Sankey v. Sawyer

2025 UT App 113

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STEPHANIE E. SANKEY,
Appellant,
v.
CAMERON D. SAWYER, COURTNEY A. SAWYER, PICTURE PICTURE
FILMS LLC, AND TIM TIMMERMAN, HOPE OF AMERICA LLC,
Appellees.

Opinion
No. 20240530-CA
Filed July 25, 2025

Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Robert A. Lund
No. 200401083

Stephanie E. Sankey, Appellant Pro Se
Gerald M. Salcido and Jon M. Hogelin,
Attorneys for Appellees

JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 After a bench trial, the court issued a written ruling
adverse to Stephanie Sankey and in favor of her litigation
opponents, Cameron Sawyer, Courtney Sawyer, Picture Picture
Films LLC, and Tim Timmerman, Hope of America LLC
(collectively, the Sawyers). Sankey attempts to appeal that ruling,
and the issues presented here are (a) whether her appeal is timely
and (b) if not, whether the trial court abused its discretion in
denying her motion for an extension of time within which to file
a timely appeal. For the reasons discussed herein, we conclude
that Sankey’s appeal was not timely and that the court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Sankey’s request for an extension
Sankey v. Sawyer

of time. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s denial of Sankey’s
motion for an extension of time and dismiss her appeal.

BACKGROUND

¶2 While she was in law school in Utah in the early 2000s,
Sankey met Cameron Sawyer—a classmate’s cousin—and the two
became friends. After she graduated, Sankey moved back to her
home state of Arizona to work as a prosecutor, but she and
Cameron kept in touch, and Sankey followed Cameron’s career in
the film industry. In 2014, Cameron and his sister, Courtney
Sawyer, formed two companies—Picture Picture Films LLC and
Tim Timmerman, Hope of America LLC—with the goal of
producing a movie entitled “Tim Timmerman, Hope of America.”
To finance the movie, the Sawyers sought investors. Sankey was
one of those investors; she made three investments totaling
$75,000. Unfortunately, the movie’s performance turned out to be
“abysmal,” and Sankey did not receive any return on her
investment. Later, she filed suit in Utah against the Sawyers for
affinity fraud, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent
nondisclosure, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence, among
other causes of action.

¶3 Following a two-day bench trial, the court issued a written
“Ruling and Judgment” (the Ruling) determining that Sankey had
“failed to carry her burden of proof as to any of her claims” and
dismissing the complaint with prejudice. At the end of the Ruling,
the court noted that the Sawyers, prior to trial, had made an offer
of judgment pursuant to rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and that Sankey had rejected that offer. The court also
noted that its “trial verdict [was] less favorable than the offer” that
Sankey rejected. Accordingly, the court ruled that “Sankey is
liable to [the Sawyers] for the cost[s] they incurred after the date
of the offer,” and it instructed the Sawyers to “pursue judgment
for those costs by separate motion and affidavit.” And it
concluded the Ruling by stating that it would “enter a final

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judgment after the resolution of the allocation of costs.” The
Ruling was entered on September 5, 2023.

¶4 The Sawyers never filed a motion or affidavit related to
costs. 1 In fact, nothing at all happened in the case for more than
six months following entry of the Ruling. Finally, on March 18,
2024—more than 190 days after entry of the Ruling—Sankey filed
a motion for enlargement of time to file a notice of appeal. In that
motion, Sankey asserted that “good cause, or at a minimum,
excusable neglect exist[ed]” to justify enlarging the time for her to
appeal. In particular, Sankey claimed that good cause existed
because the Sawyers “were responsible for filing a Proposed
Judgment within 14 days” and never did so, and because she did
not know the status of the case and “ha[d] been waiting for” the
trial court to issue a final order.

¶5 A few weeks later, on April 8, 2024, the trial court issued a
written order denying Sankey’s motion. In that order, the court
noted that, while Sankey may not have had “access to the Utah
court’s electronic system to check” on the status of the case, she
“could have easily called the court,” as she had about other
matters, “to inquire about the status of the case.” The court also
emphasized that Sankey “is an attorney with over 20 years of
experience” and is therefore “well acquainted” with the legal
system and is “accustomed to interacting with” court clerks. The
court determined that, “[w]hile . . . the [Sawyers] were dilatory,”
Sankey “was equally dilatory.” It also observed that, under
applicable rules, Sankey was authorized to prepare and serve a

1. The Sawyers assert that they never filed a motion for costs
because, they claim, Sankey represented to them that if they did
not seek costs, she would not appeal. Sankey, for her part, denies
that any such representation or agreement was ever made. We do
not purport to resolve this factual dispute in this opinion, and the
reasons for the Sawyers’ failure to file a motion or affidavit
regarding costs are ultimately immaterial to the appeal.

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proposed judgment after the Sawyers failed to do so. The court
thus concluded that Sankey had “failed to demonstrate good
cause or excusable neglect,” and it accordingly denied her motion.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶6 Sankey now appeals, asserting that her appeal is timely
and that, even if it isn’t, the trial court abused its discretion in
denying her motion for enlargement of time. As a general matter,
whether an appeal is timely filed presents a question of law that
we analyze in the first instance. See In re Estate of Pahl, 2007 UT
App 389, ¶ 9, 174 P.3d 642 (stating that a determination as to
whether “we have jurisdiction to reach” issues on the merits “is a
question of law”).

¶7 However, we review deferentially a trial court’s ruling on
a motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal. See Bennett
v. Bigelow, 2013 UT App 180, ¶ 8, 307 P.3d 641 (“We give the [trial]
court’s ruling on a rule 4(e) motion broad deference on review.”
(cleaned up)); see also Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App
299, ¶ 6, 13 P.3d 616 (“The discretion of the trial court to grant or
deny a Rule 4(e) motion is very broad, highly fact dependent, and
fundamentally equitable in nature.”). In particular, we review a
court’s determination regarding the existence of good cause for
abuse of discretion. See Tomlinson v. Department of Workforce Serv.,
2012 UT App 148, ¶¶ 4–5, 278 P.3d 1098 (per curiam); see also State
v. Sanchez, 2017 UT App 229, ¶ 2, 409 P.3d 156 (per curiam) (stating
that, under an abuse of discretion standard, we will reverse the
trial court’s decision only if we determine that “no reasonable
person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court” (cleaned
up)). But to the extent that our analysis involves interpreting rules
of procedure, we review a court’s interpretation “for correctness.”
In re C.D.S., 2023 UT 11, ¶ 15, 531 P.3d 217(cleaned up).

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ANALYSIS

¶8 The first question we must address is whether Sankey’s
appeal was timely filed, and in this case, that question turns on
whether the Ruling was the sort of order that started the
appellate-finality clock ticking. For the reasons discussed, we
conclude that it was, that (in this particular situation) Sankey
needed to file a notice of appeal within 180 days of the Ruling’s
entry, and that her failure to do so renders her appeal untimely.
That conclusion compels us to then assess Sankey’s challenge to
the trial court’s denial of her motion for enlargement of time
within which to file an appeal.

I. Timeliness

¶9 “As a general rule, an appellate court does not have
jurisdiction to consider an appeal unless the appeal is taken from
a final order or judgment.” In re J.E., 2023 UT App 3, ¶ 17, 524 P.3d
1009 (cleaned up); see also Utah R. App. P. 3(a)(1) (“Except as
otherwise provided by law, a party may appeal a final order or
judgment from a [trial] court . . . .”). This general rule is known as
the “final judgment rule.” See Williams v. State, 716 P.2d 806, 807
(Utah 1986). A “final judgment” is one that “ends the controversy
between the parties prior to appeal.” Smith v. Volkswagen
SouthTowne, Inc., 2024 UT App 33, ¶ 13, 547 P.3d 198 (cleaned up),
cert. denied, 558 P.3d 90 (Utah 2024). “The final judgment rule
promotes efficiency by preventing the piecemeal litigation and
seriatim appeals that would result if litigants were permitted, by
right, to immediately appeal any adverse ruling by a trial court.”
In re J.E., 2023 UT App 3, ¶ 17.

¶10 Sankey argues that the Ruling was not a final, appealable
order, and she maintains that her “appellate rights were never
triggered” by entry of the Ruling. She acknowledges that the
Ruling contained final dispositive rulings dismissing all of the
causes of action she brought against the Sawyers, but she asserts
that the Ruling was not final—and therefore did not start the

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appellate-finality clock ticking—because it awarded costs to the
Sawyers and left the amount of those costs unquantified and open
for later determination. 2 But Sankey’s argument fails because, as
we explain, a ruling is still final even if the amount of awarded
costs remains to be determined.

¶11 Our supreme court has long held that “disputes regarding
court costs need not be resolved in order to have a final judgment
for purposes of appeal.” Beddoes v. Giffin, 2007 UT 35, ¶ 5, 158 P.3d
1102; see also id. ¶ 12 (“Court costs and other matters clerical in
nature are not material and do not need to be resolved for a
judgment to be final for the purposes of an appeal.”); Dale K.
Barker Co. v. Bushnell, 2014 UT App 199, ¶ 9, 334 P.3d 504 (citing
Beddoes and stating that “disputes as to court costs” do not have
to “be resolved in order to have a final judgment for appeal”
(cleaned up)). 3

2. As noted, see supra ¶ 3, the trial court awarded costs pursuant
to rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that
should one party reject a settlement offer made pursuant to that
rule that is more favorable than the eventual award, then “the
offeree shall pay the offeror’s costs incurred after the offer.” Utah
R. Civ. P. 68(b). Here, the trial court could potentially also have
awarded costs to the Sawyers under rule 54 as the prevailing
party, see id. R. 54(d)(1) (“Unless a statute, these rules, or a court
order provides otherwise, costs should be allowed to the
prevailing party.”), but it elected not to do so and made no
determinations as to which party had prevailed. The fact that the
court chose to award costs pursuant to rule 68 as opposed to rule
54 does not affect our analysis.

3. Utah is not alone in determining that a judgment or order is
final even if costs remain to be adjudicated. See, e.g., Pfeifer v. John
Crane, Inc., 164 Cal. Rptr. 3d 112, 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (“A
(continued…)

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¶12 To be sure, some of the rules regarding appellate finality
and timeliness were amended in 2015 and 2016, after Beddoes was
issued. In particular, those rules were changed to clarify that “[a]
motion or claim for attorney fees does not affect the finality of a
judgment for any purpose” and that “the time in which to file the
notice of appeal runs from the disposition of the motion or claim.”
See Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(f); see also id. R. 58A advisory committee’s
note to 2016 amendment (“The 2016 amendments in paragraphs
(b) and (f) are part of a coordinated effort with the Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Appellate Procedure to change the
effect of a motion for attorney fees on the appealability of a
judgment.”); Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(F) (clarifying that “[a] motion
or claim for attorney fees” is one of the motions that will toll the
time for filing a notice of appeal until “entry of the dispositive
order” on the motion); id. R. 4 advisory committee’s note to 2016
amendment (2017) (“The 2016 amendment added Subdivision
(b)(1)(E) and (F).”). And these amendments were apparently
intended to “effectively overturn” previous Utah Supreme Court
precedent—other than Beddoes—that had held to the contrary. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 58A advisory committee’s note to 2016
amendment (noting that the amendments “effectively
overturn[ed]” ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, 998 P.2d 254,
and Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115 (Utah 1998)).

¶13 But these amendments changed the landscape only with
regard to attorney fees, and not with regard to costs. The text of
these amendments mentions only “attorney fees”; it contains no
mention of costs. See id. R. 58A(f); Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(F); see
generally Williamson v. MGS by Design, Inc., 2022 UT 40, ¶ 13, 521
P.3d 866 (stating that, when interpreting statutes, courts should

judgment is final and appealable if all that remains is a
determination of costs and interest.”); In re Estate of Kunsch, 794
N.E.2d 1059, 1064 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“Generally, a judgment or
order is final even if there remains for determination issues
regarding costs.” (cleaned up)).

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“give effect to omissions in statutory language by presuming all
omissions to be purposeful” (cleaned up)); Aequitas Enters., LLC v.
Interstate Inv. Group, LLC, 2011 UT 82, ¶ 15, 267 P.3d 923 (“When
we interpret a procedural rule, we do so according to our general
rules of statutory construction.” (cleaned up)). And the advisory
committee note regarding one of those amendments states that it
was intended “to change the effect of a motion for attorney fees on
the appealability of a judgment.” Utah R. Civ. P. 58A advisory
committee’s note to 2016 amendment (emphasis added). Thus,
our supreme court’s pronouncement in Beddoes regarding costs is
still valid today: an order that leaves only costs unadjudicated but
otherwise resolves all outstanding claims and defenses is a final
and appealable order. See 2007 UT 35, ¶ 5.

¶14 In this case, the Ruling resolved all of Sankey’s claims and
causes of action against the Sawyers, and it left nothing more to
be decided on those claims. All that remained for the court to do
following entry of the Ruling was to quantify the amount of costs
to which the Sawyers were entitled. Under these circumstances,
and under Beddoes, the Ruling was a final order that, in this case,
started the appellate-finality clock ticking.

¶15 Sankey correctly points out, however, that no party filed a
separate judgment following entry of the Ruling, as required by
rule 58A(a). That rule requires that “[e]very judgment and
amended judgment must be set out in a separate document
ordinarily titled ‘Judgment’—or, as appropriate, ‘Decree.’” The
purposes of this separate document rule are to “(1) clearly signal
that all claims involving all parties have been adjudicated,
(2) document the resolution of each claim and the resulting rights
and liabilities of all parties, and (3) start the post-judgment motion
and appeals clock as soon as the court signs and dockets it.” Griffin
v. Snow Christensen & Martineau, 2020 UT 33, ¶ 18, 467 P.3d 833.
To achieve these purposes, the separate document should be
“self-contained,” “note the relief granted,” and “omit” or

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“substantially omit . . . the [trial court’s] reasons for disposing of
the parties’ claims.” Id. ¶ 20 (cleaned up).

¶16 The Ruling itself does not qualify as a “separate document”
within the meaning of rule 58A(a). It is twenty-three pages long
and is chock-full of the trial court’s reasons for disposing of
Sankey’s claims. We thus agree with Sankey that no separate
document was ever filed in this case.

¶17 But that fact ends up being of no assistance to Sankey here.
The drafters of the 2015 and 2016 amendments to rule 58A(a)—
the amendments that added the “separate document”
requirement to the Utah rules—contemplated that there might be
cases in which the parties fail to file a separate document as
required. See Utah R. Civ. P. 58A advisory committee’s note to
2015 amendment (stating that the drafters had been asked to
address “the ‘hanging appeals’ problem” and had attempted to
solve it by enacting the 150-day rule discussed below). To deal
with such cases, the rule contains the following provision:

If a separate document is required, a judgment is
complete and is entered at the earlier of these
events: (A) the judgment is set out in a separate
document signed by the judge and recorded in the
docket; or (B) 150 days have run from the clerk
recording the decision, however designated, that
provides the basis for the entry of judgment.

Id. R. 58A(e)(2) (emphasis added).

¶18 Rule 58A(e)(2)(B) is applicable here because a separate
document was required and none of the parties ever filed one. In
this situation, “judgment is complete” when “150 days have run
from the clerk recording the decision . . . that provides the basis
for the entry of judgment.” Id. The Ruling is the decision that
provides the basis for the entry of judgment, and it was entered
on September 5, 2023. Thus, judgment was “complete,” despite

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the parties’ collective failure to file a separate judgment
document, 150 days after entry of the Ruling. By our count (and
by the trial court’s), that occurred on February 2, 2024.
Accordingly, “entry of the judgment” for purposes of calculating
Sankey’s time for filing a notice of appeal occurred on that date.
See Utah R. App. P. 4(a) (making clear that the time for filing a
notice of appeal is computed from “the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from”).

¶19 And under governing rules, once “entry of the judgment”
has occurred, an appellant has thirty days to file a notice of appeal.
Id. (stating that a notice of appeal is to be filed “within 30 days
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from”).
That thirty-day clock started ticking on February 2, 2024, meaning
that (due to leap year and the fact that March 3 was a Sunday)
Sankey had until Monday, March 4, 2024 to file a timely notice of
appeal. And Sankey does not dispute that she failed to do so.

¶20 Thus, because Sankey failed to file a notice of appeal on or
before her deadline to do so, her appeal is untimely.

II. Good Cause or Excusable Neglect

¶21 Litigants who miss their deadline for filing a notice of
appeal have one last chance to fix the problem: they can ask the
trial court to extend the time for filing the notice. See Utah R. App.
P. 4(e). Such a request must be made by motion, and it must be
filed either “before the expiration of” the notice-of-appeal filing
deadline—in which case the movant must demonstrate “good
cause”—or “not later than 30 days after the expiration of” that
deadline—in which case the movant must demonstrate either
“good cause or excusable neglect.” Id.

¶22 Sankey filed such a request with the trial court, and she did
so on March 18, 2024, after the expiration of the deadline but
within the thirty-day grace period thereafter. Thus, Sankey’s
motion qualifies as timely, but because she filed the motion after

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the appeal deadline had run but within thirty days thereafter, she
must meet the requirements of rule 4(e)(2), which require her to
make a “showing of good cause or excusable neglect.”

¶23 The trial court determined that Sankey had failed to make
that showing, and Sankey challenges that determination here on
appeal. In particular, the court found Sankey to have been
“equally dilatory” in that she did not “reach out to the court to
inquire about the status of her case” and she did not submit a
proposed separate judgment document herself. In view of its
conclusion that Sankey had been “just as dilatory and
lackadaisical as” the Sawyers, the court found that Sankey had
“failed to demonstrate good cause or excusable neglect.” As
noted, see supra ¶ 7, we review that determination deferentially,
and for the reasons discussed we discern no abuse of discretion in
the trial court’s determination.

¶24 Although often used in tandem with one another, good
cause and excusable neglect are different standards. As our
supreme court has explained it, excusable neglect “is an
admittedly neglectful delay that is nevertheless excused by
special circumstances,” while good cause “pertains to special
circumstances that are essentially beyond a party’s control.”
Reisbeck v. HCA Health Serv. of Utah, Inc., 2000 UT 48, ¶ 13, 2 P.3d
447 (emphasis omitted). 4 Of the two, “good cause” is “a more
liberal standard” that is easier to demonstrate. Id. ¶ 14.

¶25 Sankey first argues that she showed good cause or
excusable neglect because the trial court instructed the Sawyers—

4. The court in Reisbeck was interpreting a previous version of rule
4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Compare Reisbeck v.
HCA Health Serv. of Utah, Inc., 2000 UT 48, ¶ 5, 2 P.3d 447 (quoting
the then-effective version of the rule), with Utah R. App. P. 4(e)(2).
However, the version of the rule interpreted in Reisbeck is
substantively similar, for our purposes, to the current rule.

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and not her—to prepare an affidavit of costs, and she maintains
that, under such circumstances, her appellate-finality clock has,
even now, not started ticking because the Sawyers never filed any
such affidavit. But we have already rejected this argument. See
supra Part I. Sankey’s 150-day clock started ticking when the
Ruling was entered, and the fact that quantification of costs
remained open did not change the landscape.

¶26 Next, and relatedly, Sankey takes issue with the trial
court’s conclusion that she was dilatory, and she asserts that she
acted diligently in checking her email regularly to see if the
Sawyers had filed a motion or affidavit related to costs. We find
her argument unpersuasive for two main reasons.

¶27 First, as the trial court noted, if Sankey had been unsure
about the timeline for appeal, finality, or the status of the costs
situation, she could have asked the court or the Sawyers. In its
ruling on Sankey’s motion, the trial court emphasized that Sankey
“could have called the court to see if any additional documents
had been filed,” and it noted that, instead, “she chose to take no
action for a period of 192 days.” Furthermore, the trial court noted
that the “fact that she did eventually learn of the status of the case
. . . establishes that she could have done so earlier.” We discern no
abuse of discretion in the court’s determinations in this regard.

¶28 Second, although the trial court did direct the Sawyers to
prepare an affidavit of costs and a separate judgment document,
the applicable rule authorized Sankey to prepare a separate
judgment document in the event that the Sawyers failed to do so.
To be sure, the rule commands “[t]he prevailing party or a party
directed by the court” to “prepare and serve on the other parties
a proposed judgment for review and approval as to form.” Utah
R. Civ. P. 58A(c)(1). But the rule accounts for the possibility that
the assigned party might shirk that duty, stating that “[i]f the
prevailing party or party directed by the court fails to timely serve
a proposed judgment, any other party may prepare a proposed

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judgment and serve it on the other parties.” Id. Thus, once the
Sawyers failed to prepare and serve a costs affidavit and separate
judgment document, the rule authorized Sankey to step in and
prepare a proposed separate judgment document. The trial court
was referring to this rule when it noted that Sankey “could have
availed herself of the latitude given under [the rules] and drafted
a proposed judgment herself.” With these facts in mind, the court
found that, “[a]ll in all, . . . [Sankey] was just as dilatory” as the
Sawyers, and on that basis the court found that Sankey had “failed
to demonstrate good cause or excusable neglect.”

¶29 On this record, the court did not abuse its discretion in
making this finding. While it is perhaps possible that another
factfinder could have reached a different conclusion on these
facts, we cannot say that “no reasonable person [could have taken]
the view adopted by the [trial] court.” See State v. Sanchez, 2017 UT
App 229, ¶ 2, 409 P.3d 156 (per curiam) (cleaned up); see also supra
¶ 7. We thus reject Sankey’s challenge to the court’s good-cause
and excusable-neglect finding. 5

5. The Sawyers also seek an award of attorney fees incurred on
appeal, pursuant to rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. That rule authorizes us to award fees when an appeal
is “frivolous,” see Utah R. App. P. 33(a), and it defines a “frivolous
appeal” as “one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend,
modify, or reverse existing law,” id. R. 33(b). “The sanction for
bringing a frivolous appeal is applied only in egregious cases, lest
there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal erroneous
lower court decisions.” Staszkiewicz v. Thomas, 2024 UT App 183,
¶ 23 n.3, 562 P.3d 723 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 568 P.3d 260 (Utah
2025). While we are ultimately unpersuaded by Sankey’s
arguments, we do not consider her appeal to be so “egregious” as
to warrant sanctions. We therefore decline the Sawyers’ invitation
to award attorney fees on appeal.

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CONCLUSION

¶30 When the Ruling was entered on September 5, 2023, the
150-day appellate-finality clock referenced in rule 58A(e)(2)(B)
began to run, meaning that Sankey’s thirty-day deadline for filing
a notice of appeal began to run on February 2, 2024. Because she
filed no notice of appeal within the next thirty days, her appeal is
untimely. And the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Sankey’s motion for enlargement of her time to file a
notice of appeal. We therefore affirm the court’s order denying
Sankey’s motion for an extension of time and dismiss her
untimely appeal.

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