Philip D. Mckibben, Et Al., Res. V. Leroy Christiansen, Et Al., Pets.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
PHILIP D. McKIBBEN, individually and for
and on behalf of LLC EVERETT I, a
Washington limited liability company, and
P.D. & M.K., LLC, a Washington limited
liability company,
Respondent,
v.
LEROY CHRISTIANSEN and JUDY
CHRISTIANSEN, husband and wife and
the marital community composed thereof;
STEVEN M. FUESTON and JANE DOE
FUESTON, husband and wife and the
marital community composed thereof; and
DAVID C. EBERT and MICHELLE
EBERT, husband and wife and the marital
community composed thereof,
Petitioners,
FRANK COLACURCIO, JR. and JANE
DOE COLACURCIO, husband and wife
and the marital community composed
thereof,
Defendants.
No. 68316-1-
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: March 18,2013
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Appelwick, J. 	— A trial court has broad discretion to 	manage the discovery
process. When a party objects on the basis that documents requested during discovery
are protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, the trial court
should determine whether a valid privilege exists. 	If so, it should evaluate whether the
party waived the 	privilege or an exception to the privilege exists. 	In making those
determinations, the trial court may, for instance, order the production of a privilege log,
appoint a special master, or conduct in camera review. 	It may not, however, do what

No. 68316-1-1/2
was done here: order disclosure of the allegedly privileged materials and reserve its
ruling on privilege for a later date. 	Such a ruling irreparably frustrates the purposes of
the privileges, because what is seen cannot become unseen. 	In other words, "it is not
an easy task to unring a bell." 	State v. Rader. 62 Or. 37, 40, 124 P. 195 (1912). We
reverse and remand for the trial court to exercise its discretion and rule on the asserted
privileges prior to ordering any disclosure of the challenged materials.
WE CONCUR: