William Courtney Ryan, Jr. v Cynthia D. Kramer

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Before Judges Baker, Bray and Overton
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
WILLIAM COURTNEY RYAN, JR.
v. 	Record No. 2197-94-1 	OPINION
BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER
CYNTHIA D. KRAMER 	OCTOBER 24, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
John C. Morrison, Jr., Judge
Cheshire I'Anson Eveleigh (Wolcott, Rivers, Wheary,
Basnight & Kelly, P.C., on briefs), for appellant.
Paul M. Lipkin (Goldblatt, Lipkin & Cohen, P.C.,
on brief), for appellee.
William Courtney Ryan, Jr. (husband), the appellant, and
Cynthia D. Kramer (wife), the appellee, were formerly husband and
wife. 	They divorced in 1991. 	One child was born of the marriage
on August 4, 1985. 	Husband appeals, and wife cross-appeals from
a decree of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk (trial
court).
Although husband alleges several trial court errors that he
asserts are grounds for reversal of the decree, all stem from the
trial court's imputation to husband of his monthly earnings at
the time he quit his job as an airline pilot he had held for more
than twenty-six years.
The following are relevant excerpts from the trial court's
decree:
THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on June 23,
1994 upon the appeal of [husband] from a
support order entered in the Norfolk Juvenile

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and Domestic Relations District Court on
April 4, 1994 and again came on to be heard
on July 21, 1994 upon a continuance of the
June 23 hearing, both parties being present
in proper person at both hearings as well as
the attorney for the defendant being present;
and was argued by counsel.
And it appearing to the Court from the
testimony of the parties on June 23, 1994
that for 26 1/2 years, [husband] was an
airline pilot for U.S. Air, who voluntarily
accepted early retirement January 1, 1994 at
age 51, his average monthly gross income for
the year 1993 having been $12,443.00; that
since his early retirement, [husband] has
been engaged as a real estate agent with GSH
having earned nothing to date in 1994; that
[Kramer] who was not working at the time of
the separation of the parties, at the time of
their divorce on April 12, 1991, or at the
present time, now has a six-month old child
with her current husband; that [Kramer] has
legal and physical custody of the minor child
of the parties, [son], who was born August 4,
1985; that in the past year or more,
[husband] has had visitation with [son] 120
days out of the year, thus entitling him to
the shared custody provisions of Virginia
Code Section 20-108.2(G)(3) ("the
Guidelines"); that the presumptive amount of
child support payable by [husband] to
[Kramer] under the Guidelines based upon zero
gross income of [husband] and zero gross
income of [Kramer] is $7.91; that the
application of the Guidelines is unjust and
inappropriate in this case for the reason
that [husband's] average gross monthly income
for 1993 of $12,443.00 ought to be imputed to
him, he having voluntarily terminated his
employment; that it is inappropriate to
impute income to [Kramer], she having never
been significantly gainfully employed during
her marriage to [husband] or thereafter; that
[husband] ought to be given credit in the
application of the Guidelines for a child
born to him and his wife since his divorce
from [Kramer], and he further should be given
credit for a portion of a premium on his life
insurance which he carries for [son's]
benefit in the event of his untimely demise.
And it further appearing to the Court from

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the testimony of [husband] on July 21, 1994
that as of August 1994, he has accepted
employment with Saudi Arabian Airlines, which
requires his move with his family to Saudi
Arabia and hence will not be able to exercise
shared custody of [son] that would entitle
him to the shared custody provisions of the
Guidelines.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who
prevailed below, here the appellee/wife, we hold that the
evidence sufficiently supports the trial court's finding of fact,
and that it did not err when it found that husband voluntarily
left his employment of more than twenty-six years, at which he
earned $12,443 per month. 	In a similar case, the Supreme Court
of Virginia affirmed the trial court's imputation of income and
said: The effect of the chancellor's decision to
deny the reduction was to hold that the
father gambled with the children's ability to
receive his financial support, and lost. 	Of
course, a father is not prohibited from
voluntarily changing employment. 	But, the
chancellor, in the exercise of judicial
discretion, implicitly held that when the
father who was under court order to pay a
certain sum for child support, which he was
able to pay given his employment, chose to
pursue other employment, albeit a bona fide
and reasonable business undertaking, the risk
of his success at his new job was upon the
father, and not upon the children. 	We cannot
say that this demonstrates the chancellor
imposed an erroneous standard of proof in
denying the father relief.
Antonelli v. Antonelli, 242 Va. 152, 156, 409 S.E.2d 117, 119-20
(1991).
Because we find that the trial court did not err when it

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imputed income to husband, the other issues raised pursuant to
that finding are moot.
Husband further asserts that the trial court erred when it
failed to hold that wife had a financial obligation to provide
for the child of the parties. 	We disagree. 	While both parties
owe a duty of support, Yohay v. Ryan, 4 Va. App. 559, 359 S.E.2d
320 (1987), decisions concerning child support rest within the
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on
appeal unless plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence.
Young v. Young, 3 Va. App. 80, 81, 348 S.E.2d 46, 47 (1986).
There is evidence to support the judgment of the trial court and
there is no showing of an abuse of trial court discretion.
Husband further contends that the trial court erred by
refusing a full evidentiary hearing concerning his current
employment. 	The record discloses that husband, taking a business
risk that he was not forced to take, voluntarily resigned from
his more than $12,000 monthly income to try realty sales at which
he earned no income. 	It further appears that husband wanted to
show that after failing in his real estate venture, he obtained
another position as a pilot at which he earned only $4,000 per
month. 	It was not error on these facts for the trial court to
exercise its discretion to limit the evidence concerning
comparative income.
We have carefully examined the record and find that this
child support case involved no infringement on any constitutional

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right that could be applied to this case.
Finally, each issue raised by wife in her cross-appeal is
governed by the rule of trial court discretion. 	Upon our
examination of the record, we find no abuse of trial court
discretion on those issues.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
Affirmed.