State v. Lightel

2025 UT App 40

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
KADIN WOOLF LIGHTEL,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20230140-CA
Filed March 20, 2025

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Heather Brereton
No. 211906349

Sarah J. Carlquist and Dayna T. Moore,
Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Daniel W. Boyer,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

LUTHY, Judge:

¶1 Kadin Woolf Lightel pled guilty to eighteen counts of
sexual exploitation of a minor based on his possession of child
pornography. The issue in this appeal is whether Lightel is
required to register as a sex offender for his entire lifetime or for
a shorter period. Adult defendants convicted of sexual
exploitation of a minor typically must register for life, but there is
an exception for adult offenders who were under age twenty-one
at the time of their crimes and whose offenses did “not involve
State v. Lightel

force or coercion.” Utah Code § 77-41-105(3)(c)(iii)(A). 1 Based on
the nature of some of the images in Lightel’s possession, the
district court declined to determine that Lightel’s offenses did not
involve force or coercion and that he was therefore eligible for the
exception. Lightel challenges that ruling. We reject his argument
and affirm the district court’s decision.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The State charged Lightel with eighteen counts of sexual
exploitation of a minor. 2 “An actor commits sexual exploitation of
a minor when the actor knowingly possesses or intentionally
views child sexual abuse material,” Utah Code § 76-5b-201(2),
which is defined (with some additional statutory nuance) as “any
visual depiction” “of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct,” id. § 76-5b-103(1). 3 Lightel was twenty years old at the
time of the charged conduct.

1. This code section has been amended since Lightel was charged
and sentenced, but the amendments made no substantive changes
relevant to this appeal. Compare Utah Code § 77-41-105 (2020), and
id. § 77-41-105 (2023), with id. § 77-41-105 (2024). We therefore cite
the current version throughout this opinion.

2. The State also charged Lightel with two counts of dealing in
material harmful to a minor, to which he pled guilty. Those
offenses do not trigger sex offender registration. See Utah Code
§ 77-41-102 (defining “offender” to not include a person found
guilty of dealing in material harmful to a minor); id. § 77-41-105
(requiring only “offender[s]” to register). Thus, they are not
relevant to this appeal, and we do not address them further.

3. Sections 76-5b-103 and 76-5b-201 have been amended since
Lightel was charged, but those amendments did not make
(continued…)

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State v. Lightel

¶3 Lightel pled guilty to all of the charges. In so doing, he
acknowledged that he had read the charging document and
understood “the nature and the elements of [the] crimes to which”
he was pleading guilty. He specifically admitted that he had
“knowingly possessed 18 distinct images of child pornography.”
Lightel then asked the district court to find “under Utah Code
[section] 77-41-105(3)(c)(iii) that the lifetime registry requirement
does not apply in this case because [he] was under 21 at the time
of the crimes and the offense did not involve force or coercion.”

¶4 The Department of Adult Probation and Parole prepared a
presentence investigation report. The report described each item
of child sexual abuse material Lightel had pled guilty to
possessing, making plain that at least some of those items
depicted children being forced or coerced into engaging in sexual
activity. Through counsel, Lightel confirmed that the presentence
report needed no corrections.

¶5 At sentencing, Lightel again asked the court to find that the
lifetime sex offender registration requirement did not apply to
him. He argued that the offenses he committed “did not involve
force or coercion” because “he did not create the content” he pled
guilty to possessing and because “[h]e didn’t do anything that
involved force or coercion.” Lightel contended that the statute
requires the sentencing court to look at the defendant’s actions to
determine whether “the offense . . . involve[d] force or coercion.”
Id. § 77-41-105(3)(c)(iii)(A). The State countered that the statute
required the court to also evaluate the material Lightel possessed
to determine whether the offense involved force or coercion.

¶6 Ultimately, the district court said it would be “hard-
pressed” to read the statute as Lightel was arguing because the

substantive changes that are relevant here. Compare Utah Code
§§ 76-5b-103, -201 (2020), with id. §§ 76-5b-103, -201 (2024). We
therefore cite the current versions of these provisions as well.

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State v. Lightel

“language of the statute is [that] the offense does not involve force
or coercion,” not “that the [d]efendant did not use force or
coercion.” In its sentencing order, the court found only that
Lightel was less than twenty-one years old when he committed
the offenses, not that the offenses did not involve force or
coercion. Therefore, the court implicitly rejected Lightel’s request
and left him subject to the lifetime sex offender registration
requirement.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 Lightel now appeals, challenging the district court’s
decision declining to find that he qualified for the statutory
exception to lifetime sex offender registration because his offenses
did not involve force or coercion. Because the court’s decision
turned on its interpretation of Utah Code section 77-41-
105(3)(c)(iii), we review its decision for correctness. See State v.
Salazar-Lopez, 2024 UT App 61, ¶ 9, 548 P.3d 929 (“The correct
interpretation of the applicable statute is . . . a question of law that
we review for correctness.”).

ANALYSIS

¶8 Lightel contends that he qualifies for the exemption from
lifetime registration as a sex offender because he was under
twenty-one years old when he committed the offenses to which
he pled guilty and because “the offense[s]” did not “involve force
or coercion.” Utah Code § 77-41-105(3)(c)(iii)(A). Like the district
court, we disagree.

¶9 Utah law establishes a Sex, Kidnap, and Child Abuse
Offender Registry that is maintained by the Department of Public
Safety. See generally id §§ 77-41-102 to -114. Under the relevant
statutory provisions, “child abuse offender[s],” “kidnap
offender[s],” and “sex offender[s]” are all “offender[s]” who must

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State v. Lightel

comply with the law’s registration requirements. See id. §§ 77-41-
102(13), -105. “Sex offender” is defined to mean, among other
things, “an individual . . . convicted in this state of” any of thirty
specifically enumerated sex crimes, including “sexual
exploitation of a minor.” Id. § 77-41-102(19)(a).

¶10 The default registration requirement under the statute is
that an adult offender must register with the Department of Public
Safety “for the duration of [his or her] sentence and for 10 years
after termination of sentence.” Id. § 77-41-105(3)(a). However, an
adult offender convicted for the first time of any of twenty crimes
listed in section 77-41-106—eighteen of which, including sexual
exploitation of a minor, are among the thirty specifically
enumerate crimes that qualify a person as a sex offender under
section 77-41-102(19)—is required to register for the offender’s
lifetime. Id. § 77-41-105(3)(c)(i). But an exception to this lifetime
registration requirement is provided under section 77-41-
105(3)(c)(iii). It states,

If the sentencing court at any time after conviction
determines that the offense does not involve force or
coercion, lifetime registration under Subsection
(3)(c)(i) does not apply to an offender who commits
the offense when the offender is under 21 years old.

Id. § 77-41-105(3)(c)(iii)(A). If this exception applies, then the
offender need only register for the duration of his or her sentence
plus ten years. See id. § 77-41-105(3)(c)(iii)(B).

¶11 Lightel was convicted as an adult of eighteen counts of
sexual exploitation of a minor, one of the crimes for which lifetime
registration is generally required for adult offenders. However,
because Lightel was under twenty-one years old when he
committed those crimes, he is entitled to the exception to lifetime
registration if “the offense[s] [did] not involve force or coercion.”
Id. § 77-41-105(3)(c)(iii)(A). Thus, the issue before us is whether
the offenses Lightel committed involved force or coercion.

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State v. Lightel

¶12 When we interpret a statute, we first determine whether
the language at issue is plain and unambiguous. If it is, we simply
apply the language according to its plain meaning. See Brixen
& Christopher Architects, PC v. State, 2001 UT App 210, ¶ 14, 29 P.3d
650 (“When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we do
not look beyond the language’s plain meaning to divine
legislative intent.” (cleaned up)). If it is not, we may look outside
the text to resolve the ambiguity. See Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v.
Salt Lake Board of Equalization, 2012 UT 4, ¶ 21, 270 P.3d 441
(“Where the language of a statute is ambiguous, we may look
beyond the statute’s text in order to ascertain its legislative
purpose.” (cleaned up)).

¶13 When determining whether the meaning of particular
statutory language is plain, dictionary definitions may be helpful
as a “starting point.” See State v. Bagnes, 2014 UT 4, ¶ 14, 322 P.3d
719. But because dictionaries usually “catalog[ue] a range of
possible meanings that a statutory term may bear,” a “dictionary
alone is often inadequate to the task of interpretation, as the range
of possible meanings it identifies may encompass both parties’
positions.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶14 Another potential limitation on the simple reference to a
dictionary definition to determine plain meaning is that
“[d]ictionary definitions are acontextual, whereas the meaning of
sentences depends critically on context, including all sorts of
background understandings.” United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d
1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012). After all, when interpreting statutory
language, we do not look at terms and their definitions “in
isolation.” See Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 12, 248
P.3d 465. “Our task, instead, is to determine the meaning of the
text given the relevant context of the statute (including,
particularly, the structure and language of the statutory scheme).”
Id.; see also Orten v. Utah County, 2024 UT App 132, ¶ 28, 558 P.3d
900 (“When interpreting statutory schemes, Utah courts often
apply the whole-text canon, which calls on the judicial interpreter

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State v. Lightel

to consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the
physical and logical relation of its many parts.” (cleaned up)).
Accordingly, “the fact that the statutory language may be
susceptible of multiple meanings does not [necessarily] render it
ambiguous; all but one of the meanings is ordinarily eliminated
by context.” Olsen, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 13 (cleaned up). Such is
ultimately the case here.

¶15 Lightel suggests that to discern what it means for
“the offense” in a given case to “involve force or coercion,”
Utah Code § 77-41-105(3)(c)(iii)(A), we should look to
the dictionary definitions of “involve.” He also contends that
the definition we should employ is the one that says “involve”
means “to have within or as a part of itself.” Involve, Merriam-
Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/involve
[https://perma.cc/E6C6-TX9L]. We agree that this definition fits in
this context. When it is used, the exception to lifetime registration
applies, quite logically, “[i]f the sentencing court . . . determines
that the offense does not [have within or as a part of itself] force
or coercion.” Utah Code § 77-41-105(3)(c)(iii)(A).

¶16 Lightel next insists that whether the offense in a particular
case has force or coercion within or as part of itself turns
exclusively on whether the defendant’s conduct that satisfies the
elements of the crime includes force or coercion. If the defendant’s
use of force or coercion satisfies an element of the crime, Lightel
explains, the offense has force or coercion within or as a part of
itself. If the defendant’s use of force or coercion does not satisfy
one of the elements of the crime, Lightel maintains, the offense
does not have force or coercion within or as a part of itself.
Lightel’s argument in this regard is problematic for two related
reasons.

¶17 First, adoption of Lightel’s preferred definition of
“involve” does not, as Lightel assumes, resolve the equally
pertinent question of what the legislature meant by “the offense.”

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State v. Lightel

The crime in this case was sexual exploitation of a minor. “An
actor commits sexual exploitation of a minor when the actor
knowingly possesses or intentionally views child sexual abuse
material.” Id. § 76-5b-201(2). Thus, we agree that “the offense” in
a given case of sexual exploitation of a minor has within or as a
part of itself the defendant’s conduct that satisfied the elements of
the crime—namely, the action of knowingly possessing or
intentionally viewing child sexual abuse material. However, the
crime includes (1) the defendant’s knowing or intentional state of
mind, (2) the act of possessing or viewing, and (3) the object of
that action—an item of child sexual abuse material. Thus, in a very
real sense, the object of the defendant’s action—the item of child
sexual abuse material possessed or viewed—is also within or a
part of the offense. Under this reading, if that item “depict[s] . . .
a minor” being forced or coerced into “engaging in sexually
explicit conduct,” id. § 76-5b-103(1) (defining child sexual abuse
material), then the depicted force or coercion is also within or a
part of the offense. This is a reasonable reading of the statute even
if proof of such force or coercion is not required to establish that
the crime was committed, because the child sexual abuse material
that is viewed or possessed is an integral part of the crime. Had
the legislature intended to foreclose this reading of the statute, it
could have done so by tasking sentencing courts with
determining not whether “the offense” involved force or coercion
but, rather, whether “the defendant’s conduct” involved force or
coercion. It did not.

¶18 To this point, we have demonstrated that when we use
Lightel’s preferred definition of “involve” (which we agree is a
good fit), the meaning of the other operative statutory term—“the
offense”—is still susceptible of multiple meanings: (1) it could
mean solely the defendant’s conduct that was necessary to satisfy
the elements of the crime or (2) it could also include the item of
child sexual abuse material that the defendant possessed or
viewed to commit the crime. As already noted, “the fact that the
statutory language may be susceptible of multiple meanings does

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State v. Lightel

not [necessarily] render it ambiguous; all but one of the meanings
is ordinarily eliminated by context.” Olsen, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 13
(cleaned up). Which brings us to the second problem with
Lightel’s proposed reading of section 77-41-105(3)(c)(iii): his
proposed reading is eliminated by the broader context of the Sex,
Kidnap, and Child Abuse Offender Registry statute.

¶19 As outlined above, the statute requires a registration
period of the sentence for the crime plus ten years for adult
offenders who commit some sex crimes (e.g., lewdness involving
a child) and lifetime registration for adults who commit other sex
crimes (e.g., rape of a child). See Utah Code
§§ 77-41-105(3)(a), -105(3)(c)(i), -106. By enacting this scheme, the
legislature has clearly deemed the commission of some sex crimes
to be indicative of the offender posing a higher risk of lifetime
danger to society than the commission of other sex crimes.
Likewise, the statute allows adult offenders under age twenty-one
whose sex crimes would otherwise require lifetime registration to
instead register for a shorter period of time if their individual
offenses do not involve force or coercion. See id. § 77-41-
105(3)(c)(iii). Through this portion of the registration regime, the
legislature has also clearly shown that it deems the probability
that an offender poses a lower risk of lifetime danger to be a
function of two additional factors: (1) the age of the offender at the
time of the crime and (2) a lack of force or coercion within or as
part of the offense. Thus, the broader context of the Sex, Kidnap,
and Child Abuse Offender Registry statute demonstrates that the
legislature’s intent was that in order for an adult offender to
qualify for the exception to lifetime registration, he or she must
show both that he or she was under the age of twenty-one at the
time of the crime and that his or her particular offense was of a
different character from what it might have been in that it did not
involve force or coercion.

¶20 Lightel concedes that under his proposed reading of
section 77-41-105(3)(c)(iii), an offender would never have to show

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State v. Lightel

that his or her particular offense of sexual exploitation of a minor
was any different from any other defendant’s version of the
offense because, in every instance, the sentencing court would
determine (based on a legal ruling we would issue here) only that
the use of force or coercion never satisfies an element of sexual
exploitation of a minor. Thus, in practice the only thing an adult
offender who committed sexual exploitation of a minor would
have to show to qualify for the exception to lifetime registration is
that he or she was under age twenty-one at the time of the crime.
And such a result is contrary to the legislature’s plain mandate
that a two-factored factual inquiry be employed before excepting
an adult offender from otherwise-required lifetime registration.
See generally Croft v. Morgan County, 2021 UT 46, ¶¶ 32‒35, 496
P.3d 83 (recognizing and applying “the canon of surplusage,”
which “establishes . . . a presumption that statutory language be
given operative effect” (cleaned up)).

¶21 On the other hand, interpreting “the offense” in a
particular instance of sexual exploitation of a minor to include the
item of child sexual abuse material possessed or viewed by the
offender comports with the plain intent of the legislature as
evidenced by the statutory scheme as a whole. Stated another
way, Utah’s registration regime makes plain that the legislature
views, for example, a child rape accomplished through a twenty-
year-old’s use of force to be more indicative of the probability that
the defendant poses a lifetime risk to society than if the defendant
accomplished the crime through some other means, such as by
engaging in intercourse with a willing (though legally
nonconsenting) thirteen-year-old. See Utah Code § 76-5-402.1
(defining “[c]hild” to mean “an individual who is younger than
14 years old,” and stating that “[a]n actor commits rape of a child
if the actor . . . has sexual intercourse with a child”). And viewing
section 77-41-105(3)(c)(iii) in the context of that regime, we do not
hesitate to conclude that the legislature has also deemed sexual
exploitation of a minor accomplished through a twenty-year-old’s
possession or viewing of an image depicting a minor being forced

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State v. Lightel

to engage in sexually explicit conduct to likewise be more
indicative of the probability that the defendant poses a lifetime
risk to society than if the twenty-year-old defendant
accomplished the crime through the possession or viewing, for
example, of an image depicting a seventeen-year-old’s unforced
and uncoerced partial nudity. See id. § 76-5b-103(1), (7), (10)
(defining “[c]hild sex abuse material” to include, among other
things, “the visual depiction” of a seventeen-year-old’s “nudity or
partial nudity for the purpose of causing sexual arousal of any
individual”).

¶22 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that when a sentencing
court determines under Utah Code section 77-41-105(3)(c)(iii)(A)
whether “the offense” in a particular case of sexual exploitation of
a minor “involve[s] force or coercion,” it is required to examine
not only the defendant’s conduct but also the child sexual abuse
material at issue and determine whether the images depicted
therein involve force or coercion. Here, because it is undisputed
that at least some of the child sexual abuse material that Lightel
pled guilty to possessing involved force or coercion, the district
court did not err by declining to find that Lightel’s offenses did
not involve force or coercion.

CONCLUSION

¶23 Because the district court correctly interpreted and applied
the statute at issue, we affirm.

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