Bianca Mcswiggan, Respondent V. Ryan Mcswiggan, Appellant

61138-4Washctapp7 apr 2026

Testo completo

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
BIANCA MCSWIGGAN, No. 61138-4-II
Respondent,
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RYAN MCSWIGGAN,
Appellant.
VELJACIC, C.J. — Ryan McSwiggan appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition to
modify the parenting plan involving his two children, GM and CM, with his former spouse, Bianca
McSwiggan. Ryan1 alleges that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence, not admitting
his offered guardian ad litem (GAL) report, and not entering a new parenting plan after making
adjustments to the original parenting plan. We affirm.
FACTS
I. INITIAL PARENTING PLAN
The parties were married in 2016 and petitioned for dissolution in 2021. They have two
children, GM (age 9) and CM (age 6).
The trial court entered a final parenting plan in 2022. The court designated Ryan as the
primary residential parent with Bianca having one overnight every other week with the children.
1 Because the parties share the same last name, we refer to them by their first names. No disrespect
is intended.
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
April 7, 2026
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2
The limitation on Bianca’s residential time was based on the court’s finding that she “had untreated
mental health conditions that have interfered with her ability to parent.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at
221. The court ordered that after Bianca had been enrolled in counseling for three months, her
time would increase to two overnights every other week. After six months of counseling, her time
would increase to Monday through Friday every other week. The court ordered Bianca to provide
evaluation and compliance reports to the court monthly and that if she did not follow the evaluation
and treatment requirements, her visitation would revert to supervised visits for a few hours on
Saturdays and Sundays. Bianca filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied.
II. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
In December 2022, there was an altercation between the parties. On December 20, Ryan
obtained a temporary restraining order against Bianca. The order restrained both parties from
disturbing the peace of the other and restrained Bianca from assaulting, harassing, or threatening
to use force against Ryan and/or the children.
The trial court noted on the order that Bianca had not filed compliance reports with the
court as required in the parties’ 2022 parenting plan. The court ordered that until the next hearing,
the children would have supervised visits with Bianca two days per week for four hours. Ryan
filed a petition to modify the parties’ parenting plan based on Bianca’s alleged failure to follow
through with treatment. The parties later agreed to dismiss the modification matter.
III. BIANCA’S OBJECTION TO RELOCATION
In June 2023, Ryan was discharged from the Army, which resulted in him moving from
the military base at Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM) to Lacey. In July 2023, Bianca filed an
objection to the relocation. She alleged that Ryan moved with the children without giving her
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proper notice. The court appointed the GAL from the parties’ dissolution proceedings to evaluate
whether relocation was in the children’s best interest.
In the GAL’s April 2024 report, the GAL noted that Bianca reported that she had filed
compliance reports as required under the parties’ parenting plan, but the GAL did not see any in
the file. However, the GAL noted that she reviewed a letter from Bianca’s therapist, Dr. R. Jason
Katzenbach, that stated that Bianca was in compliance with treatment and there “were no concerns
about her mental health.” CP at 193. The GAL ultimately concluded that although Bianca
participated in some counseling, she failed to complete all counseling requirements set forth in the
parties’ parenting plan.
The GAL further noted that Bianca had ongoing difficulties ensuring the children arrived
at school on time. She noted that the school documented numerous tardies.
Regarding relocation, the GAL determined that Ryan, as the primary residential parent,
was entitled to a presumption in favor of relocation and that the move was not a substantial distance
from the prior residence.
The GAL recommended keeping Ryan as the primary residential parent but changing
Bianca’s residential schedule to minimize school-day transportation issues. The GAL proposed
that Bianca have the children “Friday after school until return to school Monday” every other week
to minimize Bianca’s responsibility to arrive at school on time. CP at 211.
The GAL further recommended updated mental health and parental capacity evaluations,
participation in co-parenting counseling and parenting classes, and equal parental access to the
children’s medical, mental health, and school records, along with restrictions against derogatory
comments by either parent.
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The trial court approved the relocation and found the move would not result in a change to
the parenting plan because it was a local move. Neither party appealed this order.
III. RYAN’S PETITION TO MODIFY PARENTING PLAN
In April 2024, Ryan petitioned for modification of the parties’ parenting plan. He
requested a major modification to halt Bianca’s time, arguing the children’s current living situation
with her was harmful to their physical, mental, or emotional health based on Bianca’s alleged
failure to seek treatment for mental illness. He also requested a minor modification based on
Biaca’s alleged failure to comply with the parenting plan.
The trial court found there was adequate cause to set the matter for trial. The matter
proceeded to a bench trial where the parties represented themselves pro se.
At trial, Bianca offered a 2024 letter from her psychologist, Dr. Shamyka Sutton. The letter
was offered twice as both exhibit 1 and exhibit 5. Dr. Sutton’s letter stated that in consulting with
Bianca and Dr. Katzenbach, Bianca has “continued weekly treatment sessions and continued
progression through treatment, while maintaining her stabilized mental health status since my
evaluation with no reported issues or reoccurrence of symptoms.” CP at 35. Dr. Sutton also stated
that she performed a psychological assessment in 2022 of Bianca and it was their opinion that
Bianca “has met the recommendation in the evaluation.” CP at 35. Ryan objected to exhibit 1 as
hearsay and that the exception for medical treatment under ER 803(2)(4) did not apply. The trial
court agreed and excluded exhibit 1.
Binaca also submitted a 2024 summary of treatment from Dr. Katzenbach. Dr. Katzenbach
stated that Bianca participated in therapy from April 2022 until March 2023. He noted that Bianca
reported minimal psychological distress and demonstrated regular use of treatment skills. Dr.
Katzenbach also noted that at a recent follow up with Bianca she “continues to endorse and report
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low levels of psychological distress and continues to demonstrate knowledge and use of the above
previously acquired skills.” Ex. 3. There was no objection to this exhibit.
During trial, Ryan questioned Bianca and directed her to the 2024 GAL report. Ryan stated
that he was referring to “Exhibit 108.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) (Oct. 22, 2024) at 61. The trial court
asked, “Are you offering that report?” RP (Oct. 22, 2024) at 61. Ryan responded, “I am.” RP
(Oct. 22, 2024) at 61. Questioning then continued with Ryan referencing the GAL report. The
record does not show that the exhibit was admitted at this point.
At the conclusion of trial, during its oral findings, the trial court referenced exhibit 5 and
stated that while the court had previously excluded the exhibit (apparently referring to the identical
exhibit 1), it was now admitting it because “this exhibit was relevant to the discussion that was
ongoing as to compliance.”2 RP (Oct. 31, 2024) at 67. The court stated, “I think it’s important to
have this report because there was much talk, both at trial and even the guardian ad litem about
Dr. Sutton and what she was recommending. And also Dr. Katzenbach.” RP (Oct. 31, 2024) at
67-68. The court found that the exhibit met the hearsay exception for statements relating to
Bianca’s treatment and admitted it.
The trial court denied Ryan’s request for a major modification of the parenting plan, finding
that “there has been no substantial change to the situation of the children or the parent who did not
file the Petition.” CP at 113 (emphasis omitted). The court also denied Ryan’s request for a minor
modification, finding “the situation of the children or a parent has not changed substantially.” CP
at 114. Under “Other findings” the court ordered that “[b]oth parents are to ensure the children
arrive at school on time.” CP at 115.
2 Because there is customarily no opportunity to object during a trial court’s ruling on a case, and
Ryan had objected to this report previously, we conclude this error was preserved for appeal.
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Under the section “Other Changes” on the order denying modification, the trial court
ordered that Bianca would have the children from Friday to Tuesday every other week instead of
the originally ordered Monday through Friday every other week. This schedule was very similar
to the schedule recommended in the GAL report. The adjustment was to give Bianca fewer school
days, which the court hoped would result in fewer school tardies. The court found that this
adjustment was necessary “[b]ecause of a substantial change in one parent’s/child’s situation” and
that the change was “in the children’s best interest.” CP at 116.
IV. RYAN’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Ryan moved for reconsideration. He argued, inter alia, that the adjustment to Bianca’s
residential time was a modification of the 2022 parenting plan that the trial court was precluded
from making without a finding that there was a basis for a major or minor modification. The court
denied the motion to reconsider concluding that it was permitted to make adjustments to the
parenting plan. The court reiterated that it adjusted Bianca’s days because it “lessened the number
of days that [Bianca] would be responsible for dropping off the children at school . . . this is in the
children’s best interest.” CP at 177.
Ryan appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. EVIDENTIARY ERROR
Ryan contends that the trial court committed two evidentiary errors: admitting Dr. Sutton’s
2024 letter and excluding the GAL’s 2024 report. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with
Ryan on the first error but disagree on the second.
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A. Dr. Sutton’s Letter
Ryan first argues that the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Sutton’s letter because it was
inadmissible hearsay.
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion.
State v. Jennings, 199 Wn.2d 53, 59, 502 P.3d 1255 (2022). “A trial court abuses its discretion
when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable
reasons.” State v. Lord, 161 Wn.2d 276, 283-84, 165 P.3d 1251 (2007). A trial court also abuses
its discretion if “‘no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.’” Jennings,
199 Wn.2d at 59 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Atsbeha, 142 Wn.2d 904,
914, 16 P.3d 626 (2001)).
“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” ER 801(c). Hearsay
statements are not typically admissible. ER 802
ER 803(a)(4) provides that a statement is excepted from the hearsay rule where it was
“made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or
present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external
source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” The declarant’s motive
must be consistent with promoting treatment and not in anticipation of litigation. See In re the
Welfare of M.R., 200 Wn.2d 363, 379, 518 P.3d 214 (2022).
Here, the statement at issue, Dr. Sutton’s letter, was an out-of-court statement made for the
truth of the matter asserted and therefore hearsay. We are unpersuaded that it was made for the
purpose of treatment. Instead, the letter appears to have been made for purposes of litigation. As
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a result, the letter does not fall under the ER 803(a)(4) exception. Therefore, the trial court abused
its discretion in admitting the letter. Nevertheless, the error was harmless.
We apply a harmless error analysis when a trial court allows inadmissible hearsay. State
v. Templeton, 148 Wn.2d 193, 200, 59 P.3d 632 (2002). A nonconstitutional error “requires
reversal only if there is a reasonable probability that the error materially affected the outcome of
the trial.” State v. Kindell, 181 Wn. App. 844, 853, 326 P.3d 876 (2014).
Here, there is not a reasonable probability that the error materially affected the outcome of
the trial. The inadmissible hearsay was minimal and cumulative of Dr. Katzenbach letter, which
was admitted without objection. Dr. Katzenbach was Bianca’s treatment provider in 2024. Dr.
Sutton discussed in part a 2022 evaluation, so Dr. Sutton’s opinion involved less recent
information. Accordingly, Ryan was not prejudiced by any error in admitting Dr. Sutton’s letter.
B. GAL Report
Ryan next argues that the trial court erred by excluding the 2024 GAL report. But Ryan
does not suggest what the remedy would be for this alleged error.
We will reverse an evidentiary ruling only if it results in prejudice. State v. Neal, 144
Wn.2d 600, 611, 30 P.3d 1255 (2001). Here, while Ryan was questioning Bianca, Ryan directed
her to the GAL report. Ryan stated that he was referring to “Exhibit 108.” RP (Oct. 22, 2024) at
61. The trial court asked, “Are you offering that report?” RP (Oct. 22, 2024) at 61. Ryan
responded, “I am.” RP (Oct. 22, 2024) at 61. The trial court did not expressly admit the exhibit,
but questioning then continued with references to the GAL report. Even assuming the trial court
did not formally admit the report, Ryan does not explain how this affected the outcome of the
proceedings. Without argument regarding any potential prejudice, we decline to address this issue
further.
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II. NEW PARENTING PLAN
Ryan contends the trial court erred by making adjustments to the parties’ parenting plan
without entering a new parenting plan. We disagree.
Under the section “Other Changes” on the order denying modification, the trial court
expressly ordered that Bianca would have the children from Friday to Tuesday every other week
instead of the originally ordered Monday through Friday every other week. Ryan does not assign
error to the basis for this adjustment; rather, he appears to challenge the form of the court’s order.
However, he provides no legal authority for his proposition that a trial court must complete a new
parenting plan form when ruling on an adjustment, rather than memorializing its decision in
another form of order. See RAP 10.3(a)(6) (parties must include argument in support of the issues
presented “together with citations to legal authority”). Without regard to whether we agree with
the court’s practice here, we decline to consider this issue further. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy
v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).
CONCLUSION
We affirm.3
3 Ryan also alleges in the assignment of error section of his brief that the trial court failed “to apply
the plain meaning of Judge Henderson’s Order Denying Revision” regarding the 2022 parenting
plan. Br. of Appellant at 1. But he does not dedicate a portion of the argument section of his brief
to explain this assignment of error as required under RAP 10.3(a)(6). Without more, we do not
address this issue further.
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A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
Veljacic, C.J.
We concur:
Glasgow, J.
Che, J.

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