Celia W. Watt, Sometimes Known as Celia Weeks v. Fairfax County Department of Family Services

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Kelsey, Petty and Senior Judge Bumgardner
CELIA W. WATT, SOMETIMES KNOWN AS
CELIA WEEKS
MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. 	Record No. 2446-05-4 	PER CURIAM
MAY 23, 2006
FAIRFAX COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF FAMILY SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Jonathan C. Thacher, Judge
(Michael S. Arif; Martin & Arif, on brief), for appellant.
(David P. Bobzien, County Attorney; Peter D. Andreoli, Jr., Deputy
County Attorney; Dennis R. Bates, Senior Assistant County
Attorney; Mario A. Bezzini, Guardian ad litem for the minor child,
on brief), for appellee.
Celia W. Watt, s/k/a Celia Weeks, appellant, contends the trial court erred in terminating
her parental rights to her minor child, “B.” For the reasons stated herein, we summarily affirm
the trial court’s decision. Rule 5A:27.
On October 5, 2005, the circuit court entered an order terminating appellant’s parental
rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B), (C)(1), and (C)(2). Appellant argues that the Fairfax
County Department of Family Services (“DFS”) failed to present clear and convincing evidence
that termination was appropriate under either Code § 16.1-283(B) or Code § 16.1-283(C)(2).
Appellant also argues that termination was not warranted because DFS failed to show it was in
B.’s best interests.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

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“Clear and convincing evidence that the termination [of residual parental rights] is in the
child’s best interests is a requirement in common to termination of parental rights under Code
§ 16.1-283(B), (C), . . . or (E).” Fields v. Dinwiddie County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1,
8 n.5, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 n.5 (2005). While the best interests of the child is “the paramount
consideration of a trial court” in a termination proceeding, Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of
Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991), terminations under Code
§ 16.1-283(B), (C), and (E) provide distinct, “individual bases upon which a petitioner may seek
to terminate residual parental rights.” City of Newport News v. Winslow, 40 Va. App. 556, 563,
580 S.E.2d 463, 466 (2003).
A termination under Code § 16.1-283(B) requires a finding that:
1. The neglect or abuse suffered by such child presented a serious
and substantial threat to his life, health or development; and
2. It is not reasonably likely that the conditions which resulted in
such neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated
so as to allow the child’s safe return to his parent or parents within
a reasonable period of time.
Termination pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) requires proof that the parent, “without
good cause, has been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve
months from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditions
which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement,” notwithstanding
reasonable and appropriate efforts of services agencies.
Termination under Code § 16.1-283(C)(1) requires clear and convincing evidence that
the parent . . . ha[s], without good cause, failed to maintain
continuing contact with and to provide or substantially plan for the
future of the child for a period of six months after the child’s
placement in foster care notwithstanding the reasonable and
appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other
rehabilitative agencies to communicate with the parent or parents
and to strengthen the parent-child relationship.

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While appellant argues generally that termination of her parental rights was not in B.’s
best interests, she does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the circuit court’s
decision under Code § 16.1-283(C)(1). Therefore, should we find that termination was in the
child’s best interests, we need not address appellant’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of the
evidence under the other two statutory provisions. See Fields, 46 Va. App. at 8, 614 S.E.2d at
659.
When considering termination of a parent’s residual rights to a child, “the paramount
consideration of a trial court is the child’s best interests.” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d
at 463. On review, “[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly weighed all the evidence,
considered the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best
interests.” Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990). “The trial court’s
judgment, when based on evidence heard ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463.
On April 24, 2002, B. was treated for a broken leg and facial bruises, and placed in a full
body cast. He was eleven months old. His treating physician reported these injuries, as well as
an old, untreated broken arm, to DFS. B.’s maternal uncle, who had custody of him at the time,
explained the injuries by stating that B.’s right leg “made a noise and went limp” while he was
changing the child’s diaper. B.’s father, Fred Watt, had placed B. in his uncle’s care in Virginia
while appellant was incarcerated in Texas on forgery charges from February 1 to April 30, 2002.
Appellant’s incarceration in Texas resulted from a parole violation which occurred when
she was arrested for shoplifting in Delaware in January 2002. At the time she was apprehended,
she had left B. and his half-sister in the car with the motor running. In addition to the shoplifting
charge, she was arrested for child endangerment, possession of drug paraphernalia, and
possession of a non-narcotic substance.

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DFS filed a petition alleging that B. was an abused and neglected child, and DFS
obtained temporary custody. In May 2002, DFS filed a foster care plan with an initial goal of
return home. The plan required appellant to obtain adequate housing, maintain stable
employment, participate in a psychological and parenting skills assessment, and maintain contact
with B.
Between June and August 2002, DFS requested that Delaware authorities perform a
home study in preparation for B.’s return to his parents. At that time, placement with appellant
was denied due to “criminal background findings,” including the fact that appellant remained on
probation. In January 2003,1 DFS requested a second home study, but appellant and Watt
refused to make themselves available to meet with the evaluator or submit criminal background
forms. 2 They also declined offers from DFS to assist them with housing and employment in
Virginia.3
In May 2003, DFS changed the goal from return home to adoption. At that time, B. had
been in foster care for over a year. Appellant had been ordered by the juvenile court in January
2003 to attend parenting classes, follow drug and alcohol treatment recommendations, and
1 On January 9, 2003, the juvenile and domestic relations district court (“juvenile court”)
ordered appellant to attend parenting classes, follow drug and alcohol treatment
recommendations, and participate in individual therapy.
2 Appellant’s husband had violated his probation in Texas, and did not want to cooperate
in the completion of a criminal background investigation. Appellant and Watt were married in
July 2003.
3 Specifically, DFS
talked to them about . . . considering moving into a shelter and also
looking at some of the housing programs in the area. And also a
referral was made to the skilled resource center for an employer
. . . . [B]oth Ms. Watt and Mr. Watt gave it some thought, but they
decided to live in Delaware. And . . . they did not follow up with
the skilled resource center, regarding employment.

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participate in individual therapy. At the time DFS changed its goal to adoption, appellant had
completed the parenting classes, but had not continued the individual treatment recommended in
her psychological evaluation and ordered by the juvenile court.
In February 2004, Watt turned himself in to Texas authorities to serve time on his
probation violation. Delaware authorities scheduled a home visit with appellant the following
May. While the case worker found appellant’s mobile home to be “clean and appropriate,” it
lacked propane for heating or cooking, and had little food on hand. Appellant’s landlord
indicated he had not renewed her lease because the rent payments had been consistently late.
Furthermore, a capias was issued on June 10, 2004, as a result of appellant’s failure to pay fines
on a prior traffic conviction. The home study recommended against B.’s placement with
appellant, noting that the lease difficulties and the outstanding capias posed “a substantially high
risk” for his subsequent removal.
On July 22, 2004, DFS filed a petition to terminate appellant’s residual parental rights.
The juvenile court granted the petition in November 2004. Appellant appealed to circuit court,
but relocated to Texas in November 2004 to be closer to her husband and daughter, who was in
her former husband’s custody.
Subsequent to appellant’s relocation to Texas, another home study was conducted in
January 2005. This home study also recommended against placement with appellant. The study
noted appellant was unemployed, had failed to provide a list of personal references, and had
declined to provide DFS with a plan for B.’s care.
By the time of the termination hearing in June 2005, appellant had been arrested on drug
charges and could not attend the hearing because she was incarcerated in Texas. B. was then
four years old and had lived with the same foster parents since July 2002. When he was first
placed in foster care, B.was only one year old and still in a full body cast. After the cast was

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removed, he learned to walk again normally. DFS records indicate he “adjusted extremely well
to the foster care placement,” and describe him as a “healthy, cheerful, and intelligent child.”
His foster mother testified that she and her husband had discussed adoption with DFS and that B.
considered his foster sister to be his natural sibling. None of B.’s relatives represented potential
placements.
Based on the foregoing, we find that B.’s best interests were served by termination of
appellant’s parental rights. B. was placed in foster care because he was abused by a third party,
but he remained in foster care for approximately two additional years because appellant refused
to cooperate with DFS. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period
of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his
responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394
S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). Not only was appellant uncooperative with DFS in its initial attempts to
perform home studies, she refused to provide a plan for B.’s care upon her relocation to Texas,
where she was unemployed and ultimately incarcerated. Thus, appellant’s ability to assume
responsibility for B. has remained uncertain for several years, while B. has thrived in the secure
environment provided by his foster family. Based upon the evidence presented, we are unable to
say that the trial court erred by finding termination was in B.’s best interests.
Accordingly, the trial court’s decision is summarily affirmed.
Affirmed.