Rashawn A. Neville v Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Willis, Elder and Senior Judge Cole
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
RASHAWN A. NEVILLE
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. 	Record No. 1228-99-2 	JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
JULY 5, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
Buford M. Parsons, Jr., Judge
Matthew P. Geary (Goodwin, Sutton, DuVal &
Geary, P.L.C., on brief), for appellant.
Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
On appeal from his conviction of grand larceny, in
violation of Code § 18.2-95, Rashawn A. Neville contends that
the evidence failed to support his conviction. 	We affirm.
On appeal, we review the evidence in
the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom. 	The
judgment of a trial court sitting without a
jury is entitled to the same weight as a
jury verdict and will not be set aside
unless it appears from the evidence that the
judgment is plainly wrong or without
evidence to support it.
Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418
(1987).

In a bench trial, Neville was convicted of breaking and
entering, in violation of Code § 18.2-91, and grand larceny, in
violation of Code § 18.2-95. 	The trial court sentenced him to
three years imprisonment for each offense. 	Neville's petition
for appeal relating to the breaking and entering conviction was
denied.
Neville's convictions arise from an incident that occurred
on May 6, 1998, at the home of Norris Edward Temple, Jr. 	Temple
testified that, arriving home that afternoon, he saw that an air
conditioning unit had been removed from a window. 	When he
entered the house, "[e]verything was turned over, the tables,
and the couch was moved." 	In the kitchen, he saw Neville, who
attempted to hide his face and ran out of the house. 	When
questioned by police, Neville admitted stealing a necklace from
the house.
Neville contends that the evidence was insufficient to
prove that the value of the necklace was $200 or more. 	See Code
§ 18.2-95. 	No evidence was offered to prove the condition of
the necklace, its carat weight, or its current value. 	However,
Temple testified that the necklace was worth $600 and that he
had bought it at the Gold Factory in the Sixth Street
Marketplace for $600.
Although the value of stolen property is measured as of the
time of the theft, the original purchase price may be considered
as evidence of its current value. 	See Dunn v. Commonwealth, 222
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Va. 704, 705, 284 S.E.2d 792, 792 (1981). 	"[T]he opinion
testimony of the owner of personal property is competent and
admissible on the question of the value of such property,
regardless of the owner's knowledge of property values." 	Walls
v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 480, 482, 450 S.E.2d 363, 364 (1994).
The valuation of jewelry is distinguishable from that of
depreciable personal property. 	Jewelry tends to hold its value,
and often to appreciate. 	No evidence disclosed that the
necklace had suffered misuse or deterioration. 	See Lester v.
Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 495, 505, 518 S.E.2d 318, 322 (1999).
Without any such countervailing evidence, the fact finder was
entitled to infer from the evidence that the necklace,
originally purchased for $600, was worth at least $200 at the
time of the theft. 	Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court
is affirmed.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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