State v. Brown

2025 UT App 52

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
PATRICK KOANEIL BROWN,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20230312-CA
Filed April 17, 2025

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Adam T. Mow
No. 211904632

Sarah J. Carlquist, Attorney for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Jeffrey D. Mann,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES RYAN D. TENNEY and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 Patrick Koaneil Brown admits he shot and killed David 1
following a heated exchange, but he maintains he acted in self-
defense. He claims that he tried to deescalate the situation, his
efforts failed, and when David rammed his car into the back of
Brown’s car, he felt he had no choice but to shoot David. A jury
found Brown guilty of murder, but the conviction was reduced to
manslaughter because the jury credited Brown’s claim of
imperfect self-defense. Brown was also convicted of multiple
counts of discharge of a weapon. At trial, a detective (Detective)
was allowed to testify, over Brown’s objection, that David’s
ramming of Brown’s car constituted criminal mischief under the

1. A pseudonym.
State v. Brown

law, essentially explaining why the instruction on perfect self-
defense, which the jury would soon confront, would not apply.
Because we agree that Detective should not have been allowed to
testify to inadmissible legal conclusions and that Brown was
prejudiced by the admission of this testimony, we vacate Brown’s
conviction and remand this matter for a new trial.

BACKGROUND

¶2 One April morning in 2021, David was driving his fiancée
(Fiancée), his sixteen-year-old daughter (Daughter), and the two-
year-old daughter he shared with Fiancée to breakfast. At the
same time, Brown was selling clothes out of the back of his car to
David’s friend. David stopped to talk to his friend but was soon
distracted by Brown and his car. David began making fun of
Brown’s car, and the conversation escalated. David got “out of the
car and stepped to [Brown].” Fiancée reported that David wanted
to fight Brown. After David “got out of the car, [Brown] went into
his car and got [a] gun.” According to Fiancée, David was upset
that Brown had retrieved his gun, an action that made David more
willing to fight Brown. Daughter testified that Brown retrieved
his gun because he was scared of David and that “[e]verybody”
knew that David liked to fight. She further testified that Brown
“didn’t put the gun away right away ‘cause [David] was still in
[Brown’s] face.”

¶3 Eventually, Brown “went back to his car and put [the gun]
away.” Fiancée heard Brown say, “Let’s drop it,” and Brown
“got[] back in his car and tried to drive” away. But David got in
his own car and followed Brown.

¶4 David followed Brown for several blocks, all the while
“[y]elling out the window,” “cussing and honking,” and “trying
to [incite] a fight” because “he wanted to fight.” David was
following so closely that Brown feared he may be trying to ram
into his car.

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State v. Brown

¶5 This pattern continued until Brown stopped his car at a red
light. Once stopped, Brown leaned out his window and said, “If
you follow me for another block, I’m going to shoot you in front
of your family.” In response, David hit the gas and “rammed
[into] the back of” Brown’s vehicle. David immediately backed up
about 150 feet and stopped. At the same time, Brown proceeded
into the intersection, made a U-turn, and drove toward David,
who had exited his vehicle and was now standing on the street
next to his car. Brown would later tell police that he drove toward
David because all he “was tryin’ to do is follow [David] since he
rammed [Brown’s] truck, and get his tag number.”

¶6 A bystander reported that when David got out of his car he
did not appear to be “de-escalating the situation.” Rather, he “had
his hands down in, like, a clenched fist,” looking “like he was
ready to fight him.” According to another bystander, David “got
out looking like he wanted to fight.” And he “[k]ind of threw his
hands up” and looked like “he was kind of calling [Brown] on.”

¶7 As Brown drove past David, he slowed and fired four shots
out the driver’s side window, hitting and killing David. When
arrested, Brown explained that he was scared and thought David
had a weapon: “I got caught in the situation. I’m accepting
responsibility. I ain’t acting like I’m innocent. I know what I did
was wrong. I wasn’t tryin’ to kill him. I wasn’t trying to shoot him
up there. But when he jumped out the truck it scared me. I thought
he had a weapon.” Brown further theorized that David had made
a phone call to a known drug dealer who was on his way to harm
Brown.

¶8 Brown was charged with one count of murder, three
counts of discharge of a weapon, and one count of possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person.

¶9 At trial, Brown’s primary argument was that the jury
should find him not guilty because he acted in self-defense. The

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State v. Brown

jury was instructed on the law governing self-defense. Under
Utah law,

An individual is justified in using force intended or
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only if
the individual reasonably believes that force is
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury
to the individual or another individual as a result of
imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent the
commission of a forcible felony.

Utah Code § 76-2-402(2)(b). The jury was further instructed on
Utah law’s definition of “forcible felony,” which specifically
includes “aggravated assault.” Id. § 76-2-402(1)(a).

¶10 The jury was also instructed on the differences between
perfect and imperfect self-defense and on the defense of extreme
emotional distress. The jury instructions explained that perfect
self-defense is a complete defense to murder while imperfect self-
defense is an incomplete defense. Imperfect self-defense applies
when defendants reasonably but incorrectly believe that they
satisfy the requirements for self-defense. The instructions further
explained that extreme emotional distress applies when the
defendant acts under the extreme emotional distress that was
caused by the decedent’s highly provoking act immediately
preceding the offense.

¶11 In his opening statement, Brown’s counsel (Counsel) set up
Brown’s argument that his actions were justified as self-defense
by arguing that “if someone rams someone with a car, it’s an
aggravated assault.” Later in the trial, Detective was called and
testified regarding David’s ramming of Brown’s car. Detective
stated that David’s conduct constituted criminal mischief and not
aggravated assault: “[I]n my training and experience, to me with
the damage[] on the back bumper, it was more so of a criminal
mischief rather than an aggravated-assault-type thing.” Counsel
objected, arguing that Detective’s statement was improper

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State v. Brown

opinion testimony that constituted an impermissible legal
conclusion and it was also improper expert testimony. The State
responded, saying that Detective was merely “testifying about his
training and experience” and that the testimony may be
“damaging, but it’s not improper.”

¶12 The court overruled Counsel’s objection. Detective then
continued to testify, highlighting his “training and experience”
from having “investigated multiple accidents” and “multiple
criminal mischief situations.” He concluded that “in [his]
professional experience,” given the “totality of the
circumstances,” David’s ramming of Brown’s car “would have
been a criminal mischief, at most.”

¶13 Then, in closing argument, the prosecutor highlighted the
importance of Detective’s testimony: “Now I’m not going to get
too far into the weeds on this ‘prevent the commission of a forcible
felony’ because you heard both law enforcement officers tell you
this isn’t an aggravated assault. This is a destruction of
property.”2 Later the prosecutor argued, “I’m telling you what the
officers told you that the damage to [Brown’s vehicle] is consistent
with a road-rage-criminal-mischief-damage-of-property type of
accident.”

¶14 The jury found Brown guilty on all counts. But the murder
conviction was reduced to manslaughter because the jury also
found Brown acted in imperfect self-defense and with extreme
emotional distress.

2. Another police officer (Sergeant) offered general testimony
about vehicle ramming incidents and aggravated assault.
Sergeant testified that she would not cite a person who
“intentionally rammed” another vehicle for aggravated assault
but “for something else.” Sergeant did not mention criminal
mischief, nor did she specifically discuss David’s ramming of
Brown’s vehicle.

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State v. Brown

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶15 Brown appeals and argues that the court erred when it
overruled Counsel’s objection and admitted Detective’s
testimony regarding David ramming Brown’s car. “We review the
trial court’s determinations regarding the admissibility of
evidence under an abuse of discretion standard.” Anderson v.
Thompson, 2008 UT App 3, ¶ 25, 176 P.3d 464. 3

ANALYSIS

¶16 Detective improperly testified to the legal definition and
implications of David ramming Brown’s car, and that testimony
was prejudicial. Accordingly, as explained below, we must vacate
Brown’s conviction and remand this matter for a new trial.

¶17 Under Utah case law, a witness may not testify to a legal
conclusion. State v. Davis, 2007 UT App 13, ¶ 15, 155 P.3d 909
(“Opinions that tell the jury what result to reach or give legal
conclusions continue to be impermissible.” (cleaned up)).
“Testimony is likely to constitute an impermissible legal
conclusion if it is framed in a way that is unhelpful to the
factfinder; blurs the separate and distinct responsibilities of the
judge, jury, and witness; or creates a danger that a juror may turn
to the witness’s legal conclusion rather than the judge for
guidance on the applicable law.” State v. Brown, 2019 UT App 122,
¶ 28, 447 P.3d 1250 (cleaned up); see also Davis, 2007 UT App 13,
¶¶ 15–16; Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (“It [is] clear that questions which would merely allow the
witness to tell the jury what result to reach are not permitted. Nor

3. Brown also raises several other issues on appeal, including
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, cumulative error, and
lack of merger. Given our resolution of this appeal on the issue
discussed herein, we need not address these other issues.

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State v. Brown

is [rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 4] intended to allow a
witness to give legal conclusions.” (cleaned up)). “Witnesses quite
clearly provide impermissible legal conclusions when they tie
their opinions to the requirements of Utah law.” State v. Zimpfer,
2024 UT App 136, ¶ 36, 558 P.3d 111 (cleaned up).

¶18 In State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), two
expert witnesses testified that the defendant’s actions violated the
Utah Uniform Securities Act. Id. at 756. There, we held that
“[d]espite the fact that there is no bright line between responses
that embrace an ultimate issue and those that provide an
impermissible legal conclusion, those portions of the expert
witnesses’ testimony to which [the] defendant objects quite
clearly state legal conclusions because the witnesses tie their
opinions to the requirements of Utah law.” Id. 5 As demonstrated
by Tenney and the related case law, witnesses give improper legal
conclusions when they couch their opinions as legal conclusions,
tie their opinions to the requirements of Utah law, or otherwise
tell the jury what conclusion to reach. See Steffensen v. Smith’s
Mgmt. Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 1993) (“Opinion testimony
is not helpful to the fact finder when it is couched as a legal
conclusion.”); State v. Chapman, 2014 UT App 255, ¶ 20, 338 P.3d
230 (concluding that testimony was admissible because the
witness did not “couch his opinion specifically in terms of what is
required under Utah law, or otherwise tell the jury what
conclusion to reach”).

4. “An opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an
ultimate issue.” Utah R. Evid. 704(a).

5. In cases dealing with highly technical issues “not within the
knowledge of the average” layperson, expert witnesses may be
allowed to offer an opinion on mixed questions of law and fact,
but they still may not “improperly instruct[] the jury on the law.”
State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361–62 (Utah 1993) (cleaned up).

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¶19 Here, Detective’s testimony was clearly tied to Utah Code
section 76-2-402(2)(b), which requires a forcible felony to justify
deadly force in self-defense, and section 76-2-402(1)(a), which
specifically includes aggravated assault and not criminal mischief
within the definition of forcible felony. Utah law states that “[a]n
individual is justified in using force intended or likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury if the individual reasonably
believes that force is necessary to . . . prevent the commission of a
forcible felony.” Utah Code § 76-2-402(2)(b) (emphasis added). And
Utah law’s definition of “forcible felony” specifically includes
“aggravated assault” but not criminal mischief. Id. § 76-2-
402(1)(a). Accordingly, whether the circumstances here amounted
to a forcible felony, as opposed to criminal mischief, was a
question with which the jury would be directly confronted.
Indeed, the jury instructions directed the jury to determine
whether Brown had been faced with a forcible felony. The
instructions further defined “forcible felony” to include
“aggravated assault.”

¶20 At trial, Detective testified about how David’s actions
would have qualified only as “criminal mischief” and not as
“aggravated assault.” In his briefing, Brown explains that his
“defense was that [David] committed a forcible felony when he
rammed his car into Brown’s car and that Brown had a right to
use deadly force to defend that forcible felony.” So, Brown
concludes, “when Detective was allowed to repeatedly and
conclusively testify that [David] ramming his car into the back of
Brown’s car was ‘criminal mischief rather than an aggravated-
assault-type thing[,]’ . . . his testimony foreclosed Brown’s claim
of perfect self-defense.” Brown complains that “Detective’s
testimony directly and significantly undermined Brown’s claim of
perfect self-defense.”

¶21 Of course, “when witnesses have used a term in its
ordinary meaning rather than its legal meaning, we have
determined that their testimony was appropriately admitted.”

20230312-CA 8 2025 UT App 52
State v. Brown

Zimpfer, 2024 UT App 136, ¶ 38 (cleaned up). 6 But “criminal
mischief” doesn’t really have an ordinary meaning, and it’s
hardly a term used in day-to-day parlance. It is difficult to conjure
up a purpose for Detective to be testifying to the difference
between aggravated assault and criminal mischief and their
relevance here other than to undermine the jury’s independent
role by concluding for it that no aggravated assault had occurred.
Thus, it’s clear that Detective offered improper legal conclusions
at trial by directly tying his testimony to the requirements of Utah
law and instructing the jury on the correct legal resolution of
issues within its purview. Accordingly, the district court abused
its discretion in overruling Brown’s objection to this testimony.

¶22 But the fact that Detective’s testimony was improper does
not alone merit reversal. Brown must also demonstrate that he
was prejudiced by this testimony. “An evidentiary error requires
reversal only if there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result for the accused had the error not occurred. A reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome exists if our confidence in
the result of the trial is eroded.” State v. Lopez, 2018 UT 5, ¶ 30, 417
P.3d 116 (cleaned up). Here, our confidence in the result of this
trial has been eroded for at least two reasons.

¶23 First, appellate courts should proceed with caution when a
party completely changes its tune between the trial and the appeal
as to the significance and materiality of certain testimony. Of
course, just because a party argues for the admission of evidence,
even in the face of an objection, it does not necessarily follow that
an appellate court must conclude that any error in admitting the
evidence was prejudicial. After all, on appeal, evidence is viewed

6. Indeed, one of the deciding factors in the court’s determination
that the testimony in State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993),
was admissible was the fact that the word “‘materiality’ has a
popular meaning bearing directly on the factual issue before the
jury.” Id. at 1362. The same cannot be said for “criminal mischief.”

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State v. Brown

in light of the totality of the circumstances, including against the
backdrop of all the other evidence that was admitted at trial. Often
the balance of the evidence is so compelling that wrongfully
admitted evidence is still harmless. It remains concerning,
however, for a party to specifically highlight evidence as being
particularly important at the trial level, not just in the context of
responding to an objection, but also in arguing to the jury that it
should focus on that evidence and give great weight to it, only to
turn around at the appellate level and assert that the same
evidence did not meaningfully alter the evidentiary picture after
all. Here, the State specifically, repeatedly, and affirmatively
advocated for the importance of the same testimony that it now
characterizes as not having great significance.

¶24 Members of the Utah Supreme Court have advised courts
to “tread carefully” in these situations. State v. Ellis, 2018 UT 2,
¶ 55, 417 P.3d 86 (Himonas, J., concurring). It would be
problematic “if our trial courts were to regularly admit testimony
based, in part, on the State’s representation that it’s crucial, only
to have our appellate courts affirm the resulting conviction
because the error in admitting the testimony was harmless.” Id.
¶ 56; see also State v. Farnworth, 2018 UT App 23, ¶ 36, 414 P.3d
1053 (“Where a prosecutor has touted the importance of
erroneously admitted evidence, we should be hesitant to find its
admission harmless, let alone harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.”). Unlike many, or even most, cases where we review the
harmful effect of improperly admitted evidence that is perhaps
ancillary to a party’s case, if (1) a party places significant emphasis
on the evidence in the presentation of its case and highlights that
specific evidence in its argument and invites the jury to not only
focus on the evidence but base its ultimate determination on the
evidence and (2) it appears that the jury, in part, credited the
opposing party’s theory as reflected in its verdict, then our
confidence is more likely to be undermined.

20230312-CA 10 2025 UT App 52
State v. Brown

¶25 Though the State on appeal argues that “Detective’s
testimony that the collision wasn’t aggravated assault was . . .
harmless,” that is a far cry from the story the State told at the trial
level. At trial, the State repeatedly elicited testimony from
Detective to establish that the ramming was criminal mischief and
not aggravated assault. The State vigorously defended against
objections to the admission of that testimony, specifically telling
the judge that it understood “that it’s damaging, but it’s not
improper.”7

¶26 Then, in closing argument, the State doubled down on the
importance of Detective’s testimony by repeatedly insinuating
that Brown’s self-defense claims were meritless because David’s
actions did not satisfy the statutory requirement. The State
argued, “Now I’m not going to get too far into the weeds on this
‘prevent the commission of a forcible felony’ because you heard
both law enforcement officers tell you this isn’t an aggravated
assault. This is a destruction of property.” Later the State said,
“I’m telling you what the officers told you that the damage to
[Brown’s vehicle] is consistent with a road-rage-criminal-
mischief-damage-of-property type of accident.” The State’s
affirmative statements below that this testimony was important to

7. Curiously, when Brown attempted to cross-examine Detective
on the testimony he had just given, the State objected and the
district court sustained that objection. Regardless of the
admissibility of any testimony, once the court has allowed a
witness to testify, that testimony can be challenged in cross-
examination. See State v. Sheehan, 2012 UT App 62, ¶ 27, 273 P.3d
417 (“Once the court determines that evidence is sufficiently
reliable to be admitted at trial, the court may not then violate a
defendant’s constitutional rights to present an effective defense
by excluding conflicting evidence or testimony that challenges
that expert’s opinion or credibility.”).

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State v. Brown

its case give us significant pause when analyzing the State’s
argument on appeal that the testimony was in fact harmless. 8

¶27 Second, and more importantly, under the particular factual
circumstance of this case and the verdict that the jury rendered,
our “confidence in the result of the trial is eroded” because there
is reason to believe that the jury gave Detective’s testimony
significant weight, just as the prosecutor asked it to. See Lopez,
2018 UT 5, ¶ 30 (cleaned up). This is the case because the
distinction between perfect and imperfect self-defense was crucial
to the jury’s determination:

Self-defense may be perfect or imperfect. Perfect
self-defense is a complete justification and bars a
conviction. It applies when a defendant reasonably
believes that unlawful force against him is

8. The State also argues that Detective’s testimony was harmless
because “it was cumulative of another Sergeant’s unchallenged
testimony providing the same opinion.” See State v. Miranda, 2017
UT App 203, ¶ 47, 407 P.3d 1033 (“[W]hen erroneously admitted
evidence is cumulative of evidence already before the factfinder,
the error may be considered harmless.”). However, in this case,
Detective’s testimony was not cumulative of Sergeant’s
testimony. Sergeant testified that she would not cite a person who
“intentionally rammed” another vehicle for aggravated assault
but “for something else”; she explained, “You can’t [cite] for
aggravated assault. It’s a felony charge.” Sergeant’s testimony
and the questions that elicited it were theoretical in nature, asking
about what Sergeant would do in a hypothetical situation. In
contrast, Detective’s testimony very specifically stated a legal
conclusion about David’s actions in this case. In this way,
Detective’s testimony certainly added something “new or
additional to the evidentiary picture” and thus was not
cumulative of Sergeant’s testimony. See State v. Samples, 2022 UT
App 125, ¶ 74, 521 P.3d 526 (cleaned up).

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imminent and he is legally justified in using force to
defend himself. Imperfect self-defense is a partial
justification. It reduces a murder charge to
manslaughter when a defendant reasonably, but
mistakenly, believes that the circumstances
provided a legal justification or excuse for the use of
deadly force.

State v. Silva, 2019 UT 36, ¶ 25, 456 P.3d 718 (cleaned up).

¶28 The jury instructions in this case reflected this distinction:
“Perfect self-defense is a complete defense to Murder.” “The
defendant is justified in using force intended or likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury . . . if the defendant reasonably
believes that . . . [f]orce is necessary to prevent . . . the commission
of a forcible felony.” The jury instructions go on to explain, “You
must consider imperfect self-defense only if you find the
defendant guilty of Murder. Imperfect self-defense is a partial
defense to Murder. It applies when the defendant caused the
death of another while incorrectly, but reasonably, believing that
his conduct was legally justified or excused.”

¶29 In this case, the jury found that the defense of imperfect
self-defense did apply. That means the jury found that Brown was
reasonable in believing that his self-defense was legally justified
but that he was mistaken in that belief.

¶30 The State argues that, as a matter of law, Brown’s self-
defense came “too late.” See State v. Berriel, 2013 UT 19, ¶ 14, 299
P.3d 1133 (“The imminence requirement distinguishes lawful
defensive force from two forms of unlawful force: that which
comes too soon and that which comes too late. A preemptive
strike against a feared aggressor is illegal force used too soon; and
retaliation against a successful aggressor is illegal force used too
late.” (cleaned up)). The State asserts that because the ramming
was completed before Brown shot and because any threat of a
forcible felony had abated, Brown could not have been justified in

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using deadly force. But that interpretation of events is not the only
explanation of the facts. Just because one act of ramming had been
completed, it did not mean that, in the moment, Brown thought
there was no risk of being rammed again. Brown had tried to
deescalate the situation, but the drawn-out nature of the
encounter may have signaled to Brown that David was intent on
harming him. More specifically, the ramming may have caused
Brown to believe that David was not afraid to cause him bodily
harm by using his automobile to chase him.

¶31 The jury had already indicated that it viewed the
circumstances in some measure as Brown did. Its verdict indicates
that jury members thought Brown was reasonable in his belief
that lethal force was necessary but that he was mistaken in that
belief. But why did they think he was mistaken? Here, the jury
could have looked at the totality of the circumstances and
deferred to Detective’s conclusion that the threat could not
constitute a forcible felony. After all, the verdict indicates that the
jury thought Brown’s belief that he needed to defend himself was
reasonable, but some additional factor made his use of force not
legally justified. It is the origin of this additional factor that gives us
pause. In one scenario, the jury might have looked at the totality
of the circumstances and simply determined that deadly force
was not justified. In that case, the verdict would be unassailable
on appeal. But in another equally or more likely scenario, the jury
might have done exactly as the prosecutor invited it to do and
deferred to the legal opinion of Detective. And if it did so defer,
then its verdict is infirm.

¶32 Accordingly, our confidence in the result is undermined
because it appears the jury may have relied on—and, in fact,
probably did rely on—Detective’s improper testimony and
interpreted it to mean that Brown’s actions could not possibly
have been legally justified. The State’s view of the evidence—that
any threat had abated—is also a reasonable one, but it is one that
the State should argue to a jury and not a call that should be made

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by this court. Both sides should present their varying views of the
evidence without the taint of improperly admitted evidence.

¶33 Detective’s testimony was improper and it prejudiced
Brown’s case. Brown should have the benefit of a trial without the
influence of Detective’s improper legal conclusions.

CONCLUSION

¶34 The district court abused its discretion in allowing
Detective’s improper testimony. In the context of this case, the
admission of that testimony and the prosecutor’s overt emphasis
on it prejudiced Brown and undermines our confidence in the
verdict. As a result, we vacate Brown’s conviction and remand the
matter for a new trial.

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