Johnson v. Winters

Termont Superior Court
Filed 01/30/26
Washington Unit

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Washington Unit Case No. 25-CV-00159
65 State Street
Montpelier VT 05602
802-828-2091
www.vermontjudiciary.org
Kerrie Johnson v. Christopher Winters et al

ENTRY REGARDING MOTION
Title: Motion; Motion to Reconsider for Protective Order; Nov. 4, 2025 Entry Order
(Motion: 7; 9)
Filer: Kerrie Johnson; David R. Mclean
Filed Date: December 15, 2025; January 04, 2026

The motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Plaintiff Johnson seeks reconsideration of the Court's November 4" order concerning

discovery in this matter. This motion comes on the heels of the discovery hearing that Plaintiff
did not attend.
As the Court explained in its November 4" Order, the sole issue before the Court is a
mandamus issue under Rule 75, to determine whether DCF/DAIL exercised its discretion in

finding good cause under 33 V.S.A. § 4921(c)(1) to deny Plaintiff Johnson the requested files.
An action for mandamus is necessarily limited. As the Vermont Supreme Court stated:
The purpose of mandamus is generally to require a public official or body to
perform a simple ministerial duty imposed by law, although it may be available to
enforce even discretionary duties "[w]here there appears, in some form, an
arbitrary abuse of the power vested by law in an administrative officer ... which
amounts to a virtual refusal to act or to perform a duty imposed by law.

Sagar v. Warren Selectboard, 170 Vt. 167, 171, 744 A.2d 422, 425 (1999) (quotation omitted).
In other words, the question before the Court in the present matter is strictly limited to

whether DCF/DAIL acted within their discretion or in an arbitrary manner. It is not to qualify or
second guess the good cause but simply to determine that DCF/DAIL did or did not exercise

such discretion. Mandamus is largely a procedural right to ensure that government acts within

the guardrails of its authority, and the common remedy to mandamus is to mandate that the

government perform the review or analysis that it was originally obligated to perform. Alger v.
Department of Labor & Industry, 2006 VT 115,q 15.
In this respect, Plaintiff’s efforts to broaden the scope of discovery to obtain information
on the nature of the documents withheld, any interrogatories that go beyond the mandamus claim
(including interrogatories about claims that have been dismissed) are largely outside of the scope
of the matter before the court and are not relevant to the claims. V.R.C.P. 26(b)(1).
In the present case, the question for the Court to review is whether DCF/DAIL’s decision
to deny Plaintiff’s request for the redacted investigation files was done with or without good
cause. 33 V.S.A. § 4921(c)(1). Discovery in such a case would include: (1) information as to
how DCF/DAIL processed the request; (2) who reviewed and made the determination; (3) the
nature of the determination process; (4) what considerations went into the determination; and (5)
the determination and any contemporary supporting reasoning not otherwise disclosed at the
time. While this list is not intended to be exhaustive, it is intended to underscore the limited and
procedural nature of the Court’s review of the remaining claim before the Court.
As presently framed, Plaintiff’s interrogatories and requests to produce largely overshoot
this mark and seek: (1) copies of the underlying files that were denied; (2) information
concerning claims related to the Office of Child, Youth, and Family Advocate that is not
presently before the Court as an active claim; (3) broader trends and details about requests and
denials; or (4) material, such as information concerning other investigations, that exceeds the
present review of under Rule 75 mandamus of Defendant’s denial to Plaintiff’s request. While
the Court has reviewed the discovery requests, it finds that simply parsing them into allowable
and unallowable questions would not adequately address the issue in either Plaintiff’s motion or
Defendant’s motion for a protective order.
Put plainly, Plaintiff is entitled to discovery relevant to her Rule 75 claim. Such
discovery should be proportional to the needs of the case. V.R.C.P. 26(b)(1). Plaintiff appears
to be painting this as a public records and transparency quest. That may be part of Plaintiff’s
motivation, but the nature of this review as created by the legislature is far more limited. These
are confidential and private documents that the legislature has exempted from general public
view. 33 V.S.A. § 4921. While it has given parents the right to obtain this information, it has
made that right conditional and subject to the broad discretion of DCF/DAIL. Id. This authority
is without right of appeal. Therefore, the nature and scope of the Court’s review is limited and
tied to the procedural question of whether DCF/DAIL gave sufficient process and consideration
to make a good faith determination on its denial.
The Court will give Plaintiff an opportunity to scale her interrogatories to the scope and
relevance of the present Rule 75 appeal. Plaintiff shall have 30 days to revise and re-send her
discovery requests consistent with this Order.
Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider is Denied to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to broaden or
expand the scope of discovery or redefine the scope of her Rule 75 claim.
Defendant’s motion for a protective order is Granted. Plaintiff’s discovery requests are
struck, and Plaintiff may re-file her requests consistent with the scope of her claim as outline in
this Order.
So Ordered.

Electronically signed on 1/29/2026 7:05 PM pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d)

__________________________________
Daniel Richardson
Superior Court Judge