State v. Christensen

2025 UT App 86

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
ISAAC MICHEAL CHRISTENSEN,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20230033-CA
Filed June 5, 2025

Seventh District Court, Price Department
The Honorable Jeremiah Humes
No. 211700443

Freyja Johnson, Rachel Phillips Ainscough, and
Heather Ellison, Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Jonathan S. Bauer,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE AMY J. OLIVER authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

OLIVER, Judge:

¶1 One evening in July 2021, Isaac Micheal Christensen’s
daughter, Nadine, called Christensen’s ex-girlfriend, Kim, for
help because Christensen was drunk and acting erratically. Kim
and her current boyfriend, Rick, drove to Christensen’s house to
help Nadine without notifying Christensen. 1 When they arrived
at Christensen’s house, Nadine disclosed to Kim that Christensen
had sexually abused her earlier that evening. Kim went outside
with Nadine and called 911. Shortly after, Christensen exited the
house and threatened Kim, Rick, and several police officers
responding to the 911 call, all while pointing a shotgun at them.

1. Nadine, Kim, and Rick are pseudonyms.
State v. Christensen

Christensen was arrested and charged with ten felonies and three
misdemeanors for his conduct that night. Christensen moved to
sever the charges related to the sexual abuse allegations made by
Nadine from the charges related to Christensen’s conduct with
the shotgun, but the district court denied the motion.

¶2 At his trial on all the charges, Christensen objected to the
admission of body camera footage of a police officer interviewing
Nadine on the night of the 911 call, arguing it contained hearsay.
The district court deemed Nadine’s statements during the
interview prior consistent statements under rule 801(d)(1)(B) of
the Utah Rules of Evidence and allowed them to be presented to
the jury at trial. The jury convicted Christensen on all the charges.
Christensen now appeals, asserting that the district court abused
its discretion in denying his motion to sever and in admitting the
body camera footage of Nadine’s interview. We reject
Christensen’s arguments and affirm his convictions.

BACKGROUND 2

The Incident and Allegations

¶3 One day in July 2021, Kim received several troubling and
nonsensical text messages from Christensen. Kim and
Christensen had previously been in a romantic relationship, and
Kim had lived with Christensen for a few months earlier in the
year. However, Kim and Christensen had broken up several
weeks before she received the texts from him, and Kim had gotten
back together with her previous boyfriend, Rick. After receiving
the texts, Kim reached out to Christensen via video call to ask if

3. “On appeal from a jury verdict, we review the record facts in a
light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and recite the facts
accordingly, presenting conflicting evidence only as necessary to
understand issues raised on appeal.” State v. Rogers, 2020 UT App
78, n.2, 467 P.3d 880 (cleaned up).

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State v. Christensen

he was okay because his behavior was unusual. Christensen’s
phone image started moving as if he was hitting his head with his
phone, and then the call cut out.

¶4 Later that evening, Christensen’s eleven-year-old
daughter, Nadine, called Kim to ask for help because Christensen
was drunk and acting erratically. After Kim received Nadine’s
call, Kim, Rick, and their baby drove from their house in Midvale,
Utah to Christensen’s house in Helper, Utah without notifying
Christensen. During the two-hour drive, Kim spoke with Nadine
on the phone a few times. Kim arrived at Christensen’s house
around midnight and went inside while Rick and the baby
remained outside. When Kim entered the house, Christensen
demanded to know who was in his house and retrieved a shotgun
from his bedroom, pointing it at Kim’s chest despite Nadine’s
informing him, “It’s just [Kim]. It’s just [Kim].”

¶5 After recognizing Kim, Christensen lowered the shotgun.
Nadine then spoke with Kim privately and told her that earlier
that evening, Christensen had touched her vagina and “made
[her] suck his penis,” and “would slap [her] if [she] didn’t do it
properly.” Kim then asked Christensen if Nadine could go
outside with her, but Christensen did not want Nadine to leave
the house. After making several comments about his ability to kill
people, Christensen relented and allowed Nadine to go outside
with Kim. Once outside, Kim immediately called 911.

¶6 While Kim was on the phone with 911, Christensen came
to the doorway unarmed and told Nadine it was time to come
inside and go to bed. As Kim stalled for time, Christensen went
into his house and then returned outside with a shotgun.
Christensen pointed the shotgun at Kim and accused her of
playing “games” with him and “whispering on the phone.” Kim
told Christensen she was on the phone with her grandmother,
who lived on the same street. Christensen pointed the shotgun at
Rick, asked him why he was staring at him like a “pedophile,”

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State v. Christensen

and told Rick that he would “put a slug in his head” if he did not
shut up. After Rick heard Christensen rack his shotgun, he went
to the back seat of the car to protect his baby.

¶7 At the same time, four officers responding to the 911 call
(Officers 1, 2, 3, and 4) arrived without lights or sirens and parked
down the street. The officers approached on foot with flashlights
and without identifying themselves. While the officers were
approaching, Christensen shattered the rear window of Kim’s car
with the barrel of the shotgun and stated, “[I]f that’s the Carbon
County sheriffs, I’ll put a bullet in them too.” Believing the noise
from the glass shattering was a gunshot, the officers ran toward
the house. As they approached, Christensen positioned the
shotgun (that had a red dot sight) on top of the car and pointed it
at the officers. The officers retreated, and Christensen threw the
shotgun into his front yard and then went back into his house.

¶8 At this point, Kim and Rick were able to get into their car
and drive to Kim’s grandmother’s house down the road. Once out
of the driveway, they told Officer 3 that Nadine was still at the
house. Officer 1 and Officer 2 returned to their vehicles to get
rifles, while the other two officers stayed near Christensen’s
house. As Officer 1 and Officer 2 approached the house, Nadine
came out from the side of the house. Officer 3 and Officer 4
walked Nadine back toward their vehicles; Officer 4 placed her in
one of the vehicles so she would be out of harm’s way.

¶9 Christensen then exited the house unarmed with his hands
up and was arrested by the officers without incident. Officer 4
then went to Kim’s grandmother’s house—where Kim, Rick, and
Kim’s grandparents were—to interview Nadine. Before the
interview, Nadine had been alone in the kitchen with Kim. During
the interview, for which Kim was also present, Nadine disclosed
that Christensen hit her, but she was reluctant to talk about the
sexual abuse until Kim told Officer 4 that Christensen had made
Nadine “suck him.” Nadine then told Officer 4 that Christensen

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State v. Christensen

would threaten her when she was not “do[ing] it properly.”
Officer 4’s body camera recorded his interview with Nadine (the
Interview Footage).

¶10 Nadine was treated by an emergency medical technician
(EMT) at the scene and disclosed to EMT that Christensen had
“touched her ‘down there’” and that he had slapped her multiple
times in the face when she “didn’t do things the right way” but
that the slaps were not hard.

¶11 After Christensen was arrested, an officer at the jail
collected a penile swab from Christensen, which was the first
penile swab the officer had taken. This officer had been trained in
taking buccal swabs 3 but not penile swabs.

The Investigation

¶12 The next morning, Nadine was examined by a nurse
(Nurse) who was not a certified sexual assault nurse examiner but
had completed similar training. During the examination, Nurse
completed a sexual assault form, which is “an 11-page document”
that details “what sort of contact occurred and what injuries [were
observed] and any history.” Nurse observed that Nadine had no
apparent injuries. However, Nadine reported that Christensen
forced her “to put his penis in her mouth” and that Christensen
had “put his hands in her vagina.” Nurse also collected several
swabs from Nadine to check for sexually transmitted infections
and to check for the presence of DNA that did not match
Nadine’s. Nurse also took photos of Nadine and collected the
clothing Nadine was wearing when she arrived.

3. “A buccal swab is a routine method for obtaining a DNA
sample that involves wiping a small piece of filter paper or a
cotton swab similar to a Q-tip against the inside cheek of an
individual’s mouth to collect some skin cells.” State v. Evans, 2021
UT 63, ¶ 1 n.1, 500 P.3d 811 (cleaned up).

20230033-CA 5 2025 UT App 86
State v. Christensen

¶13 Nadine was later interviewed at the Children’s Justice
Center (CJC). While in the lobby waiting for the interview to
begin, Nadine met and spoke with a Carbon County Sheriff’s
Office detective (Detective) who was also waiting in the lobby.
This conversation was not recorded. Once the interview began,
the CJC interviewer (Interviewer) could not establish a good
rapport with Nadine. So, Interviewer left the interview and
Detective stepped in to continue Nadine’s interview. Nadine
disclosed the sexual abuse to Detective during the interview,
telling him that Christensen made her suck him “down here,”
referring to Christensen’s genitals, and forced her to let him “lick
down here,” referring to her own genitals. She also stated that
Christensen hit her “[h]ard across the cheek” and in the middle of
her back.

¶14 For a number of months after the interview, Nadine would
frequently meet with Detective; they would discuss how Nadine
was doing, topics she was interested in, and whether she had any
concerns or questions about the court process. The post-interview
meetings were not recorded.

The Charges and Motion to Sever

¶15 Christensen was charged with three counts related to the
alleged abuse of Nadine: sodomy upon a child, aggravated sexual
abuse of a child, and child abuse (collectively, the sexual abuse
charges). He was also charged with four counts of assault against
a peace officer, two counts of aggravated assault (one with a
domestic violence enhancement), two counts of commission of
domestic violence in the presence of a child, and one count of
criminal mischief (collectively, the assault charges). Christensen
moved to sever the sexual abuse charges from the assault charges,
arguing that the sexual abuse charges were not connected to the
assault charges and that he would be prejudiced by their joinder.
The State opposed Christensen’s motion to sever.

20230033-CA 6 2025 UT App 86
State v. Christensen

¶16 The district court denied Christensen’s motion to sever in
an oral ruling. In denying the motion, the court found that the
evidence of the sexual abuse charges and the assault charges was
“inextricably intertwined.” The court relied on the fact that the
alleged crimes were “very closely connected in time, no more than
two hours” apart, and that they were “part of a similar pattern of
conduct” because the State sought to prove Christensen “was
acting aggressively toward the child, then toward the adults, then
toward the police.” The district court also found that Christensen
would not be unduly prejudiced from a single trial on all the
charges because evidence of both groups of charges was needed
to support the State’s theory of the case (that Christensen’s
conduct with the shotgun occurred because of his guilty state of
mind after committing the alleged abuse) and Christensen could
present his theory of the case just as well (that the sexual assault
did not occur and the reason “he responded the way he did is
because someone entered his house unlawfully”).

¶17 The district court determined that rule 404(b) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence—which prohibits the use of prior bad acts “to
prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular
occasion the person acted in conformity with the character”—did
not apply. And the court also ruled that, even if rule 404(b) did
apply, the rule would not restrict evidence of either set of charges
from coming in because there would be “a proper noncharacter
purpose in either of the separate trials.” Finally, the court ruled
that the probative value of the evidence would not be
substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice and,
thus, that its admission did not violate rule 403 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence. See Utah R. Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”).

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State v. Christensen

The Trial

¶18 The case proceeded to a jury trial where the State presented
evidence from seventeen witnesses, including Nadine, Kim, Rick,
Officers 1, 2, 3, and 4, the emergency dispatcher, three forensic
scientists, EMT, Nurse, Detective, and Interviewer. During
Nadine’s testimony, the State played a video of her CJC interview.
After the video was played, Nadine testified that the statements
she made in the CJC interview were true. She also acknowledged
that Detective was one of her close friends now and that she was
“pretty good friends” with Kim.

¶19 Kim testified about her phone call with Christensen, her
phone calls with Nadine, and the events that occurred at
Christensen’s house as described above. She also testified that,
during the phone calls that took place during her two-hour drive
to Helper, Nadine did not mention that Christensen sexually
abused her. And Rick testified as to the events as detailed above.

¶20 The emergency dispatcher who received Kim’s 911 call
testified. She testified that she heard through the phone
Christensen saying “he would fire the weapon” and “put a slug
in [Kim’s] head.” The recording of the 911 call was also played for
the jury.

¶21 Officers 1, 2, 3, and 4 all testified about the events detailed
above. Officer 1 further testified that he did not activate his body
camera, so he had no body camera footage that could be played
for the jury. Footage from Officer 1’s vehicle dash camera and a
video of Christensen sitting in Officer 1’s patrol vehicle were
admitted at trial. Officer 1 also testified about interviewing
Christensen at the jail. He stated that during the interview, he told
Christensen he was arrested for pointing “a gun at officers” and
that Christensen stated he did not remember doing that. Officer 1
acknowledged that he did not do any tests to determine if
Christensen was intoxicated and that Christensen seemed
confused.

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State v. Christensen

¶22 The State also sought to play the Interview Footage from
Officer 4’s interview with Nadine at Kim’s grandmother’s house,
but the district court sustained Christensen’s objection to
admission of that evidence at that time. The court was concerned
it was being offered “as a prior consistent statement by the victim,
and [she had] not been impeached yet.”

¶23 EMT and Nurse testified about their interactions with
Nadine as described above.

¶24 The State called three forensic scientists to testify. They
testified that Christensen’s penile swab was positive for human
alpha-amylase, which is a digestive enzyme found in saliva, tears,
and fecal matter. 4 However, no control swab was taken, and the
sample was taken with a foam swab instead of a cotton swab,
which is the preferred type of swab. The DNA analysis of
Christensen’s penile swab provided a mixture of DNA from two
individuals, one matching Christensen and one matching Nadine.
An analysis of Nadine’s swabs found no male DNA.

¶25 The State also called Detective, Interviewer, an officer who
took photos of the scene, and the officer who took Christensen’s
penile swab. All testified about their involvement in the case as
described above.

¶26 Christensen called three witnesses in his defense. He first
called a forensic psychologist (Psychologist). Psychologist
testified about the irregularities in Nadine’s CJC interview,
including the change in interviewer, which he had never seen
happen before. He opined that the change in interviewer could
have signaled to Nadine that she was not giving the right answers
to the first interviewer. He also testified that it was “highly

4. According to one of the forensic scientists, while laboratory
testing can “determine the presence of bodily fluids,” such as
human alpha-amylase, it cannot “determine why it’s present or
from whom it’s present.”

20230033-CA 9 2025 UT App 86
State v. Christensen

concerning” that Nadine had an unrecorded forty-minute
conversation with Detective before the CJC interview and hours
of unrecorded conversations with Detective after the interview.

¶27 Psychologist also testified about proper interview
techniques and forensic interview technique (FIT) interviewing of
children. He explained that FIT interviewing is an evidence-
gathering protocol developed over forty years by psychologists
and law enforcement for interviews of children. Psychologist
opined that a proper FIT interview requires the interviewer to be
totally and completely objective and approach the interview with
a neutral position.

¶28 Christensen also called a nurse practitioner who reviewed
Nadine’s sexual assault examination report. The nurse
practitioner testified that there was no redness on Nadine’s face
to support her claims that Christensen slapped her. She also noted
that when Christensen was arrested, his underwear was “soiled”
and it was possible that this led to the presence of amylase on his
penile swab.

¶29 Finally, Christensen called a private investigator
(Investigator) who testified about the proper interview guidelines
for CJC interviews. He also reviewed the officers’ body camera
footage and noted that no footage showed Christensen holding a
weapon. Finally, Investigator testified that it was basic police
protocol for officers to separate witnesses before interviewing
them, “to find out what each individual witness knew or had to
say or had knowledge of,” but that Officer 4 had not done so when
he allowed Kim to be present for the interview with Nadine.
Investigator emphasized that when any of the witnesses are
children it is even more important to separate them and interview
them individually.

¶30 After Christensen rested, the State again sought to admit
the Interview Footage, which the court had previously refused to
admit. The State argued the Interview Footage should now be

20230033-CA 10 2025 UT App 86
State v. Christensen

admitted as a prior consistent statement because the defense had
implied that Nadine had fabricated her account or, at a minimum,
that she had “acted from a recent improper influence” on her
testimony. Christensen argued that the video was still hearsay
because there was not “sufficient evidence of impeachment” or “a
direct attack on [Nadine’s] statement” to warrant admission of the
Interview Footage as a prior consistent statement. The court
admitted the Interview Footage, ruling that Psychologist’s
testimony about the problems with the CJC interview was “an
implied charge” that Nadine “was acting under improper
influence or motive,” and that, therefore, the video “qualifie[d] as
a prior consistent statement to rebut” the charge. The State then
played the Interview Footage for the jury.

¶31 Before deliberations, the jury was instructed on three
affirmative defenses: intoxication, defense of self or others, and
defense of habitation. After deliberating, the jury convicted
Christensen on all twelve counts. Christensen timely appealed.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶32 Christensen raises two issues on appeal. First he argues the
district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever
the sexual abuse charges from the assault charges. “The grant or
denial of severance is a matter within the discretion of the trial
judge, so we reverse a denial only if the trial judge’s refusal to
sever charges is a clear abuse of discretion in that it sacrifices the
defendant’s right to a fundamentally fair trial.” State v. Lim, 2022
UT App 69, ¶ 16, 513 P.3d 72 (cleaned up).

¶33 Christensen also contends that the district court abused its
discretion in admitting the Interview Footage. “We grant
significant deference to a lower court’s determination to allow or
exclude evidence and review its decision for abuse of discretion.”
State v. Estes, 2025 UT App 10, ¶ 15, 564 P.3d 239, cert. denied, Mar.
20, 2025 (No. 20250166).

20230033-CA 11 2025 UT App 86
State v. Christensen

ANALYSIS

I. Denial of the Motion to Sever

¶34 Christensen argues the district court abused its discretion
in denying his motion to sever the sexual abuse charges from the
assault charges. However, “severance is not a matter of right.”
State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822, 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). “Two or
more felonies . . . may be charged in the same indictment or
information if” the offenses are either “(a) based on the same
conduct or are otherwise connected together in their commission;
or (b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan,” and
neither party will be “prejudiced by [the] joinder.” Utah Code
§ 77-8a-1(1), (4). And “any error in denying severance will be
deemed harmless unless the defendant can establish a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome if the court had granted a
severance.” See State v. Covington, 2020 UT App 110, ¶ 45, 472 P.3d
966 (cleaned up). Here, even if we assume—without deciding—
that the district court abused its discretion in denying
Christensen’s motion to sever, we conclude that Christensen has
not demonstrated “a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome” on either set of charges if they had been tried in two
separate trials. Id. (cleaned up).

A. The Sexual Abuse Charges

¶35 In a hypothetical separate trial on the sexual abuse charges,
the jury would not hear any evidence regarding the assault
charges. But even without that evidence, the jury would be
presented with strong testimonial and physical evidence against
Christensen supporting the sexual abuse charges.

¶36 Regarding the testimonial evidence, the jury would still
have heard about the events leading up to Kim’s arrival at
Christensen’s house, including the nonsensical text messages Kim
received from Christensen and the video call Kim had with
Christensen earlier that day where he was exhibiting strange

20230033-CA 12 2025 UT App 86
State v. Christensen

behavior. The jury also would have heard from Kim and Nadine
about how Nadine called Kim for help because Christensen was
drunk and acting erratically and how Kim found the behavior so
troubling that she put her baby into her car and drove two hours
from Midvale to Helper to check on Nadine and Christensen. The
jury would also have heard that when Kim arrived at
Christensen’s house, Nadine asked to speak with her privately
and disclosed that, earlier that same evening, Christensen had
touched her vagina and “made [her] suck his penis” and “would
slap [her] if [she] didn’t do it properly.”

¶37 Assuming that no mention of Christensen’s conduct with
the shotgun would have come in, the jury still would have been
informed that Kim called 911 after Nadine’s disclosure and that
Officer 4 interviewed Nadine at Kim’s grandmother’s house,
where Nadine confirmed Kim’s statement that Christensen made
“her suck him” and disclosed that he threatened her when she
was not “do[ing] it properly.” Finally, the jury would have heard
testimony from Nadine about the sexual abuse, including the
recording of her CJC interview describing the abuse, and heard
testimony from both EMT and Nurse about Nadine’s disclosures
to them within twenty-four hours of the abuse.

¶38 In terms of physical evidence, the jury would have heard
that human alpha-amylase—a substance found in saliva, tears,
and fecal matter—was found on Christensen’s penile swab. And,
perhaps most significantly, the jury also would have heard that
the results of the DNA analysis of Christensen’s penile swab
showed DNA matching two profiles: Nadine and Christensen.

¶39 On the defense side, all of Christensen’s attacks on
Nadine’s testimony and her credibility, as well as the influences
or motive to fabricate, would have been presented to the jury in
much the same way as they had been in the actual trial. And the
jury would have heard Christensen’s alternative explanations of

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State v. Christensen

why there was human alpha-amylase and Nadine’s DNA on his
penile swab.

¶40 Nonetheless, Christensen contends that a jury in a separate
trial would be less likely to convict him of the sexual abuse
charges because the assault charges portraying him as “a lawless,
violent man” are what made the difference for the jury in reaching
its guilty verdict. But it is unlikely that evidence of his conduct
toward Kim, Rick, and the officers tipped the scales towards
conviction on the sexual assault charges. Indeed, the State
presented compelling evidence in support of the sexual assault
charges—in particular, Nadine’s testimony combined with the
DNA evidence showing that Nadine’s DNA was present on
Christensen’s penis. Thus, we see no reasonable likelihood that a
jury would acquit Christensen of the sexual abuse charges in a
trial without any reference to his actions with the shotgun.

¶41 Therefore, even if the charges were tried separately,
Christensen has not demonstrated “a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome” in a separate trial on the sexual abuse
charges. State v. Covington, 2020 UT App 110, ¶ 45, 472 P.3d 966
(cleaned up).

B. The Assault Charges

¶42 In a hypothetical separate trial on the assault charges, there
would be strong evidence for the jury to convict Christensen even
if the details of the sexual abuse allegations were not disclosed to
the jury. As in the original trial, the jury would have heard about
the events leading up to Kim’s arrival at Christensen’s house,
including the nonsensical text messages Kim received from
Christensen and the video call Kim had with Christensen earlier
that day where he was exhibiting strange behavior. The jury also
would have heard from Kim and Nadine about how Nadine
called Kim for help because Christensen was drunk and acting
erratically and how Kim decided to immediately drive from
Midvale to Helper to check on Nadine and Christensen. The jury

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would have heard that when Kim entered Christensen’s house, he
demanded to know who was in his house and retrieved a shotgun
from his bedroom that he pointed at Kim’s chest, despite Nadine’s
informing him, “It’s just [Kim]. It’s just [Kim].”

¶43 Additionally, as appellate counsel conceded during oral
argument, the jury likely would have heard at least something
about a sexual abuse allegation made by Nadine to Kim. For
instance, the fact that Nadine made allegations of sexual abuse
would likely have been admissible to explain why Kim called 911.
The fact that Nadine made allegations of sexual abuse may also
have been admissible to explain a motive for Christensen’s actions
taken against Kim, Rick, and the officers.

¶44 But regardless of whether the allegations of sexual assault
were admissible, the jury would have heard strong evidence in
support of the assault charges. In addition to hearing the
recording of Kim’s frantic 911 call—during which Christensen can
be heard threatening Kim—the jury would have heard testimony
from Kim and Rick describing Christensen pointing the shotgun
at them, threatening them, and breaking their car window, all in
the presence of their infant son. The jury also would have heard
testimony from the four responding officers about how they
heard the window shatter and that when they approached the
property Christensen was pointing a firearm in their direction.
The officers’ testimony would have been corroborated by body
camera footage of their approach to the house and vehicle dash
camera footage of them scattering when they encountered
Christensen with a firearm pointed in their direction. The jury also
would have seen the photos of Christensen’s shotgun and the
broken window of the car.

¶45 In his defense, Christensen would still have been able to
attack the officers’ credibility through Investigator’s testimony
that none of the body camera footage showed a firearm. And
Christensen would have again been able to request jury

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instructions on his affirmative defenses of intoxication, defense of
self or others, and defense of habitation.

¶46 Christensen argues that without the sexual abuse charges
portraying him “as a bad actor with a propensity to act unlawfully
and violently,” the jury would have been more likely to accept
that he acted to defend his home, himself, and his daughter. We
see little chance that this made the difference in the jury’s verdict.
The State presented strong evidence in support of the assault
charges, including testimony from six witnesses that Christensen
was pointing the shotgun in their direction or in the direction of
others, vehicle dash camera and body camera footage of
Christensen’s actions, Kim’s frantic 911 call that also captured
Christensen’s threatening comments, and photographs of the
shotgun and broken window.

¶47 Thus, even if the jury in a separate trial did not hear
anything about the sexual abuse charges, it would have heard
convincing evidence of Christensen’s guilt on the assault charges.
Accordingly, Christensen has not demonstrated “a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome” in a separate trial on the
assault charges. State v. Covington, 2020 UT App 110, ¶ 45, 472
P.3d 966 (cleaned up).

¶48 In sum, we affirm the district court’s denial of
Christensen’s motion to sever because he has not established “a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome” on either the
sexual abuse charges or the assault charges if they were tried
separately. See id. (cleaned up).

II. The Interview Footage

¶49 Christensen also argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it admitted the Interview Footage because it was
hearsay and did not fall under the prior consistent statement
exemption in rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. We
are unpersuaded and affirm the district court.

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¶50 Hearsay is “an out-of-court statement offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. In other words, hearsay is a statement
that the declarant originally made outside of the current trial or
hearing and is now being used to prove the truth of what was
said.” State v. Green, 2023 UT 10, ¶ 83, 532 P.3d 930 (cleaned up).
However, “some out-of-court statements used for their truth are
classified as ‘not hearsay’ and are excluded from the rule. Others
are still considered hearsay but are nonetheless admissible due to
the conditions under which they were made.” Id. (cleaned up).
One such circumstance where an out-of-court statement offered
for its truth is classified as “not hearsay” is when a statement is
introduced that “is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and
is offered to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant
recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or
motive in so testifying.” Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). This “prior
consistent statement exemption to the hearsay rule” applies only
“to premotive, consistent, out-of-court statements.” Green, 2023
UT 10, ¶ 84 (cleaned up). To be admissible, the statement must
have been “made prior to the time a motive to fabricate arose.” Id.

¶51 Christensen argues that Nadine’s statements in the
Interview Footage “did not predate the primary alleged influence
to fabricate—improper police interview techniques”—because
the interview itself included these improper police interview
techniques that influenced Nadine. In his briefing, Christensen
lists several implied charges in the evidence at trial to
demonstrate that a motive or influence to fabricate existed when
Officer 4 interviewed Nadine. Namely, Christensen asserts that
the interview with Officer 4—the one at Kim’s grandmother’s
house—created an influence to fabricate because Officer 4 was not
coming from a neutral position as he too was an alleged victim in
the case, which did not follow the FIT guidelines for interviewing
children. Further, Christensen argues that Kim’s presence during
the interview with Officer 4 created an influence to fabricate prior
to the CJC interview because it violated interviewing protocols for
separating witnesses. Grouping together all the implied charges

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State v. Christensen

of fabrication as stemming from “improper interview
techniques,” Christensen then argues that the district court’s
ruling admitting the Interview Footage under rule 801(d)(1)(B)
was erroneous. He asserts that even though the statements in the
Interview Footage predate the CJC interview at which
Christensen implied that Nadine fabricated the sexual abuse
charges, they do not meet the requirements of the rule because
they do not predate Officer 4’s alleged improper interview
techniques during the Interview Footage.

¶52 The State argues the Interview Footage was properly
admitted under rule 801(d)(1)(B) because one of the implied
charges of fabrication expressly recognized by the district court
was that Nadine fabricated her story after the change in
interviewers during the CJC interview because of her prior
relationship with Detective and her desire to appease him. The
State further argues that because Nadine met Detective for the
first time the day of the CJC interview, this motive to fabricate
could not have existed before Nadine’s interview with Officer 4,
which occurred shortly after Kim called the police. The State also
emphasizes that, to be admissible under rule 801(d)(1)(B), a prior
consistent statement need not “rebut every possible motive to
fabricate.” Id. ¶ 99.

¶53 We agree with the State and find State v. Green, 2023 UT 10,
532 P.3d 930, instructive. There, a defendant was charged with
several counts of sexual assault and rape against six women. Id.
¶ 7. The defendant “challenge[d] the trustworthiness of his
accusers” at trial, alleging that their accusations were fabricated.
Id. ¶ 88. While the defendant primarily asserted that the women
fabricated their allegations because they were influenced by
newspaper articles detailing other women’s allegations against
the defendant, the defendant also identified other potential
motives to fabricate, “some of which theoretically arose
immediately after the rapes occurred” and therefore before the
publishing of the newspaper articles. Id. ¶¶ 86, 88. The defendant

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State v. Christensen

argued the women’s statements from before the publication of the
newspaper articles should not be admitted under rule 801(d)(1)(B)
because the statements were not “given before any potential
motive to fabricate arose.” Id. ¶ 86. Our supreme court disagreed,
holding that rule 801(d)(1)(B) “does not require that [a] statement
rebut every possible motive to fabricate” but only that a statement
“tends to rebut one of them.” Id. ¶¶ 99–100 (cleaned up).

¶54 Similar to the defendant in Green, Christensen raised
several possible theories as to why his daughter was fabricating
the abuse allegations. While Christensen groups all these possible
influences or motives to fabricate together as “improper interview
techniques,” we see several different potential influences or
motives to fabricate. First, there was Officer 4’s interview
techniques, including the presence of another witness during the
interview and Officer 4 conducting the interview when he himself
was an alleged victim. Next, there was Detective’s conversation
with Nadine before the CJC interview and their frequent
conversations after the CJC interview that made Nadine consider
Detective “a close friend.” And finally, there was a change of
interviewers during the CJC interview that could have signaled to
Nadine that she was not “giving the right answers to the first
interviewer.”

¶55 Even though all of the influences or motives to fabricate
raised by Christensen involve some sort of “improper interview
technique[],” we do not see all of the allegations as one singular
influence or motive to fabricate that began during Nadine’s
interview with Officer 4. While having another witness present
during an interview of a victim, having an interview conducted
by another victim, changing interviewers mid-interview, and
developing a relationship with a victim prior to an interview
could all be broadly categorized as “improper interview
techniques,” the influences or motives to fabricate underlying
them were not all the same. One such motive recognized by the
district court—that Nadine fabricated her allegations because

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State v. Christensen

“she was motivated by a relationship with Detective”—arose after
Nadine’s interview with Officer 4 because Nadine did not meet
Detective until the morning of the CJC interview and she was
interviewed by Officer 4 shortly after the police responded to
Christensen’s house.

¶56 Thus, the Interview Footage was a prior consistent
statement and “not hearsay” under rule 801(d)(1)(B) because it
rebutted “an express or implied charge” of fabrication and the
interview was conducted before a motive to fabricate arose,
namely Nadine’s relationship with Detective. Utah R. Evid.
801(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added); see also State v. Repsher, 2025 UT
App 50, ¶ 42 (holding that consistent testimony that predates the
defendant’s fabrication theory is admissible even where the
“fabrication argument might be a touch unclear”). Because the
Interview Footage was “not hearsay” under rule 801(d)(1)(B), the
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it at trial. 5

5. Christensen also raises an alternative ineffective assistance of
counsel claim “[t]o the extent this Court believes counsel did not
adequately argue the flaws in [Officer 4’s] interview to the district
court.” To prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
Christensen must show both “that counsel’s performance was
deficient” and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Failure
“to establish either element defeats a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel.” State v. Miller, 2023 UT App 85, ¶ 25, 535
P.3d 390 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 540 P.3d 78 (Utah 2023). Because
we have determined that the Interview Footage was admissible
under rule 801(d)(1)(B), see supra ¶¶ 49–56, Christensen cannot
demonstrate the prejudice required to succeed on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Simply put, Christensen “could
not have been prejudiced by properly admitted testimony, so his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim[] fail[s].” State v. Kelley,
2000 UT 41, ¶ 26, 1 P.3d 546.

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State v. Christensen

CONCLUSION

¶57 We affirm the district court’s denial of Christensen’s
motion to sever because he has not demonstrated a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome if the motion to sever had
been granted. We also affirm the district court’s admission of the
Interview Footage at trial because it qualified as a prior consistent
statement under rule 801(d)(1)(B). We therefore affirm
Christensen’s convictions.

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