Danielle Lacroix v. Peter Rysz

VERMONT SUPREME COURT Case No. 25-AP-281
109 State Street
Montpelier VT 05609-0801
802-828-4774
www.vermontjudiciary.org

Note: In the case title, an asterisk (*) indicates an appellant and a double asterisk (**) indicates a cross-
appellant. Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.

ENTRY ORDER

FEBRUARY TERM, 2026

Danielle Lacroix v. Peter Rysz* } APPEALED FROM:
} Superior Court, Windham Unit,
} Family Division
} CASE NO. 163-9-19 Wmdm
Trial Judge: Elizabeth D. Mann

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Father appeals the family division’s order granting mother’s motion to modify parent-
child contact. We affirm.

The parties were formerly married and have an eleven-year-old son. The 2023 divorce
order incorporated the court’s October 2021 custody order, which awarded mother primary legal
and physical rights and responsibilities. The order established a biweekly parent-child contact
schedule under which father was entitled to six of every fourteen overnights with son.

In the October 2021 order, the court found that father was physically abusive toward
mother during the marriage. Son was aware of father’s anger toward mother, and this had made
son reluctant to show that he cared about and loved mother. Son demonstrated significant
confusion and emotional distress after the parties’ separation and declined to spend time with his
maternal grandfather, apparently under father’s influence. Father was uncooperative about
custody exchanges, failed to respond to mother’s messages about son’s health or last-minute
school schedule changes, and would not tell mother which week he wanted to take for summer
vacation with son. The court noted that father appeared to understand that expressing hostility
about mother in son’s presence was harmful to son, and “expressed willingness to commit to not
engaging in any such conduct.” It stated: “[t]he court takes him at his word, and expects that he
will stick to this commitment, and will communicate to others who spend time with [son] that
this is the rule that they are all expected to follow.” Although the parties were then unable to
share decision-making, the court expressed hope that father’s anger and distrust toward mother
would dissipate and that parents would be able to communicate civilly for the benefit of son.
The order required both parents to demonstrate civility and respect for the other parent in son’s
presence.
In October 2024, mother moved to modify parent-child contact. She asserted that there
had been a change in circumstances because father had not improved his behavior as expected by
the court and continued to denigrate her in front of son. Mother further asserted that father
interfered with her decision to enroll son in counseling, refused to give son prescribed
medication, allowed son to skip school, and refused to communicate civilly with mother. She
asked the court to modify the parent-child contact schedule to limit father’s contact to weekends
during the school year.

In response, father moved to enforce the requirement that parents share transportation
obligations. Father argued that at the time of the divorce order, both parties resided in
Dummerston, son attended the Dummerston school, and the specified location for custody
exchanges was equidistant from parents’ homes. In July 2023, mother moved to Vernon and
enrolled son in school there, which increased father’s driving time. Father asked the court to
designate a different exchange location and to require mother to share equally in transporting
son.

The court held a hearing on both motions over two days in April 2025. The court found
that father’s animosity toward mother remained strong and son was “negatively impacted by the
conflict” created by father’s feelings. The court found that when mother informed father that she
had moved to Vernon, father became very angry because he would have to drive farther. The
next day, he called the sheriff’s department and reported that mother and her partner were
growing over sixty marijuana plants at their new home. A sheriff’s deputy visited the property
and later reported the incident to the Department for Children and Families (DCF). Mother did
not hear further from DCF or the sheriff’s department. Father testified that he called the sheriff
because son had told him that mother and her partner grew marijuana. The court noted that
father did not acknowledge that a better course of action would have been to contact mother to
inquire about son’s report, or how stressful it would have been for son if he had been present
when the deputy arrived at the house or if a full search was conducted.

The court found that son had been diagnosed with ADHD and displayed worsening anger
and behavioral issues over the past year. Mother wanted son to participate in counseling but
father had “not been fully supportive.” Son was convinced that counseling was bad and was
unwilling to go. Mother invited father to participate in decision-making related to school and
medical issues, but her efforts backfired. Instead of engaging with mother and son’s doctor
regarding son’s ADHD diagnosis, father disclosed the diagnosis to son, who returned from his
time with father angry and distrustful of mother.

Father refused to attend son’s events if mother was present and would not bring son to
events that overlapped with his parenting time, regardless of their importance to son. Son was
named to a baseball all-star team that played a game on July 4 every year, but father did not
allow son to play. Father also refused to bring son to baseball practice during his weekend time
in the fall. Father refused to attend son’s end-of-the-year jump-rope show two years in a row,
once because it was on a “Mom day” and the second time because he felt mother was exhausting
son. The court found that father’s anger toward mother continued unabated. His inflexibility
had impacted son’s ability to fully engage in activities and created uncertainty for son regarding
participation in social and sporting events.

The court further found that despite knowing that son was supposed to be with mother
during the Christmas 2024 break, father told son in the spring that they would be going on a
cruise and scheduled the cruise during mother’s holiday time without consulting her. Mother

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allowed son to go on the cruise, not wanting to be the “evil parent who denied [son] the cruise
opportunity.”

Although it could not conclude that son’s aggressive behaviors at school were solely
caused by father’s behavior, the court found that the weekday custody transitions were disruptive
to son and should be minimized. The court noted that son was absent from school numerous
times when he was in father’s care, without a valid excuse.

The court concluded that because father’s attitude toward mother and his displays of
animosity had not abated as expected by the court in its 2021 order, there had been a real,
substantial, and unanticipated change in circumstances justifying modification of the parent-child
contact order. The court assessed the factors set forth in 15 V.S.A. § 665 and concluded that
parents were equally situated with regard to most of them, except that mother was more able and
willing to foster a positive relationship with father. The court therefore altered the contact
schedule to give father alternating weekends and half the summer break with son. The court
ordered that custody exchanges occur at school on Fridays and otherwise at an agreed-upon
location roughly halfway between parents’ homes. Father appealed.

When considering a motion to modify a parent-child contact order, the trial court must
first determine whether there has been a “real, substantial, and unanticipated change of
circumstances.” 15 V.S.A. § 668(a). If this requirement is satisfied, then the court must consider
whether modification of the existing order is in the child’s best interests according to the
statutory factors. Id.; see 15 V.S.A. § 665(b) (listing best-interests factors court must consider).
“Decisions regarding the granting, modifying or denying of parent-child contact lie within the
discretion of the family court, and we will not reverse the court’s decision unless its discretion
was exercised upon unfounded considerations or to an extent clearly unreasonable upon the facts
presented.” DeSantis v. Pegues, 2011 VT 114, ¶ 26, 190 Vt. 457 (quotation omitted).

Father first challenges the court’s determination that there was a change in circumstances
sufficient to justify modifying the existing parent-child contact arrangement. He argues that the
parties always had difficulty co-parenting, so the continuation of such difficulties could not
constitute a change in circumstances. The trial court’s determination of changed circumstances
is a matter of discretion, and we will uphold it “unless its exercise of discretion was on grounds
or for reasons clearly untenable, or the exercise of discretion was to a clearly unreasonable
extent.” Meyer v. Meyer, 173 Vt. 195, 197 (2001). “There are no fixed standards to determine
what constitutes a substantial change in material circumstances; instead, the court should be
guided by a rule of very general application that the welfare and best interests of the children are
the primary concern in determining whether the order should be changed.” Maurer v. Maurer,
2005 VT 26, ¶ 7, 178 Vt. 489 (mem.) (quotation omitted). The burden of demonstrating changed
circumstances regarding a parent-child contact order “is not as high as the heavy burden of
showing changed circumstances with respect to a motion seeking a change of custody.” Hawkes
v. Spence, 2005 VT 57, ¶ 20, 178 Vt. 161 (quotation omitted).

The court acted within its discretion here. The 2021 order indicated that father had long
been controlling and uncooperative around coparenting with mother. However, father had
expressed a willingness to commit to being respectful and civil about mother in son’s presence,
and the order anticipated that he would do so going forward. As the court found in its 2025
order, father had not acted in the manner anticipated by the court, which constituted a change in
circumstances. See Hoover (Letourneau) v. Hoover, 171 Vt. 256, 258 n.2 (2000) (explaining
that “[c]ircumstances or arrangements are ‘unanticipated’ if they were not expected at the time of

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divorce”). The court’s decision was based in part on how father’s behavior had negatively
impacted son, who had displayed worsening anger and behavioral issues. “Even if the parties
had anticipated disagreeing continually as father contends, the effect of this on [son] was not
necessarily anticipated.” Meyer, 173 Vt. at 198. The court also found that father had
undermined mother’s medical decisionmaking and interfered with scheduled vacation time. We
have held that a parent’s “willful, repeated interference” with the other parent’s rights and
responsibilities “may constitute changed circumstances sufficient to justify modification.”
Weaver v. Weaver, 2018 VT 38, ¶ 18, 207 Vt. 236. Given this record, the court acted within its
discretion in finding a change in circumstances sufficient to justify modifying the existing
parent-child contact order.

Father claims that the court’s order contravenes the public policy expressed by the
Legislature in 15 V.S.A. § 650, which states that “it is in the best interests of their minor child to
have the opportunity for maximum continuing physical and emotional contact with both
parents.” He argues that the court acted out of a desire to punish him for his behavior. The
record does not support his claim. The court was properly focused on son’s best interests. It
explained that father’s behavior was having a disruptive impact on son’s wellbeing and in
particular, his behavior and participation at school. Its order reduced father’s contact during the
school week to minimize transitions that would affect school, but increased father’s contact
during the summer and maintained the existing holiday schedule. The order gave father ample
contact time overall and was not contrary to § 650. See Bancroft v. Bancroft, 154 Vt. 442, 449
(1990) (holding that order giving father visitation rights that amounted to half of children’s time
on weekends and school vacations, and approximately twenty-five percent of their time overall,
did not offend § 650).

We reject father’s claim that § 650 required the court to find serious emotional or
psychological harm to son before it could alter the parent-child contact schedule. While the
court “may not permanently halt all contact between a parent and a child” absent such a showing,
Weaver, 2018 VT 38, ¶ 32, the statutory scheme makes clear that the court may modify parent-
child contact if it finds that there has been a real, substantial and unanticipated change in
circumstances and modification is in the child’s best interests. See 15 V.S.A. § 668(a) (stating
standard for modification of parent-child contact order); Bancroft, 154 Vt. at 449.

Father also challenges several of the court’s findings. First, he argues that there was no
evidence to support the court’s statements that he could have raised his concern to mother about
her alleged marijuana plants before calling the police and that it could have been stressful for son
if the sheriff had visited the house, or conducted a search, when son was there. However, these
were not truly “findings.” Rather, the court was observing that if father was motivated by a
desire to protect son, he could have approached the situation in a way that posed less risk of
traumatizing son. The court’s statements were based on its assessment of the evidence and are
not clearly erroneous.

Next, father claims that there was no evidence to support the court’s finding that father
had “not been fully supportive” of counseling for son. We see no error. Mother and father
agreed that father did support son’s visits with a male counselor at school. However, mother also
testified that father generally felt that counseling was unhelpful. He refused to go to marriage
counseling with her. When son began having aggressive behaviors, she wanted additional
counseling for son beyond what the school could offer, and the school recommended counseling
for son. However, father strongly opposed counseling and son refused to go. Mother asked
father to help her find an appropriate counselor but father refused. By the time son began seeing

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the male counselor, it was unhelpful because son had become so fearful of therapy. Father did
not encourage son to open up to other counselors. This record supports the court’s finding that
father was not fully supportive of son’s participation in counseling.

Similarly, the record supports the court’s finding that father’s animosity toward mother
interfered with his ability to make decisions in the best interest of son. Father admits on appeal
that he “does continue to feel a certain level of animus toward mother.” The record of text
messages between the parties since 2022 showed that father often did not respond to mother’s
requests for information about son or invitations to have father attend school events. After
mother informed him that she was moving to Vernon, their communications deteriorated sharply.
Father made derogatory remarks about mother and her new partner, accused mother of picking
counselors who favored her, and at one point in early 2024, completely stopped responding to
mother’s texts about son for two months without explanation. Father stated at the hearing that he
refused to go to son’s activities during mother’s time because “I don’t need to be. I don’t need
any more RFAs.” He also refused to take son to fall baseball practice because he had signed son
up for motocross. While mother could not control what son did during father’s time, Barrows v.
Easton, 2020 VT 2, ¶ 14, 211 Vt. 354, the record supports the court’s finding that son missed
many social and sporting events due to father’s refusal to cooperate with mother, and that the
uncertainty was not in son’s best interests. The same record, along with mother’s testimony,
supports the court’s finding that mother invited father to participate in decision-making regarding
school and medical issues, without success.

The record also supports the court’s finding that weekday household transitions were
disruptive to son and should be minimized. Mother testified that son’s behaviors escalated at
home and school on transition days. Son’s school principal testified that son had been referred to
the office twenty-two times that year, which was a high number. She had to suspend son twice
for aggressive behavior, including putting his hands around another child’s neck and taking
another child’s hat and wrestling him to the ground. On around five occasions, she observed son
to be in tears, slumped in his chair, and unwilling to talk about what was bothering him. Son’s
report cards showed that his school performance had worsened over the past year. While there
was no evidence presented of what day of the week or month these incidents occurred, the
principal’s testimony generally corroborates mother’s testimony regarding son’s escalating
behavior.

We further see no error with the court’s statement that son missed numerous days of
school while in father’s care and that these absences were not explained by illness or another
valid explanation. Mother’s testimony supports this finding. Father argues that her testimony
was insufficient to contradict his testimony that he only kept son out of school if son wasn’t
feeling well. He makes the same assertion with regard to other findings by the court. However,
the existence of conflicting evidence does not make findings clearly erroneous if they are
otherwise supported by the record, as is the case here. See Gilbert v. Davis, 144 Vt. 459, 461
(1984) (“The ruling of the court must stand if supported by credible evidence, even though there
may be inconsistencies or substantial evidence to the contrary.”).

Father argues that the court clearly erred in finding that son had been negatively impacted
by father’s behavior.* We disagree. The court could reasonably infer from mother’s testimony

* Father claims that the court should have called son as a witness or appointed a guardian
ad litem and that without doing so, it could not make this finding. Father failed to preserve this
claim by requesting such relief below; we therefore do not address this argument. See Bull v.
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and father’s own statements that father’s attitude and statements about mother were detrimental
to son, as evidenced by son’s increasing aggression and anger toward mother, which escalated on
days when they exchanged custody. The court had previously made similar findings in its 2021
order. We reject father’s claim that expert testimony was required to establish that father’s
conduct was likely harmful to son. See Renaud v. Renaud, 168 Vt. 306, 309 (1998) (“[T]he
great weight of authority holds that conduct by one parent that tends to alienate the child’s
affections from the other is . . . inimical to the child’s welfare.”). “In determining the best
interests of the children in custody matters, the court may draw upon its own common sense and
experience in reaching a reasoned judgment.” Gordon v. Fogell, 2025 VT 24, ¶ 7 (quotation
omitted).

The court considered the best-interests factors and explained the reasoning for its
decision, which is consistent with the child custody statutes. We accordingly do not disturb its
decision.

Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

Harold E. Eaton, Jr., Associate Justice

Nancy J. Waples, Associate Justice

Pinkham Eng’g Assocs., 170 Vt. 450, 459 (2000) (“Contentions not raised or fairly presented to
the trial court are not preserved for appeal.”).
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