Credit Acceptance Corporation v. Harold Celley

VERMONT SUPREME COURT Case No. 26-AP-126
109 State Street
Montpelier VT 05609-0801
802-828-4774
www.vermontjudiciary.org
Note: In the case title, an asterisk (*) indicates an appellant and a double asterisk (**) indicates a cross-
appellant. Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.
ENTRY ORDER
SEPTEMBER TERM, 2026
Credit Acceptance Corporation v. Harold Celley* }
}
APPEALED FROM:
} Superior Court, Lamoille Unit, Civil Division
} CASE NO. 25-CV-04051
Trial Judge: Benjamin Battles
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
In this debt-collection action, borrower appeals from a civil division order granting
summary judgment to lender for the balance of a loan to purchase a vehicle. On appeal,
borrower argues that there were disputes of material fact that precluded granting summary
judgment. We affirm.
The following facts were undisputed unless otherwise indicated. In February 2021,
borrower executed a financing agreement to purchase a vehicle and agreed to pay fifty-four
monthly payments of $431.48 each. That contract was subsequently assigned to lender.
Borrower made payments on the loan until April 2024, leaving a balance of $6,496.43. In
September 2025, lender commenced this action to collect the outstanding loan.
In March 2026, lender moved for summary judgment, and attached several supporting
documents, including the loan agreement and notice of default and acceleration sent to borrower.
These documents showed that in May 2024, lender sent a notice of account to borrower
indicating that the account was delinquent, and that same month lender also mailed a notice of
acceleration.
 The lending contract required borrower to have property insurance coverage for the
vehicle. The contract also contained an option for Guaranteed Auto Protection (GAP) insurance
coverage provided by a third party, Phoenix American Administrators, which borrower elected to

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Borrower did not dispute that he opened the account or failed to make the required
payments, but asserted that he did not remember receiving the notice of default and acceleration.
He claimed that the car had been in an accident, towed by a towing company, and subsequently
sold and that he thought there would be an investigation regarding the vehicle. He asserted that
he received no notification of abandonment procedures for the vehicle, or notice of the sale, and
that these notices were required before lender could bring a collection proceeding. Borrower did
not provide any citations to the record to support his assertions or supply any affidavits or
documentary evidence.
The trial court granted defendant summary judgment based on lender’s statement of
undisputed facts, and entered judgment for lender in the amount of $6,496.43 plus interest and
costs. Borrower appeals.
“This Court reviews summary judgment rulings de novo, applying the same standard as
the trial court.” Jadallah v. Town of Fairfax, 2018 VT 34, ¶ 14, 207 Vt. 413. Summary
judgment is granted when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. V.R.C.P. 56(a). Although we give the nonmoving party the benefit
of all reasonable doubts and inferences, a party opposing summary judgment “must identify
specific facts, with citations to the record, showing that there was a genuine issue for trial.”
Jadallah, 2018 VT 34, ¶ 14 (quotation omitted).
On appeal, borrower argues that there is a dispute of fact over whether legally sufficient
notice concerning abandonment proceedings and disposition of the collateral vehicle ever
occurred. Borrower asserts that under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), a
secured creditor seeking a deficiency judgment following disposition of collateral must
demonstrate compliance with the applicable notice and disposition requirements.
Borrower has not demonstrated any dispute of material fact that would preclude summary
judgment. Although borrower asserts that lender failed to provide him with notice of
abandonment proceedings, borrower failed to create any factual record to show that lender ever
initiated abandonment. Borrower alleged that the collateral was in an accident, held by a towing
company, and sold because it was abandoned. These allegations were not properly alleged in
response to lender’s motion for summary judgment and not supported by affidavit or other
evidence in the record. In any event, even these facts do not indicate that lender was in
possession of the collateral or involved in any abandonment sale. Lender’s undisputed facts
supported by citations to the record demonstrated that borrower defaulted on his loan, and lender
purchase. There are no facts in the summary-judgment record regarding whether borrower made
an insurance claim or received any payment from insurance. On appeal, borrower has not made
any arguments related to insurance. Therefore, we do not address the issue. See Progressive Ins.
Co. v. Brown ex rel. Brown, 2008 VT 103, ¶ 9, 184 Vt. 388 (explaining that in response to
motion for summary judgment, nonmoving party was required to raise any arguments that
defeated motion).

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provided notice to borrower of the accounting and notice of acceleration. Therefore, lender was
entitled to judgment for the remaining balance of the loan.
Affirmed.
BY THE COURT:
Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice
Harold E. Eaton, Jr., Associate Justice
Christina E. Nolan, Associate Justice