New River Castings Co et al v Colleen M. Woolwine

0877003Vactapp

Testo completo

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Elder, Frank and Humphreys
Argued at Salem, Virginia
NEW RIVER CASTINGS COMPANY AND
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
MEMORANDUM OPINION* 	BY
v. 	Record No. 0877-00-3 	JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
DECEMBER 12, 2000
COLLEEN M. WOOLWINE
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
J. Gorman Rosenberger, Jr. (Wilson, Garbee &
Rosenberger, on brief), for appellants.
No brief or argument for appellee.
New River Castings Company and its insurer appeal a
decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission awarding
Colleen M. Woolwine medical benefits for an injury sustained on
October 23, 1998. 	New River contends that the commission erred
in finding that Woolwine presented sufficient evidence to prove
an injury by accident, as well as the necessary causation. 	We
disagree and for the reasons that follow, affirm the
commission's decision.
"[T]o establish an 'injury by accident,' a claimant must
prove (1) that the injury appeared suddenly at a particular time
and place and upon a particular occasion, (2) that it was caused
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
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by an identifiable incident or sudden precipitating event, and
(3) that it resulted in an obvious mechanical or structural
change in the human body." 	Southern Express v. Green, 257 Va.
181, 187, 509 S.E.2d 836, 839 (1999). 	"[I]t is well established
that the commission's determination of causation is a factual
finding that will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by
credible evidence." 	Corning, Inc. v. Testerman, 25 Va. App.
332, 339, 488 S.E.2d 642, 645 (1997).
Woolwine was employed by New River in its finishing
department where she performed hand grinding. 	Hand grinding
involved picking up a casting from a conveyor belt, quickly
running a hand grinding machine over the casting, and either
returning the casting to the conveyor belt or throwing it into a
nearby basket.
On October 23, 1998, Woolwine was working the 8:00 a.m. to
8:00 p.m. shift.1 Woolwine testified that near the end of her
shift, she was returning a casting to the conveyor belt and
"after [she] put it back on the belt [she] felt left wrist
pain." 	She stated that she had spent a "couple of minutes"
grinding the casting and was not sure exactly what happened, but
thought she may have struck her wrist with the casting and
bruised it. 	In response to the question, "you just know that
1 The incident report shows the date of injury as October
24, 1998, the date that Woolwine presented to the first aid
station. 	However, testimony during the hearing established that
the actual date of injury was October 23, 1998.
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before you picked up that particular casting your wrist was fine
and then after you put it down your wrist was hurting," Woolwine
answered "[y]eah."
Woolwine reported to the first aid station the next
morning. 	She testified that she told the nurse she "wasn't sure
what [she] had done, but that [she] thought [she] had hurt [her
wrist] grinding." 	The "First Aid Report Log" from October 24,
1998 states that Woolwine checked in at 7:20 a.m. complaining of
left wrist pain. 	It specifically states, "c/o left wrist pain.
Repetitive grinding."
Dr. Kenneth Jones, Woolwine's family physician, noted on an
attending physician's report dated November 9, 1998, that he
examined Woolwine that day and suspected "tendonitis vs. carpal
tunnel left wrist." 	The report described the incident as
follows: 	"Picking up a part off the line and left wrist started
to hurt." 	In his June 3, 1999 deposition, Dr. Jones stated that
based on this history, in his opinion, "Ms. Woolwine's
tendonitis was clearly a work-related injury that occurred on
October 24, 1998 [sic]."
New River argues that based on the above, Woolwine failed
to establish a "particular event" because of her differing
accounts of when she sustained the injury. 	New River argues
there is no credible medical evidence to establish causation,
because there is no accurate history of the incident.
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The commission, with one member dissenting, found that
the first-aid log from October 24, 1998
clearly records [the first aid nurse's]
conclusion of how the claimant injured
herself - "repetitive grinding." . . . 	Dr.
Jones's testimony, however, was clear that
the claimant described an injury that
occurred while she was working on a specific
casting on October 23, 1998. . . . 	We are
also not persuaded that the history recorded
by Dr. Jones's nurse - that the claimant was
hurt while "picking up" a part - is at odds
with the claimant's testimony - that she was
not certain of when she was hurt, but only
that she hurt herself at some point while
working on a particular casting. . . . 	Her
recollection of developing wrist pain while
grinding a particular casting, which is
corroborated by Dr. Jones's notes and
testimony, sufficiently describes an injury
by accident.
We agree with the commission. 	The specific incident which
caused the employee's sudden mechanical or bodily change must
generally be viewed in the aggregate, not in its component parts.
Although a claimant must prove a "sudden
precipitating event" that caused the injury,
"[t]o constitute injury by accident it is
not necessary that there should be an
extraordinary occurrence in or about the
work engaged in." "Sudden" as used in this
context means an "immediate" event that
causes or precipitates an injury; "sudden"
is not used here to connote an unexpected
consequence. 	Thus, "sudden precipitating"
event is one that "immediately" causes an
injury, as distinguished from an injury that
appears or occurs gradually. 	[Yet], an
injury or injuries may be caused by one or
several "sudden [or immediate] events" that
cause the mechanical changes to occur in the
body.
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R & R Construction Corp. v. Hill, 25 Va. App. 376, 379, 488
S.E.2d 663, 664 (1997) (citations omitted).
Here, the evidence established that Woolwine's wrist was
not in pain before she picked up the particular casting, but was
in pain after she placed the casting on the conveyor belt.
There was no evidence that Woolwine had a history of wrist
problems. 	Furthermore, Dr. Jones examined Woolwine and found
that she suffered from tendonitis as opposed to carpal tunnel.
The commission, as finder of fact, could reasonably have found
on these facts that after grinding the part, Woolwine felt pain
as a result of some step taken in that particular grinding
process. 	Thus, suffering from an "identifiable incident or
sudden precipitating event."
The fact that Woolwine failed to identify precisely which
step in the process caused the pain does not constitute a
failure to prove that an immediate or sudden event caused the
wrist pain. 	See id. at 379-80, 488 S.E.2d at 664-65 (claimant
who felt soreness in his back after lifting five to seven
buckets suffered an "accident by injury," although he could not
precisely identify which bucket he was lifting when he felt the
pain).
Finally, New River's argument that the commission
improperly relied upon Dr. Jones's evaluation because it was
based on an incredible or inaccurate history is also of no
consequence. 	First, as we have indicated above, we agree with
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the commission that Dr. Jones's recorded history is not
necessarily at odds with Woolwine's explanation of the incident.
Woolwine has maintained that she felt the pain after putting the
part back on the belt. 	She has also been consistent in stating
that she doesn't know at what point in the process the
pain/injury was incurred or caused. 	However, she knows that her
wrist was fine when she picked up the part and began to hurt
once she put it down.
Nevertheless, we have previously held that "medical
evidence is neither dispositive nor required to establish
causation. . . . 	'The testimony of a claimant may also be
considered in determining causation . . . .'" 	Corning, 25 Va.
App. at 339-40, 488 S.E.2d at 645 (citation omitted). 	In this
case, the commission did not rely solely on Dr. Jones's report
in reaching its conclusion, but also relied on Woolwine's
testimony. 	Thus, we find that their finding is reasonable and
supported by credible evidence.
Affirmed.

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