Harry Emell Dean v Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Willis and Bumgardner
Argued at Salem, Virginia
HARRY EMELL DEAN MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. 	Record No. 3074-97-3 	JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
DECEMBER 29, 1998
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE
Jonathan M. Apgar, Judge
Anna M. Bagwell (Office of the Public
Defender, on brief), for appellant.
Richard B. Campbell, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Harry Emell Dean appeals his conviction of driving after
being declared an habitual offender. 	He argues that the trial
court erred when it ruled that the order declaring him an
habitual offender was in effect when he drove. 	Finding that the
trial court correctly interpreted the order, we affirm the
conviction.
On February 3, 1997, Roanoke city police stopped the
defendant for a traffic infraction and arrested him after
determining that he was an habitual offender. 	A circuit court
had declared the defendant an habitual offender on July 7, 1983.
The order stated that the defendant was not to drive "for a
period of ten (10) years from this date and the privilege of the
*Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
this opinion is not designated for publication.

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defendant to operate a motor vehicle in this State has been
restored by an order of a Court of record as provided by
statute." 	(Emphasis added.) 	The Commonwealth introduced the
order at trial.
The defendant argues the order revoked his privilege to
drive for ten years but is not clear that the revocation stayed
in effect after that period. 	He contends the language is
ambiguous, but he concedes that the order would be clear had the
word "until" appeared after "and" before "the privilege." 	We
disagree that the lack of the word "until" renders the order
unclear.
In 1983, the code provided that the defendant remained an
habitual offender for ten years and until the privilege to
operate had been restored. 	See Code § 46.1-387.7 (now Code
§ 46.2-357). 	In Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 246, 249, 402
S.E.2d 711, 713 (1991), the order revoked the license to drive
for ten years. 	It contained no provision that the revocation
continued until a court restored the privilege. 	This Court held
that Davis's privilege to drive had been restored once the period
of years had passed. 	The present case is not analogous.
The order in this case states that Dean is not permitted to
drive for ten years. 	However, it continues "and the privilege of
the defendant . . . has been restored by an order of a Court of
record . . . ." 	Unlike Davis, the coordinate conjunction "and"
links the clause revoking for ten years to a second clause.

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"And" is "a conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing
the idea that the latter is to be added to or taken along with
the first." 	Black's Law Dictionary 86 (6th ed. 1990). 	Both
conditions stated in the order must be met; ten years must pass,
and a court must restore the defendant's privilege to drive.
Finding that the order gave the defendant notice that his
license was suspended for ten years and until restored by a court
of record, we affirm his conviction.
Affirmed.