State Of Washington, Respondent V. Coryell Adams, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON
Respondent,
v.
CORYELL LAVOI ADAMS,
Appellant.
No. 68543-1-1
DIVISION ONE 	S 	£°
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: July 8, 2013
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Grosse, J. — Consent is not required where officers conduct an inventory
search of a 	lawfully impounded 	vehicle. 	Opening a car door to obtain the
odometer mileage and insert a key in the ignition preparatory to towing a lawfully
impounded vehicle falls within the parameters of an inventory search and does
not require a warrant. 	Here, the driver was arrested for driving with a suspended
license. The vehicle was parked in an unsafe area and attempts were made to
locate other drivers to move the vehicle before impounding it. 	The trial court did
not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence discovered
when the trooper opened the car door to prepare the car for towing.
On July 1, 2010, Trooper Gregory Marek of the Washington State Patrol
stopped Coryell Adams for lane travel violations on Interstate 5. During a license
check, 	Trooper 	Marek 	discovered 	that 	Adams' 	driver's 	license had 	been
suspended since 2008 for unpaid child support. 	Trooper Marek arrested Adams.
The vehicle had been stopped and parked in a tow zone and presented a threat
to public safety. 	Attempts were made to contact Adams' friends to retrieve the
vehicle but were unsuccessful. 	Trooper Marek then made arrangements for the
car to be towed. 	Trooper Marek opened the driver's side door to obtain the

No. 68543-1-1/2
vehicle's mileage from its odometer and to insert the key in the ignition for the
tow truck operator in accordance with police department policy. 	When Trooper
Marek opened the door to obtain the mileage, he noticed a baggie in the driver's
door panel. 	Based on training and experience, the trooper inferred the white
crystal 	substance 	in 	the 	baggie 	was 	a 	narcotic, 	either 	cocaine 	or 	crystal
methamphetamine. 	He closed the door and had the car towed to the impound lot
where a K-9 dog alerted the police to possible drugs. 	A warrant was obtained
and the search revealed a substance that was later identified as cocaine.
After a jury found Adams guilty of possession of a controlled substance,
cocaine, the court sentenced him to 18 months. 	Adams argues that the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of
his 	car. 	He 	challenges 	the 	court's 	finding that 	the 	trooper's 	actions 	were
reasonable and that there was no search. 	We review a suppression ruling to
determine whether substantial evidence supports the challenged findings of fact,
and 	whether the 	findings of fact 	support the 	conclusions of law, which are
reviewed de novo.1
The trial court's written finding of fact 5 stated:
To 	prepare 	the 	vehicle 	for towing, Trooper 	Marek opened 	the
driver's door to get the vehicle mileage reading and ensure the key
fit the 	ignition. 	These were 	reasonable steps 	of the 	impound
process.
The trial court then concluded:
Trooper Marek's actions in opening the driver's door to get the
mileage and 	prepare 	for the 	tow were 	reasonable, 	legal and
appropriate. This did not constitute a search.
1 State v. Armenta. 134 Wn.2d 1, 9, 948 P.2d 1280 (1997).

No. 68543-1-1/3
The State concedes that the trial court's conclusion that this was not a
search was incorrect. 	Nevertheless, this court can affirm a trial court's denial of a
motion to suppress on any ground supported by the record, even where the trial
court made an erroneous legal conclusion.2
RCW 	46.55.113 	authorizes 	the 	impoundment 	of 	a 	vehicle 	in 	certain
situations. 	RCW 46.55.113(2)(d) authorizes impoundment "[w]henever the driver
of a 	vehicle 	is arrested 	and 	taken 	into 	custody 	by 	a 	police 	officer." 	The
reasonableness of a particular impoundment must be determined from the facts
of each case.3 Here, it is undisputed that removal of the vehicle was necessary
because it was a traffic hazard. 	The trooper explored reasonable alternatives to
impound by attempting to reach someone who could drive the vehicle.4
It is well settled that a police officer may conduct a good faith warrantless
inventory search concomitant with a lawful impound of a vehicle.5 	Moreover, it is
generally 	recognized 	that this ability stems from the 	"community caretaking"
function 	of the 	police, 	and 	is 	wholly 	separate 	from 	criminal 	investigation.6
Trooper Marek's opening the door with the intent to write down the mileage and
insert the ignition key for the tow truck operator falls squarely into the community
caretaking function of an inventory search. 	All of these actions that Trooper
Marek performed were preparatory to an intended inventory search. 	The fact
2State v. Avery. 103 Wn. App. 527, 537, 13 P.3d 226 (2000).
3State v. Greenwav, 15 Wn. App. 216, 219, 547 P.2d 1231 (1976).
4 State v. Hardman, 17 Wn. App. 910, 567 P.2d 238 (1977).
5 State v. Montague. 73 Wn.2d 381, 438 P.2d 571 (1968); State v. Garvin, 166
Wn.2d 	242, 249-50, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009).
6 South Dakota v. Qpperman. 428 U.S. 364, 368, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed 2d
1000(1976).

No. 68543-1-1/4
that the trooper stated that he did not take an inventory is not determinative of
whether an inventory was properly started. 	Trooper Marek was lawfully entering
the vehicle when he discovered the potential narcotics.
Adams does not challenge the State's authority to impound the vehicle.
Nor does he challenge the fact that reasonable attempts were made to find other
drivers before impoundment. 	His challenge appears to be related solely to the
trooper's 	opening 	the 	car door 	preparatory 	to 	the 	car 	being 	towed 	to 	the
impoundment lot. 	Adams argues that the opening of the door was not 	an
inventory search and therefore Trooper Marek's actions were not 	reasonable
because there was no evidence that the tow truck operator needed the key
placed in the ignition and that the impoundment form did not list the mileage from
the odometer.
In State v Tyler,7 our supreme court noted that the Washington State
Patrol was required to take appropriate steps to ready a vehicle for towing once
impoundment is the only reasonable course left. Such steps included the use of
"a uniform impound authorization and inventory form" developed and provided by
the state patrol in accordance with RCW 46.55.075.8 	In Tyler, as here, the
standardized form entitled "Authorization to Tow/Impound and Inventory Record"
required the officer to enter the vehicle's mileage, license plate number, vehicle
identification number, make and model, and style, and whether there was any
damage to the exterior of the vehicle.9 All of those actions necessitated opening
7 No. 87104-3, 2013 WL 2367952 (Wash. May 30, 2013).
8 Tyler, 2013 WL 2367952, at *5.
9Tyler, 2013 WL 2367952, at *5.

No. 68543-1-1/5
the car door. 	Trooper Marek was following 	reasonable police procedures.10
Marek's search was because of the 	impoundment and was not performed to
detect crime, but rather (1) to protect the owner's property while it is in police
custody; 	(2) to 	protect the 	police 	against spurious 	claims 	of lost 	or stolen
property; 	and (3) to protect the police from 	potential danger.11 	Indeed, the
trooper 	withdrew 	when 	he 	noticed 	the 	possible 	contraband 	and 	requested
permission to search the vehicle. Adams refused.12 Adams' refusal is immaterial
because as the Tyler court noted, the police do not need to obtain consent from
the driver to conduct an inventory search even when the driver has specifically
refused such consent.
Trooper Marek lawfully opened the vehicle as a prelude to towing the car
and 	his 	inventory 	was 	conducted 	in 	accordance 	with 	established 	police
department policies and 	procedures. 	The trial court did 	not err in denying
Adams' motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
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WE CONCUR:
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10 See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372, 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739
(1987) 	("reasonable 	police 	regulations 	relating 	to 	inventory 	procedures
administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment").
11 Qpperman, 428 U.S. at 369; Tyler, 2013 WL 2367952, at *5.
12 Seizure of the drugs at the point the trooper discovered them would have been
upheld under a valid inventory search. 	Tyler, 2013 WL 2367952, at *4-5.