In re C.A.

2017 UT App 72
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH , IN THE INTEREST OF C.A., M.A., AND M.A.,
PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
B.D.J.,
Appellant,
v.
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee.
Per Curiam Opinion
No. 20170143-CA
Filed April 27, 2017
Seventh District Juvenile Court, Monticello Department
The Honorable Mary L. Manley
No. 1129857
Don M. Torgerson, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M.
Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem
Before JUDGES M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN , K ATE A. TOOMEY , and
DAVID N. M ORTENSEN .
PER CURIAM:
¶1 	B.D.J. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental
rights. Mother asserts that it was not in the best interests of the
children to terminate her parental rights. We affirm.
¶2 	“[I]n order to overturn the juvenile court’s decision [to
terminate a person’s parental rights,] the result must be against
the clear weight of the evidence or leave the appellate court with
a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.” In

In re C.A.
20170143-CA 	2 	2017 UT App 72
re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435 (citation and internal
quotation 	marks 	omitted). 	We 	“review 	the 	juvenile 	court’s
factual findings based upon the clearly erroneous standard.” In
re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ¶ 11, 21 P.3d 680. A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous only when, in light of the evidence supporting
the finding, it is against the clear weight of the evidence. See id.
Further, we give the juvenile court “wide latitude of discretion
as to the judgments arrived at based upon not only the court’s
opportunity to judge credibility firsthand, but also based on the
juvenile court judges’ special training, experience and interest in
this field.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Finally, “[w]hen a foundation for the court’s decision exists in
the evidence, an appellate court may not engage in a reweighing
of the evidence.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12.
¶3 	Mother 	asserts 	that 	the 	juvenile 	court 	erred 	in
determining 	that 	it 	was 	in 	the 	children’s 	best 	interests 	to
terminate her parental rights. Specifically, Mother argues that
because the children were not yet eligible to be adopted by their
foster parents, the court should have given her more time to
demonstrate 	her 	fitness. 	The 	juvenile 	court 	made 	specific
findings, unchallenged by Mother, that support its best interests
determination. 	For 	example, 	the 	juvenile 	court 	found 	that
Mother’s visits with the children reversed the positive progress
of the children’s behavior since being taken into the State’s
custody. 	The 	court 	went 	on 	to 	find 	that 	because 	of 	this
regression, 	“contact 	by 	the 	mother 	is 	compromising 	the
placement” of the children and “[c]ontinued visitation with the
mother is detrimental to the children.” Further, the juvenile
court found that the children appear to have “no bonds of love
and affection with their Mother or any significant relationship
with her.” The juvenile court similarly made several findings
concerning the lack of any progress Mother had been making
with her service plan. These unchallenged findings support the
juvenile court’s determination that it was in the best interests of
the children to terminate Mother’s parental rights regardless of

In re C.A.
20170143-CA 	3 	2017 UT App 72
the timing of any potential approval to allow the foster parents
to adopt the children. Because a foundation for the juvenile
court’s decision exists in the record, we may not engage in a
reweighing of that evidence. See id.
¶4 	Affirmed.