William St. John Maggi v Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Lemons
WILLIAM ST. JOHN MAGGI
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. 	Record No. 1660-98-3 	JUDGE DONALD W. LEMONS
JUNE 1, 1999
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY
William N. Alexander, II, Judge
(Jesse W. Meadows, III, on brief), for
appellant. 	Appellant submitting on brief.
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; H.
Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee. 	Appellee
submitting on brief.
*Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
this opinion is not designated for publication.
William St. John Maggi appeals his conviction in a bench
trial of unauthorized use of a vehicle in violation of Code
§ 18.2-102. 	On appeal he contends that the evidence was not
sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the
intent to temporarily deprive the owner of the use of the
vehicle. 	We disagree and affirm the conviction.
I. 	BACKGROUND
William Maggi had known Teresa Haynes for approximately
three months. 	They had lived together at her home in Hurt,
Virginia, for approximately ten days as of September 3, 1996.
On that morning Maggi and Haynes left her home at 9:30 a.m. for

her job in Lynchburg. 	She gave him permission to use the car
during the day for errands, and he was to pick her up at work at
10:00 p.m. 	He never requested permission to drive her car to
Washington, D.C.
At approximately 9:45 p.m. that evening, Maggi called
Haynes at work. 	When she told him to pick her up at 10:00 p.m.,
“he said he would be there in ten minutes” but he never appeared
because he was drunk and was in Washington, D.C. 	Haynes did not
see her car again until the following evening. 	Maggi returned
the car to her driveway at 11:00 p.m. on September 4, 1996.
II. 	SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Where the sufficiency of the evidence is an issue on
appeal, an appellate court must view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth. 	See Cheng v. Commonwealth,
240 Va. 26, 42, 393 S.E.2d 599, 608 (1990).
Maggi admitted that instead of picking Haynes up at work as
they had agreed, he “took it upon [himself]” to drive to
Washington, D.C. 	He stated that he thought he could return in
time to meet Haynes at work, but instead, he got drunk, lied to
her on the telephone concerning his location, and remained in
Washington, D.C. with her car. 	Maggi maintains that his conduct
was “stupid” but not criminal.
“Under Code § 18.2-102, a conviction of unauthorized use of
a vehicle requires proof of use without the consent of the owner
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with intent to deprive the owner of possession temporarily, but
without intent to steal.” 	Overstreet v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.
App. 234, 236, 435 S.E.2d 906, 907 (1993) (citation omitted).
The evidence clearly demonstrates that Maggi’s use of the car
exceeded the permission he had received for its use. 	His
voluntary decision to drive the car to Washington, D.C., become
intoxicated, and deceive the owner about where he was located
with her car only fifteen minutes before he was due to return
the car supports the trial court’s finding of criminal intent to
temporarily deprive the owner of the use of the vehicle. 	The
conviction is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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