Park City Premier Properties v. Silver Summit Esta

2023 UT App 121

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PARK CITY PREMIER PROPERTIES, LLC, ET AL.,
Appellants,
v.
SILVER SUMMIT ESTATES, ET AL.,
Appellees.

Opinion
No. 20220556-CA
Filed October 5, 2023

Second District Court, Ogden Department
The Honorable Jennifer L. Valencia
No. 190901546

Troy L. Booher, Dick J. Baldwin, Taylor P. Webb, and
Blake D. Johnson, Attorneys for Appellants
David C. Wright and Brooke A. White,
Attorneys for Appellees

JUDGE AMY J. OLIVER authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred.

OLIVER, Judge:

¶1 Park City Premier Properties, LLC (Premier) subdivided
property in Weber County, into the Silver Summit Estates (Silver
Summit), equipping each lot with private wells. When the owners
of these lots (the Lot Owners) became dissatisfied with their
allotted water usage, they sued Premier, arguing the Weber
County Code required provision of a secondary water system in
addition to the wells. The Lot Owners filed a motion for partial
summary judgment on their claim. Premier filed its own motion
for partial summary judgment, arguing the Lot Owners’ claim
was barred under the County Land Use, Development, and
Management Act (CLUDMA). The district court denied both
motions. But after the Lot Owners renewed their motion, the court
Park City Premier Properties v. Silver Summit

granted partial summary judgment in their favor, ruling as a
matter of law that Premier was required to provide a secondary
water system to the subdivision. On Premier’s interlocutory
appeal, we reverse.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2013, Premier purchased foreclosed property in Weber
County, planning to subdivide it into Silver Summit. The prior
owner of the property was a shareholder in the Co-op Farm
Irrigation Company (Co-op)—the only supplier of irrigation
water to the area—and Premier purchased his shares. Premier
then filed a Subdivision Application with the Weber County
Planning Commission. In its application, Premier provided a
certificate of ownership of the Co-op shares and indicated Silver
Summit’s secondary water 1 would be provided by “irrigation”
and its culinary water would be provided by private wells.

¶3 In 2014, Weber County signed a Subdivision Improvement
Agreement (the Agreement) with Premier. The Agreement
required Premier to make improvements to Silver Summit,
including installing a storm drain and street signs, paving an
asphalt road, and relocating an existing shed. The Agreement
required Premier to “comply with all relevant laws, ordinances,
and regulations” in making these improvements, including the
Weber County Public Works Standards and Technical
Specifications (the Specs). Weber County was obligated to
provide final plat approval if the terms and conditions of the
Agreement were “consistent with all relevant state laws and local
ordinances.”

1. The Weber County Code defined “secondary water” as “water
furnished for other than culinary purposes.” Weber County Code
§ 106-4-2(m) (2019). Weber County has since repealed section 106-
4-2(m). See Weber County, Amendment to the Culinary and
Secondary Water Requirements for a Subdivision (May 25, 2021).

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¶4 At the time, the relevant local ordinances listed certain
required improvements for subdivisions, including an ordinance
governing secondary water in the Weber County Code. This
provision stated:

Where a subdivision is proposed within an existing
culinary water district[,] . . . the planning
commission shall, as part of the approval of the
subdivision, require the applicant to furnish
adequate secondary water and install a secondary
water delivery system to the lots in the subdivision
sufficient to conform to the public works standards,
if such water district or company files or has filed a
written statement with the Weber County Planning
Division which specifies that the policy of such
water district or company is to the effect that its
water is not to be used for other than culinary
purposes and will not permit culinary water
connections unless secondary water is provided by
the applicant. A certified copy of the minutes of the
board of trustees of such water district or company
showing the enactment of such policy must be
furnished to the planning commission.

Weber County Code § 106-4-2(m) (2019). The Specs further
provided that secondary water systems “shall be considered as a
required subdivision improvement” and “[e]ach secondary water
system shall originate from a reliable water source capable of
delivering a minimum annual supply of 3.0 acre-feet per acre of
irrigable property.” Weber County, Public Works Standards and
Technical Specifications, section 1.17.05 (1982). Though the Silver
Summit plat did not mention secondary water, Weber County
approved it. Premier recorded the final plat and a Private Wells
Deed Covenant soon after.

¶5 After receiving approval to subdivide, Premier did not sell
any lots directly. Instead, it transferred the lots to several related

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entities, who in turn sold the lots to the Lot Owners individually.
The Real Estate Purchase Contracts (REPCs) that the Lot Owners
signed allowed them to receive any water rights attached to the
property. Premier maintained an informal arrangement with the
selling entities to transfer Co-op shares to the Lot Owners who
requested them in their REPCs.

¶6 In order to use the private wells on their lots, the Lot
Owners filed an application with the Weber County Water
Conservancy District (the Water District). The Water District
provides culinary water to the area using an “exchange
application” wherein homeowners use water from their private
wells and the Water District releases a commensurate amount of
water from a reservoir to compensate for the private use. The Lot
Owners’ applications—approved by the state engineer—allowed
them to use their culinary wells to draw a specified amount for
secondary water purposes.

¶7 Five years after Weber County approved Silver Summit,
the Lot Owners became dissatisfied with the amount of secondary
water they were allowed to draw from their wells and filed a
complaint against Premier in district court. The complaint alleged
(1) a breach of contract claim against the various lot sellers2 and
(2) an action under CLUDMA section 17-27a-802 to enforce
section 106-4-2(m) of the Weber County Code against Premier.
The Lot Owners argued section 106-4-2(m) required Premier to
supply secondary water and to transfer its remaining Co-op
shares to the Lot Owners.

¶8 The Lot Owners then filed a motion for partial summary
judgment on their claim against Premier under CLUDMA section
17-27a-802. Premier then filed a cross-motion for partial summary
judgment, arguing the Lot Owners’ claim was barred because, as
an appeal from a “land use decision” by an administrative

2. The Lot Owners’ breach of contract claim against these entities
is not relevant to this appeal.

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authority, it should have been brought within thirty days under
CLUDMA section 17-27a-801.

¶9 In its first ruling on the motions, the district court
concluded section 106-4-2(m) of the Weber County Code was
unambiguous but found “there are no undisputed material facts
before the court that indicate whether the [Water District] filed a
statement with the County.” The court also determined the
evidence was “insufficient and conflicting” as to whether Weber
County’s approval of Silver Summit was “a land use decision”
that would be barred by CLUDMA’s statute of limitations.
Accordingly, the court denied both motions.

¶10 The Lot Owners renewed their motion for partial summary
judgment, arguing that the latter half of section 106-4-2(m) of the
Weber County Code was inapplicable to Silver Summit’s situation
and Premier must finish what it started and install secondary
water infrastructure in the subdivision. Premier did not renew its
motion.

¶11 In ruling on the Lot Owners’ renewed motion, the district
court found there was no longer any dispute of material fact
precluding summary judgment on their claim. The district court
noted that while it had previously accepted Premier’s
interpretation of the Weber County ordinances, it now found that
interpretation “illogical and circular, at best.” According to the
court, “[c]onsidering the larger context of the ordinance, the
specifications, Utah statutes, and the actual process to obtain well
and/or irrigation water,” section 106-4-2(m) “applies to a different
scenario which may exist in other areas of the county, but clearly
does not exist in the area at issue here.” The court granted partial
summary judgment to the Lot Owners, thus requiring Premier to
provide secondary water to the subdivision.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12 Premier seeks interlocutory review of the district court’s
grant of partial summary judgment to the Lot Owners, arguing

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the Weber County Code does not require it to provide secondary
water to Silver Summit and the Lot Owners’ claim is procedurally
barred by CLUDMA. 3 “We review the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment for correctness, considering only whether the
trial court correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that
no disputed issues of material fact existed.” In re Weidner, 2019 UT
App 10, ¶ 11, 438 P.3d 896 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

¶13 In Weber County, a developer is required to file an
application and submit a development plan for approval before
subdividing land. See Weber County Code § 106-1-4 (2021). If a
developer is granted final plat approval, it must make necessary
improvements to the property. Id. At the time, the Weber County
Code listed certain required improvements, including providing
secondary water. Weber County Code § 106-4-2(m) (2019).
Premier argues the ordinance did not require it to provide
secondary water to Silver Summit and the district court erred in
concluding it did. We agree with Premier.

¶14 Utah courts “interpret municipal and county ordinances
and resolutions according to our well-settled rules of statutory
interpretation and construction.” Pinetree Assocs. v. Ephraim City,
2003 UT 6, ¶ 13, 67 P.3d 462. Thus, we “first examine the plain
language of the ordinance and resort to other methods of
interpretation only if the language is ambiguous.” Gardner v. Perry
City, 2000 UT App 1, ¶ 17, 994 P.2d 811. An ordinance is
ambiguous when “its terms remain susceptible to two or more
reasonable interpretations.” Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch
P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 15, 267 P.3d 863. “A party’s suggested
interpretation of [an ordinance] is not reasonable” and will not

3. Because we conclude that the Weber County Code does not
require Premier to provide secondary water to the subdivision,
we do not reach Premier’s argument regarding CLUDMA.

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create ambiguity “when it contradicts the plain language.” State
v. Wilkerson, 2020 UT App 160, ¶ 11, 478 P.3d 1048 (cleaned up).

¶15 Premier reads section 106-4-2(m) of the Weber County
Code to require a developer to provide secondary water only if
(1) the water district filed a written statement that it has a policy
limiting culinary water use to culinary purposes and (2) the
district filed a certified copy of the board minutes reflecting
enactment of the policy. Premier’s plain-language interpretation
of the ordinance is the correct one.

¶16 Under Weber County Code section 106-4-2(m), secondary
water must be provided in a subdivision within an existing water
district only “if such water district or company files or has filed a
written statement with the Weber County Planning Division”
restricting its water to culinary purposes and has filed a certified
copy of board meeting minutes showing the enactment of such a
policy. (Emphasis added.) “Words such as . . . ‘if’ are words of
condition.” McArthur v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 2012 UT
22, ¶ 32, 274 P.3d 981 (cleaned up). And following the word “if”
in section 106-4-2(m) are two explicit conditions: (1) the water
district has a policy in place restricting its water to culinary uses
and (2) the district files a certified copy of the district’s board
meeting minutes reflecting its adoption of the policy. It is not
necessary to look beyond these conditions as neither are met here.
Far from having a policy restricting water to culinary uses, the
Water District allows culinary water to be used for secondary
purposes, albeit on a limited basis. And there is no record
evidence indicating the Water District ever filed certified board
meeting minutes showing the adoption of such a policy. 4 In the
absence of these conditions, the ordinance does not require
Premier to provide secondary water to Silver Summit.

¶17 To avoid this result, the Lot Owners argue that while the
Water District may not have a formal policy limiting culinary

4. On appeal, the Lot Owners concede that the Water District has
not filed such a statement.

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water use, it has a de facto policy that nonetheless satisfies section
106-4-2(m). According to the Lot Owners, the Water District’s
individual exchange agreements with customers limit the amount
of culinary water that may be used for secondary purposes. And
they argue the Water District’s culinary water use is restricted as
a matter of law through the state engineer’s supervision of water
usage across Utah. The Lot Owners argue “it no longer matters
for purposes of the [o]rdinances whether the [Water] District itself
restricts water use” because “it is in fact restricted.” But based on
the plain language of section 106-4-2(m), it matters a great deal
whether the Water District itself restricts culinary water use. The
suggestion of a de facto policy limiting culinary water being
sufficient under section 106-4-2(m) contradicts the very language
of the section, which explicitly requires a written policy limiting
the use of culinary water, filed with Weber County, accompanied
by certified board meeting minutes. Because it contradicts the text
of the ordinance, the Lot Owners’ interpretation is not reasonable
and does not create ambiguity capable of overcoming the
ordinance’s plain language. See Wilkerson, 2020 UT App 160, ¶ 11.

¶18 To further muddy the waters, the Lot Owners assert that
section 106-4-2(m) must be read in light of the purpose and
context of the Weber County Code’s subdivision requirements as
a whole. The Lot Owners note the purpose of these requirements
is to facilitate “buildable lots,” which would naturally include
secondary water systems, and that this court should not put “form
over substance” to conclude otherwise. While it is “well settled
that when faced with a question of statutory interpretation, our
primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose” of
lawmakers, it is also well settled that “the best evidence” of this
intent is “the plain language of the statute itself.” Marion Energy,
2011 UT 50, ¶ 14 (cleaned up). The plain language of section 106-
4-2(m) indicates an intent to require secondary water
infrastructure in a subdivision only if two explicit conditions are
met. Because the Water District does not meet these explicit
conditions, Premier was not required to provide secondary water

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to Silver Summit. 5 Thus, the district court erred in granting partial
summary judgment to the Lot Owners on their claim to enforce
the ordinance against Premier.

CONCLUSION

¶19 By its plain language, the Weber County Code does not
require Premier to provide secondary water to Silver Summit. The
district court erred in granting partial summary judgment to the
Lot Owners on their claim. Accordingly, we reverse and remand
the matter for further proceedings.

5. The Lot Owners also argue that the Specs support the
conclusion that secondary water is a required subdivision
improvement. The Weber County Code required all subdivision
improvements to “comply with the specifications and standards
contained” in the Specs. Weber County Code § 106-4-1(b)(2019).
The Specs state that a “secondary water system shall be
considered as a required subdivision improvement and shall be
under the same construction guarantees, release of funds
procedures, and acceptance as the regular subdivision
improvements.” Weber County, Public Works Standards and
Technical Specifications, section 1.17.05 (1982). But the Specs are
not an independent mandate for developers and apply only when
an improvement is required by the Weber County Code. Section
106-4-2(m) did not require Premier to provide secondary water as
an improvement, so the Specs do not apply here.

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