Jade H. Miller v A T & T Corporation

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Elder, Bumgardner and Lemons
JADE H. MILLER MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. 	Record No. 1167-98-4 	PER CURIAM
SEPTEMBER 29, 1998
A T & T CORPORATION
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Matthew H. Swyers; Koonz, McKenney, Johnson,
DePaolis & Lightfoot, on brief), for
appellant. 	Appellant submitting on brief.
(Joseph F. Giordano; Semmes, Bowen & Semmes,
on brief), for appellee. 	Appellee submitting
on brief.
Jade H. Miller ("claimant") appeals a decision of the
Workers' Compensation Commission ("commission") denying her claim
for payment of certain medical expenses. 	Claimant contends that
the commission erred in finding that she failed to prove that her
reflex sympathetic dystrophy ("RSD") and related medical
treatment were causally related to her April 3, 1995 compensable
injury by accident. 	Finding no error, we affirm.
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party below. 	See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990).
Unless we can say as a matter of law that claimant's evidence
sustained her burden of proof, the commission's findings are
binding and conclusive upon us. 	See Tomko v. Michael's
*Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.

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Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970).
In denying claimant's application, the commission made the
following findings:
[T]here is no clear factual relationship
between the accident on April 3, 1995 and the
claimant's RSD and there is no definitive
medical opinion linking them. 	Rather, Drs.
[Daniel R.] Ignacio, [Ellen J.] LaBelle and
others, who support the questionable
diagnosis of RSD, state only that the
claimant has RSD and needs treatment for her
chronic pain. 	None of them opine directly
that the claimant's RSD is related to her
compensable injury.
On the other hand, Drs. [Albert C.]
Casabona, [Ali G.] Ganjei and [Daniel J.]
Freedenburg opined that the claimant does not
have RSD. . . .
The present record before the Commission
is one in which several practitioners who
have treated the claimant believe that she
has RSD. 	None of these practitioners have
opined that the claimant's RSD is directly
attributable to her work injury. 	The
claimant's initial treating physician, as
well as physicians to whom Dr. Casabona has
referred the claimant, have opined that the
claimant's difficulties are not related to
RSD or to her work injury of 1995.
The commission's factual findings are amply supported by the
medical records. 	Based upon the lack of any persuasive medical
opinion establishing a causal connection between claimant's RSD
and her compensable accident, the commission, as fact finder, was
entitled to conclude that "the claimant has not established that
her RSD is the result of her work injury on April 3, 1995, and
that, therefore, treatment at Johns Hopkins University and other
pain management centers are not the responsibility of this
employer." 	"Medical evidence is not necessarily conclusive, but

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is subject to the commission's consideration and weighing."
Hungerford Mechanical Corp. v. Hobson, 11 Va. App. 675, 677, 401
S.E.2d 213, 215 (1991).
Based upon this record, we cannot find as a matter of law
that claimant's evidence sustained her burden of proof.
Accordingly, the commission's findings are binding and conclusive
upon us on appeal.
For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.