Dudley v. Burlington

Termont Superior Court
Filed 03/17/26
Chittenden UUnit

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Chittenden Unit Case No. 25-CV-4318
175 Main Street
Burlington VT 05402
802-863-3467
.vermontjudiciary.org

SHAWN DUDLEY,
Plaintiff

V. DECISION ON MOTIONS

CITY OF BURLINGTON,
Defendant

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND TO STRIKE

Plaintiff Shawn Dudley brings this action in connection with several press releases issued
by the Burlington Police Department about him in 2023 and 2024. He asserts claims for
defamation, negligence, and a violation of his constitutional due process rights, and seeks more
than $13.9 million in damages. Defendant City of Burlington has filed both a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure and a special motion
to strike pursuant to Vermont's anti-SLAPP statute. In response, Plaintiff seeks to amend his
complaint, which the Court allows. The City is represented by Sean M. Toohey, Esq. and
Plaintiff is representing himself. For the reasons discussed below, the City's motions are
GRANTED.

Alleged Facts

The following facts are alleged in the Amended Complaint or appear in the documents
attached thereto. The Court makes no finding as to their accuracy at this stage of the
proceedings. See Montague v. Hundred Acre Homestead, LLC, 2019 VT 16, q 10, 209 Vt. 514.
The Court does not, however, accept as true "conclusory allegations or legal conclusions
masquerading as factual conclusions." Vitale v. Bellows Falls Union High Sch., 2023 VT 15,
1 28, 217 Vt. 611 (quotation omitted).

A. "Barricaded Hostage Situation" Press Release

On February 25, 2023, the City of Burlington issued a Press Release (Am. Compl., Ex.
A) regarding an incident involving Plaintiff Dudley and his son, titled "Agency Assist
barricaded hostage situation in Milton." The press release describes how the Burlington Police
Department responded to a "direct request for assistance" from the Milton Police Department
involving "[a] man with an arrest warrant . . barricaded in a residence with a four-year old
child." Ex. A at 1. The Burlington press release refers to an attached press release from the
Milton Police Department for the specifics of the incident. The Milton press release recites that
Milton police received a complaint that Dudley was "refusing to return his four year old son to
the child’s mother . . . [who] has sole legal responsibility for the kid.” Id. at 3. Milton police
spent four days attempting to have Dudley voluntarily release the child to the mother. Upon
entering the residence, police “encountered several barricades and barriers hindering officers
from moving inside the residence.” Id. After several hours with assistance from neighboring
police departments, Plaintiff “was taken into custody for custodial interference, resisting arrest,
hindering law enforcement officers and violation of a relief from abuse order.” Id. The City of
Burlington emailed the press release to My Champlain Valley News, which published a news
article about it. NBC 5 also published an article about the event.

Dudley claims that this press release “falsely characterized” the event as a “hostage
situation” and “stated alleged accusations as fact before any conviction.” Am. Compl. ¶ 5. He
claims that he “did not hold his son hostage,” explaining that he “had filed a Change of Custody
Motion and Emergency Motion four days prior to the raid, possessing evidence of child
abuse/neglect by the mother (Porschea Sweetser) and her partner (Justin Russell) that was
substantiated in Chittenden Family Court.” Id. ¶ 9. He further explains that he “was acting to
protect his child, yet [Burlington] maliciously labeled him a hostage-taker,” and claims that the
mother’s partner had previously held the child hostage for several hours yet South Burlington
police labelled the incident a mere “domestic dispute.” Id. ¶ 10.

B. Knife Threat Press Release

On April 10, 2024, the City of Burlington published a press release stemming from
another situation involving Plaintiff. Am. Compl., Ex. F. The press release stated that “officers
. . . responded to a report of an individual threatening someone with a knife” and that when they
“arrived on scene, the individual threatening someone with a knife was identified as Shawn
Dudley.” Id. The press release continued: “Investigation revealed Dudley brandished two
knives at three individuals after a brief disagreement.” Id. The related probable cause affidavit
repeats the same accusations as facts. Am. Compl. ¶ 12. The Vermont Daily Chronicle
published an article repeating information from the press release. Am. Compl. ¶ 13; see also Ex.
H. Plaintiff claims that the statements are false in that they improperly “stat[e] alleged
accusations as fact before any trial or conviction.” Am. Compl. ¶ 10.

C. Dog Park/Deadly Weapon Press Release

On October 3, 2024, the City of Burlington published a press release involving another
situation involving Plaintiff. Am. Compl. Ex. I. The press release recited that “officers . . .
responded to the area of the dog park near the bike path for a fight involving a knife in which one
of the parties was described as having blood on them.” The press release continued: “Upon
arrival, officers located an individual bleeding. Investigation revealed a male suspect caused
significant bodily injuries, including a laceration to the victim’s chest and wrist. . . . The male
suspect was later identified as Shawn Dudley, . . . [who] was taken into custody for aggravated
assault.” The press release further states: “Additionally, Dudley violated his active criminal
conditions of release – cannot possess dangerous or deadly weapons, when he caused serious
bodily injuries to the victim with a sharp cutting instrument and was found to be in possession of
a folding knife.” Several news outlets published articles about the incident, repeating
information contained in the press release. Plaintiff claims that the press release “stat[es] alleged

2
accusations as fact before any trial or conviction” and “negligently and maliciously omit[s]
critical facts” which he deems “exculpatory evidence.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 19.

D. Plaintiff’s Claims

Based on the three press releases described above, Dudley asserts claims for “defamation
of character (libel),” “negligence and gross negligence,” and “violation of due process (jury
taint).” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20-27. He claims that the City published false statements about him
(i.e., alleging that he held a child hostage, threatened workers with a knife, and stabbed a man) to
third parties, that the statements were made with malice, and that the statements constitute
defamation per se. As to the negligence claim, he alleges that the City has a “duty to release
accurate information to the public and to respect the presumption of innocence,” that it breached
this duty by “publishing unverified opinions as facts, failing to include exculpatory evidence in
press releases,” and that this breach caused him damages. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23-25. As to the due
process claim, he alleges a “widespread dissemination of [] false narratives” that has “saturat[ed]
the community with false ‘facts’ of guilt” and “programmed the potential jury pool to view [him]
as dangerous,” thus “making an impartial trial impossible.” Id. ¶¶ 26-27. 1

Discussion

Preliminarily, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s original Complaint named the Burlington
Police Department as the defendant rather than the City, included only one claim (for
defamation), and was based on only the first press release. Plaintiff has moved to amend his
complaint, substituting the City as the proper defendant, adding the negligence and § 1983
claims, and adding more facts based on the second and third press releases. The City argues that
the amendment would be futile for the same reasons expressed in its motion to dismiss. For ease
of analysis, the Court grants the motion to amend and addresses all claims in the Amended
Complaint under the motion to dismiss framework below.

The City moves to dismiss all claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The City
contends that it has sovereign immunity, that this case is an impermissible collateral attack on
Plaintiff’s criminal charges, that the statements in the press releases were conditionally
privileged and true, and that Plaintiff has pled no municipal custom or policy to support a § 1983
action. Because the Court dismisses the claims under Rule 12(b)(6), as discussed below, it does
not reach the immunity argument. 2

1
Dudley also claims that several local news media outlets have violated his constitutional
rights to a fair and speedy trial and due process. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 21. Because Dudley has not
named any of those outlets as defendants and because they are not state actors, the Court does
not address those “claims” any further.
2
The Court notes, however, that there are problems with the City’s immunity argument. In the
City’s briefing, it seems to conflate the concepts of state sovereign immunity and municipal
sovereign immunity. See Mot. to Dismiss at 2-4; Reply at 2-3. Moreover, much of the authority
cited by the City relates to specific forms of discretionary function immunity in other states –
rather than Vermont’s “governmental vs. proprietary” distinction – and is thus inapposite. See
3
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court considers whether
“it appears beyond doubt that there exist no facts or circumstances that would entitle the plaintiff
to relief.” Davis v. Am. Legion, Dep’t of Vt., 2014 VT 134, ¶ 12, 198 Vt. 204 (quoting Alger v.
Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 2006 VT 115, ¶ 12, 181 Vt. 309). The Court “must assume that the
facts pleaded in the complaint are true and make all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor.” Montague, 2019 VT 16, ¶ 10 (citation omitted). The burden on plaintiffs under Vermont
law is “exceedingly low” at the pleading stage. Prive v. Vt. Asbestos Group, 2010 VT 2, ¶ 14,
187 Vt. 280. Complaints are intended to give enough notice to the defendant to allow a
response, but need not lay out every detail of the facts supporting the claim. See Colby v.
Umbrella, Inc., 2008 VT 20, ¶ 13, 184 Vt. 1 (“The complaint is a bare bones statement that
merely provides the defendant with notice of the claims against it.”). The goal is to “strike a fair
balance, at the early stages of litigation, between encouraging valid, but as yet underdeveloped
causes of action and discouraging baseless or legally insufficient ones.” Id. As such, motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim are “disfavored.” Bock v. Gold, 2008 VT 81, ¶ 4, 184 Vt. 575.
“Nonetheless, where the plaintiff does not allege a legally cognizable claim, dismissal is
appropriate.” Montague, 2019 VT 16, ¶ 11 (citation omitted).

I. Defamation.

“To state a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must allege the following: (1) a false and
defamatory statement concerning another; (2) some negligence, or greater fault, in publishing the
statement; (3) publication to at least one third person; (4) lack of privilege in the publication; (5)
special damages, unless actionable per se; and (6) some actual harm so as to warrant
compensatory damages.” Wolfe v. VT Digger, 2023 VT 50, ¶ 13, 218 Vt. 408 (quotation
omitted). “A defamatory statement is one that tends to tarnish a plaintiff’s reputation and expose
[him] to public hatred, contempt or ridicule.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Truth is a complete
defense to defamation,” though it is “not necessary to prove the literal truth of the accusation in
every detail[;] . . . it is sufficient to show that the imputation is substantially true.” Id.
(quotations omitted).

Dudley’s defamation claim fails because he does not sufficiently plead either falsity or
lack of privilege. “[W]here the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint show the presence of a
privilege,” a defamation plaintiff must “include in [his] pleadings allegations that would
overcome the presence of a privilege.” Skaskiw v. Vermont Agency of Agric., 2014 VT 133, ¶
12, 198 Vt. 187 (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint shows the presence of
a privilege. The Restatement recognizes a conditional privilege for the “publication of
defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official action . . . that deals with a matter
of public concern . . . if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the
occurrence reported.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611. “An arrest by an officer is an
official action, and a report of the fact of the arrest or of the charge of crime made by the officer
in making or returning the arrest is therefore within the conditional privilege covered by this
Section.” Id. § 611, cmt. h.; see also Skaskiw, 2014 VT 133, ¶ 9 (noting the Court “frequently
ha[s] adopted provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts with respect to defamation”).

Reply at 2-3. And the discussion referenced in Civetti relates to qualified immunity, which the
City does not seek to apply here. Civetti v. Turner, 2022 VT 64, ¶ 11, 217 Vt. 411.
4
Other jurisdictions have recognized a conditional, or qualified, privilege for police statements to
the press. See, e.g., Burke v. Town of Walpole, 405 F.3d 66, 95 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that
“several jurisdictions have recognized, either by statute or by judicial decision, a conditional
privilege for statements made by the police to members of the press or the public”); Lanier v.
Higgins, 623 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (police chief interviewed by television
station “was not clothed with an absolute privilege but rather with a special or conditional
privilege”); Trentecosta v. Beck, 703 So. 2d 552, 564 (La. 1997) (qualified privilege for “fair
reporting of investigations or arrest” may be “available to . . . troopers in their role as law
enforcement officers reporting the facts of an investigation and a resulting arrest to the press and,
in turn, to the public”); Peterson v. City of Mitchell, 499 N.W.2d 911, 915-16 (S.D. 1993)
(holding that police were entitled to statutory qualified privilege in issuing press release). 3

Accordingly, Dudley had to allege facts that would overcome the privilege. A
“conditional privilege is abused, and becomes ineffective, if the defendant acted with malice.”
Skaskiw, 2014 VT 133, ¶ 11. The privilege can be overcome by one of two forms of malice: “(1)
conduct manifesting personal ill will, reckless or wanton disregard of plaintiff’s rights, or carried
out under circumstances evidencing insult or oppression or (2) knowledge of the statement’s
falsity or with reckless disregard of its truth.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the Court cannot
infer malice from any of Plaintiff’s allegations, which are “not sufficient to defeat the conditional
privilege.” Id. ¶ 14.

In his Amended Complaint, Dudley alleges that the statements in the press releases were
“made with malice” because the City “knew or should have known the ‘hostage’ label was false
based on the charges actually filed, and knew the ‘assault’ narrative was contradicted by witness
statements[].” Am. Compl. ¶ 21. As discussed below, however, the “hostage” label was not
false. Simply because the police did not charge Dudley with a crime called “hostage-taking” that
tracked the exact definition of “hostage” does not mean that describing the event colloquially as
a “hostage situation” was false. Dudley was, in fact, charged with custodial interference, which
encompasses hostage situations. See 13 V.S.A. § 2451(a). Moreover, the fact that the police
knew that its narrative of the charged crime was contradicted by witness statements does not
equate to malice. Virtually all crime narratives may be contradicted to some extent by witnesses.
Indeed, that is the very purpose of a trial – to sort out factual disputes. Plaintiff has not
overcome the conditional privilege.

The defamation claim also fails as to all three press releases for the additional reason that
Dudley has not adequately alleged falsity. As to the first press release, he primarily takes issues
with the use of the term “hostage” to describe the situation. The term “hostage” is defined
generally as “[a] person held by one party in a conflict as security that specified terms will be
met by the opposing party” or as “[o]ne that is under the constraining control of another.”

3
The Court notes that some of these jurisdictions have relied on Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 598A: “An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if an inferior administrative
officer of a state or any of its subdivisions who is not entitled to an absolute privilege makes a
defamatory communication required or permitted in the performance of his official duties.”
Thus, in additional to § 611, the Court concludes that § 598A provides an alternative rationale for
applying a conditional privilege here.
5
American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed.) (online); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed.
2024) (defining “hostage-taking” as “[t]he unlawful holding of an unwilling person as security
that the holder's terms will be met by an adversary”). In his Amended Complaint, Dudley denies
holding his son “hostage,” but then admits that he held him unlawfully to “protect” him from
alleged abuse and neglect from the mother and her partner. He does not allege that he had legal
custody of his son at that time; in fact, he alleges only that he had filed an emergency motion in
family court seeking to change custody a few days prior. Simply filing a motion to change
custody did not give him the legal right to refuse to return the child to his mother. Thus, the
police department’s description of the incident as a “hostage situation” was not false.

As for the other two press releases, Dudley alleges that they contain “false” statements
because they improperly stated “alleged accusations as fact” before any trial or conviction and
that they omitted exculpatory evidence. When the alleged “false” statements are read in the
context of the entire press releases, however, the statements are not false. The only rational
takeaway from the press releases is that they merely report that Dudley was arrested and charged
with certain crimes, not that he was convicted of or definitely committed the alleged crimes.
See, e.g., Foley v. Lowell Sun Publ’g Co., 533 N.E.2d 196, 197 (Mass. 1989) (“When the
statement is read in the context of the article as a whole, its clear meaning is to report that
[plaintiff] was arrested for assaulting an officer – and not that he either had been convicted of the
offense or had actually committed the assault.”). Dudley does not deny that he was arrested or
charged with the crimes listed. Moreover, “[s]tatements about crimes are often technically
incorrect but substantially true,” which “means the gist or sting of the defamation must be true
even if details are not.” Dobbs’ Law of Torts § 533 (2d ed.). Even assuming that part of the
press releases could be interpreted as “technically incorrect,” the gist of the press releases – that
Dudley was arrested and charged with particular crimes – is substantially true. Accordingly,
Plaintiff has not adequately pled a “false and defamatory statement concerning another.” Wolfe,
2023 VT 50, ¶ 13.

II. Negligence.

Dudley’s negligence claim rests on essentially the same factual allegations underlying his
defamation claim. He alleges that the City has a “duty to release accurate information to the
public and to respect the presumption of innocence,” that it breached this duty by “publishing
unverified opinions as facts, failing to include exculpatory evidence in press releases,” and that
this breach caused him damages. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23-25. Additionally, he appears to seek
traditional defamation damages for his negligence claim: “Defaming the Plaintiff five separate
times in approximately 18 months is beyond any level of negligence and proves ill-intent and a
malicious motive to defame the Plaintiffs credibility and reputation.” Id. ¶ 26.

The Court concludes that Dudley’s negligence claim is nothing more than a defamation
claim disguised as negligence. It is well-established that a “plaintiff is not permitted to avoid
defenses to a defamation claim by challenging the defamatory statements under another
doctrine.” Guzhagin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 566 F. Supp. 2d 962, 969 (D. Minn.
2008); see also Vackar v. Package Mach. Co., 841 F. Supp. 310, 315 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(“[P]laintiffs may not avoid the strictures of defamation law by artfully pleading their defamation
claims to sound in other areas of tort law.”); Apostle v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 572 F. Supp.

6
897, 906 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (holding that, “where the same factual basis is used to make both
defamation and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, and where a qualified privilege
applies to the publication, as a matter of law Plaintiffs’ negligence claim cannot survive. ”);
Akarah v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 253 N.E.3d 712, 720-21 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024) (same);
Wagner v. Allen Media Broad., 3 N.W.3d 758, 784–85 (Wis. Ct. App. 2024) (same).
Accordingly, the conditional privilege that bars Dudley’s defamation claim also bars his
“negligence” claim.

III. Due Process.

Dudley fails to state a valid due process claim. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 provides a right of
action where a “person,” under color of state law, subjects another person to the deprivation of
any federal constitutional rights. 4 A municipality can be liable under § 1983 “if the deprivation
of the plaintiff’s rights under federal law is caused by a governmental custom, policy, or usage of
the municipality.” Matusick v. Erie Cty. Water Auth., 757 F.3d 31, 62 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). A plaintiff may
satisfy the “custom, policy, or usage” requirement in one of four ways:

The plaintiff may allege the existence of (1) a formal policy officially endorsed by
the municipality; (2) actions taken by government officials responsible for
establishing the municipal policies that caused the particular deprivation in
question; (3) a practice so consistent and widespread that, although not expressly
authorized, constitutes a custom or usage of which a supervising policy-maker
must have been aware; or (4) a failure by policymakers to provide adequate
training or supervision to subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to
deliberate indifference to the rights of those who come into contact with the
municipal employees.

Brandon v. City of New York, 705 F. Supp. 2d 261, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citations omitted).
Dudley has pled no such “custom, policy, or usage” by the City as required to establish Monell
liability. Accordingly, his § 1983 claim fails as a matter of law.

The Court also notes that, for the first time in his December 19, 2025 filing (which
constitutes his Reply in support of his motion to amend, his Sur-Reply in further opposition to
the motion to dismiss, and his opposition to the motion to strike), Dudley asks the Court to take
the extraordinary step of overturning his convictions in four separate criminal docket numbers,
ostensibly on the basis of “multiple constitutional injuries that . . . tainted all” of his criminal
proceedings. Pl.’s Mem. at 14 (filed Dec. 19, 2025). Even assuming that the convictions in
those dockets are related to the allegations underlying his Amended Complaint, a party’s proper
remedy is to challenge those convictions in a direct appeal or a petition for post-conviction relief

4
While Plaintiff does not cite to § 1983 in his Amended Complaint, his December 19, 2025
memorandum clarifies that his due process claim is brought pursuant to § 1983.

7
(“PCR”). Dudley sought no such relief in his Amended Complaint, and this action is not a
PCR.5
IV. Special Motion to Strike.

The City has separately moved to strike the Amended Complaint as a “Strategic
Lawsuit[] Against Public Participation” (“SLAPP”). Under Vermont’s anti-SLAPP statute, a
SLAPP suit is “an action arising from defendant’s exercise, in connection with a public issue, of
the right to freedom of speech or to petition the government for redress of grievances under the
U.S. or Vermont Constitution.” 12 V.S.A. § 1041(a). The statute authorizes the defendant in an
alleged SLAPP suit to bring a special motion to strike within 60 days after the filing of the
complaint. Id. § 1041(b). The motion is decided on the “pleadings and supporting and opposing
affidavits,” id. § 1041(e)(2), and must be granted unless the plaintiff shows that “the defendant’s
exercise of his or her right to freedom of speech and to petition was devoid of any reasonable
factual support and any arguable basis in law” and “the defendant’s acts caused actual injury to
the plaintiff.” Id. § 1041(e)(1)(A), (B). 6

“[T]he anti-SLAPP statute represents an ‘attempt[ ] to define the proper intersection
between two constitutional rights – a defendant’s right to free speech and petition and a
plaintiff's right to petition and free access to the courts.’” Polak v. Ramirez-Diaz, 2025 VT 9,
¶ 18, 336 A.3d 383 (quoting Felis v. Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC, 2015 VT 129, ¶ 41, 200 Vt.
465). Thus, Ҥ 1041 should be construed as limited in scope and . . . great caution should be
exercised in its interpretation.” Id. (quotation omitted).

The Court must first determine whether this action is a SLAPP suit under the statute, that
is, whether the action “ar[ose] from” the defendant’s exercise of its right to free speech in
connection with a public issue. 12 V.S.A. § 1041(a). That threshold requirement may be
satisfied by “any written or oral statement concerning an issue of public interest made in . . . a

5
The Court further notes that most, or all, of this action appears to be an impermissible
collateral attack on Plaintiff’s criminal cases. Cf. Bd. of Med. Prac. v. Perry-Hooker, 139 Vt.
264, 267, 427 A.2d 1334, 1336 (1981). But to the extent he alleges that his arrests lacked
probable cause or were otherwise defective, Dudley’s proper course of action is to raise those
arguments in his criminal cases. Similarly, to the extent his due process claim asserts that the
City’s alleged defamation has “ma[de] an impartial jury trial impossible” by “taint[ing]” the jury
pool, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26-27, that is an issue to be raised in his criminal cases before the jury is
drawn. Indeed, the proper remedy “if the court is satisfied that there exists in the unit where the
prosecution is pending so great a prejudice against the defendant that he or she cannot obtain a
fair and impartial trial there” is a motion for change of venue in criminal court. V.R.Cr.P. 21(a).
Similarly, the proper remedy for a defective plea is not a civil action for damages, but a motion
to withdraw the plea under Criminal Rule 32(d) or the postconviction relief procedure in 13
V.S.A. §§ 7131-37.
6
The statute requires “a hearing on a special motion to strike.” 12 V.S.A. § 1041(d). Here,
however, neither party has requested a hearing, and the absence of a hearing would not prejudice
either party. In any event, the statute does not require an evidentiary hearing. See Talandar v.
Manchester-Murphy, 2024 VT 86, ¶¶ 38-40, 331 A.3d 1093.

8
place open to the public.” Id. § 1041(i)(4). This determination typically depends on the nature
of the allegations in the challenged claim. See Jenkins v. Miller, No. 2:12-CV-184, 2017 WL
4402431, at *32 (D. Vt. Sept. 29, 2017); Rand Res., LLC v. City of Carson, 433 P.3d 899, 907
(Cal. 2019); Marabello v. Boston Bark Corp., 974 N.E.2d 636, 641-42 (Mass. 2012). The City,
as the party moving to strike Plaintiff’s claims, has the burden to satisfy this threshold
requirement. Cornelius v. The Chronicle, Inc., 2019 VT 4, ¶ 8, 209 Vt. 405.

The City has satisfied its burden in this case. The claims brought against the City
(defamation, negligence, and § 1983) all stem from the City’s issuance of three press releases
announcing Plaintiff’s arrests. The press releases are essential to the claims, as the claims could
not be stated without reference to the press releases. Accord Apache Corp. v. Apollo Expl., LLC,
No. 11-21-00295-CV, 2023 WL 3511262, at *5 (Tex. App. May 18, 2023). And the issuance of
a press release is an example of the exercise of free speech. See, e.g., Patton v. O’Bannon, 2011-
0989, 2011 WL 6754099, *3 (La. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2011) (finding “no error in the district
court’s determination that the issuance of a press release by the district attorney’s office . . .
constituted acts in furtherance of the defendants’ free speech rights in connection with a public
issue”); see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Even
dry information, devoid of advocacy, political relevance, or artistic expression, has been
accorded First Amendment protection.”) (collecting cases); Scruggs v. City of Bowie, No. 7:14-
CV-00123-O, 2015 WL 13450692, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2015) (defendant established that
“press release is a matter of public concern, and . . . [plaintiff’s] suit is based on . . . exercise of []
right to free speech”). 7

Moreover, our Supreme Court has observed, generally, that “matters connected to law
enforcement investigation, public safety, and crime in the community are of public concern.”
Talandar, 2024 VT 86, ¶ 43 (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that defendant’s report to police that
plaintiff assaulted her did not concern a public issue) (quotation omitted); Wolfe, 2023 VT 50,
¶ 22 (holding that four newspaper articles challenged by plaintiff involved speech in connection
with a public issue because they described plaintiff’s threats toward Speaker of Vermont House
of Representatives, his arrest at Statehouse, and his resulting criminal charges); Cornelius, 2019

7
The Court acknowledges that the question of whether a government entity is entitled to the
protection of the anti-SLAPP statute – not raised by either party here – is a complicated and
unsettled issue involving a split of authority in other states. Compare Vargas v. City of Salinas,
205 P.3d 207, 217 (Cal. 2009) and Gontmakher v. City of Bellevue, 85 P.3d 926, 931 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2004) with Crosby v. Town of Indian River Shores, 358 So. 3d 444, 446-47 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2023), Clark Cty. v. 6635 W Oquendo LLC, 544 P.3d 900, 903 & n.3 (Nev. 2024), and
Hayes v. Zaleznik, 2001 Mass. App. Div. 107 (Dist. Ct. 2001). The related question of whether
government entities, such as municipalities, enjoy First Amendment rights is also unsettled, see
United States v. Am. Libr. Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 210-11 (2003) (acknowledging but declining to
decide question); Tennessee v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 665 F. Supp. 3d 880, 919-21 (E.D. Tenn.
2023); New Mexico v. McAleenan, 450 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1207-10 (D.N.M. 2020); Mosdos
Chofetz Chaim, Inc. v. Vill. of Wesley Hills, 701 F. Supp. 2d 568, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), and is
further complicated by the so-called “government speech doctrine.” See Pleasant Grove City,
Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009). Because neither party has raised the issue, the
Court does not reach it here.
9
VT 4, ¶¶ 1-2 (newspaper articles reporting that plaintiff and his brother threatened a parole
officer and had been deemed a possible threat by law enforcement due to their lengthy criminal
history and increasingly violent and erratic behavior, describing brothers’ involvement in killing
of an individual, and describing plaintiff’s arraignment on charges of aiding in escape of his
brother involved a public issue). While the Court has also refused to create a “blanket
exemption” for reports of criminal activity, see Polak, 2025 VT 9, ¶¶ 24, 28 (defendants’
statements to police regarding alleged assault and gun threat were not made in a connection with
a public issue where no arrests were made, no charges were filed, and there were no news reports
about dispute), the press releases here fall squarely within the type of reports of criminal activity
that are matters of public concern. Dudley was arrested and charged multiple times, and several
news organizations deemed the reports newsworthy enough to publish articles about the events.

Because the City has met its burden under the statute, the burden now “shift[s] to
[P]laintiff” to demonstrate that the City’s press releases were “‘devoid of any reasonable factual
support and any arguable basis in law.’” Cornelius, 2019 VT 4, ¶ 15 (quoting 12 V.S.A.
§ 1041(e)(1)(A)). Given that the claims cannot survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
Dudley cannot meet his burden. Specifically, as discussed above, Dudley has not adequately
pled that the alleged defamatory statements in the press releases were false. The press releases
report that he was arrested and charged with crimes, and Dudley does not deny that he was
arrested or charged with the crimes listed. Thus, he cannot show that the press releases were
“devoid of any reasonable factual support and any arguable basis in law.” 12 V.S.A.
§ 1041(e)(1)(A). Accordingly, the Court must grant the City’s special motion to strike.

Order

Plaintiff’s motion to amend is GRANTED. The City’s motion to dismiss (Mot. # 2) is
GRANTED as to the entire Amended Complaint. The City’s special motion to strike the
Amended Complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute (Mot. # 3) is also GRANTED.

If the City is seeking its “costs and reasonable attorney’s fees,” it shall file an appropriate
supporting affidavit within 14 days. See 12 V.S.A. § 1041(f)(1).

Electronically signed on March 16, 2026 at 4:30 PM pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d).

________________________________
Megan J. Shafritz
Superior Court Judge

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