Richard Wood v Janice Wood Chambliss, f/k/a J.Wood

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Coleman, Humphreys and Senior Judge Overton
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
RICHARD WOOD
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. 	Record No. 2615-99-1 	JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
JULY 25, 2000
JANICE WOOD CHAMBLISS, F/K/A
JANICE C. WOOD
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH
H. Thomas Padrick, Jr., Judge
Cheshire I'Anson Eveleigh (Wolcott, Rivers,
Wheary, Basnight & Kelly, P.C., on brief),
for appellant.
Leonard D. Levine (Gordon, Allison & Levine,
P.C., on brief), for appellee.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
Richard Wood (Richard) appeals from a denial of his petition
to reopen the divorce proceedings between him and his former wife,
Janice Wood Chambliss (Janice), for the purpose of terminating
payments to wife of a portion of husband's pension. 	For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.
A final decree of divorce ending the marriage between Richard
and Janice was entered by the circuit court on October 3, 1988.
This decree in pertinent part stated as follows:
[T]he Complainant, Janice C. Wood is entitled
to receive a monetary award of $53,861.00,
which is 50% of the Defendant's [Richard's]

New York Police Department pension benefits
(the present value of which is $107,722.00),
payable to her at the rate of $424.00 per
month, based upon consideration of all
marital property of the parties, including
the Defendant's New York Police Department
retirement benefits and the Defendant,
Richard Wood, being entitled to receive same,
it is ORDERED that the New York City Pension
Bureau, City of New York, shall pay the
portion due to Complainant [Janice] pursuant
to the provisions of this Order directly to
the Complainant. 	The first payment shall be
due Complainant on October 1, 1988. 	These
payments shall resolve the matter of the
Complainant's interest in the Defendant's
Police Department pension and these payments
are made as a division of property pursuant
to Virginia Code Section 20-107.3. 	The
Complainant shall receive her proportionate
share of said retirement payment income each
month for as long as Defendant receives his
pension or until one of the parties dies.
After Janice received $53,861 from Richard's pension, Richard
petitioned the circuit court to reopen and place the matter back
on the docket for the purpose of entering an order terminating
further payments to Janice, as well as her interest in Richard's
pension benefits.
By letter opinion, the circuit court denied Richard's
petition and in doing so "determined that the source of the
confusion at the time [of the entry of the decree] was the law's
requirement [at that time] that the present value of the
Defendant's pension had to be established and some prior hearings
had not done so."
- 2 -

Code § 20-107.3(E)(8) as it existed prior to July 1, 1988,
required the court to consider the present value of a pension in
making a monetary award. 	This requirement existed even if the
payments were deferred. 	However, in Zipf v. Zipf, 8 Va. App. 387,
382 S.E.2d 263 (1989), we held:
[U]se of the present value to fix a sum
certain monetary award derived from a pension
is not only unnecessary, but inappropriate
where distribution is deferred, we conclude
that in this instance the legislature did not
intend the present value to serve as a means
of diminishing the true value of the monetary
award. 	The present value calculation serves
two important functions. 	First, it provides
the trial judge with an informational base
figure to assist in calculating the amount of
the award. 	In addition, the present value of
a pension would be useful information for the
"party against whom a monetary award is
made," who might wish immediately to "satisfy
the award, in whole or in part, by conveyance
of property, subject to the approval of the
court."
Id. at 397-98, 382 S.E.2d at 269 (citing Code § 20-107.3(D)).
In cases such as this one, a present value calculation
of any pension benefits is virtually meaningless because the
pension is divided by percentage and paid over time. 	In this
instance, Janice was awarded a 50% share of Richard's pension
stream, payable as he received payments. 	We find that the
reference in the decree to the sum Janice was entitled to
receive did not defeat the trial court's clear award of an
ongoing 50% share in Richard's pension benefits.
- 3 -

Richard relies on our decision in Hastie v. Hastie, 29 Va.
App. 776, 514 S.E.2d 800 (1999), as authority that the pension
payments to Janice should be terminated. 	His reliance on Hastie
is misplaced. 	The decree entered in Hastie allocated 40% of the
husband's retirement pension valued at $102,496.40 payable at the
rate of $575.04 monthly "until paid in full." 	Id. at 778, 514
S.E.2d at 801 (emphasis in original). 	In contrast, the plain
language of the decree here required the pension payments to
Janice to continue "as long as [Richard] receives his pension or
until one of the parties dies." 	(Emphasis added).
We therefore find no error in the decision of the trial
court.
Affirmed.
- 4 -