* Donna Zink, Appellant/cross-respondent V. Pierce County, Respondent/cross-appellant

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
JOHN DOE L; JOHN DOE M; JOHN DOE N;
and JOHN DOE O, as individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated; JOHN DOE
D; JOHN DOE G,
No. 48378-5-II
Respondents,
v.
PIERCE COUNTY,
Respondent/Cross-Appellant,
v.
DONNA ZINK, a married woman,
ORDER AMENDING IN PART
UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND
PUBLISHING OPINION
Appellant/Cross-Respondent
JOHN DOE C,
Respondent.
The Appellant/Cross-Respondent has moved for reconsideration of the court’s unpublished
opinion filed August 21, 2018. The court now rules as follows:
1. The third paragraph on page 2 is amended to read as follows:
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
January 23, 2019
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We affirm the orders granting class certification in Does L-O’s and D’s
lawsuits. We reverse and remand the order allowing Does L-O and Doe C to
proceed under pseudonyms, but we do not address whether Does G and D were
correctly allowed to proceed under pseudonyms because this issue is moot as to
them. We affirm the order granting summary judgment dismissal of Zink’s
counterclaims and a permanent injunction in the County’s lawsuit. Finally, we
affirm in part and reverse in part the orders granting the offenders’ motions for
summary judgment and permanent injunctions in Does L-O’s, C’s, and D’s
lawsuits, reverse the order granting Doe G’s motion for summary judgment and a
permanent injunction, and remand for further proceedings.
2. The paragraph under section III on page 6 is amended to read as follows:
Doe C was added as a plaintiff-intervener in the lawsuit of Does L-O. The
superior court consolidated all four lawsuits.
3. The second and third paragraphs under section IV on pages 45-46 are amended to
read as follows:
We affirm the orders certifying Doe D’s and Does L-O’s lawsuits as class
actions. We reverse and remand the order allowing Does L-O and Doe C to proceed
under pseudonyms. We affirm the order granting Pierce County’s motion for
summary judgment and a permanent injunction.
Regarding the order granting Does L-O’s and Doe C’s motion for summary
judgment and a permanent injunction, we affirm the exemption of juvenile SSODA
evaluations but reverse the exemption of SSOSA evaluations and registration
records and information from disclosure. Regarding the order granting Doe D’s
motion for summary judgment and a permanent injunction, we affirm the
exemption of juvenile SSODA evaluations but reverse the exemption of SSOSA
evaluations and registration records and information from disclosure. And
regarding the order granting Doe G’s motion for summary judgment and a
permanent injunction, we reverse the exemption of his sex offender registration
forms from disclosure. We remand for proceedings consistent with our decision.
4. In all other respects the motion for reconsideration is denied.
5. Appellant/Cross-Respondent and Respondent/Cross-Appellant each filed a motion
to publish the court’s unpublished opinion filed on August 21, 2018. Both motions to publish are
hereby granted and therefore the final paragraph, reading “A majority of the panel having
determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be
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No. 48378-5-II
3
filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.” is deleted and the opinion will
be published.
6. Sua sponte, the case caption above is amended to include John Doe C as a
respondent.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JOHANSON, P.J.
We concur:
MELNICK, J.
SUTTON, J.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
JOHN DOE L; JOHN DOE M; JOHN DOE N;
and JOHN DOE O, as individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated; JOHN DOE
D; JOHN DOE G,
No. 48378-5-II
Respondents,
v.
PIERCE COUNTY,
Respondent/Cross-Appellant,
v.
DONNA ZINK, a married woman,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant/Cross-Respondent.
JOHANSON, P.J. — This case arose from Donna Zink’s 2014 Public Records Act (PRA),
ch. 42.56 RCW, request for level 1, 2, and 3 sex offender records held by Pierce County. After
being notified of Zink’s request, sex offenders John Doe D, John Doe G, and John Does L-O
initiated three lawsuits, two of which were class actions, to enjoin various records’ release. The
County also brought suit to enjoin the release of juvenile records in its possession, and Zink
brought counterclaims against the County for PRA violations.
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
August 21, 2018
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No. 48378-5-II
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After consolidating the cases, the superior court granted the offenders’ motions for
summary judgment and permanent injunctions and denied Zink’s cross motion. The superior court
also granted the County’s motion for summary judgment of Zink’s counterclaims and entered a
permanent injunction barring the County from releasing unredacted juvenile records.
Zink and the County both appeal. Zink argues that the superior court erred when it granted
the offenders’ and the County’s summary judgment motions, certified the offenders’ lawsuits as
class actions, and allowed the offenders to proceed under pseudonyms. The County cross appeals
and argues that the superior court erred when it entered summary judgment and permanent
injunctions in the offenders’ lawsuits.
We affirm the orders granting class certification in Does L-O’s and D’s lawsuits. We
reverse and remand the order allowing Does L-O to proceed under pseudonyms, but we do not
address whether Does G and D were correctly allowed to proceed under pseudonyms because this
issue is moot as to them. We affirm the order granting summary judgment dismissal of Zink’s
counterclaims and a permanent injunction in the County’s lawsuit. Finally, we affirm in part and
reverse in part the orders granting the offenders’ motions for summary judgment and permanent
injunctions in Does L-O’s and D’s lawsuits, reverse the order granting Doe G’s motion for
summary judgment and a permanent injunction, and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
I. PRA REQUEST
In October 2014, Zink made a PRA request to the Pierce County Sheriff’s Department
(PCSD), Pierce County Prosecutor’s Office (PCPO), or “any office or department of Pierce
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No. 48378-5-II
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County”1 for all special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA), RCW 9.94A.670, and
special sex offender disposition alternative (SSODA), RCW 13.40.162, evaluations, victim impact
statements, registration forms for “all sex offenders registered in Pierce County,” and a “[l]ist
and/or database of all sex offenders registered in Pierce County.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 252. The
PCSD began notifying the approximately 3,000 registered offenders who were the subjects of the
requested records.
Zink later made two more PRA requests. In her second and third requests, Zink sought
“any and all” judgment and sentences related to convicted sex offenders. CP at 1131.
II. SEX OFFENDERS’ AND PIERCE COUNTY’S LAWSUITS
Zink’s requests spawned lawsuits from four sets of plaintiffs—a group of level 1 offenders,
a group of level 2 and 3 offenders, one individual level 3 offender, and the County on behalf of
PCSD—to bar requested records’ release, as set forth below.
A. DOES L-O: COMPLIANT LEVEL 1 OFFENDERS
Does L-O, who identified themselves as level 1 sex offenders who were compliant with
registration, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of all the compliant level 1 sex offenders who
were the requested records’ subjects, including both juvenile and adult offenders. Does L-O made
three exemption arguments. First, they argued that all requested records were exempt from
disclosure under a portion of the “Community Protection Act” (CPA), former RCW 4.24.550
1 This appeal does not involve responses of agencies other than PCSD and PCPO. Accordingly,
we use “the County” to collectively refer to PCSD and PCPO, unless the context requires further
specificity.
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No. 48378-5-II
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(2011), as an “other statute” exemption2 to the PRA. Second, they argued that SSOSA/SSODA
evaluations were exempt from disclosure under the PRA’s exemption incorporating the Uniform
Health Care Information Act (UHCIA), ch. 70.02 RCW. Third, they argued that juvenile SSODA
evaluations were exempt from disclosure under ch. 13.50 RCW, pertaining to juvenile records, as
another “other statute” exemption.
B. DOE D: COMPLIANT LEVEL 2 AND 3 OFFENDERS
Doe D, who identified himself as a level 3 sex offender who was compliant with
registration residing in Pierce County, filed suit to enjoin the release of “all” registration records
and SSOSA evaluations. Doe D later moved to certify his lawsuit as a class action, representing
level 2 and 3 sex offenders. Doe D made two exemption arguments: first, that the CPA, former
RCW 4.24.550, was an “other statute” exemption that barred disclosure of registration forms, and
second, that the SSOSA evaluations were exempt under the PRA’s UHCIA exemption.
C. DOE G: COMPLIANT LEVEL 3 OFFENDER
Doe G, who identified himself as a level 3 sex offender who was compliant with
registration conditions, individually brought suit against Pierce County. He argued that first, his
registration forms were exempt from disclosure under the CPA, former RCW 4.24.550, as an
“other statute” exemption. And he argued that second, his SSOSA evaluations were exempt from
disclosure under the UHCIA as a PRA exemption.
2 The PRA’s “other statute” exemption exempts from production records that fall within “the
specific exemptions of [an] other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific
information or records.” Former RCW 42.56.070(1) (2005).
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No. 48378-5-II
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Doe G later explained that although he was included in Doe D’s class of level 2 and 3 sex
offenders, he was “differently situated” because he had participated in a SSOSA evaluation but
did not receive a SSOSA sentence. CP at 1204. He did not file a SSOSA evaluation with the
sentencing court, and Pierce County could not locate Doe G’s SSOSA evaluation.
D. PIERCE COUNTY
Pierce County filed a lawsuit in which it made one exemption argument: that ch. 13.50
RCW, was an “other statute” exemption to the PRA. Thus, records other than the official juvenile
court file, such as SSODA evaluations, held by PCSD, a juvenile justice or care agency, could not
be released under the PRA.
Zink brought counterclaims alleging various PRA violations by “Pierce County” and
sought dismissal of the County’s action. CP at 1074. Specifically, she claimed that the PCPO
violated the PRA because it (1) refused to provide documents electronically, (2) assessed excessive
fees without applying the PRA’s factors for determining costs, (3) failed to identify an exemption
or provide an exemption log, and (4) improperly notified third parties. And she claimed that the
PCSD violated the PRA because it (1) assessed excessive fees without applying the PRA’s factors
for determining costs, (2) failed to identify an exemption or provide an exemption log, and (3)
improperly notified third parties.
E. OFFENDERS’ LAWSUITS: CLASS CERTIFICATION AND PERMISSION TO PROCEED UNDER
PSEUDONYMS
Does L-O, the level 1 offenders, and Doe D, a level 3 offender, moved to certify their
respective lawsuits as class actions. Over Zink’s objections, both lawsuits were certified as class
actions. Does L-O represented all compliant level 1 sex offenders named in registration forms, a
registration database, and SSOSA or SSODA evaluations in the County’s possession. Doe D
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No. 48378-5-II
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represented all level 2 or 3 sex offenders whose registration forms or whose “psychosexual”
evaluations were in the County’s possession. CP at 3080.
All offenders moved to proceed under pseudonyms and were allowed to do so. In Does L-
O’s lawsuit, the superior court entered an order, in which it found that “[f]orcing Plaintiffs to
disclose their identities to bring this action would eviscerate their ability to seek relief” and that
they had “demonstrated a significant risk of physical, mental, economic, and emotional harm if
their identities are disclosed.” CP at 980. Further, allowing Does L-O to proceed under
pseudonyms would not affect the defendant and would affect only the public’s ability to ascertain
Does L-O’s names, which had “little bearing on the public’s interest in the dispute or its
resolution.” CP at 980. Thus, the Does L-O’s “interest in proceeding anonymously outweighs the
public interest in knowing their names.” CP at 980.
In Doe D’s lawsuit, by the time Doe D sought a preliminary injunction, his identity had
been disclosed. He clarified that he no longer sought permission to proceed under a pseudonym.
III. CONSOLIDATION AND POSTCONSOLIDATION PROCEEDINGS
The superior court consolidated all four lawsuits.
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS AND RESPONSES
1. DOES L-O
Does L-O moved for summary judgment and a permanent injunction to bar the release of
level 1 sex offenders’ registration records and SSOSA/SSODA evaluations. They made three PRA
exemption arguments. First, they argued that the CPA, former RCW 4.24.550, was an “other
statute” that barred release of their SSOSA/SSODA evaluations and registration records. Second,
they argued that ch. 13.50 RCW was an “other statute” that exempted just their juvenile SSODA
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No. 48378-5-II
7
evaluations from release. Third, they argued that the PRA’s UHCIA exemption barred
SSOSA/SSODA evaluations from release.
In support of their summary judgment motion, Does L-O relied on their own declarations
and those of various attorneys and treatment professionals. Their supporting evidence documented
harm to the offenders and to the public’s interest in effectively treating the sex offenders that would
result from disclosure.3
In response to Does L-O’s summary judgment motion, the County agreed that ch. 13.50
RCW was an “other statute” exemption that exempted juvenile SSODA evaluations from
production but otherwise disagreed with Does L-O’s arguments. For her part, Zink disputed that
any of the requested records were exempt.
2. DOE D
Doe D moved for summary judgment and a permanent injunction preventing the release of
registration forms and the database under the CPA, former RCW 4.24.550, as an “other statute”
exemption to the PRA. Doe D also requested that the injunction bar the release of SSOSA/SSODA
3 A treatment provider opined based on research and personal experience that sex offenders whose
names appeared on public websites suffered “significant barriers to housing, employment, and
reintegration into the community.” CP at 1392. Community notification made offenders unable
to secure stable housing or employment and being “outed” by a third-party website often caused
offenders to lose their jobs or be unable to find employment or housing opportunities. CP at 1392.
The Does also provided their own declarations that disclosure of their identities and other
information would result in considerable harm to them. Two of the Does stated that disclosure
would result in losing employment and education opportunities and harm to their families.
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No. 48378-5-II
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records under the PRA’s UHCIA exemption. Doe D supported his motion with evidence of harm
to the sex offenders if their information was disclosed.4
In its response to Doe D’s summary judgment motion, the County argued that the CPA,
former RCW 4.24.550, and the PRA’s UHCIA exemption did not exempt the requested records
from production. Zink also responded that the SSOSA/SSODA evaluations were not exempt.
3. DOE G
Doe G moved for summary judgment and for a permanent injunction prohibiting the release
of his SSOSA evaluations and registration forms. Doe G argued that his SSOSA evaluations were
exempt because they were not public records and that his registration forms were exempt insofar
as they contained personal information of the type used to apply for a driver’s license under RCW
42.56.230(7)(a) (“the personal information exemption”). Doe G supported his summary judgment
motion with evidence that he faced harm from disclosure of his information; he also incorporated
by reference the other offenders’ evidence.5
4 Doe D provided evidence that making it easier for members of the public to locate sex offenders
by, for example, providing their precise residential addresses would “undoubtedly lead to harm
against them” and that “[v]igilantes” used specific information about sex offenders “to harm
them.” CP at 1527. “Public disclosure of this kind of information regarding level II and III sex
offenders seriously jeopardizes the safety of the juveniles and adults whose precise location
information would be available to anyone who wants to cause them harm.” CP at 1527. Doe D
stated that disclosure would cause harm to himself and the people he lived with.
5 In support of his summary judgment motion, Doe G provided his declaration that he was a
registered level 3 sex offender who resided in Pierce County and had participated in a SSOSA
evaluation but had not requested a SSOSA sentence. Doe G stated that he was elderly and was
concerned about his ability to protect himself and his family “from harassment and the threat of
physical violence” and that his situation was extremely “disruptive, vexatious and hurtful.” CP at
1229-30.
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No. 48378-5-II
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In response to Doe G’s motion, the County argued that the personal information exemption,
RCW 42.56.230(7)(a), did not exempt any personal information at issue. Zink also filed a response
in which she addressed the CPA, former RCW 4.24.550. In addition, she filed a consolidated cross
motion for summary judgment dismissal of the three offender lawsuits. Among other arguments,
she claimed that as a matter of law, the records at issue had to be released under a portion of the
Washington State Criminal Records Privacy Act (CRPA), ch. 10.97 RCW.
4. PIERCE COUNTY
a. PIERCE COUNTY’S MOTION
The County moved for a permanent injunction barring the release of unredacted juvenile
sex offender documents in PCSD’s possession under ch. 13.50 RCW as an “other statute”
exemption to the PRA. The County argued that based on evidence of the highly sensitive nature
of juvenile documents, disclosure would substantially and irreparably damage juvenile offenders.
The County also requested summary judgment of Zink’s counterclaims. In support of that
request, the County provided declarations from the PCPO’s and the PCSD’s public records
officers. The PCPO officer explained that she received Zink’s November 2014 request for sex
offender judgment and sentences. To receive copies of the records, which were not electronic, the
PCPO assessed $0.15 per page, plus postage, and an hourly labor rate for scanning records to
compact disk (CD) or faxing copies. Zink, however, requested that records be provided
electronically through e-mail or “the cloud.” CP at 1701. Zink declined to pay the fee to scan the
records to CD or fax her copies, and the PCPO closed Zink’s request. It never gave any third-
party notice.
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The PCSD officer explained that PCSD, a juvenile justice agency, possessed juvenile
records that included more than just those documents found within the official juvenile court file,
including offenders’ mental health and healthcare records, such as juvenile rehabilitation
administration intake and referral records. As of the time of the PCSD officer’s declaration,
production in response to Zink’s PRA request was not complete. The officer was aware that in
other jurisdictions where similar requests had been made, offenders had successfully enjoined their
records’ release.
After receiving Zink’s October PRA request, the PCSD began sending installments of
responsive records and accompanying exemption logs.6 By August 2015, the PCSD had sent Zink
all noncompliant level 1 sex offender registration records and some sex offender registration
databases for level 2 and 3 and noncompliant level 1 sex offenders, sex offender judgments and
sentences, and victim impact statements. Other than victim impact statements and judgments and
6 Its productions are summarized below:
1. December 23: Judgment and sentences for level 2 and 3 offenders with
last names A-B,
2. February 17, 2015: Registration file records for noncompliant level 1
offenders with last names A-D,
3. April 14: Registration file records for noncompliant level 1 offenders
with last names E-G, H-J,
4. June 8: Registration file records for noncompliant level 1 offenders with
last names K-M,
5. July 7: Registration file records for noncompliant level 1 offenders with
last names N-Z,
6. July 24: Judgment and sentences and victim impact statements for
offenders with last names Y-Z.
PCSD noted redactions in cover letters or exemption logs, although through an oversight, an
exemption log for the April 14 production was not sent to Zink until August 12.
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No. 48378-5-II
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sentences, the PCSD sent no records related to compliant level 1 sex offenders. Neither did the
PCSD include any juvenile convictions in the judgments and sentences.
Related to Zink’s counterclaims against the PCPO, the County argued that the PCPO (1)
did not violate the PRA by refusing to provide documents electronically, (2) accurately calculated
costs, (3) did not need to identify an exemption or produce an exemption log because PCPO never
produced any responsive documents, and (4) did not notify any third parties. Related to Zink’s
counterclaims against PCSD, the County argued that PCSD (1) did not assess any fees, (2)
provided exemption logs, notified Zink of exemptions, and was not required to list a specific
exemption when giving third-party notice, and (3) properly notified third parties.
b. ZINK’S RESPONSE
Zink filed a response to the County’s motion for summary judgment of her counterclaims
in which she argued that the existence of genuine issues of material fact precluded summary
judgment of her counterclaims and that summary judgment was not appropriate as a matter of law.
She relied upon her declaration, which repeated her allegation that PCSD was “withholding”
records and had taken “final” action when the County filed for injunctive relief. CP at 2104-05.
Zink’s declaration also included her claim that her October 3 request was directed to both PCPO
and PCSD, but PCPO did not respond. And she argued that ch. 13.50 RCW was not an “other
statute” exemption that exempted juvenile sex offender records from production.
B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDERS
The superior court entered orders on the parties’ summary judgment motions as set forth
below.
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1. OFFENDERS’ LAWSUITS
In Does L-O’s lawsuit, the superior court determined that ch. 13.50 RCW and the CPA,
former RCW 4.24.550, were both “other statute” exemptions to the PRA. The superior court
granted Does L-O’s summary judgment motion and entered declaratory judgment and a permanent
injunction that “registration records and information” and unredacted SSOSA/SSODA evaluations
were exempt under the CPA, former RCW 4.24.550, that unredacted SSOSA/SSODA evaluations
were exempt under the PRA’s UHCIA exemption, and that unredacted juvenile SSODA
evaluations were exempt under ch. 13.50 RCW. CP at 2330. The superior court also ruled that
juvenile SSODA evaluations and other juvenile documents could be released if redacted.
In Doe D’s lawsuit, the superior court determined that ch. 13.50 RCW and the CPA, former
RCW 4.24.550, were both “other statute” exemptions to the PRA. The superior court granted Doe
D’s summary judgment motion and entered declaratory relief and a permanent injunction. It
determined that for both level 2 and 3 sex offenders, “registration records and information” and
unredacted SSOSA/SSODA evaluations were exempt under the CPA, former RCW 4.24.550, as
incorporated into the PRA. CP at 2560-61. Further, for both level 2 and level 3 offenders,
unredacted SSOSA/SSODA evaluations fell within the UHCIA exemption to the PRA and
unredacted juvenile SSODA evaluations were exempt under ch. 13.50 RCW as incorporated into
the PRA. The superior court determined that information in registration forms that fell under the
personal information exemption, RCW 42.56.230(7), because it was of the type required to apply
for a driver’s license was exempt. Finally, the superior court ruled that juvenile SSODA
evaluations and other juvenile documents could be released if redacted.
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No. 48378-5-II
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In Doe G’s lawsuit, the superior court determined that a portion of the PRA, the personal
information exemption, RCW 42.56.230(7)(a), exempted disclosure of all Doe G’s sex offender
records containing personal information of the type used to apply for a driver’s license. Further,
the superior court ruled that the CPA, former RCW 4.24.550, was an “other statute” under the
PRA. The superior court granted Doe G’s summary judgment motion and entered a permanent
injunction barring the release of his sex offender registration forms and SSOSA under the CPA,
former RCW 4.24.550, and the personal information exemption, RCW 42.56.230(7)(a), insofar as
they contained personal information of a type used to apply for a driver’s license. The superior
court also determined that Doe G’s SSOSA evaluation was exempt under the PRA’s UHCIA
exemption, the PRA’s definition of a “public record,” and the PRA’s attorney-client privilege and
work production exemptions. CP at 2311.
2. PIERCE COUNTY
a. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION
Related to the County’s motion for a permanent injunction prohibiting release of
unredacted juvenile records, the superior court ruled that ch. 13.50 RCW was an “other statute”
exemption under the PRA and that “PCSD [wa]s a ‘juvenile justice or care agency’ under [ch.]
13.50 [RCW].” CP at 2336. Accordingly, the superior court entered a permanent injunction
barring release of juvenile records or information about juveniles other than that available in an
open court file. However, juvenile records could be released if redacted.
Finding no genuine issue of material fact, the superior court granted the County’s motion
for summary judgment of Zink’s counterclaims.
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b. DENIAL OF ZINK’S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The superior court denied Zink’s motion for summary judgment in all three offender
lawsuits. In doing so, it ruled that Zink did not file a request for release under RCW 42.56.210
and failed to meet her burden to show that that provision applied.
Zink appeals the summary judgment, pseudonym, and class certification orders.7
ANALYSIS
I. ORDERS GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS
A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES: SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE PRA
We review summary judgment decisions and actions under the PRA’s injunction statute,
RCW 42.56.540, de novo. Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. Bloedow, 187 Wn. App. 606,
618, 350 P.3d 660 (2015). In reviewing summary judgment, we perform the same inquiry as the
superior court, and we affirm where “‘there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 176 Wn.2d
909, 922, 296 P.3d 860 (2013) (quoting Qwest Corp. v. City of Bellevue, 161 Wn.2d 353, 358, 166
P.3d 667 (2007), abrogated on other grounds by Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 178
Wn.2d 635, 310 P.3d 804 (2013)). “We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
7 Zink provides over 150 assignments of error in her appellant’s brief, many of which are
unsupported by argument or citation to authority. We address only those assignments of error that
are supported by argument and citation to legal authority. RAP 10.3(a)(6). Further, to the extent
that Zink relies on her trial court briefing to satisfy RAP 10.3(a)(6), we reject her attempt to
incorporate by reference her arguments below. See Holland v. City of Tacoma, 90 Wn. App. 533,
538, 954 P.2d 290 (1998). And we do not address the arguments Zink first makes in her reply
brief, including that the superior court was biased against her. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v.
Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).
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nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in [the nonmoving] party’s favor.” Lakey,
176 Wn.2d at 922.
The PRA “is a ‘strongly worded mandate for broad disclosure of public records.’” John
Doe A v. Wash. State Patrol, 185 Wn.2d 363, 371, 374 P.3d 63 (2016) (WSP) (quoting Hearst
Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wn.2d 123, 127, 580 P.2d 246 (1978)). In enacting the PRA, the legislature
made certain records exempt from production through specific exemptions listed in the PRA itself.
Resident Action Council v. Seattle Hous. Auth., 177 Wn.2d 417, 432, 327 P.3d 600 (2013). We
interpret these exemptions narrowly and interpret disclosure provisions liberally. WSP, 185 Wn.2d
at 371. Three of these exemptions are pertinent to this appeal.
First, there is an exemption from public disclosure for “health care information” under the
UHCIA, ch. 70.02 RCW. RCW 42.56.360(2); John Doe G v. Dep’t of Corr., 190 Wn.2d 185, 193,
410 P.3d 1156 (2018) (Doe G II). A SSOSA evaluation is not exempt under the UHCIA exemption
in the PRA. Doe G II, 190 Wn.2d at 197.
Second, there is an exemption from public disclosure for certain personal information.
RCW 42.56.230(7)(a). Exempt personal information under the PRA includes “[a]ny record used
to prove identity, age, residential address, social security number, or other personal information
required to apply for a driver’s license or identicard.” RCW 42.56.230(7)(a).
Third, there is an “other statute” exemption that incorporates the specific exemptions of an
“other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records.” Former
RCW 42.56.070(1) (2005). Ch. 13.50 RCW is one such statute. Wright v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health
Servs., 176 Wn. App. 585, 597, 309 P.3d 662 (2013). But the CPA, former RCW 4.24.550, is not
such a statute. WSP, 185 Wn.2d at 368.
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The PRA also contains an injunction statute, which provides for court protection of public
records that fall within the PRA’s exemptions. See RCW 42.56.540.
B. SSOSA AND SSODA EVALUATIONS
“A SSOSA is a sentencing alternative that allows a trial court to suspend a first time sex
offender’s felony sentence if that offender meets certain statutory criteria.” Doe G II, 190 Wn.2d
at 192. Under the SSOSA statute, an offender who has requested a SSOSA must undergo an
examination “to determine whether the offender is amenable to treatment.” RCW 9.94A.670(3).
The sentencing court uses the evaluation that results from the examination to determine “whether
the offender should be granted an alternative sentence instead of [prison] time.” Doe G II, 190
Wn.2d at 194. Because they are forensic examinations made to aid a sentencing court in
determining whether to impose a SSOSA, SSOSA evaluations are not exempt from disclosure
under the UHCIA as an exemption to the PRA. Doe G II, 190 Wn.2d at 197.
Similar to SSOSAs, SSODAs provide an “alternative to traditional sentencing” for
“[j]uveniles facing a first-time conviction for certain sex offenses.” State v. Sanchez, 177 Wn.2d
835, 840, 306 P.3d 935 (2013). The sentencing court uses a SSODA evaluation to determine
whether to impose a SSODA on an eligible juvenile offender. RCW 13.40.162(3). The SSODA
statute requires an evaluation to include the same information as a SSOSA evaluation, including a
proposed treatment plan. RCW 13.40.162(2)(a)-(b); see RCW 9.94A.670(3). WAC regulations
set forth required contents of both SSODA and SSOSA evaluations. WAC 246-930-320(2)(f)(i),
(ii); see WAC 246-930-010(9).
The sentencing court uses the SSODA evaluation to consider whether a SSODA will
benefit the juvenile offender and the community. RCW 13.40.162(3). In making this decision,
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the sentencing court also considers the victim’s opinion and the benefit to the offender and the
community of imposing a SSODA. RCW 13.40.162(3).
C. EXEMPTION OF SSOSA AND SSODA EVALUATIONS UNDER UHCIA EXEMPTION TO PRA
In all three offender lawsuits, the superior court ruled that SSOSA and SSODA evaluations
were exempt from disclosure under the UHCIA exemption to the PRA. Zink and the County argue
that this was error. Does L-O and D argue that the superior court’s ruling was proper as a matter
of law. Following Doe G II, we agree with Zink and the County that the superior court erred in
Does L-O’s and Doe D’s lawsuits. But we do not reach whether the superior court erred when it
ruled the SSOSA evaluations in Doe G’s lawsuit were exempt if discovered.
1. SSOSA EVALUATIONS
“A SSOSA evaluation is not directly related to health care,” so that SSOSA evaluations do
not contain health care information and are accordingly “not exempt from PRA disclosure.” Doe
G II, 190 Wn.2d at 194, 197. Thus, the superior court erred in Does L-O’s and Doe D’s lawsuits
when it ruled that SSOSA evaluations are exempt from disclosure under the UHCIA exemption to
the PRA.
In Doe G’s lawsuit, the superior court also ruled that Doe G’s SSOSA evaluations were
exempt from disclosure under the UHCIA as a PRA exemption. But the only evidence provided
about Doe G’s SSOSA evaluations was that Doe G had never submitted evaluations to the
sentencing court and that the County could not locate any of Doe G’s SSOSA evaluations.
Accordingly, this issue is not ripe for review. See Clark County v. Rosemere Neighborhood Ass’n,
170 Wn. App. 859, 888, 290 P.3d 142 (2012) (a controversy is ripe for review when, among other
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things, it presents an actual, not merely possible disagreement and involves direct and substantial
interests, not interests that are “potential, theoretical, abstract, or academic”).
2. SSODA EVALUATIONS
Doe G II did not address juvenile SSODA evaluations. However, Doe G II’s reasoning
about SSOSA evaluations applies with equal force to juvenile SSODA evaluations.
Regarding SSOSA evaluations, the critical features making the evaluations “not directly
related to [a patient’s] health care” were the following:
SSOSA evaluations are made for the purpose of publishing the results to the
court. When a SSOSA is requested, the court orders a SSOSA evaluation and uses
the evaluation to assess whether the offender should be granted an alternative
sentence. RCW 9.94A.670(3)-(4).
. . . .
. . . In a SSOSA evaluation, the court must decide whether the offender is
amenable to treatment and whether a SSOSA will serve public safety interests and
the penological goal of rehabilitation.
. . . .
. . . [T]he treatment plan must . . . include “[r]ecommendations for specific
behavioral prohibitions, requirements and restrictions on living conditions, lifestyle
requirements, and monitoring by family members and others that are necessary to
the treatment process and community safety.” .
Doe G II, 190 Wn.2d at 194-97 (quoting WAC 246-930-320(2)(g)(iii)).
Juvenile SSODA evaluations share these same critical features. As with a SSOSA
evaluation, the sentencing court uses the juvenile SSODA evaluation to make its decision whether
to impose a sentencing alternative. See RCW 13.40.162(2), (3). And like a SSOSA evaluation, a
juvenile SSODA evaluation informs the sentencing court’s decision by providing information
about whether the community will benefit from a sentencing alternative and whether the offender
is amenable to treatment. RCW 13.40.162(3), (2); see RCW 9.94A.670(4). Further, the statutorily
required contents of a juvenile SSODA evaluation contained in RCW 13.40.162(2) are nearly
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identical to the statutorily required contents of a SSOSA evaluation in RCW 9.94A.670(3).
Finally, WAC 246-930-320(2)(g)(iii), setting forth the requirements for a treatment plan, applies
equally to SSOSA and SSODA evaluations. WAC 246-930-010(9).
Because juvenile SSODA evaluations have the same critical features that the Supreme
Court held made SSOSA evaluations not directly related to a patient’s health care, SSODA
evaluations are also not directly related to a patient’s health care. Thus, juvenile SSODA
evaluations, like SSOSA evaluations, are not exempt from disclosure under the PRA’s exemption
incorporating the UHCIA. The superior court erred when it ruled to the contrary in Doe D’s and
Does L-O’s cases.
D. EXEMPTION OF RECORDS UNDER THE PERSONAL INFORMATION EXEMPTION, RCW
42.56.230(7)
In Doe G’s and Doe D’s lawsuits, the superior court ruled that as a matter of law,
information in sex offender registration forms that fell under the personal information exemption,
RCW 42.56.230(7), was exempt from disclosure.8 Zink and the County argue that these rulings
were error. Doe G responds that the superior court properly interpreted the law. Doe D does not
address this issue in his briefing. We agree with Zink and the County on this issue of first
impression.
When interpreting a statute, we look to its plain meaning; but if the plain meaning is
ambiguous—susceptible “‘to more than one reasonable interpretation’”—we “‘resort to statutory
8 In the summary judgment order in Doe D’s lawsuit, the superior court ruled that “[s]ex offender
registration forms, which contain the offender’s specific residential address and other information
of that type, are exempt under [the personal information exemption, RCW 42.56.230(7)].” CP at
2307.
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construction, legislative history, and relevant case law’” to determine legislative intent. Jametsky
v. Olsen, 179 Wn.2d 756, 762, 317 P.3d 1003 (2014) (quoting City of Seattle v. Winebrenner, 167
Wn.2d 451, 456, 219 P.3d 686 (2008); Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 373, 173 P.3d
228 (2007)).
The personal information exemption, RCW 42.56.230(7)(a), exempts from public
inspection and copying “[a]ny record used to prove identity, age, residential address, social
security number, or other personal information required to apply for a driver’s license or
identicard.” No case has interpreted this subsection.
The personal information exemption, RCW 42.56.230(7)(a), is ambiguous on its face
because it is not clear whether it applies to records actually “used to prove” personal information
in an application for a driver’s license or identicard or whether it applies to records of a type used
to prove such information. See Jametsky, 179 Wn.2d at 762. The legislative history reveals that
the personal information exemption, RCW 42.56.230(7), was added in 2008, when the legislature
enacted laws to prevent profiling and tracking of individuals using their enhanced driver’s licenses
and identicards.9 LAWS OF 2008, ch. 200, § 5. This act included a legislative finding that enhanced
driver’s licenses and identicards were not intended to “facilitate the profiling and tracking of
individuals.” LAWS OF 2008, ch. 200, § 1(2). Further, the final bill report explained that at the
time, there were no laws restricting a nongovernmental entity from using personal information
9 As enacted, the personal information exemption, RCW 42.56.230(7)(a), created an exemption
for “[d]ocuments and related materials and scanned images of documents and related materials
used to prove . . . personal information required to apply for a driver’s license or identicard.” LAWS
OF 2008, ch. 200, § 5.
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“gained through” an enhanced driver’s license or identicard. H.B. REP. ON SUBSTITUTE H.B. 2729,
at 2, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008).
The legislative finding’s reference to the use of enhanced driver’s licenses and identicards
to track individuals with those cards and the final bill report’s reference to personal information
actually “gained” through an enhanced driver’s license or identicard both support that the personal
information exemption, RCW 42.56.230(7)(a), was intended to prevent the release of actual
information submitted to the Department of Licensing. Additionally, in interpreting the PRA, we
read its exemptions narrowly. Resident Action Council, 177 Wn.2d at 431. For these reasons, we
interpret the personal information exemption, RCW 42.56.230(7)(a), as exempting only covered
personal information actually submitted as part of an application for a driver’s license or
identicard.
Because the superior court interpreted the personal information exemption, RCW
42.56.230(7)(a), broadly to bar the disclosure of any information of a type that would be submitted
in connection to an application for a driver’s license or identicard, it erred as a matter of law in
Doe D’s and Doe G’s lawsuits.
E. EXEMPTION OF RECORDS UNDER THE CPA, FORMER RCW 4.24.550, AND THE PRA
In all three offender lawsuits, the superior court ruled that former RCW 4.24.550 barred
release of sex offender records because it was an “other statute” exemption to the PRA. The parties
agree that under WSP, the superior court’s rulings that the CPA, former RCW 4.24.550, was an
“other statute” barring the release of records under the PRA, were erroneous.10 We agree and
10 Doe G does not address this issue.
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reverse the superior court’s rulings that the CPA, former RCW 4.24.550, barred the release of
requested records.
In WSP, the Supreme Court held that “RCW 4.24.550, and specifically RCW
4.24.550(3)(a), is not an ‘other statute’ exemption under” the PRA. 185 Wn.2d at 368. Thus, the
superior court’s rulings to the contrary were incorrect as a matter of law and are reversed.
F. EXEMPTION OF JUVENILE RECORDS UNDER CH. 13.50 RCW AND THE PRA
In Does L-O’s, Doe D’s, and the County’s lawsuits, the superior court ruled that ch. 13.50
RCW is an “other statute” exemption to the PRA so that certain juvenile records were exempt from
disclosure. Related to the County’s lawsuit, Zink and the County disagree over whether the
superior court erred when it determined that unredacted juvenile records and information not found
in the official juvenile court file were exempt under ch. 13.50 RCW as an “other statute” PRA
exemption. Related to Does L-O’s and D’s lawsuits, Zink also argues that court-ordered juvenile
SSODA evaluations are not confidential because they are part of the official court file. We reject
Zink’s arguments and follow State v. A.G.S., 182 Wn.2d 273, 340 P.3d 830 (2014).
It is well settled that ch. 13.50 RCW is an “other statute” exemption to the PRA that bars
the release of juvenile justice and care records. See Wright, 176 Wn. App. at 597.11 At the time
of Zink’s request, former RCW 13.50.010 (2013) defined the official juvenile court file as “the
11 In Wright, we held that the PRA did not apply to a request for a recorded interview because the
interview was a record maintained in a juvenile’s social file and was thus governed by ch. 13.50
RCW. 176 Wn. App. at 597-98; see also Anderson v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs,, 196 Wn.
App. 674, 684, 384 P.3d 651 (2016) (the language in ch. 13.50 RCW creates an exception to PRA
disclosure), review denied, 188 Wn.2d 1006 (2017); In re Dependency of KB, 150 Wn. App. 912,
923, 210 P.3d 330 (2009) (ch. 13.50 RCW provides the exclusive “process, including sanctions,
for obtaining juvenile justice and care agency records”); Deer v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs, 122
Wn. App. 84, 91, 93 P.3d 195 (2004) (ch. 13.50 RCW is an “other statute” exemption).
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legal file of the juvenile court containing the petition or information, motions, memorandums,
briefs, findings of the court, and court orders.” Former RCW 13.50.010(1)(b). “‘Records’” were
the “official juvenile court file, the social file, and records of any other juvenile justice or care
agency in the case,” and “‘[s]ocial file’” was the “juvenile court file containing the records and
reports of the probation counselor.” Former RCW 13.50.010(1)(c)-(d) (2014).
For records related to the commission of juvenile offenses, “[t]he official juvenile court
file of any alleged or proven juvenile offender shall be open to public inspection, unless sealed
pursuant to RCW 13.50.260.” RCW 13.50.050(2). But “[a]ll records other than the official
juvenile court file are confidential and may be released only as provided in [ch. 13.50 RCW], RCW
13.40.215,[12]and [former RCW] 4.24.550.[13]” RCW 13.50.050(3).
1. NON-SSODA EVALUATION JUVENILE COURT RECORDS
In its lawsuit, the County provided undisputed facts that the juvenile records in PCSD’s
possession went beyond those that were contained in official juvenile court files.14 Under RCW
12 RCW 13.40.215 creates community notification provisions for juveniles found to have
committed a violent offense, a sex offense, or stalking.
13 Former RCW 4.24.550 governs risk assessment and notification when sex offenders are released
from confinement. See also Sanchez, 177 Wn.2d at 848 (RCW 13.50.050 incorporates an
“exception for the release of SSODA evaluations to local law enforcement for the purpose of
making sex offender risk assessments”).
14 The records held by the PCSD included the following:
Residential Admission Summary from JRA [juvenile rehabilitation
administration][,] . . . JRA intake interview with mental health/physical
information, JRA client history review, . . . [Child Protective Services] referrals,
Disclosure Summary of Child Victim Interview, JRA integrated treatment program,
U[rinalysis] Lab reports from probation, Psycho Sexual Polygraph Examination,
Juvenile Detention Reports, Pre[d]isposition Diagnosis Report, Memorandum from
Juvenile Detention Probation to Court, Proteen Health Social Services Report.
CP at 1607.
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No. 48378-5-II
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13.50.050(3), which is an “other statute” exemption to the PRA, records relating to the commission
of juvenile offenses other than the official juvenile court file are confidential. The superior court’s
ruling in the County’s lawsuit that juvenile records not found within the official juvenile court file
were confidential under ch 13.50 RCW as an “other statute” exemption to the PRA was
accordingly correct.15
2. JUVENILE SSODA EVALUATIONS
Related to Does L-O’s and Doe D’s lawsuits, Zink argues that SSODA evaluations are part
of the official juvenile court file, so that they must be disclosed. But in A.G.S., our Supreme Court
held that a SSODA evaluation does not fit within the definition of an “official juvenile court file”
in former RCW 13.50.010(1)(b).16 182 Wn.2d at 275. It is neither a “petition or information,
motion, memorandum, brief, finding of the court, or a court order,” or indeed a “court document”
at all; “[r]ather, it is a psychological report that includes a treatment plan.” A.G.S., 182 Wn.2d at
278. Accordingly, a SSODA evaluation “is subject to the general rule that all juvenile records not
in the official juvenile court file must be kept confidential.” A.G.S., 182 Wn.2d at 275.
15 We note that under RCW 13.50.050(5), information not within an official juvenile court file
concerning a juvenile or a juvenile’s family may be released only when redacted. In the County’s
case, the superior court ruled that if redacted, juvenile records not within the official juvenile court
file could be released. On appeal, neither Zink nor the County argue that this was error.
Accordingly, we do not reach whether RCW 13.50.050(5) allows redacted juvenile records not
within the official juvenile court file to be released.
16 In 2016, the legislature amended the definition of “official juvenile court file” in former RCW
13.50.010. LAWS OF 2016, ch. 93, § 2. We rely on the definition used in A.G.S. and in effect when
Zink made her public records request.
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Recognizing that A.G.S. addresses this argument, Zink argues that the holding applies to
only SSODAs paid for by an offender, not to court-ordered SSODAs. Zink accurately recognizes
that in A.G.S., the State and the juvenile ordered separate evaluations and it was disclosure of the
juvenile’s, not the State’s, evaluation that was at issue. 182 Wn.2d at 275-76.
Nevertheless, A.G.S.’s holding applies to all SSODA evaluations, regardless of whether
the evaluation is court ordered or paid for by the offender. In A.G.S., the reason that SSODA
evaluations were not part of the official juvenile court file was “the nature of the document itself.”
182 Wn.2d at 277. A.G.S. discussed SSODA evaluations in general, regardless of whether the
SSODA was requested by the court or a party. 182 Wn.2d at 276-77. Thus, A.G.S. relied on the
nature of the evaluation, not the identity of the requestor, and accordingly the difference in the
requestor’s identity is not a persuasive reason to abandon A.G.S.’s holding. 182 Wn.2d at 277.17
We decline to depart from A.G.S. and hold that as a matter of law, the superior court
properly ruled that juvenile SSODA evaluations were confidential because they were not part of
the official juvenile court file.
17 Zink also briefly relies upon Koenig v. Thurston County, which she claims held that SSODA
evaluations are sentencing documents that are part of the official juvenile court file. 175 Wn.2d
837, 287 P.3d 523 (2012). But Koenig held that only SSOSA/SSODA evaluations do not fall
within the PRA’s investigative records exemption because they are tools used “after a criminal
investigation has been conducted.” 175 Wn.2d at 848. Its holding does not apply here.
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No. 48378-5-II
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G. CRIMINAL RECORDS PRIVACY ACT
Zink argues that the requested evaluations are “conviction records” that must be released
in their entirety under the CRPA. We disagree with Zink that juvenile SSODA records18 in their
entirety must be disclosed under the CRPA.
The CRPA expressly supplants the PRA and requires the release of conviction records
without restriction. RCW 10.97.140. However, nothing in the CRPA supplants ch. 13.50 RCW,
which is the exclusive process for obtaining juvenile justice and care agency records. In re
Dependency of KB, 150 Wn. App. 912, 920, 210 P.3d 330 (2009) (citing Deer v. Dep’t of Soc. &
Health Servs, 122 Wn. App. 84, 92-93, 93 P.3d 195 (2004)).
“Conviction record[s]” are “criminal history record information relating to an incident
which has led to a conviction or other disposition adverse to the subject.” RCW 10.97.030(3).
Criminal history record information is essentially identifiable descriptions of offenders coupled
with notations of formal criminal charges and the disposition arising therefrom. RCW
10.97.030(4); accord Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup, 172 Wn.2d 398, 422,
259 P.3d 190 (2011).
At the outset, we disagree with Zink that the CRPA’s provisions control over ch. 13.50
RCW’s process for obtaining juvenile records. See KB, 150 Wn. App. at 920. But even if the
18 Because SSOSA evaluations are not exempt from disclosure, we do not need to reach whether
the CRPA otherwise requires SSOSA evaluations’ release. Zink also briefly argues that RCW
9.94A.475, requiring prosecutors to maintain felony sentences as public records, requires juvenile
SSODA evaluations to be released. Her reliance on this statute is misplaced because it is intended
solely for prosecutors’ guidance and “may not be relied upon to create a right or benefit,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party in litigation with the state.” RCW
9.94A.401.
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No. 48378-5-II
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CRPA’s provisions controlled, Zink could not obtain SSODA evaluations in their entirety through
the CRPA.
Juvenile SSODA evaluations by statute contain information that is not “criminal history
record information.” A juvenile SSODA evaluation must include an assessment of the offender’s
problems and deviant behaviors, the offender’s social, educational, and employment situation, the
offender’s amenability to treatment and relative risk to the community, the sources of the
examiner’s information, and a proposed treatment plan. RCW 13.40.162(2). This information
goes well beyond the offender’s description, a notation of formal criminal charges, and the
disposition arising therefrom. Thus, a juvenile SSODA evaluation necessarily contains
information that is not criminal history record information. See RCW 10.97.030(4). And because
a juvenile SSODA evaluation contains more than criminal history record information, the
information in a SSODA evaluation goes beyond that found in a conviction record. RCW
10.97.030(3).
In short, Zink argues that juvenile SSODA evaluations are conviction records, so that they
must be disclosed under the CRPA. But the fact that juvenile SSODA evaluations contain
information found in a conviction record does not require disclosure of SSODA evaluations in
their entirety under the CRPA. We hold that the CRPA does not apply to SSODA evaluations,
which fall under ch. 13.50 RCW; we also hold that even if the CRPA applied, it would not require
unredacted SSODA evaluations to be disclosed.
H. EXEMPTIONS CONCLUSION
When enjoining disclosure under RCW 42.56.540, the superior court first must determine
“that a specific exemption applies.” Yakima County v. Yakima Herald-Republic, 170 Wn.2d 775,
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807-08, 246 P.3d 768 (2011). Here, the superior court properly ruled that unredacted juvenile
records not contained in the official juvenile court file and held by Pierce County and unredacted
juvenile SSODA evaluations were exempt under ch. 13.50 RCW as an “other statute” exemption
to the PRA. However, the superior court erred as a matter of law when it ruled that
SSOSA/SSODA evaluations were exempt under the PRA’s UHCIA exemption, that certain
personal information was generally exempt under the personal information exemption, RCW
42.56.230(7)(a), and that registration records and information were exempt under the CPA, former
RCW 4.24.550, as an “other statute” exemption.
Juvenile records not found within the official juvenile court file and SSODA evaluations
in Pierce County’s, Doe D’s, and Does L-O’s lawsuits were the only records here that as a matter
of law were exempt from disclosure under the PRA. We next examine whether the County, Does
L-O, and Doe D established the permanent injunction factors in RCW 42.56.540.
I. OTHER PERMANENT INJUNCTION FACTORS
Zink disputes whether the County and the offenders met their summary judgment burdens
under RCW 42.56.540 to show undisputed material facts that an injunction was appropriate
because (1) examination of the requested records was clearly not in the public interest and (2)
would result in substantial and irreparable harm to the offenders or a vital governmental function.
Because only juvenile records were exempt from disclosure, we address her arguments as they
apply to the juvenile records enjoined from production under ch. 13.50 RCW as an “other statute”
PRA exemption.
The examination of any specific public record may be enjoined if, upon motion and
affidavit by . . . a person who is named in the record or to whom the record
specifically pertains, the superior court . . . finds that such examination would
clearly not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably damage
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any person, or would substantially and irreparably damage vital governmental
functions.
RCW 42.56.540. To enjoin disclosure under the injunction statute, a trial court must find “that a
specific exemption applies and that disclosure would not be in the public interest and would
substantially and irreparably damage a person.” Yakima Herald-Republic, 170 Wn.2d at 808.
“‘[T]he party seeking to prevent disclosure has the burden of proof.’” Lyft, Inc. v. City of Seattle,
___ Wn.2d ___, 418 P.3d 102, 113-14 (2018) (quoting Spokane Police Guild v. Liquor Control
Bd., 112 Wn.2d 30, 35, 769 P.2d 283 (1989)).
1. NOT IN THE PUBLIC’S INTEREST
Regarding juvenile SSODA evaluations, Does L-O supported their summary judgment
motion with evidence that generalized disclosure of information about juvenile offenders would
not advance public safety and was accordingly not in the public’s interest. Similarly, Doe D
provided evidence that psychosexual evaluation disclosure would deter participation in
psychosexual examinations and treatment, harm third parties, and infringe on the assessment of
risks to community safety in the sex offender management system. For its part, the County also
provided evidence that releasing juvenile records other than those in the official juvenile court file
would be contrary to vital government interests, thus being against the public interest.
In response to summary judgment, Zink bears the burden of showing that there was a
genuine issue of material fact or that summary judgment is inappropriate as a matter of law.
Ranger Ins. Co. v. Pierce County, 164 Wn.2d 545, 552, 192 P.3d 886 (2008). Rather than pointing
to evidence that she believes the superior court overlooked when it ruled that there was no genuine
issue of material fact that examination was clearly not in the public’s interest, Zink relies upon a
statement of purpose under the CPA, former RCW 4.24.550. That statement of purpose says,
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“[T]he penal and mental health components of our justice system are largely hidden from public
view and that lack of information from either may result in failure of both systems to meet this
paramount concern of public safety.” LAWS OF 1990, ch. 3, § 116.
But the statement of purpose to the CPA, former RCW 4.24.550, shows no more than that
the purpose of the CPA was to increase awareness of penal and mental health components of the
justice system. It does not support that the public has an interest in the juvenile records that are
exempt from disclosure under ch. 13.50 RCW. Zink fails to put forth evidence that rebuts Does
L-O’s, Doe D’s, and the County’s evidence that it is clearly not in the public interest to disclose
juveniles’ SSODAs and records not within the official juvenile court file. Accordingly, Zink fails
to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether disclosing the juvenile records she
requested is clearly not in the public interest.
2. SUBSTANTIAL AND IRREPARABLE HARM
Regarding substantial and irreparable harm to themselves or a vital governmental interest,
again, Does L-O and D and the County put forth detailed, unrebutted evidence of the substantial
and irreparable harm of SSODA and other juvenile record disclosure. Does L-O provided evidence
that releasing unredacted juvenile SSODA evaluations would increase known risk factors,
revictimize victims, cause social isolation of offenders, decrease compliance with registration
requirements, and compromise counseling, treatment, and rehabilitation efforts. Their evidence
included that public notification disproportionately impacted juvenile offenders, those who were
otherwise the least likely to reoffend. Similarly, Doe D explained that psychosexual evaluation
release would deter participation in treatment and injure victims of uncharged offenses. And the
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County explained that the records in its possession included highly confidential information about
juveniles’ mental health and health care.
Again, Zink does not point to evidence she believes that the superior court overlooked but
claims that the evidence provided by the offenders and the County was nothing more than evidence
of “possible harm” and “embarrassment.” Reply Br. of Appellant/Cross-Resp’t at 10 (bolding
omitted). To the contrary, the offenders’ and the County’s evidence was detailed and substantiated
harm not only to the offenders but to third parties, vital governmental functions, and the public in
general. Zink fails to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether disclosing the
juvenile records she requested would damage the offenders or a vital governmental function.
Accordingly, we affirm the superior court’s orders granting summary judgment in this regard.
J. CONCLUSION: SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS IN OFFENDERS’ AND
COUNTY’S LAWSUITS
When the superior court granted Does L-O’s motion for summary judgment, it erred when
it ruled that the CPA, former RCW 4.24.550, was an “other statute” PRA exemption that barred
the release of registration records and information and SSOSA/SSODA evaluations. See WSP,
185 Wn.2d at 368. The superior court also erred when it granted summary judgment and enjoined
the release of unredacted SSOSA/SSODA evaluations under the UHCIA exemption to the PRA.
See Doe G II, 190 Wn.2d at 197. However, the superior court properly ruled that unredacted
juvenile SSODA evaluations fell under ch. 13.50 RCW, an “other statute” exempting records from
disclosure, and that the evidence was undisputed that the offenders had met RCW 42.56.540’s
requirements for a permanent injunction. See A.G.S., 182 Wn.2d at 275; Wright, 176 Wn. App. at
597.
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When the superior court granted Doe D’s motion for summary judgment, it erred when it
ruled that the CPA, former RCW 4.24.550, was an “other statute” PRA exemption that barred the
release of registration records and information and SSOSA/SSODA evaluations. See WSP, 185
Wn.2d at 368. We also hold that the superior court erred when it ruled that information of a type
required to apply for a driver’s license was exempt from disclosure under the personal information
exemption, RCW 42.56.230(7). And the superior court erred when it ruled that unredacted
SSOSA/SSODA evaluations were exempt from disclosure under the UHCIA exemption to the
PRA. See Doe G II, 190 Wn.2d at 197. However, the superior court properly enjoined the release
of unredacted juvenile SSODA evaluations under ch. 13.50 RCW, including ruling that the
evidence was undisputed that the offenders had met RCW 42.56.540’s requirements for a
permanent injunction. See A.G.S., 182 Wn.2d at 275; Wright, 176 Wn. App. at 597.
As for Doe G’s motion for summary judgment and a permanent injunction, the superior
court erred when it ruled that the CPA, former RCW 4.24.550, was an “other statute” PRA
exemption that barred the release of his sex offender registration forms. See WSP, 185 Wn.2d at
368. We also hold that the superior court erred when it ruled that the personal information
exemption, RCW 42.56.230(7)(a), barred the release of personal information of a type used to
apply for a driver’s license. We do not address whether the superior court erred when it ruled that
if discovered, the SSOSA evaluations were exempt from disclosure under the UHCIA as a PRA
exemption.
Finally, the superior court properly ruled that to the extent the County held juvenile justice
and care agency records not otherwise contained in the official juvenile court file, ch. 13.50 RCW
is an “other statute” that exempts those records from production. See A.G.S., 182 Wn.2d at 275;
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Wright, 176 Wn. App. at 597. The superior court also properly ruled that the County had provided
undisputed evidence to meet its burden under RCW 42.56.540, setting forth the PRA’s permanent
injunction factors.
We reverse in part and remand the superior court’s order granting summary judgment and
a permanent injunction in Doe G’s lawsuit. We reverse in part and affirm in part the orders
granting summary judgment and permanent injunctions in Doe D’s and Does L-O’s lawsuits and
remand for further proceedings. We also affirm the superior court’s ruling on the County’s
summary judgment motion enjoining the release of unredacted juvenile court records not found in
the official juvenile court file. Next, we look to whether the superior court properly granted
summary judgment and dismissed Zink’s counterclaims against the County for PRA violations.
K. COUNTERCLAIMS AGAINST COUNTY FOR ALLEGED PRA VIOLATIONS
Zink argues that the trial court erred when it granted the County’s summary judgment
motion and dismissed her counterclaims with prejudice. We address her arguments related to the
PCSD and to PCPO in turn below.
In addition to reviewing summary judgment de novo, we review de novo whether an
agency complied with the PRA. RCW 42.56.550(3).
1. PIERCE COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT
When the superior court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment dismissal of
Zink’s counterclaims against the PCSD, it concluded that PCSD had the right to give third-party
notice under RCW 42.56.540 and PCC 2.04.040. Further, the PCSD did not have to provide an
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exemption log because its production was not yet final. Zink raises several arguments related to
the superior court’s legal conclusions.19
a. THIRD-PARTY NOTIFICATION
First, related to third-party notification, Zink contends that as a matter of law, RCW
42.56.540, setting forth the requirements to enjoin production, and former RCW 42.56.520(2)
(2010), allowing additional time to respond to a record request, disallow notifying third parties
unless an exemption applies. Under her interpretation, she argues that the PCC provision allowing
a records officer to notify third parties without identifying an exemption violates RCW 42.56.540
and former RCW 42.56.520(2).20 Zink also asserts that she created a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the PCSD acted in good faith because it was aware that in other jurisdictions,
offenders had obtained injunctions to bar the release of records. These arguments fail.
RCW 42.56.540 gives an agency the “option” of notifying third persons named in a record
unless notice is required by law, in which case there is no “option.” Former RCW 42.56.520(2)
allows additional time to respond to a request if there is a need to notify third persons. PCC
2.04.040D provides, “In the event that the requested records contain information that may affect
rights of others and may be exempt from disclosure, the public records officer or designee may,
19 Zink does not argue that PCSD assessed costs in violation of the PRA; she acknowledges that
only PCPO assessed any costs.
20 Zink also briefly claims that RCW 42.56.240(8) barred the County from disclosing her
information in the notification letters. We disagree. RCW 42.56.240(8) exempts from public
inspection and copying “[i]nformation submitted to the statewide unified sex offender notification
and registration program under RCW 36.28A.040(6) by a person for the purpose of receiving
notification regarding a registered sex offender.” (Emphasis added.) This statute clearly does not
apply to Zink’s PRA request to the County.
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prior to providing the records, give notice to such others whose rights may be affected by the
disclosure.”
RCW 42.56.540 and former RCW 42.56.520 specifically state that if a third person is
named in a record, the County may notify the third person that the record is the subject of a PRA
request. Contrary to Zink’s arguments, there is no requirement that the County first determine that
an exemption will apply to the record. Indeed, to require an exemption to be identified first
contravenes RCW 42.56.540’s mechanism for allowing the third person to then move to enjoin the
examination of the record by showing that an exemption exists. See Yakima Herald-Republic, 170
Wn.2d at 808. We disagree with Zink that allowing the County to notify offenders before
determining that an exemption applied circumvents the PRA.
In addition, and contrary to Zink’s argument, PCC 2.04.040 is consistent with RCW
42.56.540 and former RCW 42.56.520(2). Again, it reflects the PRA’s option for agencies to
notify third persons who may be affected by production of a requested record because, as here,
they are identified in it.
Finally, related to Zink’s argument that she created a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether other jurisdictions released offender records, Zink points to her summary
judgment opposition evidence that Yakima County had released SSOSA evaluations. But this
does not create a factual issue regarding whether the County was aware of “other jurisdictions”
having received similar requests, resulting in offenders obtaining injunctions. CP at 1607. Thus,
Zink fails to create a genuine issue of material fact on this point.
Zink’s arguments that the superior court wrongly granted summary judgment of her
counterclaims against the PCSD related to third-party notification accordingly fail.
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b. WITHHOLDING RECORDS
Second, Zink argues that the PCSD violated the PRA because it was not allowed to
“withhold” records until it identified an exemption and produced an exemption log. Opening Br.
of Appellant at 64. We disagree and follow our opinion in Hobbs v. Wash. State Auditor’s Office,
183 Wn. App. 925, 335 P.3d 1004 (2014).
The PRA does not allow a requestor “to initiate a lawsuit prior to an agency’s denial and
closure of a public records request.” Hobbs, 183 Wn. App. at 935. “Under the PRA, a requester
may only initiate a lawsuit to compel compliance with the PRA after the agency has engaged in
some final action denying access to a record.” Hobbs, 183 Wn. App. at 935-36. When an agency
produces records in installments, the agency does not “deny” access to the records until it finishes
producing all responsive documents. Hobbs, 183 Wn. App. at 936-37.
Here, the County provided evidence in support of summary judgment that it was still
producing records in response to Zink’s request as of the date Zink filed her counterclaims. When
the County moved for summary judgment and put forth facts to support that the PCSD had not yet
taken a final action on Zink’s PRA request, the burden shifted to Zink to show that the PCSD had
taken a final action on her request. But to support her claims, Zink simply relied upon the fact that
the PCSD had sought judicial review when the County instituted its lawsuit to prevent PCSD from
having to disclose juvenile records not in the official juvenile court file. Zink submitted her own
declaration repeating her allegation that the PCSD was “withholding” records, CP at 2104, and
claiming that the PCSD’s production was final because it had sought an injunction barring the
release of juvenile records and informed Zink it would not release some sentencing and judgment
documents until it obtained judicial review.
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Even viewed in the light most favorable to Zink, the fact that the PCSD sought judicial
review of whether some records were exempt does not constitute a “final” action on Zink’s request.
The PCSD did not refuse to disclose records. Rather, it sought legal review of whether the records
were exempt or whether they were not exempt and thus would be released to Zink.
Zink relies on City of Lakewood v. Koenig, which she claims stands for the rule that an
agency must explain its exemptions at the outset, in response to a request. 182 Wn.2d 87, 343
P.3d 335 (2014). But reliance on Koenig assumes that the agency redacted or withheld records in
response to a request; here, PCSD had not yet finished producing records in response to Zink’s
request. Accordingly, Koenig is inapplicable. We disagree with Zink that she has shown that she
waited for a final action denying access to a record before initiating a lawsuit. See Hobbs, 183
Wn. App. at 935.
Zink also argues that Hobbs is distinguishable because it involves “RCW 42.56.520” and
she filed her “complaint” under “RCW 42.56.550.” Opening Br. of Appellant at 71. Contrary to
Zink’s assertions, her counterclaims repeatedly referenced former RCW 42.56.520. We hold that
the superior court properly granted summary judgment dismissal of Zink’s counterclaims against
PCSD for “withholding” records.
2. PIERCE COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE
a. SUPERIOR COURT’S RULING
Related to PCPO production, the superior court found that the facts were undisputed that
the PCPO required Zink to make her request via fax and/or U.S. postal service and to provide her
correct return address. On November 21, Zink e-mailed her records request to the PCPO and
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requested records be provided by e-mail or fax. On November 26, the PCPO sent Zink a letter that
although an e-mailed request was improper, it was searching for responsive records.
On December 4, the PCPO sought clarification of Zink’s request and also explained that if
Zink did not contact the office within 30 days, it would close her request. On January 9, 2015, the
PCPO sent Zink a letter again seeking clarification of her request and explaining how charges
would be assessed. The PCPO explained that Zink could view the records for free but would have
to pay $0.15 per page plus postage and an hourly labor rate for scanning copies. On January 23,
the PCPO sent Zink a letter that the first installment of records was available and could be copied
and mailed to her for $225.70. Further, the cost of scanning the records to a CD was $84.20, and
the cost of faxing the records was $80.48. The PCPO would close Zink’s request if it did not hear
from her within 30 days.
On January 26, Zink faxed the PCPO and requested “electronic copies . . . via email or
placed in the cloud.” CP at 2679. She also requested an itemized cost analysis. On January 28,
the PCPO mailed Zink a letter again outlining the calculation of costs. On January 31, Zink faxed
the PCPO and stated that because she felt the PCPO had not adequately explained its determination
of costs, she would consider the PCPO’s decision as a denial of access. On February 23, the PCPO
closed Zink’s request as abandoned.
The superior court found that the facts were undisputed that the PCPO sent its letters to the
wrong address for Zink because of a clerical error. However, the incorrect address was immaterial
because Zink ultimately received the communications and invited the error by failing to make her
original request in the required format. The superior court determined as a matter of law that the
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cost estimate was reasonable and that the PRA did not bar the PCPO from producing records only
via fax, U.S. mail, and digital video disk (DVD)/CD.
Zink raises several arguments challenging these rulings, which we address in turn below.21
b. REFUSAL TO PROVIDE RECORDS ELECTRONICALLY
On appeal, Zink challenges the PCPO’s refusal to provide records by e-mail or “the cloud”
as a PRA violation. But her argument fails as a matter of law because “‘[n]othing in the PRA
obligates an agency to disclose records electronically.’” Benton County v. Zink, 191 Wn. App.
269, 281, 361 P.3d 801 (2015) (quoting Mitchell v. Dep’t of Corr., 164 Wn. App. 597, 606, 277
P.3d 670 (2011)), review denied, 185 Wn.2d 1021 (2016).
c. ALLEGED FACTUAL DISPUTE
Zink also asserts that she has created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
PCPO complied with former RCW 42.56.070(7) (2005), which required that an agency maintain
a statement of the “actual per page cost or other costs, if any, that it charges for providing
photocopies of public records and a statement of the factors and manner used to determine the
actual per page cost or other costs, if any.” Opening Br. of Appellant at 75 (bolding and underline
omitted); (quoting former RCW 42.56.070(7) (2005)). We disagree.
In support of summary judgment, the County provided the PCPO public record officer’s
statement that she had sent a letter to Zink on January 9, 2015, explaining that the cost for copies
of records was $0.15 per page, plus postage, and that an hourly rate would be assessed for scanning
copies to CD or faxing copies. Attached to this letter, the PCPO provided a statement of factors
21 Zink’s exemption log and third party notification arguments pertain to PCSD, not PCPO; as
Zink recognizes, PCPO closed Zink’s request without exemptions or third-party notification.
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and manner breaking down the cost calculation for scanning copies to CD and mailing them. The
PCPO also provided a copy of PCC 2.04.070, detailing the per-page price for copies. Further, on
January 28, after Zink requested the statements of factors and manner for determining costs, the
PCPO again mailed copies of these documents to Zink. Zink replied, referencing the statement
and stating that she believed it was inadequate.
Zink does not cite to the record or provide any argument about what evidence she produced
that created a genuine issue of material fact on this issue. Neither does Zink’s affidavit in
opposition to the County’s summary judgment motion provide any evidence to dispute that the
PCPO maintained a statement of costs and provided it to her. Accordingly, Zink fails to create a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the PCPO maintained a statement of factors and
manner used to determine costs and complied with former RCW 42.56.070(7).
d. REQUIRING REQUESTS TO BE MADE BY FAX OR U.S. MAIL
Zink argues that the superior court erred when it concluded that the PCPO was allowed to
require PRA requests to be made by fax or U.S. mail. She alternatively argues that there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether she did, in fact, make her original request by fax. But
Zink did not bring a counterclaim on the basis that the PCPO violated the PRA by sending
correspondence to the wrong address or requiring PRA requests to be made by fax or U.S. mail.
Accordingly, whether PCPO violated the PRA in this regard cannot be the basis for summary
judgment in Zink’s favor, and we decline to review her arguments in this regard.
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L. CONCLUSION: PIERCE COUNTY SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER
The superior court properly dismissed Zink’s counterclaims related to PRA violations.
Thus, we affirm the superior court’s order granting summary judgment and a permanent injunction
in the County’s lawsuit.
II. USE OF PSEUDONYMS
Zink argues that the superior court erred when it allowed the offenders to proceed under
pseudonyms.22 She raises arguments related to her state constitutional rights, GR 15, and the rules
of civil procedure. Does L-O argue that no court record was “seal[ed]” because they never filed
their real names and that the use of pseudonyms does not violate the civil rules. Responsive Br.
of Resp’t Does L-O at 28. We agree with Zink: under Doe G II, the superior court had to apply
the Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa23 factors before allowing Does L-O to proceed under
pseudonyms.
We review a trial court’s decision to allow plaintiffs to proceed under pseudonyms for an
abuse of discretion. John Doe G v. Dep’t of Corr., 197 Wn. App. 609, 628, 391 P.3d 496 (2017)
(Doe G I), rev’d on other grounds, 190 Wn.2d 185. The Washington Constitution, article I, section
10, guarantees the open administration of justice, including public access to court records.
Dreiling v. Jain, 151 Wn.2d 900, 908, 93 P.3d 861 (2004). Applying the experience and logic test,
“names in pleadings are subject to article I, section 10 and redaction must meet the Ishikawa
22 We do not reach Zink’s arguments that the superior court erred when it allowed Does D and G
to file their lawsuits under pseudonyms. Zink will receive Doe G’s name and has already received
Doe D’s name. Thus, these issues are moot. WSP, 185 Wn.2d at 385.
23 97 Wn.2d 30, 37-39, 640 P.2d 716 (1982).
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factors.” Doe G II, 190 Wn.2d at 201. A trial court must also justify its redaction of names in
pleadings under GR 15. Doe G II, 190 Wn.2d at 202.
Here, as in Doe G II, convicted sex offenders sought to proceed under pseudonyms.
Because convicted sex offenders’ names in pleadings implicate article I, section 10, redaction of
those names from pleadings had to meet the Ishikawa factors. 190 Wn.2d at 199.
However, the superior court did not conduct an Ishikawa analysis before allowing Does L-
O to proceed under pseudonyms. Rather, the superior court found that the public had little interest
in the plaintiffs’ real names and that Zink would not be prejudiced if the Does proceeded under
pseudonyms.
The findings—or lack thereof—in the record are insufficient to allow Does L-O to proceed
under pseudonyms. Because the superior court misapplied the law by failing to conduct an
Ishikawa analysis, it abused its discretion. Therefore, we reverse the superior court’s ruling
allowing Does L-O to proceed under pseudonyms.24
III. CLASS CERTIFICATION
Zink argues that the superior court erred when it certified Does L-O’s and Doe D’s lawsuits
as class actions. She claims that the trial court could not certify the classes without knowing the
plaintiffs’ true identities. She further claims that class actions cannot be brought under the PRA
unless the class representative is named in every record to be enjoined. We reject both of Zink’s
arguments, as set forth below.
24 Because we reverse and remand, we do not reach Zink’s remaining arguments that the superior
court erred when it allowed the offenders to bring their lawsuits under pseudonyms.
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We review decisions to certify a class for an abuse of discretion. Doe G I, 197 Wn. App.
at 628-29. Class certification is appropriate if the class is sufficiently numerous, has common
questions of law or fact, “the claims . . . of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class,” and “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class.” CR 23(a)(3), (4). Typicality is satisfied if the class members’ claims all arise from
the same course of conduct and are based on the same legal theory. Pellino v. Brink’s Inc., 164
Wn. App. 668, 684, 267 P.3d 383 (2011).
A. PLAINTIFF’S TRUE IDENTITIES UNNECESSARY
Zink argues that the trial court must know the true identities of the class representatives in
order to certify a class action and that here, without knowing Does L-O’s or Doe D’s true names,
it could not determine whether they would adequately protect the classes’ interests or had typical
claims with the classes. We disagree.
Related to typicality, Does L-O each alleged they were compliant level 1 sex offenders.
They argued that each of them would suffer the same harms from release of their records and that
they all sought injunctions barring their records’ release. To support these arguments, they
provided voluminous evidence that they and all class members faced harm from disclosure of their
information, including harassment and potential loss of economic opportunity. Related to
adequacy, Does L-O again provided abundant evidence that they stood to suffer the same injury
as the class, did not have antagonistic claims, and had retained competent and capable counsel.
Similarly, Doe D alleged he was a level 3 sex offender registered in Pierce County and had
shown his claims were typical of the class of level 2 and 3 offenders registered in the County
because they would all suffer the same harms from disclosure of their records and based their
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claims on the same legal theories. In support, Doe D provided his own declaration that he was a
registered level 3 sex offender who feared harm from the disclosure of his exact address and mental
health treatment records. Related to adequacy, Doe D asserted that he brought coextensive claims
with the class and provided evidence that he had retained “competent and capable attorneys.” CP
at 2932.
The offenders provided ample evidence to support that their claims were typical of their
respective classes and that they would be adequate representatives. The superior court did not
need to know the class representatives’ names; rather, it was provided with detailed declarations
under penalty of perjury stating that the class members, as either compliant level 1 sex offenders
or a registered level 3 offender, would suffer the same injury and brought the same claims as their
respective classes. The superior court did not abuse its discretion when it certified the classes.
B. CLASS ACTIONS UNDER THE PRA
Regarding Zink’s argument that the PRA bars class actions if the named representatives
are not named in every record the class seeks to enjoin, we follow Division One’s holding in Doe
G I’s analysis on this point. There, Division One of this court pointed out that Zink’s argument
reflected a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of class action litigation because “even
statutes the legislature phrases in individual terms allow for class actions.” Doe G I, 197 Wn. App.
at 629-30. Based on Doe G I’s holding, we reject Zink’s arguments and affirm the superior court’s
orders granting class certification in Doe D’s and Does L-O’s lawsuits.
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IV. APPELLATE COSTS AND CONCLUSION
Zink requests appellate costs if she substantially prevails on review. However, Zink does
not substantially prevail; rather, we affirm summary judgment on her counterclaims and we reject
her arguments that the superior court erred when it exempted juvenile records from disclosure.
Because Zink does not substantially prevail, we decline to award appellate costs to her.
We affirm the orders certifying Doe D’s and Does L-O’s lawsuits as class actions. We
reverse and remand the order allowing Does L-O to proceed under pseudonyms. We affirm the
order granting Pierce County’s motion for summary judgment and a permanent injunction.
Regarding the order granting Does L-O’s motion for summary judgment and a permanent
injunction, we affirm the exemption of juvenile SSODA evaluations but reverse the exemption of
SSOSA evaluations and registration records and information from disclosure. Regarding the order
granting Doe D’s motion for summary judgment and a permanent injunction, we affirm the
exemption of juvenile SSODA evaluations but reverse the exemption of SSOSA evaluations and
registration records and information from disclosure. And regarding the order granting Doe G’s
motion for summary judgment and a permanent injunction, we reverse the exemption of his sex
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offender registration forms from disclosure. We remand for proceedings consistent with our
decision.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
JOHANSON, P.J.
We concur:
MELNICK, J.
SUTTON, J.
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