Springdale Lodging v. Springdale

2024 UT App 83

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SPRINGDALE LODGING, LLC,
Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF SPRINGDALE,
Appellee.

Opinion
No. 20220373-CA
Filed May 31, 2024

Fifth District Court, St. George Department
The Honorable Eric A. Ludlow
No. 190500268

Daniel J. McDonald and Kyle C. Fielding,
Attorneys for Appellant
V. Lowry Snow, J. Gregory Hardman, and
Victoria Carlton, Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred.

ORME, Judge:

¶1 Springdale Lodging, LLC dba Majestic View Lodge
(Majestic View), submitted an application (the Application) to the
Town of Springdale (Springdale) to rezone its property.
Following public hearings before Springdale’s planning
commission and town council, the Application was denied.
Majestic View sought judicial review of the denial. The district
court ultimately granted summary judgment in Springdale’s
favor, denied Majestic View’s cross-motion for summary
judgment, and dismissed the case.

¶2 On appeal, Majestic View argues that the court erred in
concluding that Utah Code section 10-9a-801(8)(a) applied to this
Springdale Lodging v. Springdale

case, resulting in the exclusion of an affidavit by Majestic View’s
attorney (Attorney). Because we agree that the court erred in
applying that statute, and because Attorney’s affidavit created a
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Springdale’s
denial of the Application was procedurally proper, we reverse the
court’s summary judgment rulings and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

¶3 Springdale, located at the south entrance of Zion National
Park, describes itself as a town with “a unique village atmosphere
and character.” Springdale adopted a general plan 1 that
“emphasizes the goal to preserve [its] small town character and
village scale.” To that end, the general plan encourages, in
relevant part, “boutique hotels, bed and breakfasts, and other
similar lodging establishments that help promote the village
atmosphere and small-town scale.” The general plan also
embraces the policy of, “[t]o the greatest extent possible,
avoid[ing] rezoning properties from residential to commercial.”
Additionally, section 10-3-2(A) of the Springdale Town Code (the
Town Code) provides that the zone map should not be amended
“except to promote more fully the objectives and purposes of this
title and the general plan, to correct manifest errors, or to
accommodate substantial changes in conditions.”

¶4 Majestic View owns a 2.5-acre property in the southern end
of Springdale. Historically, the property was used as a

1. A “general plan” is “a document that a municipality adopts that
sets forth general guidelines for proposed future development of
the land within the municipality.” Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-9a-103(17) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023) (quotation simplified).
See generally id. § 10-9a-401(1) (requiring municipalities to adopt a
general plan).

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single-family residence and has been zoned as “Valley
Residential” since 1992. The purpose of “Valley Residential”
zoning “is to harmoniously combine residential uses with
agricultural uses,” and it “reflects the historical open farm
development of [Springdale] with residences surrounded by
cultivated fields.”

¶5 In January 2019, Majestic View submitted the Application
seeking to change its property’s zoning from “Valley Residential”
to “Valley Commercial” “to allow for a hotel, retail space, rental
housing, and a welcome center on the Property.” Majestic View
“also expressed an interest in developing affordable housing” on
part of the property. Some two weeks later, Springdale’s planning
commission considered the Application at a public hearing. At the
hearing, Attorney, an engineer, and certain other representatives
appeared on Majestic View’s behalf. Attorney and the engineer
answered the planning commission’s questions about the
Application, and Attorney also answered a question posed by a
member of the public. The record of the proceedings Springdale
later submitted to the district court did not indicate that Attorney
or the engineer requested more time to speak about the
Application at the hearing. After expressing several concerns
about the requested zone change, the planning commission
unanimously voted to recommend that the Application be denied.

¶6 In February, Springdale’s town council considered the
Application at a public hearing. Less than half an hour prior to the
hearing, Majestic View submitted a new concept plan for its
requested zone change. According to the hearing’s minutes, after
appearing before the planning commission, Majestic View
believed it “better understood [the planning commission’s]
concerns and altered the affordable housing component of the
plan. In exchange [it] wanted to revamp the Majestic View Lodge
. . . and consolidate the restaurant and gift shop to add additional
lodging units” that “would subsidize the affordable housing.”
Due to the late submission, the town council declined to consider

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the revised concept plan at the February hearing. The minutes
indicate that Springdale’s director of community development
said that the town council “could review a revised plan under the
current request, or start again with another zone change
application.” The council also expressed its intent to deny the
Application, but it tabled the issue so that legal counsel could
“draft findings to deny the request.”

¶7 In March, the town council again considered the
Application at a public hearing. The council informed Attorney
that it would consider only the original concept plan because the
planning commission had not reviewed the revised plan and
because the changes were substantial enough to require
submission of an entirely new application. Attorney replied that
“he wanted to preserve his rights under the pending Application”
and asked that the council allow Majestic View to amend the
Application so that the planning commission could review the
revised concept plan. After Springdale’s mayor responded that
the planning commission would review the revised concept plan
only if it was included in a new application, Attorney indicated
his intent to appeal the denial of the Application. Attorney also
raised concerns about procedure and process, stating that “there
were procedural differences in how the Council considered
agenda items” and that he “felt he was denied the opportunity to
speak individually with Commission or Council members, or
present different aspects of his proposal.” In light of these
allegations, the town council decided to again seek legal counsel
and once more tabled its consideration of the Application.

¶8 In April, at another public hearing, the town council voted
unanimously to deny the Application. The following month,
Majestic View initiated the current lawsuit against Springdale, 2

2. The complaint also named Springdale’s mayor, its director of
community development, a town council member, and a planning
(continued…)

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alleging several causes of action. The district court dismissed all
of Majestic View’s claims except for its request for judicial review
of the Application’s denial, brought pursuant to the Municipal
Land Use, Development, and Management Act (MLUDMA),
Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9a-101 to -905 (LexisNexis 2022 & Supp.
2023). 3

¶9 Both parties filed motions for summary judgment on the
remaining cause of action. 4 In addition to the parties’ arguments

commissioner as defendants in their individual capacities, but the
district court soon dismissed them as defendants, leaving
Springdale as the sole defendant. Majestic View does not appeal
the dismissal of the individual defendants.

3. Because the applicable provisions of the Utah Code in effect at
the relevant time do not differ from those in the most recent
printed version of the code in any way material to this appeal,
unless otherwise indicated we cite the most recent printed
version. But because the relevant provisions of the Town Code
have since been materially altered, any reference to the Town
Code is to the version in effect in 2019.

4. Springdale explains that because it and Majestic View’s prior
counsel “agreed to resolve the administrative review claim by
filing appellate-style briefs, focusing their arguments on the
administrative record that was transmitted to the district court,”
it submitted its argument in the form of a brief that recited “facts
from the record” rather than undisputed facts. Around that time,
Majestic View retained new counsel who, instead of a brief,
submitted a motion for summary judgment making the same
arguments it made in its memorandum opposing Springdale’s
“brief.” For simplicity, we refer to both filings as motions for
summary judgment. Indeed, in light of our holding in Part I below
that the court’s consideration was not limited to the record
(continued…)

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concerning the Application’s denial, Majestic View contended,
among other things, that the 317-page record Springdale
submitted to the court was incomplete because it did not contain
transcripts of the public hearings and that Springdale violated
MLUDMA and the Town Code when it did not provide Majestic
View “a reasonable opportunity to be heard” and when it did not
consider the revised concept plan.

¶10 Majestic View’s motion for summary judgment included
an affidavit from Attorney. In the affidavit, Attorney stated that
prior to the public hearing before the planning commission,
Springdale’s director of community development told him that
Majestic View would need to include only “a simple concept plan
of the intended development with a simple illustration” in the
Application and cautioned against including too much detail
because “that might distract the planning commission and town
council from the zone change itself.” Attorney alleged that the
director also told him that Majestic View would have “ample
opportunity to adjust or modify the concept plan through the
formal processes provided by” Springdale.

¶11 Attorney stated that per Springdale’s written rules of
procedure for public hearings (the Public Hearing Policy), he and
the engineer were not permitted “to speak unless spoken to.”
Attorney alleged he told the director after the commission hearing
that he had not been allowed to “talk, modify, adjust or even
receive feedback from the planning commission.” The director
allegedly told Attorney the commission was “following their
procedure,” which included inviting him to speak “during the
Q&A section.”

¶12 Attorney stated that the Public Hearing Policy was also in
effect at public hearings before the town council. He alleged that

Springdale provided, Springdale’s “brief” is properly treated as a
motion for summary judgment.

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although the Public Hearing Policy allowed for a “[s]ummary
explanation and presentation of hearing item” by Springdale, no
equivalent allotment of time was provided to him to present the
Application. Rather, he was not allowed “to speak unless spoken
to.” He also asserted that he was precluded from presenting his
visual aids or the revised concept plan at the February public
hearing before the town council. And contrary to the minutes
from the March hearing, he asserted that he “was not ‘invited to
speak’ about the merits” of the Application but was instead
limited to voicing his “objections to the process.” Attorney stated
that, at the April hearing, he “was not allowed to speak or present
anything to the Town Council.” He asserted that as a result, he
was never given the opportunity at any of the hearings to address,
among other things, whether the zone change was needed “to
correct manifest errors” or “to accommodate substantial changes
in conditions” under section 10-3-2(A) of the Town Code.

¶13 The district court resolved the parties’ summary judgment
motions in Springdale’s favor. First, applying the standard set
forth in Petersen v. Riverton City, 2010 UT 58, 243 P.3d 1261, and
Morra v. Grand County, 2010 UT 21, 230 P.3d 1022, the court ruled
that “[t]he administrative record reflects that the denial by the
Town Council was in the interest of the general welfare and
served a legitimate land use purpose.” The court, accordingly,
declined to set aside Springdale’s decision to deny the
Application. The court did not determine whether, in so doing,
Springdale acted “properly,” “contrary to state or federal law,” or
“consistent with” MLUDMA. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-9a-801(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2022). Also, in reaching its decision,
the court did not consider Attorney’s affidavit because the court
believed it was precluded under Utah Code section
10-9a-801(8)(a) from considering evidence “outside of the
administrative record.” Instead, the court based its decision on
what “[t]he administrative record reflect[ed].” And regarding
Majestic View’s challenge to the sufficiency of the record, the

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court ruled that the lack of transcripts of the public hearings did
not render the record inadequate because Utah law requires
submission of transcripts only “if available,” which was not the
case here because “Springdale does not prepare transcripts of
zone-change proceedings, and it did not prepare one in this case.”

¶14 Accordingly, the district court granted Springdale’s
motion for summary judgment and denied Majestic View’s
motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶15 Majestic View challenges the district court’s summary
judgment rulings. “We review a district court’s legal conclusions
and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for
correctness.” R.O.A. Gen. Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2022 UT App
141, ¶ 13, 525 P.3d 100 (quotation simplified). In so doing, “we
view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. (quotation
simplified).

ANALYSIS

¶16 Majestic View raises several challenges to the district
court’s summary judgment rulings. We first consider its
argument that the court incorrectly excluded Attorney’s affidavit
under Utah Code section 10-9a-801(8)(a) when it considered the
parties’ summary judgment motions. Next, we turn to Majestic
View’s argument that the Public Hearing Policy deprived it of a
reasonable opportunity to be heard as required by MLUDMA and
the Town Code. We ultimately agree with Majestic View’s
position on both these arguments and accordingly reverse the
court’s grant of summary judgment to Springdale.

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¶17 But our consideration of Majestic View’s arguments does
not end there. Because some of the other issues it raises on appeal
are likely to arise again on remand, we consider those arguments
as well. See State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8, ¶ 49, 416 P.3d 1132
(“Although it is unnecessary to our decision, we retain the
authority to reach issues when we believe our analysis could
prove helpful on remand.”). Specifically, we address Majestic
View’s claims that Springdale wrongfully refused its request to
supplement the Application with the revised concept plan and
that the district court erred when it ruled that Springdale was not
required to include transcripts of the proceedings in the record it
provided the court.

I. Attorney’s Affidavit

¶18 Majestic View argues that the district court erroneously
excluded Attorney’s affidavit from its consideration of the
motions for summary judgment for being “outside of the
administrative record” pursuant to Utah Code section
10-9a-801(8)(a). Majestic View contends that section 801(8)(a)
applies only to administrative decisions, whereas Springdale’s
denial of the Application’s requested zone change constituted a
legislative action that carries no similar limitation under
MLUDMA. We agree.

¶19 Section 801(8)(a) provides,

(i) If there is a record, the district court’s review is
limited to the record provided by the land use
authority or appeal authority,[5] as the case may be.

5. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(7)(a) (LexisNexis 2022) (“The
land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, shall
transmit to the reviewing court the record of the proceedings of
(continued…)

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(ii) The court may not accept or consider any
evidence outside the record of the land use
authority or appeal authority, as the case may be,
unless that evidence was offered to the land use
authority or appeal authority, respectively, and the
court determines that the evidence was improperly
excluded.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(8)(a) (LexisNexis 2022). The court is
permitted to “call witnesses and take evidence” only in cases
where “there is no record.” Id. § 10-9a-801(8)(b).

¶20 Under its plain terms, section 801(8)(a)’s limitations apply
specifically “to the record provided by the land use authority or
appeal authority.” Id. § 10-9a-801(8)(a). As defined by MLUDMA,
land use authorities and appeal authorities are tasked with
deciding “a land use application” either in the first instance or on
appeal, id. § 10-9a-103(5), (30)(a) (Supp. 2023), that applicants
submit to obtain “a land use decision,” id. § 10-9a-103(29)(a)(ii). A
land use decision is “an administrative decision.” Id. § 10-9a-103(31)
(emphasis added). Notably, MLUDMA states that land use
applications are not “applications to enact, amend, or repeal a
land use regulation,” id. § 10-9a-103(29)(b), which are defined as
“legislative decision[s] . . . that govern[] the use or development of
land,” including “the adoption or amendment of a zoning map or
the text of the zoning code,” id. § 10-9a-103(33)(a)–(b) (emphasis
added). MLUDMA also provides that a land use regulation is
distinct from “a land use decision of the legislative body acting as
the land use authority.” Id. § 10-9a-103(33)(c)(i) (emphasis added).
See id. § 10-9a-501(1) (“Only a legislative body, as the body
authorized to weigh policy considerations, may enact a land use

the land use authority or appeal authority, including the minutes,
findings, orders, and, if available, a true and correct transcript of
the proceedings.”).

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regulation.”); id. § 10-9a-503(1) (2022) (stating that “[o]nly a
legislative body may amend” land use regulations).

¶21 Here, the Application specifically sought the rezoning of
Majestic View’s property from “Valley Residential” to “Valley
Commercial.” This was fundamentally a legislative decision. As
an initial matter, MLUDMA expressly states that “the adoption or
amendment of a zoning map or the text of the zoning code” is “a
legislative decision.” Id. § 10-9a-103(33)(a)–(b). Furthermore, the
Utah Supreme Court has “consistently held that the enactment
and amendment of zoning ordinances is fundamentally a
legislative act.” Petersen v. Riverton City, 2010 UT 58, ¶ 10, 243 P.3d
1261 (quotation simplified). This likewise extends to decisions
made in response to applications to rezone property. Id. ¶ 1
(“[T]he decision to grant or deny an application for a zoning
change is a legislative decision.”). Indeed, site-specific zoning
decisions satisfy the “chief hallmarks of legislative action”—“the
adoption of rules of general applicability and the weighing of
broad, competing policy considerations.” 6 Krejci v. City of Saratoga
Springs, 2013 UT 74, ¶ 31, 322 P.3d 662 (quotation simplified).
Thus, in deciding whether to grant or deny the Application, the
town council was acting in a legislative capacity—not as a land
use authority or appeal authority, which are charged with making
administrative decisions. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-9a-103(29)(a)(ii), (31).

6. Although “site-specific zoning decisions affect only one piece
of property” and are therefore “not generally applicable in the
sense that they do not result in the announcement of a rule that
applies generally to other pieces of property,” they are
nonetheless “generally applicable in a more important sense, in
that they apply to all present and future parties that meet its
terms.” Krejci v. City of Saratoga Springs, 2013 UT 74, ¶ 32, 322 P.3d
662 (quotation simplified).

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¶22 Because section 801(8)(a) addresses only “the record
provided by the land use authority or appeal authority,” id.
§ 10-9a-801(8)(a)(i), its limitation on the district court’s review is
not applicable to cases such as this one in which the deciding body
is not acting in either of those capacities, 7 see id.
§ 10-9a-103(33)(c)(i) (stating that a land use regulation “does not
include . . . a land use decision of the legislative body acting as the
land use authority”). In other words, in this case there is no
“record provided by the land use authority or appeal authority”
to which the district court’s review would be limited under
section 801(8)(a)—and thus that section does not apply here. The
district court therefore erred when it held that it was statutorily
required by section 801(8)(a) to exclude Attorney’s affidavit from

7. Springdale conceded as much during oral argument before this
court. In any event, in its brief on appeal, Springdale’s argument
that section 801(8)(a) applies to zoning decisions is entirely reliant
on our Supreme Court’s decision in Petersen v. Riverton City, 2010
UT 58, 243 P.3d 1261. In that case, the appellants challenged the
district court’s summary judgment ruling upholding Riverton
City’s denial of their application to rezone their property. Id. ¶ 1.
Among other things, the appellants argued that the district court
abused its discretion when it denied their motion to conduct
additional discovery pursuant to then-rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, now-rule 56(d). Id. ¶ 25. Our Supreme Court
held that the district court’s denial was not an abuse of discretion
because “further discovery would have been meaningless when
the court could not have considered it” under section 801(8)(a). Id.
¶ 27. But the Court applied section 801(8)(a) pursuant to the
appellants’ filing of a “Petition for Review of a Land Use Decision,”
id. ¶ 26 (emphasis added)—not a land use regulation. Indeed,
appellants argued only that section 801(8)(a) did not apply to
constitutional challenges. Id. ¶ 27. Thus, the Court in Petersen was
not asked to consider—and did not rule on—the issue presented
in this appeal.

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its consideration when deciding the parties’ motions for summary
judgment.

¶23 Springdale contends that notwithstanding the issue of
admissibility under section 801(8)(a), Attorney’s affidavit “was
unnecessary” because “Majestic View’s only right under state and
federal laws is to a public hearing that includes allotted time for
public comment.” Springdale thus appears to be arguing that the
affidavit, if accepted by the district court, would not have
precluded summary judgment because it did not raise an issue of
material fact. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant
summary judgment if the moving party shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). We consider this
argument in conjunction with Majestic View’s argument
addressed in Part II.

II. Hearing Requirements

¶24 MLUDMA directs that in reviewing a challenged land use
regulation, a district court “shall”

(i) presume that a land use regulation properly
enacted under the authority of this chapter is valid;
and

(ii) determine only whether:

(A) the land use regulation is expressly
preempted by, or was enacted contrary to,
state or federal law; and

(B) it is reasonably debatable that the land
use regulation is consistent with this chapter.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2022).

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¶25 Thus, a district court’s inquiry is twofold: procedural and
substantive. First, the court must determine whether a land use
regulation was “properly enacted.” Id. § 10-9a-801(3)(a)(i).
“Failure to strictly follow the statutory requirements in enacting
the ordinance renders it invalid.” Hatch v. Boulder Town Council,
2001 UT App 55, ¶ 7, 21 P.3d 245 (quotation simplified). See also
Melville v. Salt Lake County, 536 P.2d 133, 134 (Utah 1975) (stating
that further inquiry by the reviewing court is not necessary if the
challenged legislative action “was not validly enacted”). This is
because “the authority to regulate land use through zoning
ordinances is conferred on municipalities by the state through
enabling statutes” and, consequently, “cities must strictly comply
with the statute delegating them the authority to act.” Hatch, 2001
UT App 55, ¶ 7 (quotation simplified). See State v. Hutchinson, 624
P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 1980) (“Specific grants of authority may
serve to limit the means available under the general welfare
clause, for some limitation may be imposed on the exercise of
power by directing the use of power in a particular manner.”).

¶26 Second, if the answer to the first question is in the
affirmative, the court applies a presumption of validity and its
review of a land use regulation’s substance is limited to whether
“(A) the land use regulation is expressly preempted by, or was
enacted contrary to, state or federal law” and “(B) it is reasonably
debatable that the land use regulation is consistent with
[MLUDMA].” Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)(a)(ii). The
“reasonably debatable standard” set forth in subsection
801(3)(a)(ii)(B) is “highly deferential.” Petersen v. Riverton City,
2010 UT 58, ¶ 10, 243 P.3d 1261. 8 This is because land use

8. It is worth noting that since our Supreme Court’s decision in
Petersen, our Legislature has amended section 801(3)(a) to add that
a land use regulation is presumed valid if “properly enacted” and
to include as part of the district court’s review whether “the land
(continued…)

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regulations, including “the enactment or amendment of zoning
ordinances,” are “fundamentally a legislative act,” and as such, a
reviewing court is to “avoid substituting its judgment for that of
the legislative body of the municipality.” Id. (quotation
simplified).

¶27 Majestic View’s argument is focused on the first inquiry—
whether Springdale’s legislative action of denying the
Application was “properly enacted.” Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-9a-801(3)(a)(i). Specifically, Majestic View contends that
Springdale “did not strictly comply with the processes required
by [MLUDMA] and the town code” because it did not provide
Majestic View a reasonable opportunity to be heard at the public
hearings. 9 Majestic View asserts that the town council’s and the
planning commission’s adherence to the Public Hearing Policy
deprived it of an “opportunity to present or speak unless asked a
question” and further complains that at the public hearings before
the town council, it “was not even allowed to put on the Town’s
TV screens the visual aids or the revised concept plan that it
prepared in response to the planning commission’s concerns.” It
is important to note that this argument is not a constitutional
procedural due process claim. Rather, it is a challenge brought

use regulation is expressly preempted by, or was enacted contrary
to, state or federal law.” Compare Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)(a)
(LexisNexis 2022), with id. § 10-9a-801(3) (2007). See also Petersen,
2010 UT 58, ¶ 9 (quoting the 2007 version of the statute).

9. Relatedly, Majestic View also argues that the district court erred
by applying only the “reasonably debatable” standard as
articulated in Petersen without considering the subsequent
amendments our Legislature made since that opinion was issued.
See supra note 8. On remand, if necessary, the court should address
all the inquiries set forth in section 801(3)(a), as described above.

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under section 801(3)(a)(i) that Springdale’s legislative action in
denying the Application was not proper under MLUDMA.

¶28 MLUDMA directs that “[a] legislative body may not make
any amendment [to a land use regulation] unless the legislative
body first submits the amendment to the planning commission for
the planning commission’s recommendation.” Id. § 10-9a-503(2).
See generally id. § 10-9a-503(1) (detailing the amendments a
legislative body may make). In considering a proposed adoption
of or change to a land use regulation, the planning commission is
required to “hold a public hearing,” id. § 10-9a-502(1)(b), which is
“a hearing at which members of the public are provided a
reasonable opportunity to comment on the subject of the
hearing,” id. § 10-9a-103(52) (Supp. 2023). Although Majestic View
premises part of its argument on these provisions, because
reversal is warranted based on potential violations of the Town
Code, we need not decide whether Majestic View was a
“member[] of the public” entitled to “a reasonable opportunity to
comment” at the public hearings addressing the Application. 10 Id.

¶29 Section 10-3-2(I) of the Town Code directs the town
council, upon receipt of the planning commission’s
recommendation on a proposed zoning amendment, to likewise

10. MLUDMA also recognizes “the right of each . . . participant to
be heard in each public hearing on a contested application” by
requiring the planning commission to recommend to the
legislative body application processes that achieve that end. Utah
Code Ann. § 10-9a-302(1)(e)(ii) (LexisNexis 2022). But this right
appears to pertain more generally to the application process and
not specifically to a public hearing. In any event, as noted above,
we need not decide this particular issue.

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hold a public hearing. 11 Sections 10-3-2(F) and 10-3-2(I) of the
Town Code state, with our emphasis, that “interested parties and
citizens shall have an opportunity to be heard” at the public hearings
both before the planning commission and the town council. Thus,
in addition to members of the public, the Town Code specifically
affords interested parties—including Majestic View in this case—
the “opportunity to be heard.”

¶30 “When interpreting a statute, we assume, absent a contrary
indication, that the legislature used each term advisedly
according to its ordinary and usually accepted meaning.” Marion
Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863

11. This differs from MLUDMA, which requires the legislative
body to hold only a “public meeting” when considering “each
proposed land use regulation that the planning commission
recommends.” Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-502(2)(a)–(b) (LexisNexis
2022). See id. § 10-9a-103(53) (Supp. 2023) (defining a “[p]ublic
meeting” as “a meeting that is required to be open to the public
under Title 52, Chapter 4, Open and Public Meetings Act”).
Ultimately, this has no effect on our decision. MLUDMA
expressly requires that a public hearing be held prior to the
adoption or modification of any land use regulation. See id.
§§ 10-9a-205(1), -502(1)(b) (2022 & Supp. 2023); Wallingford v. Moab
City, 2020 UT App 12, ¶ 20, 459 P.3d 1039, cert. denied, 466 P.3d
1073 (Utah 2020). Thus, regardless of whether the public hearing
was held before the planning commission or the town council, a
defective public hearing would render a land use regulation
improperly enacted. Furthermore, Town Code section 10-3-2(I)’s
provision that citizens and interested parties have an additional
opportunity to be heard by the town council does not prevent the
public meeting from being “open to the public,” as required by
MLUDMA. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-103(53). See Wallingford, 2020
UT App 12, ¶ 13 (comparing public hearings with public
meetings).

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(quotation simplified). “Utah courts interpret municipal and
county ordinances and resolutions according to our well-settled
rules of statutory interpretation and construction.” Park City
Premier Props., LLC v. Silver Summit Estates, 2023 UT App 121, ¶ 14,
538 P.3d 628 (quotation simplified). And, here, the Town Code’s
references to the opportunity of an interested party “to be heard”
are determinative.

¶31 An opportunity to be heard includes a party’s ability to
advocate during the proceeding—not merely to provide
information upon request. Although, as already emphasized, this
is not a constitutional due process case, that area of the law is
instructive here. The opportunity to be heard is a crucial aspect of
a constitutional procedural due process claim. “At a minimum,
due process requires timely and adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way.” State v. Hegbloom,
2014 UT App 213, ¶ 13, 362 P.3d 921 (quotation simplified), cert.
denied, 343 P.3d 708 (Utah 2015). It “includes the opportunity to
present evidence and argument on that issue before decision.” Id.
(quotation simplified). “Mere notice is an empty gesture if it is not
accompanied by a meaningful chance to make your case.” In re
adoption of B.Y., 2015 UT 67, ¶ 23, 356 P.3d 1215. This is not to
suggest that the opportunity to be heard in this context must fully
comply with the requirements of its constitutional due process
counterpart, but the prevalent use of the term “opportunity to be
heard” in that well-known context supports the notion that the
common understanding of the term involves the opportunity to
make one’s case by presenting information and argument in some
meaningful way.

¶32 This is consistent with Utah case law stating that when
exercising its legislative authority in the zoning context, it is both
the “privilege and obligation” of the legislative body “to gather
available pertinent information from all possible sources and give
consideration to it in making [its] determination.” Harmon City,
Inc. v. Draper City, 2000 UT App 31, ¶ 27, 997 P.2d 321 (quotation

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simplified). Thus, the legislative body must take into
consideration both arguments for and against a proposed land use
regulation. This would naturally include consideration of
meaningful argument by the party seeking the zone change. Cf.
Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986) (“In
requiring a public hearing, our legislature contemplated that
interested parties would have an opportunity to give their views,
pro and con, regarding a specific legislative proposal, and thereby
aid the municipal government in making its land use decisions.”);
Petersen, 2010 UT 58, ¶ 15 (stating that under the reasonably
debatable standard, “[t]he decision must simply be reasonably
debatable after consideration of all the evidence in favor of and against
the proposed change”) (emphasis added).

¶33 Springdale argues that “the Town Code required nothing
more than a ‘public hearing’ at which ‘interested parties and
citizens shall have an opportunity to be heard,’” which it contends
was exactly what Majestic View was provided. 12 Specifically,
Springdale asserts that “the Public Hearing Policy does not chill
speech” and “[t]he administrative record reflects that Majestic
View’s representatives spoke as much as they desired” at the
public meetings. Indeed, according to Springdale, “the record
reflects the opposite of Majestic View’s claim of a
‘speak-to-when-spoken-to’ Town policy” because Attorney “was
given the opportunity to attend and speak at public hearings
before the planning commission and town council pursuant to
Utah Code section 10-9a-205 and Town Code 10-3-2(F), (I).”

12. Springdale does not assert that compliance with the public
hearing provisions of the Town Code falls outside the scope of the
section 801(3)(a)(i) analysis. We thus do not address this question
here and instead address Majestic View’s argument in light of the
parties’ apparent agreement that the Town Code is relevant.

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Springdale also suggests that Majestic View could have spoken
during the public comment period of the hearing.

¶34 But Attorney’s affidavit contradicts these assertions. If
Majestic View was, indeed, able to present its case during the
public hearings, then the Town Code’s requirement would have
been satisfied. But if, as the affidavit claims, Majestic View was
limited to presenting only aspects of its case that were responsive
to questions it was asked, resulting in it not being able to make
meaningful argument in support of the Application, then it is
unlikely that it was afforded a sufficient opportunity to be heard
as required by the Town Code. Accordingly, a genuine dispute of
material fact exists, and the grant of summary judgment to
Springdale was improper. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a).

¶35 For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in Springdale’s favor. 13 Should Attorney’s

13. Majestic View also contends that the district court erroneously
denied its motion for summary judgment, in which it made the
same arguments it made in its memorandum opposing
Springdale’s motion for summary judgment. Majestic View bases
this argument largely on the lack of an affidavit or other evidence
from Springdale countering Attorney’s affidavit. See Home
Builders Ass’n v. City of N. Logan, 1999 UT 63, ¶ 6, 983 P.2d 561
(“When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him.”) (quotation simplified). We reverse both the
district court’s summary judgment rulings based on the court’s
erroneous conclusion that section 801(8)(a) precluded
consideration of any material outside the record supplied by
(continued…)

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Springdale Lodging v. Springdale

affidavit or other admissible evidence outside the current record
be put before the court in a future motion for summary judgment,
all those materials should be considered.

III. Other Arguments

¶36 Although we ultimately agree with Majestic View’s
position concerning Attorney’s affidavit and the right-to-be-heard
issues and reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment
to Springdale on those grounds, we proceed to address some of
the other arguments Majestic View makes on appeal because they
are likely to arise again as this matter is litigated. See State v.
Ogden, 2018 UT 8, ¶ 49, 416 P.3d 1132 (“Although it is unnecessary
to our decision, we retain the authority to reach issues when we
believe our analysis could prove helpful on remand.”).
Specifically, we address Majestic View’s arguments that
Springdale wrongfully refused its request to supplement the
Application with the revised concept plan and that the district
court erred in ruling that under Utah Code section 10-9a-801(7)(a),
Springdale was not required to include transcripts of the
proceedings in the record it provided the district court.

A. Request to Supplement the Application

¶37 Majestic View asserts that by not allowing it to supplement
the Application with the revised concept plan, Springdale failed
in its “responsibility of advising itself of all pertinent facts as a
basis for determining what is in the public interest in that regard.”

Springdale. But this does not mean that Majestic View’s motion
should have been granted. The district court’s erroneous
conclusion would have likewise deprived Springdale of the
opportunity to present extra-record evidence to counter
Attorney’s affidavit. As such, Springdale would be entitled to
such an opportunity should the motion for summary judgment be
renewed.

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Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 2000 UT App 31, ¶ 27, 997 P.2d
321 (quotation simplified). See generally id. (stating that when
acting in a legislative capacity, a legislative body is obligated “to
gather available pertinent information from all possible sources
and give consideration to it in making [its] determination”)
(quotation simplified). Majestic View asserts that the
supplemental materials were simply responsive to the concerns
raised by the planning commission and that they “did not
substantially deviate from the original application materials.”

¶38 Relatedly, Majestic View contends that instead of applying
the more global directive of section 10-3-2(A) of the Town Code
that the zone map should not be amended “except to promote
more fully the objectives and purposes of this title and the general
plan, to correct manifest errors, or to accommodate substantial
changes in conditions,” the planning commission raised very
detailed concerns that were not appropriate at that phase.
Specifically, Majestic View points to the planning commission’s
concerns that, pursuant to the Town Code, should be addressed
in the later design/development review phase—including traffic,
light pollution, visual impact, and noise. Majestic View asserts
that by raising such concerns, its legislative zoning request was
essentially turned “into a minutiae laden administrative site plan
or subdivision/plat-type review—an administrative ‘land use
decision’ instead of a legislative ‘land use regulation.’”

¶39 But zoning decisions involve several considerations, “such
as the location of businesses, schools, roads and traffic conditions,
growth in population and housing, the capacity of utilities, the
existing classification of surrounding property, and the effect that
the proposed reclassification may have on these things and upon
the general orderly development.” Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 358
P.2d 633, 636 (Utah 1961). Such considerations are relevant to
section 10-3-2(A)’s inquiry of whether the requested zone change
“promote[s] more fully the objectives and purposes of this title
and the general plan.” In fact, the general plan encourages, in

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relevant part, “boutique hotels, bed and breakfasts, and other
similar lodging establishments that help promote the village
atmosphere and small-town scale.” Thus, it was not inappropriate
for the planning commission to raise questions about specific
details at the public hearing. See generally Potter v. South Salt Lake
City, 2018 UT 21, ¶ 40, 422 P.3d 803 (“Public hearings are
unpredictable. City councilmembers and public commenters
often try to reframe a debate in ways that favor their position.”).

¶40 On the other hand, submission of materials responsive to
such detailed and unexpected concerns does not necessarily
mandate an entirely new application process. Section 10-3-2(A) of
the Town Code establishes a broad, general inquiry. Where, at the
design/development or any other subsequent phase, certain
changes to specific details of a plan might affect the entire
application, section 10-3-2(A) is more forgiving. Additionally,
section 10-3-2(I) provides, with our emphasis, that following the
planning commission’s recommendation, “the town council may
adopt the zoning ordinance as proposed, amend the zoning
ordinance and adopt or reject the zoning ordinance as amended, reject
the proposed ordinance or postpose a decision until a specified
date for a specified reason.” See also Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-9a-502(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2022) (stating that following receipt
of the planning commission’s recommendation, “the legislative
body may adopt or reject the land use regulation . . . after making
any revision the legislative body considers appropriate”). Thus,
to the extent the supplemental materials were responsive to
questions or concerns raised at the public hearing, Majestic View
still sought the same zone change (from “Valley Residential” to
“Valley Commercial”), and the changes did not raise entirely new
policy considerations from that of the original Application. Thus,
Majestic View should have been allowed to present the materials
for the town council’s consideration without necessitating an
entirely new application or remand to the planning commission.

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B. Sufficiency of the Record

¶41 Majestic View argues that the district court “erred when it
ruled that Section 10-9a-801(7) was applicable” and when it ruled
that, under that section, Springdale was not required to include
transcripts of the public hearings in the record it submitted
because the transcripts were not “available.”

¶42 Utah Code section 10-9a-801(7)(a) provides,

The land use authority or appeal authority, as the
case may be, shall transmit to the reviewing court
the record of the proceedings of the land use
authority or appeal authority, including the
minutes, findings, orders, and, if available, a true
and correct transcript of the proceedings.

As with section 801(8)(a), section 801(7)(a) only concerns a “land
use authority or appeal authority.” And as discussed in Part I,
because the town council was not acting in either of those
capacities when it denied the Application, but was instead acting
in a legislative capacity, section 801(7)(a) does not govern here.
The district court thus erred in applying that section to this case.

¶43 Curiously, MLUDMA does not contain a corresponding
section regarding submission of the record to the district court for
cases seeking judicial review of legislative actions. But, as also
discussed in Part I, the district court’s review is not limited to
considering the record Springdale transmitted. Furthermore, the
court’s order noted that Springdale did provide Majestic View
“with copies of audio recordings of all underlying administrative
proceedings.” Accordingly, in future proceedings, either party
may submit the recordings in support of their argument. And, to
the extent they or the district court find it helpful, they may
submit transcripts in lieu of recordings in accordance with regular
procedure.

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CONCLUSION

¶44 The district court erred in limiting its review to the record
provided by Springdale, resulting in the exclusion of Attorney’s
affidavit when it ruled on the parties’ summary judgment
motions. And because the affidavit creates a genuine issue of
material fact, summary judgment in Springdale’s favor was not
appropriate. We accordingly reverse the court’s summary
judgment in favor of Springdale and remand for such further
proceedings as might be appropriate, consistent with this opinion.

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