Maise Qiaomei Chen, Respondent, V. Hung Duy Le Aka Andrew Lee, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
MAISIE QIAOMEI CHEN,
Respondent,
v.
HUNG DUY LE aka ANDREW LE,
Appellant.
No. 86541-2-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HAZELRIGG, 	C.J. 	— 	Andrew 	Le 	appeals 	from 	the 	domestic 	violence
protection order entered by a superior court judge protecting Maisie Chen and their
two children from Le’s coercive control. 	On appeal, Le asserts that substantial
evidence does not support the commissioner’s finding that he engaged in coercive
control. 	Because the undisputed record in this matter reflects that Le’s actions
constituted conduct used to cause another person to suffer psychological or
emotional harm and such actions unreasonably interfered with Chen’s free will and
personal liberty, we disagree and affirm.
FACTS1
Le and Chen began a romantic relationship in 2015. 	They never married.
Beginning in 2019, they lived together in a house in Lynnwood. 	Between 2019
1 The following facts are either undisputed by both parties or, in light of the applicable
standard of review on appeal, are reasonable inferences taken from these undisputed facts in
Chen’s favor as the prevailing party in the trial court. Korst v. McMahon, 136 Wn. App. 202, 206,
148 P.3d 1081 (2006).

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and 2021, Chen gave birth to two girls, each via donor embryos obtained from a
fertility clinic. Chen was the primary caretaker of their children. Notably, while they
were living together in Lynnwood, Chen had a job and Le provided her with an
entry key to that house.
In June 2022, Le decided that Chen and their children would move to his
house in Stanwood. At this time, their youngest daughter was less than 1 year old
and their oldest was no more than 3 years old. After Chen and their children moved
in, Le retained his own entry key but he did not provide one to Chen. 	Le later
stated that “there was not a need for her to have a key at that time,” because he
typically worked from home, “she didn’t have a job at the time,” and they “would go
out together as a family.”2 Le, for his part, did not tell Chen on which days he was
scheduled to work from home and acknowledged that he was sometimes called in
to the office without advance notice. 	Chen stayed at home to take care of their
children and manage the household, including buying groceries and items for the
children.
Sometime after they moved into the Stanwood house Le installed security
cameras in the living room, home office, and basement in order to, according to
him, watch for mice and for use as a “nanny cam, [him] watching [his] babies.” At
one point, he also unilaterally “decided to turn off their [home] internet” in order to
limit their children’s screen time, which also deprived Chen of home internet
access. In addition, he “would store things and keep [his] valuables” in the house’s
locked basement, to which he did not provide Chen access.
2 Le later conceded, “It is true that Ms. Chen should have a key” and “now I see it would
have been a good idea” to have made extra keys.

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Later on, Chen obtained a job and requested that Le make her a copy of
the house key. 	Unlike when he provided her a key to the Lynnwood house, Le
instead attempted to bargain with Chen, telling her that “if she would give [him] me
her car key, [he] would give her the house key,” because, according to Le, “it would
only be fair that [he] should be able to borrow her car periodically.”3 Chen declined
to make him a copy of her car key.
Additionally, Le explained, “I did not see a pressing need to make extra keys
(and when we went out as a family, say for a road trip or misc. errands, I drove my
car with all of us in it and we all returned to the house together).” 	Le later
acknowledged, “I never got around to making a key.”4
In addition, on one evening during the time in question, Chen returned to
the Stanwood house with their children but could not gain entry into the house
because the front door was locked, she did not have an entry key, and Le was
unavailable. She and the children were able to enter the house several hours later
with Le’s assistance upon his arrival. 	On another evening, Chen and Le had an
argument and Le refused to let her into the house. He told her to stay somewhere
else that night and she did.
By late 2023 or early 2024, Chen and Le had an argument that resulted in
Chen saying to Le that if he kicked her out of the house, she would have nowhere
else to go. 	Le responded, “In February, if you’re not out, you’ll see.” 	In the last
week of February, Chen noticed that Le had taken some of their children’s clothing
3 During the time in question, Chen had a car of her own and Le also had at least one car
of his own.
4 He later stated that his failure to make her a copy of the house key “wasn’t to control her;
it was an oversight by a busy person.”

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and locked it away so that she would not have access to it. Also around this time,
Chen noticed that Le had brought home a car steering wheel lock.
Shortly thereafter, on February 28, Chen left the Stanwood residence and
took their two children with her. The next day, Chen filed a petition for a domestic
violence protection order against Le, seeking to protect herself and her children
from him. She included a sworn declaration in support of her petition alleging the
facts as set forth herein, as well as other incidents of controlling and threatening
conduct and statements by Le during the time in question. 	She stated that as a
result of his conduct and statements, she felt that, among other things, she could
not come and go from the house without his permission, he was surveilling her,
she did not have access to certain rooms in the house, and he was preventing her
from fleeing with their children.
Le responded with his own sworn declaration, alleging alternative facts,
conceding the foregoing facts, declining to dispute them, denying that certain other
incidents alleged by Chen occurred, and otherwise denying that he threatened or
controlled Chen by his actions.
In March 2024, following a hearing on the parties’ pleadings and supporting
materials, the court found that “there is a pattern of behavior that was conducted
by [Le] upon [Chen] that would satisfy the statutory definition of coercive control,”
and “the burden of proof ha[d] been met” by Chen. The commissioner granted her
petition and entered a domestic violence protection order against Le. In so doing,
the court indicated that Le’s coercive control over Chen was “the primary basis and
factor for the issuance of this protection order.”

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Le timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
I. 	Substantial Evidence
Le asserts that substantial evidence does not support the commissioner’s
determination that he engaged in coercive control over Chen. We disagree.
In considering such a challenge on appeal, we recently stated as follows:
When an appellant contends that findings of fact do not support the
trial court’s conclusions, we limit our review to determining whether
substantial evidence supports the findings and, if so, whether those
findings support the conclusions of law. 	Nguyen v. City of Seattle,
179 Wn. App. 155, 317 P.3d 518 (2014). 	“Substantial evidence” is
evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded, rational person that
the finding is true. In re Estate of Langeland, 177 Wn. App. 315, 320,
312 P.3d 657 (2013).
Graser v. Olsen, 28 Wn. App. 2d 933, 941-42, 542 P.3d 1013 (2023). In “[a]pplying
this deferential standard, we view all reasonable inferences from the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Korst v. McMahon, 136 Wn. App.
202, 206, 148 P.3d 1081 (2006). 	In so doing, we may affirm a trial court’s
determination on any basis supported by the record. 	In re Marriage of Rideout,
150 Wn.2d 337, 358, 77 P.3d 1174 (2003).
Here, the commissioner determined that Chen had carried her burden of
proof to establish that Le had engaged in domestic violence in the form of coercive
control. 	RCW 7.105.010(9)(a) defines “[d]omestic violence” for the purpose of a
protection order as
[p]hysical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of
physical 	harm, 	bodily 	injury, 	or 	assault; 	nonconsensual 	sexual
conduct or nonconsensual sexual penetration; coercive control;

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unlawful harassment; or stalking of one intimate partner by another
intimate partner.
(Emphasis added.)
RCW 7.105.010(4)(a), in turn, defines “[c]oercive control” as “a pattern
of behavior that is used to cause another to suffer physical, emotional, or
psychological harm, and in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a
person’s free will and personal liberty.” 	This statute further provides that, “[i]n
determining whether the interference is unreasonable, the court shall consider
the context and impact of the pattern of behavior from the perspective of a
similarly situated person.” RCW 7.105.010(4)(a); see also Graser, 28 Wn. App.
2d at 941-42.
We 	conclude 	that 	sufficient 	evidence 	supports 	the 	commissioner’s
determination that Le exercised coercive control over Chen during the time in
question. 	First, the undisputed record reflects that Le’s actions toward Chen
constitute 	conduct 	that 	is 	used 	to 	cause 	another 	to 	suffer 	emotional 	or
psychological harm. 	Indeed, as previously explained, when Chen moved into
Le’s Stanwood house as her primary residence, Le did not provide her an entry
key to that house, rejected her request for such a key, placed and monitored
the video recordings of security cameras inside of the house, including in the
living room, did not keep her apprised of his work schedule, did not provide her
access to the basement of their shared residence, unilaterally turned off the
home internet connection, and locked their children’s clothing away from her.
Given all of that, Le’s actions toward Chen were constraining and controlling. It
logically follows that being so constrained and controlled would result in either

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emotional 	or 	psychological 	harm 	to 	the 	person 	subject 	to 	such 	conduct.
Therefore, the foregoing actions by Le constitute conduct that is used to cause
another 	person 	to 	suffer 	emotional 	or 	psychological 	harm. 	RCW
7.105.010(4)(a).
Second, the undisputed record before the commissioner supports their
conclusion that Le’s conduct, in effect, constituted an unreasonable interference
with Chen’s free will and personal liberty. Notably, by not providing her with an
entry key to her primary residence, by not providing her with clear information
about his work schedule, and by relying on her for primary childcare and
household responsibilities, he significantly limited her ability to come and go
from her primary residence. 	Indeed, it is reasonable to infer that someone in
Chen’s situation, a mother caring for two young children and managing a
household without a key to the home, would be significantly constrained in the
range of decisions available to her on any given day. If she needed to leave the
house, for example, she could presumably either lock the door behind her and
hope that Le returned before her to unlock the door or, in the alternative, she
could leave the door unlocked and risk the safety of her home and her family’s
possessions.
Moreover, the undisputed record in this matter contains two instances in
which Chen not having a key to the Stanwood house significantly limited her:
on one occasion, Le did not allow Chen to enter the house and she had to find
another place to stay for the night, and on another occasion, Chen arrived home
late one night with the children and could not enter the locked house until Le

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later arrived to let them in. Given that, the context and impact of Chen’s pattern
of behavior from the perspective of a similarly situated person—here, a mother
and primary caretaker of two young children partnered with an individual who is
controlling and domineering—further reinforces that Le’s conduct constitutes an
unreasonable interference as set forth in RCW 7.105.010(4)(a).
Taken 	together, 	the 	foregoing 	amply 	supports 	the 	commissioner’s
determination that Le engaged in a pattern of behavior used to cause Chen to
suffer emotional or psychological harm that, in effect, unreasonably interfered
with her free will and personal liberty. Thus, substantial evidence supports the
commissioner’s determination that Le engaged in domestic violence against
Chen in the form of coercive control. Accordingly, Le’s contention fails.5
II. 	Attorney Fees
Chen requests an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to RAP
18.9(a) and RCW 7.105.310(1)(j). However, apart from dedicating a section of
her briefing to a cursory recitation of this authority, Chen does not present any
5 Le nevertheless asserts that substantial evidence does not support the commissioner’s
determination because they did not make a specific finding that Chen was more credible than Le.
However, as discussed herein, we can affirm this matter based on the undisputed record presented
to the commissioner and reasonable inferences therefrom. Korst, 136 Wn. App. at 206.
Le also contends that substantial evidence does not support the commissioner’s
determination 	because, 	according 	to 	Le, 	that 	determination 	was 	based 	solely 	on 	the
commissioner’s finding that Le and Chen had a “past dysfunctional relationship” and there are
“power dynamics” between the parties. 	Although Le correctly points out that commissioner’s
reasoning in this matter is sparse, we may affirm the commissioner’s decision as supported by
substantive evidence based on any evidence in the record before the court. Rideout, 150 Wn.2d
at 358. As explained herein, the record contains such a quantum of evidence. Accordingly, Le has
failed to demonstrate entitlement to relief on this basis.

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analysis or meaningful citation to the record applying this authority to the matter
before us.6 Therefore, we deny her request.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
6 Furthermore, the record reflects (and Chen does not dispute) that the commissioner did
not grant her request for an award of attorney fees presented in her petition in the trial court.