* State of Washington v. D.K.V.

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
D.K.V.,†
Appellant.
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No. 37401-7-III
PUBLISHED OPINION
LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. — D.K.V. appeals after the sentencing court prohibited
him from having contact with three crime victims. The prohibition was contained in the
dispositional order and also in a no contact order issued pursuant to chapter 9A.46 RCW.
D.K.V. argues the prohibition in the dispositional order should be struck and the no
contact order should be vacated because the sentencing court acted beyond its authority.
We agree and remand for that purpose.
† To protect the privacy interests of the minor, we use his initials throughout this
opinion. Gen. Order for Court of Appeals, In Re Changes to Case Title (Wash. Ct. App.
Aug. 22, 2018) (effective Sept. 1, 2018), http://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_
trial_courts.
FILED
APRIL 1, 2021
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
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No. 37401-7-III
State v. D.K.V.
2
FACTS
D.K.V., then 14 years old, fired a flare gun into a house that started a small fire.
At the time, there were three people in the house.
The State charged D.K.V. in juvenile court with first degree arson, and he later
pleaded guilty to that charge. The court ordered that he be committed to a Department of
Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) rehabilitation facility for a term of 103 to 129
weeks.
The State said that D.K.V. fired the flare gun into the house out of retaliation and
asked the court to enter a no contact order protecting the three people in the house at the
time. The court granted the request and in its disposition order prohibited D.K.V. from
having contact with the three crime victims for an unspecified time. It also imposed a no
contact order under the auspices of chapter 9A.46 RCW with a term of 10 years.
D.K.V. appealed.
ANALYSIS
D.K.V. contends the juvenile court’s no contact order exceeded its authority. The
State initially responds that we should not review the question because it was not
preserved below.
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No. 37401-7-III
State v. D.K.V.
3
Generally, this court does not review issues unless they were first raised in the trial
court. RAP 2.5(a). Requiring timely objections at the trial court level promotes efficient
use of limited resources by allowing those courts to correct potential errors. State v.
Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 685, 757 P.2d 492 (1988). But a non-rule-based exception to
RAP 2.5 has been recognized where the sentencing challenge does not depend on a
case-by-case analysis, and the error—if permitted to stand—would create inconsistent
sentences for the same crime. State v. Peters, 10 Wn. App. 2d 574, 581-82, 455 P.3d 141
(2019) (quoting State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827, 833-34, 344 P.3d 680 (2015)). This
exception applies here so we address D.K.V.’s argument.
When reviewing the scope of a juvenile court’s authority to act, this court reviews
the authority de novo. State v. Y.I., 94 Wn. App. 919, 922, 973 P.2d 503 (1999). “The
provisions of chapters 13.04 and 13.40 RCW . . . [are] the exclusive authority for the
adjudication and disposition of juvenile offenders except where otherwise expressly
provided.” RCW 13.04.450.
The sentencing standards for juvenile offenders are set forth in RCW 13.40.0357.
For less serious offenses, the standards authorize juvenile courts to impose local
sanctions, which may include up to 30 days of confinement and community supervision.
RCW 13.40.020(18). The authority to impose community supervision is what permits
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No. 37401-7-III
State v. D.K.V.
4
juvenile courts to impose conditions in their dispositional orders. See State v. K.H.-H.,
185 Wn.2d 745, 755, 374 P.3d 1141 (2016).
For sentences greater than 30 days, juvenile courts must commit the offender to the
DCYF. RCW 13.40.160(1)(b). Upon completion of an offender’s sentence, DCYF
issues a parole program that contains conditions to assist the offender’s integration into
the community. RCW 13.40.210(3). The legislature set forth a few mandatory and
various permissible conditions. RCW 13.40.210(3)(b). One permissible condition
requires the juvenile to “refrain from contact with specific individuals or a specified class
of individuals.” RCW 13.40.210(3)(b)(ix).
A court may not order community supervision when an offender is committed to
DCYF. RCW 13.40.020(5). For this reason, juvenile courts lack the authority to impose
conditions, including no contact orders, when committing an offender to the DCYF. Only
DCYF has authority to impose conditions. This appears purposeful. Maintaining the
distinction between the authority of juvenile courts and DCYF is one of the policies of the
Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, chapter 13.40 RCW. RCW 13.40.010(2)(k).
The State, citing State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 156 P.3d 201 (2007), argues
that sentencing courts have authority to impose crime-related prohibitions, including no
contact orders. There, the Supreme Court construed a trial court’s authority under the
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No. 37401-7-III
State v. D.K.V.
5
Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW. We doubt that the SRA
applies to juveniles sentenced in juvenile court. Although former RCW 9.94A.030(35)
(2019) defines “offender” to include persons under 18 years of age, whether being
prosecuted as a juvenile or as an adult, we are unaware of any decision applying the SRA
to a juvenile offender prosecuted as a juvenile. K.H.-H. confirms our doubts. There, the
Supreme Court relied on the Juvenile Justice Act, not the SRA, to support its decision that
the juvenile court had authority to impose a sentence condition. We conclude that
the SRA’s definition of “offender” is not a sufficiently express provision, as required by
RCW 13.04.450, to expand a juvenile court’s limited authority to impose conditions in
dispositional orders.
The State next argues that the juvenile court had authority under chapter 9A.46
RCW to impose the 10-year no contact order. We disagree. Under the SRA, a court
has discretion to enter a no contact order to protect a crime victim upon conviction.
RCW 9.94A.703(3)(b). Chapter 9A.46 RCW fills the significant gap in time between
when a crime victim is deserving of court protection and when the defendant is convicted.
It authorizes a no contact order prior to a defendant’s release from custody, or if the
defendant is not in custody, at arraignment. RCW 9A.46.040, .050. Nothing in chapter
9A.46 RCW authorizes a no contact order to be issued upon conviction.
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No. 37401-7-111
State v. D.K. V.
We conclude that the juvenile court had no authority to prohibit D.K.V. from
contacting the three victims, either by including the prohibition in its dispositional order
or by its separate order. Because D.K.V. was committed to the DCYF, that agency is the
proper entity to determine what conditions are appropriate upon D.K.V.'s release.
Remand.
Lawrence-Berrey, J.
WE CONCUR:
Q. 	, c_:r:Pennell, C.J.
Siddoway, J.
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