury instruction is misleading when an ordinary juror
would interpret the instruction erroneously. See State v. Moultrie, 143 Wn. App. 387, 393-94,
177 P.3d 776 (2008). An erroneous jury instruction that misleads the jury is subject to a
constitutional harmless error analysis. State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 844, 83 P.3d 970
(2004). An erroneous instruction is harmless so long as we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jury verdict would have been the same without the error. 150 Wn.2d at 845.
At trial, only Officer Johnson and Sergeant Brown testified. The State did not offer or
disclose either witness as an expert witness. Despite Wood’s objection, the trial court instructed
the jury:
A witness who has special training, education, or experience may be
allowed to express an opinion in addition to giving testimony as to facts.
You are not, however, required to accept his or her opinion. To determine
the credibility and weight to be given to this type of evidence, you may consider,
among other things, the education, training, experience, knowledge, and ability of
the witness. You may also consider the reasons given for the opinion and the
sources of his or her information, as well as considering the factors already given
to you for evaluating the testimony of any another witness.
CP at 51.

No. 49425-6-II
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During closing argument, the State noted that the officers were “trained observers . . . .
These are not lay witnesses where they glance at a car going by and they’re in an emotional
state.” 5 VRP at 386.
The trial court gave an expert testimony instruction when no witness testified in an expert
capacity. As a result, an ordinary juror may have interpreted the instruction as suggesting that
the two testifying officers were expert witnesses. Accordingly, the trial court’s instruction
misled the jury and was erroneous.
Despite this, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although it is possible that the jurors concluded that the instruction applied to the officers’
testimony, the instruction made clear that it applied only to the officers’ opinions, and not to the
facts they testified to. At trial, Officer Johnson testified to his observations, which allowed him
to identify Wood as the driver of the older green vehicle. In addition, Sergeant Brown testified
to facts that occurred during the high speed chase and his observations regarding the driver’s
physical features. Consequently, neither Officer Johnson nor Sergeant Brown expressed an
opinion at trial. Moreover, the instruction stated that the jury could reject an expert’s opinion
and that each juror must consider an expert’s credibility, as well as the weight to give his or her
testimony, as any other witness. Accordingly, the instruction did not suggest that the officers’
testimony be given more weight and did not impact the jury in assessing the officers’ testimony.
As a result, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Wood’s verdict would have been the
same without the erroneous instruction. Therefore, the trial court’s erroneous jury instruction
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

No. 49425-6-II
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V. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Wood also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by
arguing that the jury could consider evidence of the two 911 calls for more than the trial court
had instructed in its limiting instruction. The State appears to concede that the prosecutor’s
statement was improper. We determine that Wood fails to show that the prosecutor’s statement
was prejudicial.
To establish prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must show first that the prosecutor’s
conduct was improper and second, that the comments were prejudicial. State v. Yates, 161
Wn.2d 714, 774, 168 P.3d 359 (2007). A prosecutor’s improper conduct is prejudicial only
when there is a substantial likelihood that the misconduct affected the jury’s verdict. 161 Wn.2d
at 774. In assessing the prejudicial effect of a prosecutor’s improper statements, we do not
review the statements in isolation and instead place the remarks in the context of the total
argument, the issues in the case, the evidence addressed in argument, and the instructions given
to the jury. 161 Wn.2d at 774.
The trial court instructed the jury:
Certain evidence has been admitted in this case for only a limited purpose.
This evidence consists of witness testimony regarding statements made by Anna
Hall and may be considered by you only for the purpose of understanding why law
enforcement officers were called . . . and were provided the name Randolph Wood.
You may not consider it for any other purpose.
CP at 44.
During closing argument, the prosecutor provided that “[y]ou can also reasonably infer
from the evidence that the defendant knew that the police were behind him to arrest him on a
misdemeanor charge, and that was the reason that he was trying to flee from the police.” 5 VRP

No. 49425-6-II
15
at 350. Wood objected, arguing that the prosecutor’s remarks went beyond the scope of the
court’s limiting instruction. The trial court denied Wood’s objection. The prosecutor continued:
You know just that it’s a misdemeanor. It doesn’t matter what it was.
You’re only to use the information about the fact that the officers had a basis to
arrest him on the misdemeanor to provide context as to why the officers responded
that night to [Hall’s residence] and were looking for the defendant . . . . You cannot
use that information for any other reason.
5 VRP at 360.
The prosecutor’s remark that the jury could infer that Wood knew he was going to be
arrested and attempted to flee as a result suggested to the jury that it could consider Hall’s
statements for purposes other than the purpose of understanding why law enforcement was called
to her residence and provided with Wood’s name. As a result, the prosecutor indicated that the
jury was not bound by the purposes stated in the court’s limiting instruction. Accordingly, the
prosecutor’s remark was improper.
Although the prosecutor improperly suggested that the jury could disregard the trial
court’s limiting instruction, Wood cannot show that there is a substantial likelihood that the
prosecutor’s isolated remark affected the jury’s verdict. The prosecutor later rephrased her
reference to Hall’s statements and clarified the purposes for which the jury could consider the
evidence. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider Hall’s statements
only for purposes of understanding law enforcement’s involvement; we presume that juries
follow the trial court’s instructions. State v. Lamar, 180 Wn.2d 576, 586, 327 P.3d 46 (2014).
Accordingly, Wood fails to show that the prosecutor’s conduct was prejudicial.

No. 49425-6-II
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VI. CUMULATIVE ERROR
Wood also argues that the cumulative effect of these alleged errors deprived him of a fair
trial. We disagree.
The cumulative error doctrine applies when a trial is affected by several errors that
standing alone may not be sufficient to justify reversal but when combined may deny a defendant
a fair trial. State v. Greiff, 141 Wn.2d 910, 929, 10 P.3d 390 (2000). To determine whether
cumulative error requires reversal of a defendant’s conviction, we must consider whether the
totality of circumstances substantially prejudiced the defendant. In re Pers. Restraint of Cross,
180 Wn.2d 664, 690, 327 P.3d 660 (2014). The cumulative error doctrine does not apply when
there are no errors or where the errors are few and have little or no effect on the trial’s outcome.
State v. Weber, 159 Wn.2d 252, 279, 149 P.3d 646 (2006).
As discussed above, Wood identifies only two trial errors—the trial court’s erroneous
expert testimony instruction and the prosecutor’s improper suggestion that the jury could
disregard the trial court’s limiting instruction. Considering these errors together, Wood fails to
show that their combined effect deprived him of a fair trial. The prosecutor’s remark during
closing argument had little to no effect on the outcome of Wood’s trial because it was brief, the
trial court instructed the jury that it could consider Hall’s statements only for purposes of
understanding why law enforcement responded and was given Wood’s name, and the prosecutor
rephrased her improper suggestion. Moreover, the trial court’s erroneous instruction did not
impact the jury’s consideration of the officers’ testimony, and the trial court instructed the jury to
weigh the credibility of witnesses on its own. Accordingly, Wood identifies only two errors that

No. 49425-6-II
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had little to no effect on the outcome of his trial. Thus, the cumulative error doctrine does not
apply.
We affirm Wood’s conviction.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Worswick, P.J.
We concur:
Lee, J.
Melnick, J.