Glenna Michelle Babb v Scott Co. Dept. of Soc Serv

1 printed pages contain little extracted OCR body text; searchable legal-body completeness has not been established for those pages.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton

GLENNA MICHELLE BABB

v. Record No. 1585-95-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM
SCOTT COUNTY DEPARTMENT JANUARY 23, 1996

OF SOCIAL SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SCOTT COUNTY
James C. Roberson, Judge

(Melanie L. Jorgensen; Hamilton & Jorgensen, on
brief), for appellant.

(C. Dean Foster, Jr., on brief), for appellee.

Glenna Michelle Babb appeals the decision of the circuit
court terminating her parental rights to her children, Britney
and Jonathan. Babb contends that the Scott County Department of
Social Services (DSS) failed to present clear and convincing
evidence that the requirements of Code §§ 16.1-283(B) and (C) had
been satisfied. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the
parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.
Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court.

Rule 5A:27.

"When addressing matters concerning a child, including the
termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount
consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests."

Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123,

"Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.

2
128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). 	The trial courts "'are vested
with broad discretion in making the decisions necessary to guard
and to foster a child's best interests.'" 	Id. (citation
omitted). 	On appeal, when the trial court has heard the evidence
ore tenus, its judgment will not be disturbed unless plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it. 	Id.
Under Code § 16.1-283(B), DSS must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that (1) the neglect and abuse suffered by
Britney and Jonathan "presented a serious and substantial threat
to [their] life, health or development;" and (2) that it is not
"reasonably likely" that the conditions which caused the neglect
and abuse can be "substantially corrected or eliminated" to allow
the children to return to the parent in a "reasonable period of
time." 	Code § 16.1-283(B)(1) and (2). 	It is prima facie
evidence that the abusive or neglectful conditions have not been
corrected if there is proof that a parent has "habitually abused
or [is] addicted to intoxicating liquors . . . to the extent that
proper parental ability has been seriously impaired and the
parent, without good cause, has not responded to or followed
through with recommended and available treatment which could have
improved the capacity for adequate parental functioning". 	Code
§ 16.1-283(B)(2)(b). 	Similarly, proof that a parent has not
responded to or followed through on appropriate rehabilitative
efforts and services offered through DSS or other agencies is
prima facie evidence that the abusive or neglectful conditions

3
have not been corrected. 	Code § 16.1-283(B)(2)(c).
Under Code § 16.1-283(C), DSS was required to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that termination of Babb's residual
parental rights was in the best interests of Britney and Jonathan
and that Babb "without good cause, . . . [was] unwilling or
unable within a reasonable period not to exceed twelve months to
remedy substantially the conditions which led to the [children's]
foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and
appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other
rehabilitative agencies to such end." 	Code § 16.1-283(C)(2).
Proof that Babb
without good cause, . . . failed or . . .
[was] unable to make reasonable progress
towards the elimination of the conditions
which led to the [children's] foster care
placement in accordance with [her]
obligations under and within the time limits
or goals set forth in a foster care plan
filed with the court or any other plan
jointly designed and agreed to by the parent
. . . and a social, medical, mental health or
other rehabilitative agency
Code § 16.1-283(C)(3)(b), was prima facie evidence that Babb was
unwilling or unable to remedy the underlying conditions.
Britney and Jonathan were taken into custody when DSS
discovered the children, both age 3, alone at 10:00 p.m. on a
Friday. 	When Babb came home shortly after the DSS workers
arrived, she smelled of alcohol, staggered, had glassy eyes and
slurred speech. 	The apartment was dirty to the point of being
unsanitary. 	Broken glass and food were on the floor. 	The

4
children were dirty, and Britney was crying.
Britney was born with a significant case of fetal alcohol
syndrome, caused by heavy alcohol consumption by Babb during her
pregnancy. 	Britney also is mildly retarded, and displays
reactive attachment disorder, attributable to neglect by Babb,
her primary caregiver. 	Britney also continues to receive therapy
for possible sexual abuse. 	Jonathan shows symptoms consistent
with a mild case of fetal alcohol syndrome, including
microcephaly. 	Jonathan has serious problems with fine and gross
motor coordination, possibly indicating cerebral palsy. 	Jonathan
also displays reactive attachment disorder, arising from neglect
by Babb while he was in her care.
The psychiatrist who tested Britney and Jonathan noted that
reactive attachment disorder can be cured by placing a child in a
structured and stable environment. 	After an extended period of
time, Britney and Jonathan were forming emotional attachments to
their foster parents, indicating that they were beginning to
recover from the disorder. 	Both Britney and Jonathan will
continue to need a stable and structured home environment with
consistent care to aid their emotional problems. 	Jonathan will
also require physical therapy and additional special services to
address his physical and neurological problems.
DSS worked with Babb to improve her parenting skills and to
provide counseling and treatment for Babb's alcohol problem. 	DSS
provided Babb with Family Focus services, an intensive twenty to

5
twenty-five hours a week of in-home counseling, parenting and
health services. 	It also provided Babb with transportation
services. 	Babb failed to complete her GED classes and failed to
complete her substance abuse counseling. 	Babb's visits with her
children were sporadic. 	While Babb was originally cooperative
with the Family Focus services, Babb's cooperation began to lag.
Babb missed appointments and failed to follow through on her
responsibilities. 	Babb stopped attending Alcoholics Anonymous
meetings. 	Babb's participation in the Family Focus program was
terminated when the service provider found alcohol in Babb's
apartment.
The record demonstrates that DSS provided Babb with
assistance but that Babb was unable or unwilling to make
substantial improvement in the underlying problems which gave
rise to her children's foster care placement. 	Significantly, in
her testimony before the circuit court, Babb denied drinking
during her pregnancies, denied she had an alcohol problem, and
denied neglecting her children.
The children have been in foster care since 1993. 	"It is
clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy
period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent
will be capable of resuming [her] responsibilities." 	Kaywood v.
Dep't of Social Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495
(1990). 	The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence
demonstrated that it was in the best interests of these children

to terminate Babb's parental rights. That finding is not plainly

7
wrong or without evidence to support it. 	Accordingly, the
decision of the circuit court is summarily affirmed.
Affirmed.