West Valley v. Drawn

2025 UT App 198

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WEST VALLEY CITY,
Appellee,
v.
ROMEO MARQUIS DRAWN,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20240763-CA
Filed December 26, 2025

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Vernice S. Trease
No. 221911572

Staci Visser, Attorney for Appellant
Ryan Robinson and Corey D. Sherwin,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES RYAN D. TENNEY and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 One day in the fall of 2022, Romeo Marquis Drawn was
watching his son Jeremy’s little league baseball game. 1 Jeremy’s
mother, Ruth, and her boyfriend, Ken, were also there. When
Jeremy came up to bat, Ken encouraged him to keep his “eye on
the ball.” Apparently taking offense, Drawn told Ken not to talk
to his son, and a fight between the two men ensued. Ken walked
away with a broken arm, and Drawn was charged with and
convicted of assault with substantial injury. He appeals, asserting
an ineffective assistance claim based on his trial counsel’s failure
to properly address certain other-acts and character evidence that

1. We use pseudonyms when referring to nonparties in this
opinion.
West Valley v. Drawn

West Valley City introduced at trial. While we hardly endorse the
approach taken by the prosecution, we nevertheless affirm.

BACKGROUND 2

¶2 Drawn had previously been in a relationship with Ruth,
and they shared a son, Jeremy. One day in September 2022, Ruth
and her boyfriend, Ken, went to the park to watch Jeremy’s little
league baseball game. Drawn, who was also at the game, had
never met Ken, and Ruth was worried about possible trouble
between the two men. To mitigate at least some of that concern,
Ruth and Ken sat apart from Drawn’s parents, Diana and Fred,
who, in turn, were sitting apart from Drawn.

¶3 When Jeremy came up to bat, Ken encouraged Jeremy to
keep his “eye on the ball.” Apparently taking offense, Drawn
approached Ken and said, “Don’t talk to my fucking son.” Ken
responded, “I don’t think you should be doing this to your son.”
A few minutes later, Ken began walking over to the restroom.
What happened next was disputed at trial. But under the facts the
jury apparently accepted, Drawn approached Ken and asked,
“What now tough guy?” Ken responded, “I’m not doing this with
you.” Drawn then “jump[ed] on [Ken’s] back,” and the two men
“went straight to the ground.” Observers intervened and broke
up the fight.

¶4 Ruth called the police, and two officers arrived. One officer
(Officer) was speaking with other witnesses when Drawn
approached him. Drawn initially told Officer that Ken had

2. “On appeal, we review the record facts in a light most favorable
to the jury’s verdict and recite the facts accordingly. We present
conflicting evidence only as necessary to understand issues raised
on appeal.” State v. Barlow, 2025 UT App 152, n.2, 579 P.3d 422.

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West Valley v. Drawn

punched him in the forehead. Drawn subsequently changed his
story, saying that he had tackled Ken after dodging a punch.

¶5 After giving their statements to the officers, Ruth and Ken
were told that they “were free to go.” Ken thought his arm had
been dislocated in the fight, so Ruth drove him to the hospital. An
x-ray revealed that Ken’s arm was broken and he needed surgery.
Drawn was then charged with assault with substantial bodily
injury.

¶6 Early in the proceedings, an attorney (who did not
represent Drawn at trial) filed a request for discovery on Drawn’s
behalf. Among other things, the attorney requested that West
Valley City (the City) “[p]rovide notice, pursuant to Rule 404(b)
of the Utah Rules of Evidence, of [its] intent to present evidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.” The City did not provide any such notice
before trial.

¶7 At trial, Ken, Ruth, Diana, Fred, and Officer testified
consistently with the above. Aside from Fred, each witness
testified to additional information that is relevant on appeal. The
prosecutor asked Ken what he knew about Drawn through Ruth.
Ken responded that Ruth had told him that Drawn was
“unhinged.” Drawn’s trial counsel (Counsel) objected on hearsay
grounds. The district court overruled the objection, concluding
the statement was appropriate to establish why Ken and Ruth
were not sitting next to Drawn at the game. Nonetheless, the court
instructed the jury not to consider the statement for the truth of
the matter asserted.

¶8 Ruth explained that she and Ken had been sitting apart
from Diana and Fred at the game “in hopes of not upsetting”
Drawn. In response to the prosecutor’s question about why she
thought there could be an issue, Ruth stated, “Just based on
history with [Drawn] and some anger problems, we just didn’t

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want to cause any confrontation, and so we decided to sit
separately just to not tick him off in any way.” The prosecutor
then asked Ruth whether Drawn had “said anything to [her]
specifically that would cause [her] to fear that there would be a
problem.” Ruth began to answer that Drawn had not said
anything that day when Counsel objected based on rule 404(b)(1)
of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which bars “[e]vidence of a crime,
wrong, or other act . . . to show that on a particular occasion the
person acted in conformity with the character.” The record of the
ensuing sidebar is somewhat unclear, but the prosecutor appears
to have agreed to “tailor” the question to address the concern
raised by Counsel.

¶9 After the sidebar, the prosecutor asked Ruth whether
Drawn had said anything to her “leading up to this baseball game
that would give [her] a reason to think there would be a problem
while [she was] at the game.” Ruth responded, “That day, no.”
The prosecutor then asked, “What about prior to that day?” Ruth
responded, “Oh, prior to that day, yes. He told me not to have any
communications with [Diana] and [Fred], and neither should
[Jeremy] . . . . [Drawn] also gave me fear of bringing any kind of
man into my life that [Jeremy] would be around.” When the
prosecutor asked Ruth to clarify what she meant, Ruth responded
that Drawn “would just say things like, ‘Nobody should be in
[Jeremy’s] life. It’s too early.’” At this point, Counsel objected on
both rule 404(b) and relevance grounds. The prosecutor insisted
that he was “not trying to dig up all of their prior history” and
that he “just want[ed] to know why they didn’t come and sit
together.” The court overruled the objection, apparently on the
ground that Drawn’s statement could not be “a 404(b) bad act.” 3

3. The caselaw frequently—and, in our view, unfortunately—
“refers to rule 404(b) evidence as ‘prior bad acts’ evidence.” State
v. Main, 2021 UT App 81, ¶ 18 n.7, 494 P.3d 1056. In fact, the rule
is limited to neither “prior” nor “bad” acts. See id. (cleaned up).
(continued…)

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West Valley v. Drawn

¶10 Diana testified that when Drawn approached Ken and told
him not to talk to Jeremy, she started recording the encounter
because of a prior incident in which Drawn had acted
“aggressive[ly].” Counsel again objected based on rule 404(b).
After a sidebar, the prosecutor agreed to rephrase the question in
a way that would avoid the 404(b) issue. The prosecutor then
asked Diana, “Without going into prior incidents, isn’t it true . . .
that you took the phone out because you were worried [Drawn]
might do something?” Diana responded, “Absolutely.”

¶11 Officer testified that Drawn told him that “the other
involved parties . . . weren’t allowed to be there any longer” and
“that they needed to leave.” According to Officer, Drawn then
stated that he was in the process of obtaining a restraining order—
presumably against Ruth and Ken, and possibly against Diana
and Fred—but that it hadn’t been served yet. Officer testified that
neither he nor any other officer had been “hostile” toward Drawn
during the investigation. He also stated that Drawn’s conduct was
inconsistent with how people had behaved during the “hundreds,
maybe thousands” of investigations that he had “conducted as a
uniformed police officer.” Officer then elaborated,

[P]olice get there for a reason. We control the scene
. . . the best we can so that we can do a thorough
investigation. [Drawn was] more so animated and
argumentative and a little boisterous. . . . [During
my] first initial contact with [Drawn], I was
speaking with the other parties. He approached me
and was demanding that they leave and go, and was
in my face the whole time. And I was like, “Excuse

The rule instead addresses “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other
act . . . to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in conformity with the
character,” Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(1) (emphasis added), “whether
occurring before or after the actions at issue in the current case,”
Main, 2021 UT App 81, ¶ 18 n.7.

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me. I need you to go back over there, and I’ll come
over there.” And then later, [Drawn] was very
accusatory saying that I was very hostile towards
him. Later in the incident, there were several times
where he would call dispatch explaining that he
was—I believe—was an unarmed Black man, [who]
was afraid for his life . . . and so “send more police
officers.”

Counsel did not object to this testimony.

¶12 After the City rested its case, Drawn called a single witness
(Bystander). Her son was on Jeremy’s team, and she had been
watching the game. She testified that Ken, who is white, said
“Let’s do this, boy,” and shoved Drawn “with both hands in the
chest.” Bystander stated that the two men “were fighting” and
“ended up on the ground” before others “broke up the fight.” She
also testified that she had not previously known any of the people
involved in the situation. On cross-examination, Bystander
acknowledged that before she “heard or saw anything, the
altercation had already begun.”

¶13 The jury convicted Drawn as charged.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶14 On appeal, Drawn asserts a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel. Where, as here, a defendant raises such a claim for the
first time on appeal, we decide it as a matter of law. State v.
Fleming, 2019 UT App 181, ¶ 7, 454 P.3d 862.

ANALYSIS

¶15 To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show that “(1) counsel’s performance was

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West Valley v. Drawn

objectively deficient and (2) the deficient performance resulted in
prejudice.” State v. Fleming, 2019 UT App 181, ¶ 9, 454 P.3d 862.
Where a defendant fails to make a showing of deficient
performance, a court need not address prejudice. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984). On the deficient performance
prong, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” Id. at 689. The ultimate question the court must
answer is “whether, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s
acts or omissions were objectively unreasonable.” State v. Scott,
2020 UT 13, ¶ 36, 462 P.3d 350.

¶16 Drawn asserts that “Counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to exclude, object [to], or otherwise remedy
the . . . admission of unnoticed and inadmissible character
evidence.” Specifically, Drawn argues that Counsel should have
objected to Officer’s testimony, which he claims constituted
improper other-acts evidence under rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules
of Evidence and should have otherwise been excluded under rule
403. He also maintains that Counsel should have more effectively
addressed the improper evidence introduced by the testimony of
Ken, Ruth, and Diana. We address each argument in turn.

I. Officer’s Testimony

A. Rule 404(b)

¶17 Drawn argues first that Officer’s testimony ran afoul of
rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence because it centered on
“Drawn’s behavior towards law enforcement that occurred well
after the incident with [Ken]” and the City used it “to impugn
Drawn’s character and diminish his credibility.” Drawn
maintains that Counsel rendered deficient performance by
“fail[ing] to ensure that the jury did not hear and consider
evidence from [Officer] that Drawn made ‘false’ allegations . . .
and that Drawn was unusually boisterous and argumentative
with officers during the investigation.” As we explain below, rule

20240763-CA 7 2025 UT App 198
West Valley v. Drawn

404(b) does not apply to Officer’s testimony because it was
properly admitted as intrinsic evidence.

¶18 Our supreme court recently explained that “[e]vidence is
intrinsic and thus outside the scope of rule 404(b) when there is a
direct relationship between the act and the charged crime.” State
v. Blackwing, 2025 UT 60, ¶ 31. “To be considered intrinsic, the acts
must be an integral and natural part of the circumstances
surrounding the offense for which the defendant is charged or
directly connected to the factual circumstances of the crime.” Id.
(cleaned up). Importantly, “intrinsic evidence can arise from
conduct that occurs [before and] after the crime is completed.” Id.
¶ 33.

¶19 In Blackwing, the defendant was in jail pending trial for a
rape charge. Id. ¶ 1. He was subsequently charged with
solicitation, conspiracy, and attempted aggravated murder when
he “allegedly directed three women with whom he had a
polygamous relationship to murder” the alleged victim to keep
her from testifying at trial. Id. ¶¶ 1, 10. As relevant here, the
supreme court ruled that evidence related to the rape charge was
intrinsic to the other charges and therefore “not subject to rule
404(b).” Id. ¶ 34. Specifically, because the defendant tried to
orchestrate the murder to avoid punishment, there was “a direct
relationship between the sexual assault and the crimes for which
[the defendant was] on trial.” Id.

¶20 Officer’s testimony was clearly intrinsic evidence under
Blackwing. The interactions between Officer and Drawn occurred
in the near aftermath of the incident Officer was investigating.
Drawn was charged with assault after that investigation. In other
words, there was a direct relationship between how Drawn
interacted with Officer and the crime with which he was charged.
We also note that “police officers routinely testify about the
demeanor of persons giving statements to them, even when the
recorded statement has been admitted into evidence.” Johnson v.
State, 375 S.W.3d 12, 24 (Ark. Ct. App. 2010). Indeed, our cases

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West Valley v. Drawn

have allowed officers to testify about a defendant’s demeanor and
behavior during an initial police response. See, e.g., State v. Haar,
2021 UT App 109, ¶ 61, 500 P.3d 102 (noting, in a murder case,
that the officer’s testimony about the defendant’s “behavior in the
immediate aftermath of [the victim] becoming unresponsive” was
properly considered by the jury as evidence of the defendant’s
consciousness of guilt); State v. Amboh, 2023 UT App 150, ¶ 38, 541
P.3d 299 (concluding that body camera footage of the officer’s
encounter with the defendant supported the officer’s testimony
that the defendant was “openly hostile” during arrest on charges
of driving without insurance and interfering with a peace officer);
State v. Glasscock, 2014 UT App 221, ¶ 23, 336 P.3d 46 (explaining
that the defendant’s “demeanor throughout the interview simply
did not provide the detectives with any reason to question his
mental stability” and affirming the trial court’s conclusion that the
defendant’s statement was voluntary).

¶21 For these reasons, rule 404(b) did not apply to Officer’s
testimony. An objection on this basis would therefore have been
futile, which precludes a finding of deficient performance. See,
e.g., State v. Soto, 2022 UT App 107, ¶ 31, 518 P.3d 157. 4

B. Rule 403

¶22 Drawn also argues that Officer’s testimony was excludable
under rule 403 and that Counsel should have objected on that
basis. The rule enables a court to “exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . .
unfair prejudice.” Utah R. Evid. 403. District courts apply rule
403’s well-known balancing test by “identify[ing] the probative

4. To the extent Drawn argues that Counsel should have objected
to Officer’s testimony because the City failed to provide notice
under rule 404(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, that argument
is foreclosed by our conclusion that Officer’s testimony was
intrinsic evidence and, thus, not subject to rule 404(b), including
its notice requirement.

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West Valley v. Drawn

value of the evidence” and weighing it against the “unfair
prejudice that may result from the evidence.” State v. Nunez-
Vasquez, 2020 UT App 98, ¶ 58, 468 P.3d 585. “In the usual case,
the presumption [under the rule] is in favor of admissibility.” Id.
(cleaned up).

¶23 Drawn maintains that the probative value of Officer’s
testimony was low because “Drawn’s behavior after the
altercation did not . . . make it any more or less likely that [he]
started the physical altercation.” To the extent Drawn argues that
the evidence was irrelevant under rules 401 and 402 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence, we disagree for reasons we’ve already
discussed. See supra ¶¶ 17–20. We also note that a defendant’s
interactions with law enforcement in the aftermath of an alleged
crime can have probative value. See, e.g., Haar, 2021 UT App 109,
¶ 61.

¶24 On the other side of the test, Drawn points to Officer’s
testimony that Drawn called 911 multiple times during the
encounter when he “explain[ed] that he was . . . an unarmed Black
man, [who] was afraid for his life . . . and so ‘send more police
officers.’” This, Drawn argues, “is the sort of evidence that evokes
an emotional response in jurors, particularly given the existing
social climate in recent years.” We don’t disagree that testimony
implicating contentious societal issues risks “inflam[ing] passions
and ignit[ing] conscious or subconscious biases.” State v. Beverly,
2018 UT 60, ¶ 38, 435 P.3d 160. District courts and litigants should
be cognizant of such risks.

¶25 However, we cannot conclude that Counsel’s decision not
to object to Officer’s testimony on rule 403 grounds was
objectively unreasonable. Even if the substance of Drawn’s 911
calls should have been excluded under rule 403, it remains true
that Officer “spontaneously volunteered” a potentially
inadmissible opinion. State v. Herrera, 2025 UT App 1, ¶ 26, 563
P.3d 416. In such scenarios, an attorney’s options are limited.
Here, Counsel could have moved for a mistrial, sought a curative

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West Valley v. Drawn

instruction, or not objected at all. Drawn does not argue that
Counsel should have sought a mistrial based on Officer’s
testimony. And it was not until close to the end of his answer to a
question from the prosecutor that Officer testified Drawn had
called 911 and said that he “was an unarmed Black man.” So, had
Counsel objected and asked for a curative jury instruction, he
risked bringing the “pink-elephant paradox” into play, which
refers to the phenomenon that jurors, when they are “told not to
think about a thing, . . . may actually be more likely to think about
that thing.” State v. King, 2024 UT App 151, ¶ 33, 559 P.3d 96.
Objection in such an instance is the kind of tactical decision that
we are extremely reluctant to second-guess. Id.; cf. State v.
Hamberlin, 2025 UT App 131, ¶ 37, 577 P.3d 912 (noting that
appellate courts “are loath to second-guess” “quintessential
strategic decision[s]”).

¶26 On the facts here, we cannot say that Officer’s testimony
was so damaging that Counsel’s only reasonable choice would
have been to object to the testimony. Had Officer said more on the
subject, Counsel may have been obligated to object and seek a
curative instruction (or even a mistrial) because the longer the
testimony was drawn out, the more likely the jury would have
been to remember it. But Officer’s potentially objectionable
testimony was brief and spontaneous. Under these circumstances,
reasonable counsel could choose not to object.

¶27 For these reasons, Drawn has failed to establish that
Counsel rendered deficient performance in not moving to exclude
Officer’s testimony under rule 403.

II. Other Witness Testimony

¶28 Drawn argues next that Counsel should have done more to
address the damage caused by Ken’s, Ruth’s, and Diana’s
testimony related to his character and other acts. For reasons we

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West Valley v. Drawn

explain below, we cannot say that Counsel’s performance was
deficient in this regard. 5

¶29 As an initial matter, to the extent Drawn argues that Ken’s
and Ruth’s testimony that he was “unhinged” and had “anger
problems” was inadmissible under rule 404(a)(1) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence, we agree. See Utah R. Evid. 404(a)(1)
(“Evidence of a person’s character or character trait is not
admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted
in conformity with the character or trait.”). Indeed, the evidence
centered on a character trait—Drawn’s propensity for anger or
acting out on that anger. 6 See State v. Graydon, 2023 UT App 4,

5. Drawn briefly argues, again, that Counsel should have sought
to exclude much of this testimony based on the City’s failure to
provide notice under rule 404(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence
that it intended to offer other-acts evidence at trial. On this front,
Drawn is correct that the City should have given notice. See Utah
R. Evid. 404(b)(2) (“On request by a defendant in a criminal case,
the prosecutor must: (A) provide reasonable notice of the general
nature of any [other-acts] evidence that the prosecutor intends to
offer at trial; and (B) do so before trial, or during trial if the court
excuses lack of pretrial notice on good cause shown.”). But Drawn
does not explain why the trial court would have—or should
have—excluded the evidence instead of granting a continuance.
See State v. Alvarado, 2014 UT App 87, ¶ 27 n.5, 325 P.3d 116
(explaining that a court’s decision based on the government’s
“failure to provide notice . . . would likely trigger the same
analysis as under rule 16 [of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure], that is, the application of the requirement to request
a continuance”). Without any such explanation, Drawn’s
argument on this point does not help his case.

6. We noted in the introduction that we cannot endorse the
approach taken by the City in prosecuting this case—its elicitation
(continued…)

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West Valley v. Drawn

¶ 64 n.10, 524 P.3d 1034 (“Character evidence . . . includes
evidence of specific traits or propensities a person might have,
some of which might be negative even if the person could be
considered generally a good person.” (cleaned up)). We likewise
assume for the sake of argument that some of Ruth’s and Diana’s
testimony constituted other-acts evidence. 7

¶30 But Counsel objected to nearly all of the challenged
testimony, including Ken’s and Ruth’s clearly inadmissible
statements about Drawn’s general character. That Counsel did not
necessarily object on the strongest or proper grounds strikes us as
a relatively minor oversight here. 8 Short of a mistrial—a remedy
that Drawn does not meaningfully argue Counsel should have
requested in this case, see infra ¶ 33—mitigating the problems
caused by Ken’s, Ruth’s, and Diana’s testimony implicated, again,
the tactical decision of whether to object further and ask for a
curative instruction or to forgo objection in the hopes of not
emphasizing the improper testimony for the jury. See State v. King,
2024 UT App 151, ¶ 33, 559 P.3d 96.

¶31 Here, Counsel objected to Ken’s testimony that Drawn was
“unhinged,” after which the district court explained to the jury

of this kind of testimony is why. The question to Ken was phrased
in a way that the prosecutor should have known would risk a
response that Drawn was unhinged—an obvious attempt to
introduce inadmissible character evidence.

7. We need not and do not opine on whether the district court was
correct in its apparent ruling that Drawn’s statements to Ruth
were not “other acts” under rule 404(b).

8. As noted above, Counsel objected to Ken’s testimony that
Drawn was “unhinged” on hearsay grounds, not on the basis that
it was character evidence. Similarly, Counsel objected to Ruth’s
testimony that Drawn had “anger problems” because it was
other-acts evidence, not because it was character evidence.

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West Valley v. Drawn

that it could not consider the testimony for “the truth of the matter
asserted.” Given that the jury heard the testimony, we cannot say
that the jury’s calculus would have changed had it been instructed
that it couldn’t consider the testimony for any reason. In fact, the
pink-elephant paradox may have even been more problematic in
such a situation. See id. And Drawn does not explain what
difference—if any—there would have been had Counsel made the
stronger objection or if he had asked the court for a second
curative instruction.

¶32 Similarly, Counsel’s objection to Ruth’s testimony about
Drawn’s alleged proclivity for anger steered the discussion
toward Drawn’s specific acts. This brings us, again, to the
requirement that we grant broad deference to trial counsel on
decisions that are quintessentially tactical in nature. Because
requesting a curative instruction on Ruth’s testimony would have
risked placing undue attention on that testimony, we decline to
second-guess Counsel’s apparent decision not to request such an
instruction. The same is true for Counsel’s decision about how to
handle Diana’s testimony.

¶33 Drawn also argues—very briefly—that Counsel should
have requested a mistrial based on some of this testimony. We
have explained that “a mistrial is a drastic remedy, which should
be granted only where the circumstances are such as to reasonably
indicate that a fair trial cannot be had and that a mistrial is
necessary to avoid injustice.” State v. Sorenson, 2023 UT App 159,
¶ 21, 542 P.3d 529 (cleaned up). Stated otherwise, a “mistrial is
warranted only when no reasonable alternatives exist.” Id.
(cleaned up). Drawn does not explain why a mistrial would have
been appropriate in this case. Moreover, by arguing relatively
extensively that Counsel should have sought curative jury
instructions, Drawn suggests that there were reasonable
alternatives short of a mistrial that the court could have
considered.

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West Valley v. Drawn

¶34 Finally, Drawn argues again that any probative value of
Ken’s, Ruth’s, and Diana’s testimony was substantially
outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice under rule 403 and
that Counsel therefore rendered deficient performance by not
objecting on rule 403 grounds. On the facts, we disagree that
Counsel’s actual decisions were objectively unreasonable. Again,
Counsel objected to most of the challenged testimony, and either
the court instructed the jury on how it could consider the evidence
or the prosecutor agreed to tailor his question in a way that would
avoid the problem raised by Counsel. Had Counsel objected on
rule 403 grounds, the jury would have still heard much—if not
all—of the testimony. This brings Counsel’s decision on what to
do about that testimony squarely within the presumption that the
decision was objectively reasonable.

¶35 For these reasons, we cannot say that Counsel rendered
deficient performance in how he chose to address the problems
created by Ken’s, Ruth’s, and Diana’s testimony.

CONCLUSION

¶36 Drawn has not established that Counsel rendered deficient
performance in this case. Therefore, his ineffective assistance
claim fails, and we affirm his conviction.

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