State v. Dickerson

2025 UT App 173

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
TIMOTHY LAVELL DICKERSON,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20230751-CA
Filed November 28, 2025

Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Derek P. Pullan
No. 191401450

Douglas J. Thompson, Attorney for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and David A. Simpson,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 This internet-sex-sting case comes before us for a second
time. In our first opinion, we reversed the trial court’s dismissal
of criminal charges—the most serious of which were enticing a
minor and two counts of attempted sodomy on a child—against
Timothy Lavell Dickerson, and we remanded the case for trial. See
State v. Dickerson, 2022 UT App 56, ¶ 58, 511 P.3d 1191.

¶2 On remand, the court held a bench trial, and while it
acquitted Dickerson on several counts, it convicted him of
enticing a minor, one count of attempted sodomy on a child, and
possession of drug paraphernalia. Dickerson now appeals the
enticement and attempted sodomy convictions, asserting that
(a) the court clearly erred when it found that Dickerson
State v. Dickerson

subjectively believed he was chatting with a thirteen-year-old and
(b) there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s
determination that Dickerson took a substantial step toward
committing sodomy on a child. For the reasons discussed, we
reject Dickerson’s arguments and affirm his convictions.

BACKGROUND 1

¶3 In our first opinion in this case, we set forth a rather
fulsome factual background, including large excerpts of the
online conversation that occurred between Dickerson and
“Kailey,” a fictitious online persona created by an agent (Agent)
of the Utah Attorney General’s Internet Crimes Against Children
task force. See id. ¶¶ 2–12. In this opinion, we include a shorter
summary, and we emphasize only those facts necessary for
resolution of the issues before us in this second appeal.

¶4 The online profile Agent created stated that Kailey was
eighteen years old. And the profile photo Agent used was a
“cropped head shot” of one of Agent’s colleagues, a woman in her
mid-20s. Agent later acknowledged that the woman in the profile
photo did not “look like a 13-year-old girl,” because—among
other reasons—she appeared to have some wrinkles underneath
her eyes. Indeed, Agent agreed that the person in the profile
picture “look[ed] older than the age that [Kailey] later
represented” to Dickerson.

¶5 One evening, after encountering Kailey’s online profile,
Dickerson initiated contact, and early in the conversation Kailey

1. “Following a bench trial, we recite the facts from the record in
the light most favorable to the findings of the trial court and
present conflicting evidence only as necessary to understand
issues raised on appeal.” Brown v. Amidan, 2025 UT App 144, n.2
(cleaned up).

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State v. Dickerson

stated that she was “in middle school.” Dickerson appeared
skeptical of this claim, and he said, “Girl stop,” and “Stop
play[ing],” and he asked, “So is that really a pic of u[?]” Kailey
responded by confirming, several times, that she was in middle
school, and she also told Dickerson that the profile photo was
indeed of her. Dickerson then asked Kailey how old she was, and
Kailey responded by stating that she was thirteen. When
Dickerson expressed skepticism, Kailey affirmed that she was
“serious” and that she was really thirteen. Dickerson responded
by asking Kailey, in effect, what she was doing on the website if
she was indeed thirteen (“wyd on here baby”), and Kailey said
she was “[l]ooking for whatevs.” The conversation continued,
with Kailey explaining that she “live[d] in Provo with [her] dad,”
and with Dickerson eventually asking Kailey if she had “ever
been with a black dude.” During trial, Agent testified that, in his
estimation, “been with” meant having “sex with someone.”

¶6 Eventually, Dickerson and Kailey moved their
conversation off of the website app and onto text messaging. In
one of Kailey’s first texts, she explained that her “dad gets really
mad when [she’s] on the phone late.” To this, Dickerson did not
reply for almost an hour and a half, nor did Kailey send any other
messages during that time. Eventually, Dickerson restarted the
conversation, asking if Kailey wanted to “smoke,” and later
asking, “[W]at else can we do baby[?]” Kailey’s responses were
hesitant, claiming that she had “never really snuckout” before and
that she was “kinda scared” because she was unsure what
Dickerson wanted to do and because she had “never been with a
oldr guy.” Dickerson responded by saying, “Wats the oldest baby
and I promise u on my granny I won’t hurt or nun.” Kailey
responded, “[H]e was 13 in my grade.” Kailey also told Dickerson
that her best friend had an “older boyfriend and she likes it,” to
which Dickerson responded, “O she do huh and you will like it
too baby.” Dickerson asked Kailey to share her address so that
they could meet up.

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State v. Dickerson

¶7 At one point, Kailey asked Dickerson, “[Are] u gonna try
stuff with me after we smoke? lol.” Thereafter, the following
exchange occurred:

Dickerson: Do u want me to baby

Kailey: What will u show me

Dickerson: Wateva u want baby[.] It’s up to u[.] I’m
just tryin to see wats up cuz it’s getting later and
later

Kailey: Let meet up tomorrow

Dickerson: Awwwww baby y[.] I wanted to Tonite
please

Kailey: I told u i was looking for something like my
bff has. [A]nd i really dont know u or what u wanna
do

Dickerson: Okay baby and I will give u that I’m tryin
to show u just let me show u please[.] I’m down for
wateva u want baby[.] That’s y I said I can come ova
and we can talk about it while we smoke baby

Kailey: I no babe. Just so nervous

Dickerson: Nervous about wat baby

Kailey: If u kiss me and do more

....

Kailey: Ive only kissed like a couple of boys

Dickerson: Ok u never had nobody play wit it or lick
it

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State v. Dickerson

Kailey: Never

Dickerson: Has ur friend[?] U want to try

....

Dickerson: Do ur friend and her boyfriend do that

Kailey: Yeah

Dickerson: So wats up u want to

....

Dickerson: Do u want to try

Kailey: Lol. Im so lost. Try what

Dickerson: Lick it and play wit it

¶8 Agent testified at trial that, in his estimation, “play with it
or lick it” meant “[p]lay with the vagina or lick the vagina.” After
this exchange, Dickerson promised to “be gentle,” and he asked
Kailey if “[she] play wit [herself] some times.” According to
Agent, this question asked whether Kailey masturbated. Kailey
responded by saying, “[T]ried but dont know if im doing it right,”
to which Dickerson said, “Well I’ll show you Tonite baby” and “U
gon like the way I do it and daddy going to teach u a lot.”

¶9 As the conversation progressed, Kailey expressed
confusion and nervousness about whether she would get
pregnant “if [Dickerson] lick[ed] it and [played with] it.”
Dickerson insisted she would not get pregnant, and he promised
to bring a condom. At this point, Kailey agreed to meet up with
Dickerson, and she finally sent him an address in Provo.

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State v. Dickerson

¶10 Around 1:00 a.m., Dickerson sent a text stating that he was
“on the way,” and he asked Kailey to send a picture of herself.
Kailey did not do so at that time. But as he drove toward Provo,
Dickerson continued texting, and he asked Kailey, “[W]at u got
on[?],” to which Kailey responded, “Pink shirt and jeans.” Writing
back, Dickerson said, “Y u didn’t put on tights or a dress
something easy[?]” Dickerson also asked, “Can I kiss u[?]” Kailey
responded that she “hope[d] so,” and at that point the following
text exchange ensued:

Dickerson: Have u ever suck on it before

Kailey: Suck on what

Dickerson: Dick baby

Kailey: Oh never lol

Dickerson: O ok u watch porn

Kailey: I’ve seen it but don’t really watch it

....

Dickerson: U want to learn baby

Kailey: I do

Dickerson: Ok u mine right

Kailey: Yeah I’m yours

¶11 As Dickerson continued his drive, he again asked Kailey to
send a picture. This time Kailey complied and sent a selfie-style
photo of a woman from the waist up with a filter that smoothed
the skin and added a heart nose and bunny ears. Dickerson and
Kailey continued to text for more than twenty minutes until

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State v. Dickerson

Dickerson arrived at the meeting spot, told Kailey what vehicle he
was in, told her to join him, and waited for her. Dickerson was
then arrested.

¶12 After Dickerson’s arrest, officers searched his vehicle, and
they found marijuana and a box of condoms in the back pocket of
the front passenger seat. The box of condoms was “brand new”
and “unopened,” but no receipt or store bag was found to indicate
that Dickerson had purchased the condoms that night. Later,
Dickerson claimed that he “always [had] condoms” in the car and
that he did not bring them for that specific night.

¶13 Following the arrest, Dickerson agreed to speak with
Agent. During the interview, the following colloquy occurred:

Agent: What is your understanding of why we
stopped you?

Dickerson: Because I was texting.

Agent: A 13-year-old girl?

Dickerson: Yes, sir.

Agent: You knew that?

Dickerson: Yes, sir.

Dickerson also told Agent that his actions that evening had been
“stupid,” that he had “four kids,” and that he “kn[e]w that” the
eldest of which—a daughter—was only “[t]wo years younger
than” the persona he thought he was messaging. Dickerson again
told Agent, “To be honest with you, I feel stupid even doing it,
you know. I don’t know what . . . I was doing.” At one point,
Agent asked the following question: “So if you did meet up with
this 13-year-old girl, would you have followed through with [the
things that had been discussed?]” And Dickerson responded, “To

20230751-CA 7 2025 UT App 173
State v. Dickerson

be honest with you, my right hand to God, no, sir. That’s on my
dead grandma. I was talking to her, but at the same time as I was
thinking over there I was like man, my kids. . . . I be stupid, you
know what I’m saying. . . . This ain’t my lifestyle. . . . I ain’t that
type of person. I ain’t no bad guy.” He said that, instead of
following through with the actions that had been discussed, he
was going to tell Kailey, “You’re too young. Your parents care
about you.” 2 And he said he was not going to teach Kailey how to
perform oral sex on him, stating, “I couldn’t teach a grown
woman if a grown woman says I don’t know how to do it.” Agent
later summarized this part of the conversation as Dickerson
explaining that “he was just going to go down there and talk some
sense into” Kailey.

¶14 Later, the State filed five criminal charges against
Dickerson: one count of enticing a minor, two counts of attempted
sodomy on a child, one count of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, and one count of possession of
drug paraphernalia. After lengthy proceedings, including the first
appeal, the case eventually proceeded to a bench trial. During the
trial, the State called as witnesses three law enforcement officers,
including Agent, who testified about the events described above.

¶15 Dickerson presented no witnesses and chose not to testify
in his own defense. In his closing argument, Dickerson’s attorney
argued that “the State ha[dn’t] proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that [Dickerson] wasn’t just going along with this person
purporting to be 13 years old despite not believing it.” In addition,
he argued that none of the “alleged overt acts” that Dickerson
undertook “constitute[d] substantial steps that would show” that

2. Both the actual recording of Dickerson’s interview, as well as a
transcript of that interview, are contained in the record submitted
to us on appeal. Where the transcript does not accurately reflect
what was said, we have taken the quotations recited here from the
actual video recording of the interview.

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State v. Dickerson

Dickerson intended to commit sodomy on a child. Specifically, he
argued that the statements “pertaining to lick it and play with it”
were “ambiguous” and were never specified to have “meant
genitals.” He also argued that there was never any indication that
oral sex would be performed.

¶16 After the trial, the court made a lengthy oral ruling
acquitting Dickerson of two of the five charges—the drug
distribution charge and one of the two attempted sodomy
counts—but convicting him on the other three. The court
acquitted Dickerson on the attempted sodomy count related to
Dickerson attempting to perform oral sex on Kailey, determining
that “the noun for which ‘it’ stands in [the relevant part of] the
conversation [was] never expressly identified” by either Kailey or
Dickerson, and that therefore the State had “failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that [Dickerson] intended to engage
in a sexual act involving his mouth and [Kailey’s] genitals.”

¶17 But the court convicted Dickerson of enticing a minor,
attempted sodomy on a child (related to Dickerson attempting to
receive oral sex from Kailey), and possession of drug
paraphernalia. With regard to whether Dickerson believed he was
chatting with a thirteen-year-old, the court found that Kailey
“repeatedly communicate[d] . . . in ways to underscore the fact
that [Kailey was] a child. For example, she state[d] that her dad
gets really mad when [she’s] on the phone late. That she has never
really snuck out. That her oldest boyfriend was 13, in [her] grade.
That she has never engaged in sexual activities. She expresse[d]
ignorance about how one gets pregnant.” The court further found
that “any lingering doubt about [Kailey’s] minority” that might
have been present when Dickerson viewed Kailey’s original
profile photo—which the court found “clearly depicts an adult
woman in her mid-20s . . . and not a 13-year-old child”—had been
eradicated after Kailey sent the filtered photo “depict[ing] a minor
child festooned with floral rabbit ears and a heart nose”; the court
held that “[t]his picture clearly does not depict an adult woman.”

20230751-CA 9 2025 UT App 173
State v. Dickerson

Finally, and significantly, the court found that Dickerson, in his
post-arrest interview, had admitted that he knew he had been
“texting with a 13-year-old child.”

¶18 And the court made a specific finding that—with regard to
receiving oral sex from Kailey—Dickerson had “engaged in
conduct constituting a substantial step strongly corroborating his
intent to commit the crime of sodomy on a child.” The court
determined that the facts of this case were “indistinguishable
from” the facts of State v. Smith, 2024 UT 13, 548 P.3d 874, where
the Utah appellate courts affirmed the bindover of a defendant on
attempted sodomy charges in an internet-sex-sting case.
Particularly, the trial court stated as follows:

[Dickerson] communicated with a person on the
internet who he believed to be a 13-year-old girl. He
solicited oral sex from her.

During these communications he repeatedly
pressured [Kailey] to disclose her address. When
given an out to simply meet tomorrow, he declined,
insisting on a meeting tonight. He drove 33 minutes
to the prearranged meet location. When he arrived
in the area he made contact with [Kailey], parked in
the . . . parking lot, as directed, waited for her to
come out, and identified the vehicle in which he was
driving.

Again the State has proved these facts
beyond a reasonable doubt, and as a matter of law
they constitute a substantial step strongly
corroborative of [Dickerson’s] intent to commit
sodomy on a child.

¶19 The court later sentenced Dickerson to prison on the
enticement and sodomy charges.

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State v. Dickerson

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶20 Dickerson appeals his convictions for enticing a minor and
for attempted sodomy on a child, 3 and he challenges two specific
parts of the trial court’s ruling. First, as to both convictions, he
challenges the court’s finding that Dickerson subjectively
believed that, during his conversation with Kailey, he was
communicating with a person who was thirteen years old.
Dickerson challenges that finding as clearly erroneous, and he
asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
support it. Second, as to the attempted sodomy conviction, he
challenges the court’s finding that he committed a substantial step
toward commission of the specific crime of sodomy on a child. As
with the first challenge, he asserts that this finding was supported
by insufficient evidence. “When reviewing a bench trial for
sufficiency of the evidence, we must sustain the [trial] court’s
judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or
if we otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made.” State v. Holland, 2018 UT App 203, ¶ 9, 437 P.3d
501 (cleaned up). We must also “grant deference to the trial court
on findings of fact and will overturn the [trial] court’s findings of
fact only if they are clearly erroneous.” State v. Jok, 2021 UT 35,
¶ 16, 493 P.3d 665 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

I. Dickerson’s Belief About Kailey’s Age

¶21 First, Dickerson asserts that there was insufficient evidence
to support the trial court’s finding that, when communicating
with Kailey online, Dickerson believed that he was
communicating with a thirteen-year-old girl. The State disagrees,

3. Dickerson does not challenge his conviction for possession of
drug paraphernalia.

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State v. Dickerson

offering its view that the evidence “overwhelmingly showed that
Dickerson believed Kailey was only thirteen years old.” The State
has the better of this argument, because sufficient competent
evidence exists to support the court’s finding.

¶22 The most compelling evidence on this point is the content
of Dickerson’s post-arrest interview. In fact, Dickerson’s
statements during this interview are by themselves sufficient
evidence to support the court’s finding. In that interview,
Dickerson responded by stating, “Yes, sir,” to questions about
whether he had been texting a thirteen-year-old girl and—
notably—about whether he “knew that” he had been texting a
thirteen-year-old. Moreover, he told Agent that he “kn[e]w that”
his own daughter was only “[t]wo years younger than the girl”
he’d been texting.

¶23 In addition to these rather striking admissions, later in the
interview Dickerson told Agent that he had not actually intended
to “follow[] through with” the sexual acts that had been discussed
in the online conversation; as support for this contention, he
explained that he had driven all the way to Provo only to tell
Kailey that she was “too young” to be participating in such acts
and that she should not do so because her “parents care about
[her].” And in additional statements, he indicated his belief that
Kailey was not a “grown woman,” telling Agent that he had not
intended to teach Kailey how to perform oral sex on him because
he “couldn’t teach” even “a grown woman” to do so if she did not
know how. In the course of making these statements—all of which
assumed, as a premise, that Kailey was a young minor—
Dickerson did not once claim that he thought Kailey was an adult.
Thus, Dickerson’s interview statements alone provide ample
support for the court’s finding that Dickerson fully believed that
he had been communicating with a thirteen-year-old girl.

¶24 But other evidence to that effect also exists. During the
online conversation, Kailey not only told Dickerson that she was

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State v. Dickerson

thirteen, but she also provided details supporting that notion—
that she was in middle school, that she lived with her dad, that
her dad didn’t like it when she was on her phone late, that she
would need to sneak out in order to see Dickerson, and that the
only boy she’d “been with” was “13 in [her same] grade.”
Summing up this part of the conversation, the trial court observed
that “[t]hroughout the text conversation [Kailey] repeatedly
communicate[d] . . . in ways [that underscored] the fact that she
[was] a child.” And then later in the conversation, Kailey sent
Dickerson a decorated photo that—in the trial court’s judgment—
“clearly [did] not depict an adult woman.” All of this evidence,
especially when viewed alongside Dickerson’s significant
admissions during his interview with Agent, overwhelmingly
supports the court’s finding that Dickerson believed he was
communicating with a thirteen-year-old.

¶25 Dickerson resists this conclusion by making two
arguments. First, he attempts to explain away some of his
interview admissions by pointing out that he is “a black man from
the [S]outh” who, when speaking with police, chooses to
“respond[] with a healthy dose of deference.” From this, he asserts
that his “Yes, sir” responses to some of Agent’s queries should not
be interpreted as admissions to the behavior in question. We
certainly understand the point. But interpretation of Dickerson’s
responses—and the weight they should be given—is a matter for
the factfinder, and here, the trial court’s interpretation is not
unreasonable, especially in context. As already noted, many other
statements Dickerson made in the interview—even ones not
couched in “Yes, sir” language—indicated his belief that Kailey
was thirteen and not an adult. Under these circumstances, we see
no reason to second-guess the trial court’s interpretation of
Dickerson’s statements.

¶26 Second, Dickerson points to his initial skepticism of
Kailey’s claim that she was thirteen and to the fact that Kailey’s
profile photo—the thing that apparently caused him to initially

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State v. Dickerson

take interest in her—clearly depicted an adult woman. In
particular, he asserts that, at least during the early part of the
conversation, he didn’t “believe he was talking with a 13-year-
old.” And he observes that the trial court found that the profile
photo “clearly depicts an adult woman in her mid-20s . . . and not
a 13-year-old child.” From all this, Dickerson reasons that neither
he nor any reasonable person in his position would have believed
that Kailey was anything other than an adult. Indeed, he asserts
that—after seeing the profile photo and developing initial
skepticism—nothing Dickerson saw or heard in the ensuing
online conversation (including the later-sent filtered photo) could
possibly have disabused Dickerson of his initial skepticism. As he
puts it, because “the first and second pictures are [of] the same
person, when considered together, no reasonable person could
conclude that the person in both pictures was 13 years old.”

¶27 But the question isn’t whether a reasonable person in
Dickerson’s position believed Kailey was thirteen; instead, the
question is whether Dickerson believed she was thirteen. See Utah
Code § 76-4-101(3)(b) (phrasing the relevant question, regarding
the attempt charge, as whether “the attendant circumstances had
been as the actor believed them to be” (emphasis added)); id. § 76-4-
401(2)(b)(i) (2018) 4 (phrasing the relevant question, regarding the
enticement charge, as whether “the actor believes” the person “to

4. This statute was amended and renumbered after the events
involving Dickerson occurred. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
417 (LexisNexis Supp. 2025), with id. 76-4-401 (Supp. 2018). We cite
the previous version of the statute in the text because it was the
version in effect at the time of the events in question in this case.
And we elect to cite the 2018 version of the statute, rather than the
2019 version, because the 2019 version went into effect on the
same day that some of the events in question here took place and
because there are no substantive differences between the 2018 and
2019 versions of the operative statutory language.

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State v. Dickerson

be a minor” (emphasis added)). And based on the entire online
conversation and the statements Dickerson made in his post-
arrest interview, he quite clearly did. Exactly how Dickerson
squared this belief with his apparent initial skepticism is not
entirely clear from the record, but it is ultimately immaterial.
Perhaps he believed that the initial profile photo was actually not
of Kailey, or was itself doctored to provide cover for a thirteen-
year-old’s participation on an adult dating website. See State v.
Dickerson, 2022 UT App 56, ¶ 50, 511 P.3d 1191 (observing, on the
facts of this case, that a reasonable factfinder “could easily”
conclude “that Dickerson believed Kailey was a minor who had
falsely certified her age and posted an adult’s photograph to
circumvent the dating app’s ‘adults only’ policy”). Or perhaps he
was entirely persuaded by Kailey’s statements and explanations
during the conversation. But the evidence is quite strong that—
however he got there—Dickerson eventually came to espouse the
belief that he was communicating with a thirteen-year-old girl.

¶28 Accordingly, the trial court’s finding regarding
Dickerson’s subjective belief about Kailey’s age was supported by
ample evidence and is therefore not clearly erroneous, nor is it
against the clear weight of the evidence. On this basis, we reject
Dickerson’s first challenge.

II. Substantial Step Toward Commission of
Sodomy on a Child

¶29 Second, Dickerson challenges the court’s determination
that he had undertaken a “substantial step” toward commission
of the specific crime of sodomy on a child. The State argues that
the “evidence easily constitute[s] a substantial step” because
Utah’s appellate courts “have repeatedly affirmed attempt
convictions on materially identical facts.” We agree with the State.

¶30 Here, Dickerson was charged with attempting to commit
sodomy on a child. Under Utah law in effect at the time of the

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State v. Dickerson

events in question, a person commits sodomy on a child “if the
actor engages in any sexual act upon or with a child who is under
the age of 14, involving the genitals or anus of the actor or the
child and the mouth or anus of either person, regardless of the sex
of either participant.” Utah Code § 76-5-403.1(1) (2018). 5

¶31 Utah’s attempt statute instructs that “a person is guilty of
an attempt to commit a crime if he: (a) engages in conduct
constituting a substantial step toward commission of the crime;
and (b)(i) intends to commit the crime.” Id. § 76-4-101(1) (2025). In
this context, our legislature has determined that “conduct
constitutes a substantial step if it strongly corroborates the actor’s
mental state.” Id. § 76-4-101(2). Thus, the “substantial step”
element and the “intent” element are “closely linked.” State v.
Austin, 2025 UT App 51, ¶ 23, 568 P.3d 1107 (cleaned up). Our
supreme court, in interpreting the attempt statute, has explained
that a substantial step requires “significant conduct” in the form
of an “overt act.” State v. Arave, 2011 UT 84, ¶ 30, 268 P.3d 163
(cleaned up). And that act must be “something more than mere
preparation”; it must be “a tangible step toward commission of a
crime that transcends intent, yet fails to culminate in its planned
accomplishment.” Id. (cleaned up). But that act “need not be the
last act necessary to commit the crime.” State v. Washington, 2021
UT App 114, ¶ 13, 501 P.3d 1160 (cleaned up).

¶32 Thus, in order to obtain a conviction in this case, the State
was obligated to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Dickerson had taken a substantial step—that is, significant
conduct in the form of an overt act that strongly corroborated his
intent—toward committing a sexual act that involved both

5. This statute has also been amended since Dickerson was
charged. See Criminal Code Recodification, ch. 181, § 86, 2022
Utah Laws 1125, 1180. The basic elements of sodomy on a child
have not materially changed, but we cite the previous version of
the statute in the text.

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State v. Dickerson

(a) either his own or Kailey’s genitals and (b) either his own or
Kailey’s mouth. And it is important to point out here that, because
the trial court acquitted Dickerson of the sodomy count involving
his alleged attempt to perform oral sex on Kailey, the sexual act
relevant to the count on which Dickerson was convicted at trial
involves Kailey potentially performing oral sex on Dickerson.
Here, the State was obligated to prove that Dickerson had taken a
substantial step toward commission of that specific sexual act.

¶33 At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court found that
Dickerson had taken such a step. It found that, during the online
conversation, Dickerson had “solicited oral sex from” Kailey and
that he drove to Provo “to the prearranged meet location” in
anticipation of Kailey performing that particular sexual act. The
court summed up its ruling by noting that “the State ha[d] proved
these facts beyond a reasonable doubt, and as a matter of law they
constitute[d] a substantial step strongly corroborative of
[Dickerson’s] intent to commit sodomy on a child.” Dickerson
challenges this determination, but in our view there is ample
evidence to support it, particularly when comparing the factual
circumstances here with controlling caselaw.

¶34 Recently, our supreme court decided State v. Smith, 2024
UT 13, 548 P.3d 874, a case that provides helpful guidance in
determining whether a substantial step occurred in cases like this
one. There, the court held that the defendant had taken a
substantial step toward the commission of various sex crimes,
including sodomy on a child, when he showed up to a designated
meeting place after arranging to have oral sex and intercourse
with an undercover agent posing as a thirteen-year-old girl. Id.
¶¶ 14–33. The agent had created a profile on a mobile messaging
app, and after a series of text messages between the defendant and
the agent over the course of three hours, the defendant eventually
agreed to drive the fictitious girl from Utah to California in
exchange for oral and vaginal sex. Id. ¶¶ 3–6. The two were to
meet at a convenience store, the defendant would flash his lights

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State v. Dickerson

to signal where his car was located, and soon after driving away
together, the girl would perform oral sex on the defendant. Id.
¶¶ 6, 29. The defendant drove to the store, texted his location to
the girl, told her to get into his car, and flashed his lights. Id. ¶¶ 6–
7. The defendant was then arrested. Id. ¶ 7.

¶35 These actions, the court held, “strongly corroborate[d] [the
defendant’s] intent to commit” the charged crimes. Id. ¶ 29. 6 The
court explained that the text messages “ma[de] it clear that he
agreed to give [the girl] a ride to California only because she
promised to perform sex acts, oral sex among them.” Id. ¶ 30. As
for whether the defendant’s actions constituted a substantial step,
the court explained that while “[t]here are certainly many reasons
why someone would drive to a convenience store, . . . [the
defendant] drove to the arranged store, at the arranged time, and
gave the arranged signal,” and “[t]here is no plausible reason why
he would [have] do[ne] so other than to carry out the arranged
plan.” Id. ¶ 29. The court concluded that the defendant’s actions
corroborated his intent to commit sodomy on a child. Id. ¶ 30.

¶36 Even more recently, this court decided State v. Austin, 2025
UT App 51, 568 P.3d 1107. In that case, an undercover agent
created a dating “profile for a fictional twenty-five-year-old male”
who was looking for someone to participate in sexual acts with
him and his fictional thirteen-year-old male cousin. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. The
defendant engaged in a days-long text conversation with the
agent “involving discussion of specific acts that fall within the
ambit of the statutory definition of sodomy on a child.” Id. ¶ 27.
“And like the defendant in Smith, [this defendant] drove to a
designated meet-up location where he anticipated facilitating a
sexual encounter with a child.” Id. Once the defendant arrived at

6. Although the supreme court analyzed the child kidnapping
statute in this part of the opinion, it later stated that “[t]he same
logic governs our analysis of the crime of attempted sodomy upon
a child.” State v. Smith, 2024 UT 13, ¶ 30, 548 P.3d 874.

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State v. Dickerson

the meeting location, he was arrested; officers located “condoms,
sexual lubricant, and a sex toy” in his possession. Id. ¶¶ 14–15. On
these facts, a jury convicted the defendant of attempted sodomy
on a child, and we rejected his sufficiency-of-the-evidence
challenge on appeal. Id. ¶¶ 19, 30, 40. We stated that, “viewed
against the backdrop of [the] text-message conversation, [the
defendant’s] arrival at the park went beyond mere preparation for
the crime and amounted to significant conduct in the form of an
overt act.” Id. ¶ 28 (cleaned up).

¶37 Like the defendants in Smith and Austin, Dickerson
committed a series of overt acts that strongly corroborated his
intent to commit sodomy on a child, and we agree with the trial
court that the facts of this case are materially “indistinguishable”
from those in not only Smith but also Austin. In this case, the State
presented text messages in which Dickerson “solicited oral sex
from” Kailey by specifically inviting her to “[s]uck on” his
“[d]ick.” In the course of that same conversation, Dickerson
convinced Kailey to provide him with an address at which they
could meet, then drove some “33 minutes” to that location.
During the drive, he continued to text Kailey, asking her (among
other things) what she was wearing and whether she watched
pornography. As in Smith, there is “no plausible reason why”
Dickerson would drive to the prearranged meeting location, at the
arranged time, while messaging Kailey about sexual acts “other
than to carry out the arranged plan.” See 2024 UT 13, ¶ 29. This
evidence amply supports the trial court’s finding that Dickerson
had taken a substantial step toward committing the specific crime
of sodomy on a child.

¶38 Dickerson resists this conclusion by arguing several points.
First, he attempts to distinguish Smith on procedural grounds,
pointing out that Smith involved a bindover determination
following a preliminary hearing, whereas this case involves a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge following a full trial. But we
rejected this exact argument in Austin, stating that, “despite the

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State v. Dickerson

procedural differences between [Austin] and Smith, in our view
Smith [was] still useful . . . to illustrate the sort of activity that can
constitute a ‘substantial step’ toward commission of a crime in
internet sting cases.” Austin, 2025 UT App 51, ¶ 33.

¶39 Second, Dickerson attempts to distinguish Smith by
pointing out that, in Smith, “the expectation was that oral sex
would occur as soon as they started driving,” whereas in this case
“there were many steps remaining” after Dickerson’s arrival at
the meet-up location before any sexual contact was to occur. For
instance, Dickerson points out that he and Kailey had discussed
that they would smoke first and see how the evening went, before
deciding which (if any) sexual acts they would engage in. He
acknowledges that there was “innuendo and sexual implication,”
but he insists that there was not enough “causal proximity”
between his arrival at the meet-up location and eventual
commission of acts constituting sodomy. But we rejected a similar
argument in Austin on similar facts. See id. ¶¶ 34–35. And as we
have already noted, a substantial step can be taken even if other
additional actions need to occur for the crime to be completed. See
State v. Washington, 2021 UT App 114, ¶ 13, 501 P.3d 1160 (stating
that the actions constituting the substantial step “need not be the
last act necessary to commit the crime” (cleaned up)).

¶40 Third, Dickerson points to a statement this court made in
State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, 100 P.3d 231, and he asserts that
his conduct in this case can amount only to enticement of a minor
and not attempted sodomy on a child. In Ansari, we suggested—
in dicta—that “enticement” charges “would be more appropriate
in a case where . . . a defendant solicits sex from an undercover
police officer on the Internet” and where there is no actual victim,
whereas attempt charges would be more “appropriate” if the
defendant contacts an actual minor “via the Internet, meet[s] the
minor, and [is] on the verge of consummating a felonious sexual
act.” Id. ¶¶ 19–20. We acknowledge Dickerson’s point, and we
imagine that prosecutors, as a matter of course, carefully consider

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State v. Dickerson

whether, in the interest of justice, cases like this one should be
charged as enticement crimes rather than attempt crimes. But the
fact of the matter is that some internet-sex-sting cases can be
charged either way, and our statement in Ansari—especially in
light of our supreme court’s recent guidance in Smith—should not
be read as an indication that such cases can be charged only as
enticement cases. To be sure, a prosecutor who charges the more
serious crime bears a higher evidentiary burden, and by raising a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, Dickerson has put at issue
the question of whether the State carried that burden here. But so
long as that burden is met, internet-sex-sting cases can result in
convictions for attempt crimes.

¶41 Finally, Dickerson points out that he and Kailey did not
specifically discuss her performing oral sex on him until after he
had already begun his drive to Provo. He therefore posits that any
steps he took prior to sending those specific text messages cannot
count as steps toward commission of the specific crime of sodomy
on a child. But even assuming—for purposes of the discussion
only, and without deciding—that this assertion is correct,
Dickerson still committed significant overt acts after those text
messages were sent. At that point, he was only about ten minutes
into his 33-minute drive; after those texts, he completed the bulk
of the drive to the meet-up location. And during those last twenty
minutes of driving, he asked Kailey if she still “want[ed] to learn”;
he asked her to send another picture, and she sent the filtered
photograph; he arrived at the meet-up location; he told her what
kind of vehicle he was driving; and he invited her to come out and
meet him in his vehicle. These acts are enough to constitute a
substantial step. See Austin, 2025 UT App 51, ¶ 35 (noting that the
“overwhelming majority of courts in other jurisdictions . . . have
concluded that individuals caught in internet sex stings, and who
travel to an agreed-upon meeting place in anticipation of sexual

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State v. Dickerson

behavior with a fictitious victim, have taken a substantial step
toward commission of sexual crimes” (cleaned up)). 7

CONCLUSION

¶42 Sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s factual
findings that Dickerson believed he was communicating with a
thirteen-year-old girl and that Dickerson took a substantial step
toward commission of the specific crime of sodomy on a child.
Accordingly, we reject Dickerson’s appellate arguments and
affirm his convictions.

7. Dickerson also presents another argument: that the trial court
committed legal error by stating that the proven facts of the case
“constitute a substantial step” toward commission of sodomy on
a child “as a matter of law.” (Emphasis added.) In our view,
Dickerson overreads (or misinterprets) the court’s comments. As
we read those comments, the court was merely intending to state
that the facts that it had found, beyond any reasonable doubt, to
have occurred constituted a substantial step toward commission
of the charged crime. The court had just finished stating that, in
its view, the “facts proved here beyond a reasonable doubt are
indistinguishable from those in Smith.” If a court finds certain
facts to be true and then determines those facts to be
indistinguishable from the facts of a recent Utah Supreme Court
case, it is understandable that the court would feel like the
conclusion was mandated “as a matter of law.” In any event, we
do not perceive the court’s comments as an indication that it
misunderstood the relevant legal standard. And even if it had,
that error would be harmless here in any event, because it would
simply mean that the court found the case even more convincing
than it needed to be in order to support a conviction. Under the
circumstances, we need not discuss this argument further.

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