State Of Washington, Respondent V Meagan Greenhaw, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 52519-4-II
Respondent,
v.
MEAGAN ELIZABETH GREENHAW, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
SUTTON, J. — Meagan E. Greenhaw appeals her judgment and sentence for possession of
a controlled substance—methamphetamine. The trial court’s to-convict instruction for the
possession charge did not contain a knowledge element. Following the guilty verdict, the trial
court found that Greenhaw had a chemical dependency which contributed to her crime, and based
on that finding, imposed 12 months of community custody.
Greenhaw argues that (1) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that to find her
guilty, it must find that she knowingly possessed a controlled substance, (2) RCW 69.50.4013
violates due process because it imposes strict liability without a mens rea requirement, and (3) a
remand for resentencing is required for the trial court to amend the community custody supervision
provision of the judgment and sentence.
We hold that (1) the trial court did not err when it failed to include a knowledge element
in the to-convict instruction, (2) RCW 69.50.4013 does not violate due process, and (3) because
Greenhaw is not subject to the Department of Correction’s (DOC’s) supervision, her argument
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
May 12, 2020

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2
regarding community custody supervision is moot. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and
sentence.
FACTS
Meagan Greenhaw was arrested after shoplifting in a Walmart. An asset protection
associate at Walmart stopped Greenhaw and found that Greenhaw had attempted to steal
merchandise from the store.
Chehalis Police Sergeant Mathew McKnight responded to the call and arrested Greenhaw.
Sergeant McKnight searched Greenhaw incident to arrest. While searching her, he discovered a
small baggie in her front right coin pocket with a substance in it, which was later tested and found
to be methamphetamine. Greenhaw told Sergeant McKnight it was methamphetamine, but that
she was holding onto it for her boyfriend. The State charged Greenhaw with one count of
possession of a controlled substance—methamphetamine, and one count of theft in the third
degree.
The State presented testimony from the asset protection associate, Sergeant McKnight, and
the forensic scientist who determined that the substance was methamphetamine. Greenhaw
testified on her own behalf. Greenhaw testified that she told Sergeant McKnight that the substance
was methamphetamine; she thought that it was, but she did not actually know whether it was. She
testified that to definitively know whether it was methamphetamine, she “would have had to try
it.” Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 160. The jury found Greenhaw guilty on both
counts.
At the sentencing hearing, the State requested the trial court find that Greenhaw had a
chemical dependency which contributed to the crime and impose 12 months of community custody

No. 52519-4-II
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in addition to confinement. The trial court agreed, and after finding that Greenhaw had a chemical
dependency, the court sentenced her to a period of confinement plus 12 months of community
supervision.
Approximately one month later, the DOC filed a document titled “Court-Special
Supervision Closure” with the superior court. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 54. In this document, the
DOC stated, “The above cause has been screened and is not eligible for supervision by DOC.
Therefore, DOC has closed supervision interest in this cause.” CP at 54.
Greenhaw appeals the judgment and sentence.
ANALYSIS
I. KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT
Greenhaw argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that to find her
guilty of possession of a controlled substance, it must find that she knowingly possessed a
controlled substance. We disagree and hold that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the
jury on a knowledge element.
Here, the trial court’s to-convict jury instruction stated, in relevant part:
To convict the defendant of the crime of possession of a controlled
substance, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt:
(1) That on or about June 25, 2018, the defendant possessed a controlled substance,
to wit: methamphetamine; and
(2) That this act occurred in the State of Washington.
CP at 20.

No. 52519-4-II
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As we noted in State v. Schmeling, our Supreme Court has twice addressed the issue of
whether RCW 69.50.4013 contains a mens rea element, and in both cases, it has held that “the
legislature deliberately omitted knowledge and intent as elements of the crime and that it would
not imply the existence of those elements.” 191 Wn. App. 795, 801, 365 P.3d 202 (2015) (citing
State v. Bradshaw, 152 Wn.2d 528, 534-38, 98 P.3d 1190 (2004); State v. Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d 373,
380-81, 635 P.2d 435 (1981)). “The court did not express any concerns in either Bradshaw or
Cleppe that allowing a conviction for the possession of a controlled substance without showing
intent or knowledge somehow was improper.” Schmeling, 191 Wn. App. at 801.
We are bound by our Supreme Court’s explicit holding that RCW 69.50.4013 properly has
no mens rea requirement. State v. Hairston, 133 Wn.2d 534, 539, 946 P.2d 397 (1997); State v.
Gore, 101 Wn.2d 481, 486–87, 681 P.2d 227 (1984) (Court of Appeals is bound by decisions of
the Washington Supreme Court). Thus, we hold that under the principles of stare decisis, the trial
court did not err by failing to give a jury instruction that included a knowledge element.
II. RCW 69.50.4013–DUE PROCESS
Greenhaw argues that RCW 69.50.4013 violates due process because it does not require a
mens rea element. We disagree based on principles of stare decisis.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state may
deprive a person of liberty without due process of law. State v. Beaver, 184 Wn.2d 321, 332, 358
P.3d 385 (2015); U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. We review constitutional issues de novo. State v.
Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 67, 77, 428 P.3d 343 (2018). Statutes are presumed constitutional, and the
challenger bears the heavy burden of convincing the court otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt.
Bassett, 192 Wn.2d at 77.

No. 52519-4-II
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In Schmeling, relying on our Supreme Court’s holding in Bradshaw, we rejected the same
argument Greenhaw raises and held that “RCW 69.50.4013 does not violate due process even
though it does not require the State to prove intent or knowledge to convict an offender of
possession of a small amount of a controlled substance.” 191 Wn. App. at 802. We noted that
“[i]n Bradshaw, the defendant argued that the possession statute violated due process because it
criminalized innocent behavior.” Schmeling, 191 Wn. App. at 802 (citing Bradshaw, 152 Wn.2d
at 539). “The [Bradshaw] court summarily rejected the argument without discussion, noting that
the defendant had offered little analysis in support of the argument and had failed to cite any
relevant authority to show how the statute violated substantive due process.” Schmeling, 191 Wn.
App. at 802 (citing Bradshaw, 152 Wn.2d at 539). Thus, we adhere to this reasoning, and hold
that RCW 69.50.4013 does not violate due process.
III. COMMUNITY CUSTODY SUPERVISION
Greenhaw argues that a remand is required for resentencing because the trial court erred
by improperly finding that she had a chemical dependency which contributed to the crime and
ordering 12 months of community supervision. Because Greenhaw is not under supervision by
the DOC, we hold that this argument is moot.
An appeal is moot if we lack the ability to provide an effective remedy. State v. Hunley,
175 Wn.2d 901, 907, 287 P.3d 584 (2012). And a challenge to a sentence becomes moot if the
defendant has already served that sentence. Hunley, 175 Wn.2d at 907.
Here, there is no effective remedy this court can provide. The trial court imposed a term
of confinement, plus 12 months of community custody supervision. One month later, the DOC
notified the superior court that the case was not eligible for the DOC supervision, and DOC closed

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the case. Greenhaw has since been released from custody for well over one year, and she was
never under the DOC’s supervision. Because we can provide no effective remedy, Greenhaw’s
argument related to community custody supervision is moot.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment and sentence.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
SUTTON, J.
We concur:
LEE, C.J.
WORSWICK, J.