Hubbard v. Beckstead

2025 UT App 24

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHARLES AARON HUBBARD, LEE ANN HUBBARD, TRACY LEE,
DUANE FRANCE, AND HOLLY FRANCE,
Appellants,
v.
JEFFERY J. BECKSTEAD, DAVID CHUGG, JEFFERY BECKSTEAD IRA, AND
DAVID KENT CHUGG IRA,
Appellees.

Opinion
No. 20230202-CA
Filed February 27, 2025

Second District Court, Ogden Department
The Honorable Joseph M. Bean
No. 200906035

M. Darin Hammond and Kenneth Dwayne Kitchen
Brown, Attorneys for Appellants
John E. Keiter, Attorney for Appellees

JUDGE AMY J. OLIVER authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and DAVID N.
MORTENSEN concurred.

OLIVER, Judge:

¶1 For over twenty years, Charles Aaron and Lee Ann
Hubbard, Tracy Lee, and Duane and Holly France (collectively,
Appellants) have used a dirt lane located on a parcel of land
formally used as a railroad (the Railroad Parcel) to access the rear
sections of their properties. In 2007, Union Pacific Railroad (Union
Pacific) deeded the Railroad Parcel to Bartholomew Properties,
LLC (Bartholomew), a predecessor in interest to Jeffery J.
Beckstead, David Chugg, Jeffery Beckstead IRA, and David Kent
Chugg IRA (collectively, Appellees). After Appellees were
deeded the Railroad Parcel, they restricted Appellants’ use of the
Hubbard v. Beckstead

parcel. Shortly thereafter, Appellants initiated this action seeking
to gain continued access to the Railroad Parcel by enforcing their
alleged prescriptive easement rights. The district court granted
summary judgment to Appellees. Appellants claim that the
district court erred in its interpretation of the operative deed. We
find no error on the part of the district court and affirm the grant
of summary judgment in favor of Appellees.

BACKGROUND

The Contested Easement

¶2 Appellees own real property (the Property) in Weber
County, Utah, comprised of two parcels, the Railroad Parcel and
another parcel. Appellees obtained title to both parcels in 2020
and combined them into one parcel in 2021.

¶3 Appellants own properties in Weber County, Utah, that
border the Railroad Parcel on the west. The Railroad Parcel
consists of a dirt lane that runs from 1200 West in the City of Farr
West alongside the rear of Appellants’ properties. Appellants
have used the Railroad Parcel to access the rear sections of their
properties for over twenty years and have installed gates and
open sections of fencing abutting the Railroad Parcel. Appellants
used the Railroad Parcel to bring “equipment, improvements,
vehicles, and other material” to the rear of their properties
“without having to drive through and damage their yards.”

¶4 The Railroad Parcel runs along a 100-foot-wide remnant of
a railway originally constructed in the 1870s. Union Pacific
received the Railroad Parcel in 1874 via a quitclaim deed from
Dudley Chase (the 1874 Deed). The 1874 Deed states that Union
Pacific paid $914.64 in damages to Chase “on account or by reason
of the taking, occupation and use of said strip of land.” The 1874
Deed describes the parcel as “[a] strip of land one hundred feet in
width, and being fifty feet wide on each side of the center line of

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Hubbard v. Beckstead

the track of said Railroad, as now located and built, extending
through and across the . . . described tract.”

¶5 The Railroad Parcel appears to have had an operational
railway until 1942 when an Interstate Commerce Commission
decision (the 1942 ICC Decision) permitted the abandonment of
the operation of the Oregon Short Line Railroad between Corinne
Junction and Ogden, Utah. The Railroad Parcel was a segment of
the Oregon Short Line Railroad, but the Railroad Parcel was never
deeded to the Oregon Short Line Railroad. No other decision from
the Interstate Commerce Commission or its successor, the Surface
Transportation Board, relating to the Railroad Parcel has been
found. No railroad tracks currently exist on the Railroad Parcel,
and it is unclear exactly when they were removed.

¶6 In 2007, Union Pacific executed a quitclaim deed (the 2007
Deed) granting Bartholomew all of Union Pacific’s “right, title,
interest, estate, claim and demand, both at law in equity, of, in and
to the real estate . . . in Weber County, State of Utah.” However,
in the 2007 Deed, Union Pacific specifically excepted and reserved
all minerals and mineral rights. The property description
included with the 2007 Deed is as follows:

BEGINNING AT A POINT ON THE WEST LINE
OF 1200 WEST STREET, SAID POINT BEING
LOCATED NORTH 89°10’32” WEST 588.52 FEET
ALONG THE SECTION LINE AND SOUTH
01°47’02” WEST 4210.69 FEET FROM THE
NORTHEAST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 1,
AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 01°47’02”
WEST ALONG SAID WEST LINE 291.91 FEET TO
THE PROLONGATION OF THE WEST LINE OF
THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD RIGHT OF
WAY, A 100 FOOT WIDE STRIP OF GROUND AS
SHOWN PLAT OF MOUNTAIN VIEW
SUBDIVISION PHASE 1, A PLAT RECORDED AT
THE OFFICE OF THE WEBER COUNTY

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Hubbard v. Beckstead

RECORDER, THE POSTION OF SAID
SUBDIVISION HAVING BEEN CALCULATED
ON THE GROUND BASED ON FOUR EXISTING
STREET CENTERLINE MONUMENTS IN SAID
SUBDIVISION; THENCE NORTH 18°14’59” WEST
19.75 FEET ALONG THE WESTERLY LINE OF
SAID RAIROAD RIGHT OF WAY TO AN ANGLE
POINT ON THE EASTERLY LINE OF SAID
MOUNTAIN VIEW SUBDIVISION PHASE 1;
THENCE NORTH 18°14’59” WEST ALONG THE
EASTERLY LINE OF SAID SUBDIVISION AND
THE WESTERLY LINE OF SAID RIGHT OF WAY
630.01 FEET TO THE PROLONGATION OF THE
NORTHERLY LINE OF THE BARTHOLOMEW
PROPERTY; THENCE SOUTH 87°51’59” EAST
PARALLEL WITH SAID NORTHERLY LINE
106.68 FEET TO THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF
SAID BARTHOLOMEW PROPERTY, SAID POINT
BEING ON THE EASTERLY LINE OF SAID
RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY; AND THENCE
SOUTH 18°14’59” EAST ALONG THE WESTERLY
LINE OF SAID BARTHOLOMEW PROPERTY
AND THE EASTERLY LINE OF SAID RIGHT OF
WAY 338.35 FEET TO THE WESTERLY LINE OF
SAID 1200 WEST STREET AND THE POINT OF
BEGINNING.

¶7 The plat for Mountain View Subdivision Phase 1, where
Appellants’ properties are located, describes the eastern
boundary of the subdivision as

BEGINNING AT A POINT S14°31’05”W 3866.40
FEET FROM THE NE COR. OF SAID SEC. 1, . . .
SAID POINT BEING ON THE WEST R.O.W. OF
THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY AND RUNNING THENCE

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Hubbard v. Beckstead

S18°14’00”E 767.58 FEET ALONG SAID . . . R.O.W.
TO A POINT ON THE WEST R.O.W. OF 1200 WEST
STREET: THENCE S02°00’00”W 538.50 FEET
ALONG SAID R.O.W. OF 1200 WEST STREET . . . .

¶8 Southern Pacific Railroad Company, mentioned in both the
2007 Deed and the Mountain View Subdivision Phase 1 plat
description, received rights to the Railroad Parcel from Union
Pacific at some point between 1874 and 1942. Union Pacific
regained control of the Railroad Parcel when the two railroads
merged in 1996.

¶9 Following a series of real estate transactions, Appellees
purchased the Railroad Parcel in 2020 and received a warranty
deed. After the purchase, Appellees began interfering with
Appellants’ use of the Railroad Parcel, first by dumping dirt on
the lane used by Appellants to access their properties and then by
cutting off Appellants’ access to the Railroad Parcel completely.

The District Court Proceedings

¶10 Appellants initiated this action seeking continued access to
the Railroad Parcel by enforcement of their alleged prescriptive
easement rights. Appellants moved for an ex parte temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction prohibiting
Appellees “from grading, altering, or in any way modifying” the
Railroad Parcel. The district court granted Appellants’ motion for
a temporary restraining order, allowing Appellants to use the
Railroad Parcel as they had in the past. At a later hearing, the
district court granted Appellants’ request for a preliminary
injunction, which continued Appellants’ permitted use of the
Railroad Property.

¶11 After discovery, Appellees moved for summary judgment,
arguing that Appellants could not establish a prescriptive
easement. The district court held oral argument on the summary
judgment motion and requested supplemental briefing on the

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Hubbard v. Beckstead

chain of title. After the supplemental briefing was filed, the
district court resumed argument on Appellees’ motion for
summary judgment. The court stated that it was inclined to grant
Appellees’ motion for summary judgment because it found that
the language of the 1874 Deed and the 1942 ICC Decision support
that the transfer from Chase to Union Pacific in the 1874 Deed was
not in fee simple. The district court told Appellees to submit an
order for the court to consider and permitted the parties to submit
any further briefing on chain of title. The court reconvened for a
review hearing a little over a month later and granted Appellees’
motion for summary judgment.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12 Appellants assert that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment to Appellees on Appellants’ claims. “In
reviewing a district court’s summary judgment ruling, we review
its legal conclusions . . . for correctness.” Arlington Mgmt. Assocs.,
Inc. v. Urology Clinic of Utah Valley, LLC, 2021 UT App 72, ¶ 9, 496
P.3d 719 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

¶13 Appellants frame their arguments in various ways on
appeal, but in essence, they argue that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment when it concluded that (1) the 1874
Deed conveyed something less than fee simple title and (2) they
did not establish the requisite twenty years of continuous use
required for a prescriptive easement. 1 To assess Appellants’

1. Appellants also argue in their reply brief that summary
judgment was not appropriate because there are numerous
disputes as to material facts. However, because Appellants raised
this issue for the first time in their reply brief, the issue is
(continued…)

20230202-CA 6 2025 UT App 24
Hubbard v. Beckstead

arguments, we first interpret the 1874 Deed to determine whether
Union Pacific received fee simple title to the Railroad Parcel.
“When a district court interprets a deed as a matter of law, we
accord its construction no particular weight, reviewing its action
under a correctness standard.” Keith v. Mountain Resorts Dev., LLC,
2014 UT 32, ¶ 17, 337 P.3d 213 (cleaned up). We next determine
when Union Pacific “ceased to use or retain the land for the
purposes for which it was granted,” see Weiser v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., 2010 UT 4, ¶ 34, 247 P.3d 357 (cleaned up), in order to
determine when the twenty-year time period began to run for
Appellants’ prescriptive easement claim, see Kiernan Family
Draper, LLC v. Hidden Valley Health Centers, LC, 2021 UT 54, ¶ 41,
497 P.3d 330 (“To obtain a prescriptive easement, a party must
establish a property use that is (1) open, (2) notorious, (3) adverse,
and (4) continuous for at least 20 years.” (cleaned up)). As set forth
below, we conclude that the 1874 Deed conveyed an interest less
than fee simple, Union Pacific did not abandon the Railroad
Parcel in the 1942 ICC Decision but rather ceased retaining the
Railroad Parcel in the 2007 Deed, and Appellants’ claim for a
prescriptive easement thus runs from the date of the 2007 Deed,
less than twenty years ago.

A. The Pacific Railroad Acts

¶14 The Pacific Railroad Acts were a series of acts passed by
the United States Congress to aid in the construction of a
transcontinental railroad. See Pacific Railroad Act, ch. 120, 12 Stat.
489 (1862); Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 112, 12 Stat. 807 (establishing
the gauge of the Pacific Railroad and its branches); Pacific
Railroad Act of 1864, ch. 216, 13 Stat. 356 (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§ 885 (1866)); Pacific Railroad Act of 1865, ch. 88, 13 Stat. 504;

considered waived, and we will not address it on the merits. See
State v. Lorenzo, 2015 UT App 189, ¶ 12, 358 P.3d 330 (“It is well
settled that issues raised by an appellant in the reply brief that
were not presented in the opening brief are considered waived
and will not be considered by the appellate court.” (cleaned up)).

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Hubbard v. Beckstead

Pacific Railroad Act of 1866, ch. 159, 14 Stat. 79. The Pacific
Railroad Act of 1864 specifically allowed “Union Pacific Railroad
Company” to “enter upon, purchase, take, and hold any lands or
premises that may be necessary and proper for the construction
and working of said road not exceeding in width one hundred feet
on each side of its centre line,” and provide the owner of the
property with damages. Pacific Railroad Act of 1864, ch. 216, § 3,
13 Stat. 356.

¶15 The 1874 Deed’s language and format show that it is
governed by the grant of eminent domain power given to Union
Pacific in the Pacific Railroad Act of 1864. The 1874 Deed is a fill-
in form that has standard language and blank spaces that allow
for the particular details to be written in. These include a
description of the parcel being transferred, the location of the
parcel, and the parties to the transfer. The form language of the
deed states that compensation “is in full satisfaction and
discharge of all damages” for the “taking, occupation and use of
said strip of land.”

¶16 The description of the property conveyed to Union Pacific
is “[a] strip of land one hundred feet in width, and being fifty feet
wide on each side of the center line of the track of said Railroad,
as now located and built.” 2 The width of the property deeded to
Union Pacific and the existence of railroad tracks at the time of
transfer show that the 1874 Deed was a taking under the eminent
domain power granted to Union Pacific by the Pacific Railroad
Act of 1864. See id. Further, the deed compensated Chase for
“damages” for a “taking,” language that clearly demonstrates that
this was a taking under Union Pacific’s eminent domain power
rather than an arm’s length transaction between private parties
with consideration. Finally, the fact that a fill-in form was used
demonstrates that this was a common transaction that Union
Pacific engaged in with all owners of land where railroad tracks
had been built. Therefore, the language of the 1874 Deed is not

2. The handwritten portion of the description is reflected in italics.

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ambiguous; the transaction between Chase and Union Pacific was
a taking via the eminent domain powers granted to Union Pacific
under the Pacific Railroad Act of 1864.

B. The Fee Title of the Railroad Parcel

¶17 Because the transfer between Chase and Union Pacific was
a taking according to eminent domain powers specifically
granted by Congress, Union Pacific did not receive title to the
Railroad Parcel in fee simple. Land conveyed to Union Pacific
and other railroads under the Pacific Railroad Acts of 1862 and
1864 was granted in limited fee rather than in fee simple. See
Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 572 U.S. 93, 102
(2014) (“The pre-1871 statutes, granting rights of way
accompanied by checkerboard land subsidies, conveyed to
the railroads a limited fee, made on an implied condition of
reverter.” (cleaned up)); Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S.
262, 273 n.6 (1942) (“[T]he rights of way conveyed in such land-
grant acts [as the 1862 Union Pacific Grant and the 1864 Amended
Union Pacific Grant] have been held to be limited fees.”); Northern
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267, 271 (1903) (holding that land
granted to Northern Pacific Railroad Company under eminent
domain powers granted to it by Congress was held in “limited fee,
made on an implied condition of reverter,” rather than in fee
simple).

¶18 And as our supreme court recognized, “the United States
Supreme Court has clarified that the nature of federal right-of-
way grants to railroad companies prior to 1871 are of a limited fee,
made on an implied condition of reverter in the event that the
company ceased to use or retain the land for the purposes for
which it was granted.” Weiser v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2010 UT 4,
¶ 34, 247 P.3d 357 (cleaned up). Therefore, because the grant from
Congress under which Union Pacific obtained its eminent domain
power to take the Railroad Parcel occurred prior to 1871, Union
Pacific received the Railroad Parcel in limited fee.

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Hubbard v. Beckstead

C. The Prescriptive Easement Rights

¶19 Appellants claim that they are entitled to a prescriptive
easement because they have used the Railroad Parcel over a
period of more than twenty years and otherwise meet the
required elements under Utah law. But Appellants could not
acquire a prescriptive easement “of greater duration than the
interest that [Union Pacific held] in the burdened estate.” Jon W.
Bruce, James W. Ely Jr. & Edward T. Brading, The Law of Easements
& Licenses in Land, § 2:9 (updated February 2025); see also Mansfield
v. Neff, 134 P. 1160, 1164 (Utah 1913) (holding that claims of
adverse possession while property is held by a life tenant only
accrue against the life tenants and not against the remainder
interest holder); State v. Beeson, 232 S.W.3d 265, 276–77 (Tex. App.
2007) (holding that “[a]ny prescriptive easement that the
landowners possessed against the railroad terminated when the
railroad abandoned the property” because it would be
unreasonable for the future interest holder’s future property
rights to be impaired by a prescriptive easement obtained
when the future interest holder had no right to possess the
property).

¶20 As we explained above, see supra ¶¶ 17–18, Union Pacific
obtained a limited fee interest in the Railroad Parcel pursuant to
the Pacific Railroad Act of 1864. Thus, while Appellants could
obtain a prescriptive easement against Union Pacific’s limited fee
interest in the Railroad Parcel, any prescriptive rights Appellants
obtained against Union Pacific’s limited fee terminated when
Union Pacific relinquished its rights in 2007, and a new
prescriptive period began to run against Appellees. Appellants
resist this conclusion with two arguments: (1) Union Pacific
abandoned the right of way in the Railroad Parcel in 1942 and
(2) if Union Pacific received less than fee simple title to the
Railroad Parcel in the 1874 Deed, then the successors of Union
Pacific, including Appellees, could not obtain fee simple title to
the property. We are not persuaded.

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Hubbard v. Beckstead

¶21 First, Appellants argue that even if Union Pacific did not
obtain fee simple title to the Railroad Parcel from the 1874 Deed,
Appellants would still have a valid prescriptive easement because
Union Pacific abandoned its right of way in the Railroad Parcel in
the 1942 ICC Decision. But Appellants misread the 1942 ICC
Decision. The first page indicates that the certificate issued by the
ICC permitted “abandonment of operation by the Southern
Pacific Company . . . over the Oregon Short Line Railroad between
Corinne Junction and Ogden, in Box Elder and Weber Counties,
Utah.” The Southern Pacific Railroad Company did not abandon
the right-of-way itself; rather, it abandoned operation over the
Oregon Short Line Railroad in that particular location. And while
it is undisputed that Union Pacific regained its rights in the
Railroad Parcel upon merging with the Southern Pacific Railroad
Company in 1996, there is no evidence that the Railroad Parcel
was ever deeded to the Oregon Short Line Railroad. Thus, the
1942 ICC Decision does not support Appellants’ contention that
Union Pacific abandoned the Railroad Parcel in 1942.

¶22 Second, the Pacific Railroad Act of 1864 was a “pre–1871
statute[],” and thus, the grant conveyed to Union Pacific under
the act was “a limited fee, made on an implied condition of
reverter.” Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 572
U.S. 93, 102 (2014) (cleaned up). The “implied reversionary
interest” in these pre–1871 grants was retained by the United
States. 3 See id. at 109. But neither the United States nor anyone else,

3. Although not raised by either party, we note that in 1922
Congress passed the Railroad Right-of-Way Abandonment Act,
under which the United States relinquished any reversionary
interest in the land unless the land was “embraced in a public
highway legally established within one year” after the
abandonment. 43 U.S.C. § 912. If not embraced as a public
highway, the reversionary interest formally held by the United
States would revert to the person or entity whose land was
traversed by the railroad line. Id.

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Hubbard v. Beckstead

including any descendent of Chase, is asserting rightful
ownership of any reversionary interest in the Railroad Parcel.
And regardless of who the fee simple owner of the Railroad Parcel
is, Appellants cannot obtain a prescriptive easement over the
Railroad Parcel because in 2007, when Union Pacific abandoned
its rights in the parcel, the property went from being held as a
limited fee to being held in fee simple. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Townsend, 190 U.S. 267, 271 (1903) (“In effect the grant was of a
limited fee, made on an implied condition of reverter in the event
that the company ceased to use or retain the land for the purpose
for which it was granted.”). Thus, the twenty-year period
required to obtain a prescriptive easement started anew in 2007
and does not vest until 2027. See Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254,
1258 (Utah 1998) (holding that a prescriptive easement requires
use of another’s land “for a period of twenty years” (cleaned up)).

¶23 Therefore, Appellants cannot establish current prescriptive
easement rights over the Railroad Parcel because the future
interest in the parcel did not vest until Union Pacific abandoned
its right of way less than twenty years ago via the 2007 Deed.

CONCLUSION

¶24 Because the 1874 deed conveyed the Railroad Parcel to
Union Pacific in limited fee rather than fee simple, any
prescriptive easement claim Appellants had against Union Pacific
was only against Union Pacific’s limited fee interest in the
Railroad Parcel. Accordingly, when Union Pacific sold its interest
in the parcel in 2007 and it returned to fee simple form, the
prescriptive period began anew, so Appellants could not possibly
meet the length of time required for a prescriptive easement until
2027. Therefore, Appellants have not demonstrated they have a
prescriptive easement on the Railroad Parcel and summary
judgment in favor of Appellees was properly granted.

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