Dexter Joseph Summers v Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Benton, Bumgardner and Frank
DEXTER JOSEPH SUMMERS
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. 	Record No. 1797-99-3 	JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
JUNE 20, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PAGE COUNTY
John J. McGrath, Jr., Judge
(H. Webb Hudson, Jr., on brief), for
appellant. 	Appellant submitting on brief.
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; Shelly R.
James, Assistant Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee. 	Appellee submitting on brief.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
The trial court convicted Dexter Joseph Summers of
malicious wounding. 	He contends that the evidence was
insufficient. 	Finding no error, we affirm.
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence, we examine the evidence that tends to support the
conviction and allow it to stand unless it is plainly wrong or
unsupported by the evidence. 	We also view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth. 	See Commonwealth v. Presley, 256 Va. 465, 466,
507 S.E.2d 72, 72 (1998) (citations omitted).

The defendant and the victim were inmates at the Page
County Jail housed in the same cellblock. 	Several inmates told
the defendant that the victim was an informer and yelled, "get
him, get him." 	The defendant walked over to the victim, who sat
by himself, and said, "I don't like snitches." 	He struck the
victim in the head with a plastic coffee cup inflicting a cut
that required five stitches. 	The attack was unprovoked.
In order to convict the defendant of malicious wounding,
the Commonwealth must prove he maliciously cut or wounded the
victim, or by any means caused bodily injury, with the intent to
maim, disfigure, disable, or kill the victim. 	See Code
§ 18.2-51. 	The defendant concedes that his act was voluntary
and intentional, but he argues that he did not intend to wound
maliciously because he did not expect the victim to be seriously
injured by one blow with a plastic cup.
"[I]ntent is the purpose to use a particular means to
effect a definite result." 	Banovitch v. Commonwealth, 196 Va.
210, 218, 83 S.E.2d 369, 374 (1954). 	"The nature and extent of
the bodily injury and the means by which [it is] accomplished
may reflect this intent but are not exclusive factors."
Campbell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 476, 483, 405 S.E.2d 1, 4
(1991) (en banc) (court could infer that defendant intended to
disfigure or disable child by repeatedly striking with leather
belt despite defense of poor parenting skills). 	The requisite
intent may be proven from circumstances, which include the
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defendant's conduct and statements. 	See Banovitch, 196 Va. at
216, 83 S.E.2d at 373; Campbell, 12 Va. App. at 484, 405 S.E.2d
at 4.
Here, the defendant struck the victim above the temple with
a plastic coffee cup. 	The victim did not provoke the attack.
Inmates were encouraging the defendant to get the victim because
he was a snitch, and before striking, the defendant stated that
he did not like snitches. 	The blow to the head was sufficient
to break the cup, inflict a cut to the head, and require
stitches to close.
While the defendant claims the use of a plastic cup was
innocuous, it was an issue of fact whether it was innocuous or
was an effective weapon when used as it was. 	Inmates do not
have ready access to weapons, but a plastic vessel can break or
shear into an effective cutting implement. 	The finder of fact
could reasonably infer that the defendant employed the plastic
cup to enhance the blow he intended to strike and that he
intended the cup to break and become a cutting weapon. 	"The
fact finder is entitled to draw inferences from those facts
proven to be true, so long as the inferences are reasonable and
justified." 	Cottee v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 546, 555, 525
S.E.2d 25, 30 (2000) (citation omitted). 	"'[T]he finder of fact
may [also] infer that a person intends the immediate, direct,
and necessary consequences of his voluntary acts.'" 	Id.
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(citations omitted). 	See Campbell, 12 Va. App. at 484, 405
S.E.2d at 4.
We conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the
finding that the defendant maliciously struck the victim with
the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill him.
Accordingly, we affirm the conviction.
Affirmed.
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