State v. Tuyisenge

2026 UT App 61

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
ERIC TUYISENGE,
Appellant.

Per Curiam Opinion
No. 20250435-CA
Filed April 16, 2026

Third District Court, West Jordan Department
The Honorable James D. Gardner
No. 231912835

Janet Lawrence, Attorney for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Rebecca Huber,
Attorneys for Appellee

Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, RYAN M. HARRIS,
and AMY J. OLIVER.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Eric Tuyisenge pled guilty to one count of rape. As part of
his sentence, Tuyisenge was required to pay restitution to the
victim for the time she missed from work as a result of the assault.
Tuyisenge challenges the district court’s restitution order. On
appeal, we are asked to determine whether the court erred by
requiring Tuyisenge to reimburse the victim for the portion of her
lost wages that had been reimbursed by paid time off (PTO) she
had accrued. We agree with the district court that the use of PTO
is a pecuniary loss that can be included in the restitution order.

¶2 Under the Crime Victims Restitution Act, a restitution
order that attempts to quantify actual damages (as opposed to one
that takes the restitution figure from a plea agreement) must
State v. Tuyisenge

include “the entire amount of pecuniary damages that are
proximately caused to each victim by the criminal conduct of the
defendant.” Utah Code § 77-38b-205(1)(a). For purposes of the
Act, pecuniary damages are defined as “all demonstrable
economic injury, losses, and expenses regardless of whether the
economic injury, losses, and expenses have yet been incurred.” Id.
§ 77-38b-102(19)(a).

¶3 Tuyisenge does not dispute that the victim missed work as
a result of his criminal conduct. He asserts only that she did not
suffer any pecuniary loss as a result of the missed work because
she was paid for the time she missed through her PTO. Tuyisenge
asserts that the pecuniary value of the victim’s PTO itself was
“speculative” because “[t]he record did not include any statement
from [the victim] indicating she planned to use this PTO
afterward” or any other proof that she “had plans to do so.” See
State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8, ¶ 53, 416 P.3d 1132 (“Ballpark figures
and purely speculative calculations constitute insufficient
information for a district court to rely on in awarding restitution.”
(cleaned up)).

¶4 We agree with the State that the district court could make
a reasonable inference that the victim would have used her PTO
at a later date had she not needed to use it as compensation for
work missed as a result of Tuyisenge’s actions. Moreover, we
agree that the loss of PTO is itself an economic injury, given that
PTO has an easily calculable economic value and is part of an
employee’s benefits package. As the State points out, a number of
other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion, and we find
their analysis persuasive. See, e.g., People v. Perez, 2017 COA 52M,
¶ 16, 413 P.3d 266 (concluding that loss of PTO is a “loss of
employee benefits comparable to a victim’s lost wages” and
constitutes a pecuniary loss for purposes of restitution); In re Ryan
A., 39 P.3d 543, 549–50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the loss
of PTO “falls within the scope of lost wages” for purposes of

20250435-CA 2 2026 UT App 61
State v. Tuyisenge

restitution because it is “a real economic loss tied to wages
earned” (cleaned up)).

¶5 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s restitution
order.

20250435-CA 3 2026 UT App 61