Shawn D. Granger v Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Chief Judge Moon, Judges Benton and Elder
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
SHAWN D. GRANGER OPINION BY
v. 	Record No. 	1642-94-2 	CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON
JULY 18, 1995
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
George F. Tidey, Judge
Christopher J. Collins for appellant.
Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
Shawn D. Granger appeals his malicious wounding and robbery
convictions. 	He contends that the Commonwealth's evidence, which
consisted of his fingerprints on a liquor bottle that was
apparently used to strike the victims, was insufficient to support
the conviction. 	We agree and reverse.
The Commonwealth's evidence, which was wholly circumstantial,
was as follows. 	On May 2, 1993, at approximately 1:00 a.m.,
Russell Skinner and a companion were returning from a convenience
store to his companion's apartment when Skinner was struck in the
head from behind. 	As he was hit, Skinner heard the sound of glass
breaking. 	Skinner was found by police officers in a pool of
blood. 	The officers also found a broken half-gallon Canadian Mist
bottle within two feet of Skinner's head. 	At least five
fingerprints found on the bottle matched Granger's prints. 	Human
blood was also found on part of the broken bottle but not in

- 2 -
quantity sufficient for complete serology. 	After arriving at the
hospital, Skinner discovered that $150 was missing from his pants
pocket.
When the evidence is wholly circumstantial, as here, "[a]ll
necessary circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with innocence and exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence." 	Boothe v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 484,
492, 358 S.E.2d 740, 745 (1987) (citations omitted).
The Commonwealth's circumstantial evidence does not exclude
the hypothesis that Granger may have handled the bottle for an
innocent purpose before the robbery. 	At best, the Commonwealth's
case only proved that Granger once handled the bottle. 	The print
evidence does not show when Granger handled the bottle or that he
handled it at the scene of the crime. 	Moreover, Granger's prints
were found on the handle and body of the half-gallon bottle, a
location not inconsistent with someone holding the bottle to pour
from it. 	Other than the fingerprints on the bottle, there was no
"evidence of other circumstances tending to reasonably exclude the
hypothesis that the print was impressed at a time other than that
of the crime." 	Avent v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 474, 480, 164 S.E.
655, 658 (1968).
The facts of this case are inapposite to Avent, Turner v.
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 141, 235 S.E.2d 357 (1977), and Parrish v.
Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 361, 437 S.E.2d 215 (1993), relied upon
by the Attorney General. 	In each of those cases, there was
"evidence of other circumstances tending to reasonably exclude the

- 3 -
hypothesis that the print[s] were impressed at a time other than
that of the crime." 	Turner, 218 Va. at 146, 235 S.E.2d at 360.
Accordingly, we hold that under the circumstances of this
case, the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions.
The convictions, therefore, are reversed.
Reversed and dismissed.