* In Re Dependency Of: C.E.C.L.

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Dependency of:
C.E.C.L.,
a Minor Child.
No. 85591-3-I
DIVISION ONE
PUBLISHED OPINION
DÍAZ, J. — C.E.C.L. is a child whose father’s parental rights were terminated.
As there was also no remaining parent with parental rights, six months later, the
trial court appointed counsel for C.E.C.L. at state expense pursuant to RCW
13.34.212. 	Last year, this court reversed the order of termination, thus restoring
the father’s rights. 	At issue is whether RCW 13.34.212 requires the State to
continue to fund counsel for C.E.C.L. in this specific circumstance. We hold that
that statute does not require the State to so fund counsel, and reverse and remand
this matter to the trial court to vacate its order requiring the Office of Civil Legal Aid
(OCLA) to continue to fund C.E.C.L.’s counsel.
I. 	BACKGROUND
For reasons fully explained in our prior order, the superior court terminated
C.E.C.L.’s father’s parental rights on February 7, 2022. 	In Re The Welfare Of
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No. 85591-3-I/2
2
C.E.C.L., No. 84156-4-I, slip op. at 2 (Wash. Ct. App. April 10, 2023) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/841564.pdf. On August 9, 2022, the court
appointed Dana Halbert (an attorney funded through OCLA) at public expense to
represent C.E.C.L.’s interests, pursuant to RCW 13.34.212(1)(a), which requires
the court to appoint such an attorney when a parent’s rights were terminated and
when there is no parent with parental rights.
In April 2023, this court reversed the order of termination of C.E.C.L.’s
father’s rights. C.E.C.L., No. 84156-4-I, slip op. at 1.
At some point thereafter, attorney Halbert reported to the court that OCLA
notified her that OCLA would no longer pay the costs of her representation. 	In
June 2023, the superior court ordered that OCLA continue to pay for Halbert’s
representation of C.E.C.L. at state expense, finding that “[n]othing in the statute or
this Court’s order suggests that an appointment under RCW 13.34.212(1) would
end if the termination of parental rights were overturned or allows the State (via
OCLA) to cease paying for the representation should that occur.” 	The court
ordered OCLA to be notified of this decision and permitted its attorneys to explain
why it may disagree with the decision at a scheduled hearing.
In July 2023, OCLA moved to intervene and requested reconsideration.
The 	trial 	court 	allowed 	partial 	intervention, 	but 	denied 	the 	motion 	for
reconsideration.
As part of the court’s reasoning, it explained:
I think it’s a fair reading of the statute that you could represent
[C.E.C.L.] in an appellate proceeding in the termination case on this
issue because it doesn’t relate to the termination of the parent-child
relationship . . . and so the OCLA’s determination that funding Ms.
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No. 85591-3-I/3
3
Halbert’s appointment would be contrary to the appropriation of the
legislature just isn’t true. 	The legislature told OCLA to fund these
sorts of appointments, which OCLA has done up until the rights were
reinstated for the dad. 	And there -- and nothing in the statute
suggests that continuing to fund it would violate the appropriation of
the legislature.
OCLA petitioned for discretionary review, which we granted.
II. 	ANALYSIS
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Woods v. Seattle’s
Union Gospel Mission, 197 Wn.2d 231, 238, 481 P.3d 1060 (2021). “Our primary
objective in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s
intent as manifested by the statute’s language.” Id.
“Generally, when the meaning of a statute is ‘plain on its face,’ a court must
give effect to that meaning.” In Matter of Dependency of D.L.B., 186 Wn.2d 103,
116, 376 P.3d 1099 (2016) (quoting State v. Ervin, 169 Wn.2d 815, 820, 239 P.3d
354 (2010)). 	“To discern a statute’s plain meaning, we consider the text of the
provision in question, taking into account the statutory scheme as a whole.” Matter
of W.W.S., 14 Wn. App. 2d 342, 358, 469 P.3d 1190 (2020) (citing Dep’t of Ecology
v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wn.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)).
“Statutes must be interpreted and construed so that all the language used
is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous.” 	Spokane
County v. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 192 Wn.2d 453, 458, 430 P.3d 655 (2018)
(quoting Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wn.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d
1303 (1996)). 	“[W]e avoid a literal reading if it would result in unlikely, absurd or
strained consequences.” Whatcom County, 128 Wn.2d at 546.
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No. 85591-3-I/4
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OCLA first argues that the plain language of RCW 13.34.212(1) does not
require OCLA to fund continued legal representation of C.E.C.L. when the
conditions required for representation are no longer present, i.e., once this court
reversed C.E.C.L.’s father’s termination. We agree.
Under the statute:
The court shall appoint an attorney for a child in a dependency
proceeding six months after granting a petition to terminate the
parent and child relationship pursuant to RCW 13.34.180 and when
there is no remaining parent with parental rights.
RCW 13.34.212(1)(a) (emphasis added). 	And RCW 13.34.212(1)(c) states that,
“Subject to availability of amounts appropriated for this specific purpose, the state
shall pay the costs of legal services provided by an attorney appointed pursuant to
(a) of this subsection.” (Emphasis added.)
Additionally:
Legal services provided by an attorney pursuant to (a) of this
subsection do not include representation of the child in any appellate
proceedings relative to the termination of the parent and child
relationship.
RCW 13.34.212(1)(e) (emphasis added).
We must read subsections of (1)(a), (1)(c) and (1)(e) together because,
when discerning the meaning of a statute, we consider the statutory scheme “as a
whole.” 	Matter of W.W.S., 14 Wn. App. 2d at 358. 	In this case, RCW
13.34.212(1)(a) and (c), when read together, identify a “specific” situation for which
OCLA is required to appoint an attorney for a dependent child, namely when six
months have elapsed after the termination of one parent’s rights and when there
is no remaining parent with rights, making the child “legally free.” 	See In re
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No. 85591-3-I/5
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Dependency of K.W., 199 Wn.2d 131, 137 n.2, 504 P.3d 207 (2022) (defining the
shorthand “legally free” as “when no one holds parental rights and the child is
legally free for adoption”) (citing RCW 13.34.210).1 There is nothing in the statute
which contemplates requiring funding in any other situations, other than the
“specific” situation in which a child is “legally free,” i.e., bereft of any parent with
rights over them.
Moreover, subsection (1)(e) makes clear that, even in a situation where a
child is “legally free,” this funding is not open ended or indefinite, namely by
excluding state-funded legal counsel provided for in subsection (1)(a) for appellate
proceedings related to the parent’s termination.
Here, this court reversed the superior court order that terminated C.E.C.L.’s
father’s parental rights, thereby restoring his rights. 	C.E.C.L., No. 84156-4-I, slip
op. at 12. 	Therefore, under a plain language reading, the first condition of RCW
13.34.212(1)(a) was no longer present, i.e., there was no longer an operative order
“granting a petition to terminate the parent and child relationship pursuant to RCW
13.34.180” because the order granting such a petition had been reversed. In turn,
the requirement in subsection (1)(c) to fund this “specific purpose” evaporated as
well. Thus, OCLA no longer was required to fund counsel for C.E.C.L., and a court
order otherwise would contravene the purpose for which the legislature statutorily
1 In considering OCLA’s arguments, the trial court accurately noted that the term
“legally free” is “nowhere in the statute or in any appropriation legislation cited by
OCLA.” 	Respectfully we believe this disagreement is one of semantics. 	The
concept our Supreme Court defined in In re Dependency of K.W. is the same as
the concept here. 	And ultimately it is just a shorthand for a condition that is not
present on the facts here.
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No. 85591-3-I/6
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authorized funding for OCLA attorneys.2
Ultimately, the superior court issued its well-intentioned3 order because it
found that RCW 13.34.212(1) “states only the ‘condition’ for the appointment [of
counsel], and is silent on the ongoing conditions.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 34 (citing
RCW 13.34.212(1)(e) (emphasis added)). 	In particular, it held that the statute,
which excluded funding only for appellate proceedings, “could have similarly
excepted, but did not except, Ms. Halbert’s representation in the ‘dependency
proceedings’ (both actions) upon reversal.” 	Because the legislature did not, the
trial court avers we must presume the absence of such language is intentional.4
2 Furthermore, we agree with OCLA that to require OCLA to fund a dependent
child’s attorney in anything other than these very narrow circumstances could lead
to absurd results. Taken to its logical conclusion, an order such as the one issued
here would require the State to continue to fund any and all legal representation
for the child after an attorney is appointed under RCW 13.34.212(1)(a), with the
sole exception of representation in appellate proceedings related to termination of
the parent-child relationship in (1)(e). 	This interpretation could require OCLA to
fund legal representation in myriad other matters (family law, landlord tenant
disputes, estate matters) in addition to dependency, regardless of whether a
parent’s rights are fully and finally restored. We decline to read the statute in this
way 	because 	we 	presume 	the 	legislature 	did 	not 	intend 	such 	“strained
consequences.” Whatcom County, 128 Wn.2d at 546.
3 The court concluded that it was in C.E.C.L.’s best interest to have the same
counsel continue to represent him because (1) the same attorney represented the
now-3-year-old 	C.E.C.L. 	since 	birth, 	and 	(2) 	discharging 	his 	counsel 	and
appointing another would further delay a future permanency trial. 	Although the
trial court acted to ensure unbroken continuity of service for C.E.C.L., a court’s
well-meaning intent must still be exercised within the bounds of legislatively
granted authority. See, e.g., State v. G.A.H., 133 Wn. App. 567, 580, 137 P.3d 66
(2006) (citing In re Dependency of A.N., 92 Wn. App. 249, 253-54, 973 P.2d 1
(1998)).
4 	Similarly, 	in 	its 	first order, 	the 	court 	held 	that 	there 	is 	nothing in 	RCW
13.34.212(1)(a) that expressly states funding would end, should the order granting
a 	petition 	be 	reversed. 	That 	reading, 	while 	again 	accurate, 	ignores 	the
requirement of subsection (1)(c) that state funding is mandated only for the
“specific” situation in which the conditions in (1)(a) are present. Thus, “when the
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No. 85591-3-I/7
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This argument, while laudably intended for the benefit of the child, fails for
two additional reasons. 	First, only if a statute is ambiguous do courts “resort[] to
[such] principles of statutory construction . . .” 	Taylor v. Burlington N.R.R.
Holdings, Inc., 193 Wn.2d 611, 617, 444 P.3d 606 (2019). Here the plain language
of subsection (1)(c) limits the mandate for state funding to a specific situation, with
two conditions, one of which again vanished upon this court’s earlier ruling.
Second, and somewhat relatedly, the maxim upon which the court’s reasoning
relies (“unius est exclusion alterius”) “is subordinate to the primary rule of statutory
interpretation, which is to follow legislative intent.” O.S.T. ex rel. G.T. v. Regence
BlueShield, 181 Wn.2d 691, 701, 335 P.3d 416 (2014). 	And, “the legislature’s
intent [is] manifested by the statute’s language.” Woods, 197 Wn.2d at 238.5
In short, the plain language of the statute does not require OCLA to fund
C.E.C.L.’s counsel in this circumstance.
meaning of a statute is ‘plain on its face,’ a court must give effect to that meaning.”
In Matter of Dependency of D.L.B., 186 Wn.2d at 116.
5 At the hearing on OCLA’s motion and in its briefing, both OCLA and the
Department of Children, Youth, and Families represented that county funding for
C.E.C.L.’s counsel was conditionally approved or available respectively. In 2021,
the legislature expanded a child’s right to counsel in dependency proceedings,
including allocating funding by county. The program will be phased in by county,
but such provisions will not be operable in King County until 2027. 	Children's
Representation Program, W ASH. O FF. OF CIV . L EGAL A ID, https://ocla.wa.gov/about-
us/programs/childrens-representation/ 	[https://perma.cc/P9QW-MCLB]. 	That
said, the record does not show any alternate funding for C.E.C.L.’s counsel and,
thus, the only issue before us relates to state funding for C.E.C.L.’s counsel.
Similarly, neither party has filed supplemental briefs regarding funding obtained
since OCLA’s reply, including potentially any funding authorized in the event
C.E.C.L. is again legally free. Thus, we have one and only one live issue before
us.
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No. 85591-3-I/8
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III. 	CONCLUSION
We reverse and remand this matter to the trial court to vacate its order
requiring OCLA to fund C.E.C.L.’s counsel.
WE CONCUR:
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