Sidwell v. Wasatch County

2026 UT App 67

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DUSTIN SIDWELL, MARIE SHELTON, AND BRIAN MYERS,
Appellants,
v.
WASATCH COUNTY, WASATCH COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT,
AND WASATCH COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION,
Appellees.

ULA, LLC,
Intervenor-Appellee.

Opinion
No. 20240911-CA
Filed April 30, 2026

Fourth District Court, Heber Department
The Honorable Jennifer A. Mabey
No. 230500107

J. Craig Smith, Clayton H. Preece, and
Jay L. Springer, Attorneys for Appellants
Scott H. Sweat and Alex D. Stoedter,
Attorneys for Appellees
David L. Mortensen, Melanie R. Clark, and
Elise M. Carter, Attorneys for Intervenor-Appellee

JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 ULA, LLC—an entity doing business as Cascade Academy
(Cascade)—wants to operate Cascade House, which it describes
as a residential treatment facility designed for up to eight teenage
girls living with various mental health disorders. What’s notable
here is where Cascade wants to operate Cascade House: in
Wasatch County, on property located inside the residential-
Sidwell v. Wasatch County

agricultural (RA-1) zone. Under the Wasatch County Code
(WCC), land use within the RA-1 zone is restricted, but
“residential facilit[ies]” for “persons with disabilities” may be
conditionally permitted.

¶2 Cascade submitted an application for a conditional use
permit to operate Cascade House within the RA-1 zone, and that
application was approved—over objection from Dustin Sidwell,
Marie Shelton, and Brian Myers (collectively, Appellants)—first
by the Wasatch County Planning Commission (the Planning
Commission) and then by the Wasatch County Board of
Adjustment (the Board). Appellants petitioned for judicial review
of the Board’s decision in the district court. There, both sides filed
cross-motions for summary disposition, and after briefing and
oral argument, the court dismissed Appellants’ petition,
upholding the Board’s determination that Cascade House meets
the WCC’s conditional use requirements regarding residential
facilities for persons with disabilities in the RA-1 zone.

¶3 Appellants now appeal that decision, arguing that Cascade
House does not meet the pertinent requirements of the WCC. In
particular, and among other things, Appellants point out that the
WCC requires Cascade House—in order to be allowed to operate
inside the RA-1 zone as a residential facility for persons with
disabilities—to “[b]e operated by or operated under contract
with” the Utah Department of Health and Human Services, and
they assert that Cascade House does not meet this requirement.
On this point, we agree with Appellants, and on that basis we
reverse the order dismissing Appellants’ petition and remand this
case to the district court for entry of an order granting the petition.

BACKGROUND

¶4 Cascade wishes to “open a small 8-bed residential
treatment center” known as Cascade House that will house up to
eight unrelated “girls between the ages of 13–18 with severe

20240911-CA 2 2026 UT App 67
Sidwell v. Wasatch County

anxiety disorders with specialized treatment for Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder.” The “average length of stay” is expected
to be “45–90 days with 24-hour supervision.” As Cascade
describes it, the goal of Cascade House “is to create a transitional
environment for residents receiving care that will fit in with a
residential neighborhood.”

¶5 Cascade proposes that Cascade House be located on
property in Wasatch County that is within the RA-1 zone. The
purpose of this particular zone is to “allow[] residential
development near the incorporated areas, while maintaining the
rural atmosphere of Wasatch County.” WCC § 16.08.01(A). “The
intent of the zone is to increase lot sizes as development moves
away from incorporated areas as a means of facilitating a
transitional development area and to maintain, as much as
possible, the rural character of the [c]ounty.” Id. Inside this zone,
“[e]ach lot or parcel must be a minimum of five (5) acres,” id.
§ 16.08.04(A), and must meet strict requirements regarding things
like maximum density, lot width, lot frontage, setbacks, and
building height, see id. §§ 16.08.04(A), 16.08.05, 16.08.06, 16.08.08,
16.08.09. While certain uses are permitted inside the zone without
a conditional use permit (CUP), see id. § 16.08.02, other uses are
allowed only with such a permit, see id. § 16.08.03. And uses not
listed as “permitted” or “conditional” are not allowed. See id.
§ 16.08.02 (stating that the uses “listed herein, and no others, are
permitted” inside the RA-1 zone (emphasis added)).

¶6 One use that is conditionally allowed within the RA-1 zone
is a “[r]esidential facility for handicapped persons.” Id. § 16.08.03.
Elsewhere in the WCC, requirements for “residential facilit[ies]
for persons with disabilities” are set forth. Id. § 16.21.17(B). All
parties to this appeal agree that the RA-1 zone’s conditional-use
reference (in section 16.08.03) to a “residential facility for
handicapped persons” is intended to direct the reader to the
requirements (in section 16.21.17(B)) applicable to a “residential
facility for persons with disabilities.”

20240911-CA 3 2026 UT App 67
Sidwell v. Wasatch County

¶7 In 2023, Cascade submitted an application for a CUP,
seeking approval to operate Cascade House, within the RA-1
zone, as a residential facility for persons with disabilities.
Members of Wasatch County’s planning staff (county staff)
prepared a report for the Planning Commission to consider in
connection with Cascade’s application. In that report, county staff
noted that the intended residents of Cascade House were
members of “a protected class” under both the federal Americans
with Disabilities Act (the ADA) and the federal Fair Housing Act
(the FHA). But county staff also noted that Cascade wasn’t
requesting “a reasonable accommodation” under the federal
statutes, because such an accommodation wasn’t “necessary since
there is already a built-in accommodation within [the] WCC” in
the form of the code’s specific requirements for facilities for
persons with disabilities. Thus, county staff framed the question
not as whether the ADA or the FHA compelled a grant of
Cascade’s request but, instead, as whether the specific
requirements of the WCC regarding facilities for persons with
disabilities were met.

¶8 And on that point, county staff concluded that Cascade’s
proposal was “in compliance with [s]ection 16.21.17 of the [WCC]
regarding persons with disabilities.” With regard to the specific
requirement that Cascade “[c]onform to all applicable standards
and requirements of” the Utah Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS), county staff noted that Cascade House “will be
required to have a license” from DHHS similar to the one that an
affiliated facility would have. And with regard to the requirement
that Cascade House “[b]e operated by or operated under contract
with” DHHS, county staff acknowledged that “DHHS does not
refer clients to Cascade [House] or pay for clients to be in Cascade
[House]”; county staff reiterated that Cascade House “is licensed
by DHHS, not contracted with [DHHS].”

¶9 The Planning Commission held a hearing on Cascade’s
application; at that hearing, public comment was taken and many

20240911-CA 4 2026 UT App 67
Sidwell v. Wasatch County

community members—including Appellants—spoke out against
Cascade’s application. As a result of the opposition, the Planning
Commission tabled the matter and scheduled a second hearing to
give Cascade time to consider and address “all the challenges and
objections of concern” that community members had raised and
to “give confidence to the Planning Commission and the
community that [Cascade’s application was] in compliance with”
applicable zoning requirements.

¶10 At the second hearing, Cascade and county staff made
presentations to the Planning Commission. First, a county staff
member addressed each criterion that Cascade needed to meet for
approval of its requested CUP. Next, an attorney from the
Wasatch County Attorney’s Office recommended that Cascade’s
“application be approved based on everything . . . presented.”
Lastly, a representative from Cascade advocated for the approval
of Cascade’s application, asserting that Cascade met the legal
requirements and that “reasonable conditions [could] be imposed
to mitigate any detrimental effect.”

¶11 At the conclusion of the presentations, the Planning
Commission approved Cascade’s application, determining that it
complied with both the specific requirements (found in section
16.21.17(B)) that the WCC imposes on residential facilities for
persons with disabilities, as well as the general requirements
(found in section 16.23.07) that the WCC imposes on all CUPs. The
Planning Commission recognized that there had “been a large
number of concerns regarding this application,” but it ultimately
determined to approve the application, subject to conditions.

¶12 Later, Appellants appealed the Planning Commission’s
decision to the Board. Among other things, they argued that the
Planning Commission had erred in determining that Cascade
House was a “residential” facility rather than a “treatment”
facility. And they asserted that the Planning Commission had
erred in concluding that Cascade House met all of the WCC’s

20240911-CA 5 2026 UT App 67
Sidwell v. Wasatch County

requirements for approval of the application, including the
specific requirements for facilities for persons with disabilities.

¶13 In response to Appellants’ administrative appeal, county
staff created a report summarizing the issues and providing a
recommendation to the Board. In that report, county staff offered
their view that Cascade’s proposal met all relevant requirements
in the WCC, including the specific requirements for facilities for
persons with disabilities, and they recommended that the Board
affirm the Planning Commission’s decision. With regard to the
contract-with-DHHS issue, county staff again noted—as they had
in connection with the Planning Commission’s hearing—that
Cascade House was “licensed by” DHHS but “not contracted
with” DHHS, and that DHHS “does not refer clients to Cascade
[House] or pay for clients to be in Cascade [House].” But county
staff nevertheless believed that this requirement was met because
Cascade House was at least licensed by DHHS.

¶14 The Board held a public hearing to consider Appellants’
appeal, and the interested parties made presentations to the
Board. During their presentation, Appellants asserted that
Cascade House was not a “residential” facility but was, instead, a
“treatment” facility, a type of use not permitted in the RA-1 zone.
Appellants also asserted that Cascade could not meet all of the
specific requirements of the WCC, including the requirement that
it be “operated by or operated under contract with” DHHS.

¶15 After discussion, the Board voted to uphold the Planning
Commission’s determination to approve Cascade’s application
and grant the requested CUP. In so doing, the Board made
findings and conclusions supporting its decision. Among other
things, it concluded that Cascade House would be “providing
housing for a protected class as defined by the ADA and the
FHA.” Next, it found that Cascade was “in compliance with” the
WCC’s requirements for “‘[r]esidential facilities for persons with
disabilities,’ in section 16.21.17(B)” of the WCC. In particular, it

20240911-CA 6 2026 UT App 67
Sidwell v. Wasatch County

stated that “[t]he residents of the residential facility will primarily
be performing residential activities, while receiving treatment.”
Finally, the Board determined that Cascade was also in
compliance with the general conditional use requirements found
in section 16.23.07 of the WCC.

¶16 After that, Appellants filed a petition in district court
seeking judicial review of the Board’s decision. See Utah Code
§ 17-79-1009. 1 Appellants also filed a motion seeking summary
disposition of their petition in their favor. Among other things,
Appellants pointed out that, under the WCC, facilities for persons
with disabilities may not be operated by private parties inside the
RA-1 zone “without a contract with” DHHS. (Citing WCC
§ 16.21.17(B)(3).) From this premise, Appellants argued that
Cascade House could not meet all of the relevant requirements
and that therefore the Board’s decision to approve Cascade’s
application was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal “because it [was]
based on an incorrect interpretation of a land use regulation.”

¶17 In response, Cascade filed a motion—joined by Wasatch
County—asking the court to summarily affirm the Board’s
decision. In that motion, Cascade defended the Board’s decision,
asserting that its application had in fact met all of the WCC’s
relevant requirements; in particular, it asserted that “the license
under which Cascade [House] will operate is a contract between
Cascade” and DHHS.

¶18 After full briefing and oral argument, the district court
granted Cascade’s motion and dismissed Appellants’ petition.
The court concluded that there was “substantial, relevant

1. The parties cite section 17-27a-801 of the Utah Code, but that
section has since been renumbered as section 17-79-1009. See Title
17 Recodification County Programs and Related Provisions, ch.
14, § 254, 2025 Utah Laws 1st Spec. Sess. We cite the renumbered
version since no material changes have been made.

20240911-CA 7 2026 UT App 67
Sidwell v. Wasatch County

evidence . . . to support the Board’s determinations” that Cascade
House constituted a “[r]esidential [u]se” of Cascade’s property
and that Cascade met all of the relevant requirements of the WCC,
including those for residential facilities for persons with
disabilities. The court also concluded that the “FHA and ADA
were appropriately applied” by the Board in considering
Cascade’s application.

¶19 With regard to the contract-with-DHHS issue, the court
concluded that the WCC’s requirement—that residential facilities
for persons with disabilities located inside the RA-1 zone “[b]e
operated by or operated under contract with” DHHS—was
inconsistent with state licensing statutes, which contain no such
requirement. And the court seemed to defer, at least to some
degree, to Wasatch County’s interpretation of the WCC, noting
that Wasatch County was taking the position that having a license
from DHHS satisfied the relevant WCC requirement, and further
noting that Appellants were “asking the [c]ourt to disregard”
Wasatch County’s interpretation. Ultimately, the court concluded
that Appellants’ reading of the relevant WCC provision was “too
narrow,” and it accepted Cascade’s assertion that DHHS licensure
was sufficient to satisfy the requirement that Cascade House be
“operated under contract with” DHHS.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶20 Appellants now appeal the district court’s order
dismissing their petition. They assert that the Board’s decision
was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal and that the court should not
have dismissed their petition. In this procedural posture, when
we are reviewing a district court’s decision in an appeal from an
administrative decision, “[w]e afford no deference to the
intermediate court’s decision and apply the statutorily defined
standard to determine whether the court correctly determined
whether the administrative decision was arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal.” McElhaney v. City of Moab, 2017 UT 65, ¶ 26, 423 P.3d 1284.

20240911-CA 8 2026 UT App 67
Sidwell v. Wasatch County

Under that standard, “[a] court shall presume that a final land use
decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid
unless the land use decision is: (i) arbitrary and capricious; or
(ii) illegal.” Utah Code § 17-79-1009(3)(b). “A land use decision is
arbitrary and capricious if the land use decision is not supported
by substantial evidence in the record.” Id. § 17-79-1009(3)(c)(i).
And “[a] land use decision is illegal” if it is “based on an incorrect
interpretation of a land use regulation,” “conflicts with the
authority granted by” state statutes governing counties, or is
generally “contrary to law.” Id. § 17-79-1009(3)(c)(ii). We review a
county’s (or municipality’s) interpretation of its own ordinances
for correctness. See Outfront Media, LLC v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2017
UT 74, ¶ 12 & n.13, 416 P.3d 389.

ANALYSIS

¶21 Utah’s County Land Use Development and Management
Act (CLUDMA) governs land use regulation by counties and
empowers counties to “enact all ordinances, resolutions, and
rules” “necessary or appropriate for the use and development of
land” within the county. Utah Code § 17-79-101(b). CLUDMA
authorizes counties to “adopt a land use ordinance that includes
conditional uses and provisions for conditional uses that require
compliance with objective standards set forth in an applicable
ordinance,” so long as no requirement in that ordinance “conflicts
with a provision of [CLUDMA] or other state or federal law.” Id.
§ 17-79-506(1).

¶22 In this instance, Wasatch County exercised its statutory
authority to adopt a land use ordinance that controls the sorts of
development that may occur in the RA-1 zone. As framed by
county staff, the operative question is not whether federal statutes
require Wasatch County to grant Cascade’s application but,
instead, whether Cascade’s application satisfies the specific
requirements of the WCC regarding residential facilities for
persons with disabilities. We agree with this framing, and we

20240911-CA 9 2026 UT App 67
Sidwell v. Wasatch County

proceed to consider whether the district court correctly concluded
that Cascade’s application meets the relevant requirements. And
because Cascade must meet all of the requirements, a failure on
Cascade’s part to meet any of the requirements will render its
application infirm.

¶23 Those requirements include both factual and legal
prerequisites. See WCC § 16.21.17(B). On the factual side, the WCC
requires, for instance, that the proposed facility be “residential”2
and that it be occupied around the clock in a supervised family-
type arrangement. See id. § 16.21.17(B)(1). And it is also something
of a factual inquiry, at root, to determine whether the proposed
facility is “operated by or operated under contract” with DHHS.
See id. § 16.21.17(B)(3). To the extent the Board made factual
findings on these issues, we would disturb them only if we
determined that they were arbitrary and capricious.

¶24 But the contract-with-DHHS issue, as presented here, is not
a factual one, because the facts associated with this issue are
entirely undisputed: all parties agree that Cascade is licensed by
DHHS but that, aside from its license, Cascade has no contractual
relationship with DHHS. Thus, the question the parties bring for
our resolution is entirely legal and concerns the definition of the
term “contract,” as used in the WCC’s requirement that Cascade

2. One of the arguments advanced by Appellants is that Cascade
House is not a residential facility. They even assert that the Board
failed to make a finding that Cascade House’s primary use was
residential. Although we need not reach this argument given our
conclusion on the contract-with-DHHS issue, we note that the
Board did make a clear finding that Cascade House’s primary use
was residential. Specifically, it found that the “residents of
[Cascade House] will primarily be performing residential
activities, while receiving treatment.” (Emphasis added.)

20240911-CA 10 2026 UT App 67
Sidwell v. Wasatch County

“[b]e operated by or operated under contract with” DHHS. 3 Id.
(emphasis added). Cascade posits that its possession of a license
with DHHS satisfies this requirement. Appellants, on the other
hand, contend that a license and a contract are entirely different
legal concepts and that the WCC necessarily contemplates more
than simple licensure in this context. 4

¶25 Questions of ordinance interpretation present questions of
illegality, because “[a] land use decision is illegal” if it is “based
on an incorrect interpretation of a land use regulation.” Utah
Code § 17-79-1009(3)(c)(ii)(A). And as noted, we interpret county
(or municipal) ordinances just as we do statutes: for correctness,
with no deference provided to either the county’s or the lower
court’s interpretation. See, e.g., Outfront Media, LLC v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 2017 UT 74, ¶ 12 & n.13, 416 P.3d 389 (“We review the
interpretation of ordinances for correctness.”).

3. Although section 16.21.17(B)(3) requires that a residential
facility for persons with disabilities “[b]e operated by” or
“operated under contract” with DHHS, see WCC § 16.21.17(B)(3),
no party contends that Cascade House is “operated by” DHHS.
So we need only address whether Cascade House will be
“operated under contract with” DHHS. See id.

4. At one point in its brief, Cascade asserts that Appellants failed
to properly preserve the contract-with-DHHS issue for judicial
review. But even Cascade acknowledges that this issue was raised
“during Appellants’ oral argument before the Board.” And in this
context, raising the issue at the Board level is sufficient to preserve
it. See A1 Pioneer Moving v. Labor Comm’n, 2021 UT App 115, ¶ 12
n.6, 502 P.3d 305 (noting, in the administrative context, that where
the Board had “fact-finding authority,” a matter raised for the first
time at the Board level—and not raised at the lower
administrative law judge level—was sufficiently preserved for
judicial review).

20240911-CA 11 2026 UT App 67
Sidwell v. Wasatch County

¶26 When considering a question of statutory, rule, or
ordinance interpretation, we must keep in mind that “our primary
goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of” the drafters of the
provision in question. Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011
UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863 (cleaned up). And the best evidence of
that intent is the language the drafters used to express that intent.
See Hertzske v. Snyder, 2017 UT 4, ¶ 10, 390 P.3d 307 (“The best
indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the statutes
themselves.”). So we first look “to the plain language” of the
provision, “presuming that the [drafters] used each word
advisedly, and when we can ascertain the intent of the [drafters]
from the statutory terms alone, no other interpretive tools are
needed, and our task . . . is typically at an end.” Dole v. Dole, 2018
UT App 195, ¶ 15, 437 P.3d 464 (cleaned up). However, we must
not view the provision at issue in isolation; instead, the inquiry
“requires that each part or section be construed in connection with
every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.”
State v. Hatfield, 2020 UT 1, ¶ 16, 462 P.3d 330 (cleaned up). Thus,
“we give effect to every word of a statute [or ordinance], avoiding
any interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute [or
ordinance] inoperative or superfluous.” Bountiful City v. Baize,
2021 UT 9, ¶ 42, 487 P.3d 71 (cleaned up).

¶27 The plain language of section 16.21.17(B)(3) requires that
residential facilities for persons with disabilities operating within
the RA-1 zone “[b]e operated . . . under contract with” DHHS.
And in our view, the drafters’ choice to use the word “contract”—
rather than the word “license”—is meaningful here. After all,
“contract” and “license” are legal terms of art that have materially
different meanings. Definitionally, a license is a “privilege
granted by a state or city upon the payment of a fee, the recipient
of the privilege then being authorized to do some act or series of
acts that would otherwise be impermissible.” License, Black’s Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). A contract, by contrast, is defined as an
“agreement between two or more parties creating obligations that

20240911-CA 12 2026 UT App 67
Sidwell v. Wasatch County

are enforceable or otherwise recognizable at law.” Contract,
Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

¶28 Legally, these two concepts “are distinct.” See Slora v. Sun
‘n Fun Fly-In, Inc., 173 So. 3d 1099, 1103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
A license is “issued by government agencies to allow the . . .
license holder to engage in activity that would otherwise be
prohibited or restricted by law or regulation.” Id. A contract, by
contrast, is a “bargained-for agreement[] created through a
manifestation of mutual assent, typically through offer and
acceptance, supported by the exchange of consideration.” Id. A
license “facilitates the government’s regulation of an activity in
the public interest, while a contract facilitates an exchange of
promises between two or more parties for some mutually
beneficial purpose.” Id. Indeed, a license “does not have the
elements of a contract,” because it is “generally enforced through
regulatory or criminal action,” while “a contract is generally
enforced through a suit for damages or specific performance.” Id.;
see also WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Sullivan, 6 A.3d 1104, 1111 (R.I. 2010)
(stating that a license “is a mere privilege or permission and in no
sense a contract or property” (cleaned up)); US Ecology, Inc. v.
State, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 689, 702 (Ct. App. 2001) (“A license merely
permits an entity to pursue a regulated activity, and has none of
the elements of a contract.” (cleaned up)); 53 C.J.S. Licenses § 3
(2026) (“A license is not a contract or obligation between the
authority—federal, state, or municipal—granting it and the
person to whom it is granted.”).

¶29 Indeed, we have held that “a license does not create any
vested rights in its holder because a license is not a contract.”
Bourgeous v. Department of Com., 2002 UT App 5, ¶ 14, 41 P.3d 461
(emphasis added). And we have stated that a license is not the
same as a contract because—unlike a party to a contractual
relationship—the licensing entity retains “free latitude . . . to
impose new or additional burdens on the licensee, or to alter the

20240911-CA 13 2026 UT App 67
Sidwell v. Wasatch County

license, or to revoke or annul it.” Id. (cleaned up); accord Riggins v.
District Court, 51 P.2d 645, 658 (Utah 1935).

¶30 Moreover, in addition to these contrasting dictionary
definitions and compelling legal authorities, the structure of the
relevant WCC provisions also weighs strongly in favor of a
conclusion that the term “contract” should not be construed as
coextensive with the term “license.” First, an entire subsection of
WCC section 16.21.17(B) would be rendered superfluous if we
interpreted “contract” to mean “license,” because subsection (2)—
which requires Cascade House to “[c]onform to all applicable
standards and requirements of” DHHS—already encompasses
any licensure requirement. See WCC § 16.21.17(B)(2). In other
words, subsection (2) already requires Cascade House to have a
license, and if we read subsection (3) to require nothing more than
that, the subsections would be duplicative. Such an interpretation
would not “give effect to every word” in the ordinance. See Baize,
2021 UT 9, ¶ 42 (cleaned up).

¶31 Second, this interpretation also seems to run counter to the
drafters’ overall intentions for the RA-1 zone. As noted already,
Wasatch County’s stated intent was to “allow[] residential
development near the incorporated areas, while maintaining the
rural atmosphere of Wasatch County.” WCC § 16.08.01(A).
Similarly, although the RA-1 zone was “a means of facilitating a
transitional development area,” the drafters wanted “to maintain,
as much as possible, the rural character of the [c]ounty.” Id. As
applied to residential facilities for elderly persons and persons
with disabilities within the RA-1 zone, Wasatch County has
adopted something of an anti-business stance: residential facilities
for elderly persons “may not operate as a business” at all, see id.
§ 16.21.17(A), and similar facilities for persons with disabilities
may only operate as businesses if they are “operated by or
operated under contract with” DHHS, see id. § 16.21.17(B).
Interpreting “contract,” as used in subsection (3), to mean
something more than a mere license is in keeping with what we

20240911-CA 14 2026 UT App 67
Sidwell v. Wasatch County

perceive to be the overall structure and purpose of the relevant
section of the WCC.

¶32 For all of these reasons, we conclude that Cascade’s
licensure with DHHS is not the equivalent of Cascade House
being “operated under contract” with DHHS, see id.
§ 16.21.17(B)(3), and on that basis we conclude that Cascade has
not met all of the necessary prerequisites set forth in the WCC for
a CUP for a residential facility for persons with disabilities.

¶33 Cascade resists this conclusion in three ways. First, it
claims that, as a factual matter, DHHS does not actually enter into
the sort of contracts that subsection (3) contemplates—contracts
by which DHHS will refer patients to a facility or pay for patients
to be housed in a facility—and from this premise, it asserts that
the term “contract” must therefore be construed to include mere
licenses. But no party presented any evidence on this issue to the
Planning Commission, the Board, or the district court. Thus, there
is no evidence in the record to support Cascade’s contention that
DHHS does not currently enter into such contracts with
residential facilities for persons with disabilities. Indeed, when
preparing their reports for the Planning Commission and the
Board, county staff didn’t seem to be under the impression that
such contracts weren’t an option, noting in that report, without
comment about the availability of such contracts, that “DHHS
does not refer clients to Cascade [House] or pay for clients to be
in Cascade [House].”

¶34 Moreover, the WCC provision in question—the one that
requires residential facilities for persons with disabilities to “[b]e
operated by or operated under contract with” DHHS—was
enacted in 2002 and was last amended in 2006. See id. Thus, to the
extent it matters to our interpretive analysis—in which we are
trying to ascertain the intent of the drafters of the relevant
provision—whether DHHS actually does offer such contracts, the
relevant date for such an inquiry would be 2002 or 2006, not 2026.

20240911-CA 15 2026 UT App 67
Sidwell v. Wasatch County

And no party provided any information to any decisionmaker at
any point in this process about whether DHHS offered such
contracts in 2002 or 2006.

¶35 In the end, the word “contract” must be given its plain
meaning, regardless of whether DHHS does or does not currently
offer the sort of contracts described in subsection (3). Cascade’s
remedy, if it believes the unavailability of such contracts is a
problem, is to advocate for Wasatch County to amend its code to
account for the realities Cascade believes to exist.

¶36 Second, Cascade contends that interpreting subsection (3)
to impose an additional requirement beyond mere licensure
“conflicts with Utah law,” which Cascade contends “expressly
permit[s] operation only through licensure.” The district court
found this argument persuasive. Both Cascade and the district
court refer to several state statutes, all of which indicate that
facilities similar to Cascade House must have a license from
DHHS to operate. See, e.g., Utah Code § 26B-2-105(1) (stating that
a business “may not establish, conduct, or maintain a human
services program in this state without a valid and current license”
from DHHS); id. § 26B-2-206(1)(a) (stating that “[a] person . . . may
not establish, conduct, or maintain a health care facility in this
state without receiving a license from” DHHS); id. § 17E-7-201(2)
(“The responsibility to license local programs or entities that
operate a residential facility for persons with a disability . . . shall
rest with [DHHS] . . . .”). 5 But while these statutes all require

5. In supplemental briefing submitted after oral argument,
Cascade cites additional provisions of Utah law that, in its view,
support its assertion that “Utah law specifically permits facilities
like Cascade House to operate through a license.” See, e.g., Utah
Code §§ 26B-2-103, -104, -117; Utah Admin. Code R501-19-1.
These additional sections likewise simply require that facilities
like Cascade House have a license in order to operate, and they
(continued…)

20240911-CA 16 2026 UT App 67
Sidwell v. Wasatch County

facilities like Cascade House to have a license in order to operate,
none of them has anything to say about whether counties or
municipalities are (or are not) allowed to impose additional
requirements upon such facilities in order for them to operate
within particular zones. And as a matter of simple logic, the
imposition of such additional requirements is not necessarily
inconsistent with the state statutory licensure requirement, at
least as long as the relevant ordinances do not attempt to
countermand the licensure requirement (which the WCC does
not, see WCC § 16.21.17(B)(2) (stating that residential facilities for
persons with disabilities shall “[c]onform to all applicable
standards and requirements” of DHHS)). Indeed, a “municipal
ordinance need not be identical to the controlling state statute to
be consistent with it.” Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87, 90 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990); see also Salt Lake City v. Newman, 2006 UT 69, ¶ 10,
148 P.3d 931 (“We cannot simply assume that, by its silence, the
legislature intended to permit conduct made punishable under an
ordinance.” (cleaned up)); Layton City v. Glines, 616 P.2d 588, 589
(Utah 1980) (“Although the scope of the municipal ordinance is
more limited than the state statute, the provisions common to
both are consistent and lawfully enforceable by the
municipality.”). Here, section 16.21.17(B) of the WCC is certainly
not identical to state statutes that require only DHHS licensure,
but it nonetheless remains consistent with those statutes because
it does not “forbid[] that which the statute permits.” Salt Lake City
v. Newman, 2005 UT App 191, ¶ 11, 113 P.3d 1007 (cleaned up),
aff’d, 2006 UT 69, 148 P.3d 931. The section simply requires both
licensure and a contractual relationship with DHHS. Accordingly,
Wasatch County’s decision to impose additional requirements,

likewise do not prohibit municipalities from imposing additional
requirements on such facilities in particular zones. Thus, while
these additional citations do address DHHS licensing, they do not
address DHHS contracts and thus do not affect our analysis in any
meaningful way.

20240911-CA 17 2026 UT App 67
Sidwell v. Wasatch County

beyond those imposed by statute, for certain facilities to be able to
operate within the RA-1 zone is not inconsistent with state law.

¶37 Finally, Cascade invokes the ADA and the FHA—federal
statutes that prohibit discrimination, in housing matters and in
other contexts—against various groups of individuals, including
persons with disabilities. Cascade asserts—correctly, as far as we
are aware—that the potential residents of Cascade House would
be considered protected parties under these federal statutes. But
Cascade’s additional arguments on this point are somewhat
diffuse; it appears to assert, without much in the way of specifics,
that “the denial of its CUP . . . would have been discriminatory”
and “in violation of federal law.”

¶38 That may or may not be the case. But that question isn’t
before us in this appeal. No party has asserted a cause of action
under the ADA or the FHA, and no party has identified a
particular provision of either of those federal statutes that could
conceivably bar Wasatch County from denying Cascade’s CUP
application if the requirements of the WCC are not met. And
Cascade acknowledges—in at least two points in its appellate
brief—that “this is not an accommodation case” under the federal
statutes and that it at no point asked Wasatch County to make a
reasonable accommodation for Cascade House. County staff
understood this from the outset of the case, noting in their initial
report that Cascade wasn’t requesting “a reasonable
accommodation” under the federal statutes because such an
accommodation wasn’t “necessary since there is already a built-
in accommodation within [the] WCC” in the form of the WCC’s
specific requirements for facilities for persons with disabilities.
Thus, county staff framed the question not as whether the ADA
or the FHA compelled a grant of Cascade’s request but, instead,
as whether the specific requirements of the WCC regarding
facilities for persons with disabilities were met. Following county
staff’s lead, the parties presented their case to the Board and to the
district court in the same way.

20240911-CA 18 2026 UT App 67
Sidwell v. Wasatch County

¶39 The question presented below and on appeal is simply
whether Cascade’s CUP application meets the requirements of the
WCC. For the reasons already set forth, it does not. And there our
inquiry must end. If Cascade believes that a denial of its CUP
application—on the ground that it can’t meet the requirements of
subsection (3) because it doesn’t have a contract with DHHS—
somehow violates the ADA or the FHA, it may attempt to present
and litigate that question later. We offer no opinion on whether
such an attempt would be procedurally or substantively proper.

CONCLUSION

¶40 To qualify for a CUP, Cascade needed to meet all of the
WCC’s requirements for the RA-1 zone. Cascade cannot meet one
of those requirements: the one in subsection (3) that requires all
residential facilities for persons with disabilities located within
that zone to “[b]e operated by or operated under contract with”
DHHS. While Cascade has a valid license with DHHS that would
allow Cascade House to operate, it does not have any other
contractual relationship with DHHS, and Cascade House would
therefore not “operate[] under contract with” DHHS. Thus, the
Board’s and the district court’s interpretation of subsection (3)—
that a license satisfied the contract-with-DHHS requirement—
was incorrect, rendering the Board’s land use decision illegal.

¶41 On that basis, we reverse the district court’s order granting
Cascade’s motion and dismissing Appellants’ petition, and we
remand this case to the district court with instructions to grant
Appellants’ petition and to send this matter back to the Board for
issuance of an order denying Cascade’s CUP application.

20240911-CA 19 2026 UT App 67