Scott v. Labor Commission

1. The Honorable Pamela T. Greenwood, Senior Judge, sat by
special assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah Code
Jud. Admin. R. 11-201(6).
2013 UT App 291
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ANNETTE SCOTT,
Petitioner,
v.
LABOR COMMISSION; GARDEN BURGER, INC.; AND
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND,
Respondents.
Memorandum Decision
No. 20120526-CA
Filed December 12, 2013
Original Proceeding in this Court
David J. Holdsworth, Attorney for Petitioner
Jaceson R. Maughan, Attorney for Respondent
Labor Commission
Floyd W. Holm, Attorney for Respondents Garden
Burger, Inc. and Workers Compensation Fund
JUDGE JAMES Z. DAVIS authored this Memorandum Decision, in
which JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN and SENIOR JUDGE
PAMELA T. GREENWOOD concurred.1
DAVIS, Judge:
¶1 Annette Scott seeks review of the Utah Labor Commission’s
decision upholding the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) ruling that
she is not eligible to receive workers’ compensation benefits for a
2002 neck injury that she alleges required surgery in 2011. We
decline to disturb the Commission’s decision.

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20120526-CA 2 2013 UT App 291
¶2 Scott presents two issues on review. First, she asserts that
the Commission abused its discretion by not considering her late-
filed medical evidence. The Commission is granted broad
discretion in how it conducts its review of an ALJ’s decision, see
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-802(1) (LexisNexis 2011), and is permitted
to “make its own findings of fact” and “take further evidence,”
United States Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 607 P.2d 807, 810
(Utah 1980). See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-303(4)(c) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2013); Jones v. Ogden Auto Body, 646 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1982)
(per curiam) (“[W]hether further findings are made is a matter of
discretion with the Commission.”). We review the Commission’s
decision to exclude Scott’s late-filed medical evidence for an abuse
of discretion. See United States Steel, 607 P.2d at 810.
¶3 Scott also contends that substantial evidence does not
support the Commission’s decision to uphold the ALJ’s ruling that
the 2002 work accident was not the cause of her 2011 neck
condition. “Substantial evidence has been defined as that quantum
and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a
reasonable mind to support a conclusion.” Acosta v. Labor Comm'n,
2002 UT App 67, ¶ 29, 44 P.3d 819 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). We “give deference to the initial decision maker on
questions of fact because it stands in a superior position from
which to evaluate and weigh the evidence and assess the credibility
and accuracy of witnesses’ recollections.” Carbon Cnty. v. Workforce
Appeals Bd., 2013 UT 41, ¶ 6, 308 P.3d 477; see Murray v. Utah Labor
Comm’n, 2013 UT 38, ¶¶ 19–20, 308 P.3d 461. We address each
argument in turn.
I. Excluded Evidence
¶4 The new medical evidence that the Commission excluded
consists of two medical reports from Scott’s physicians that she
submitted to the Commission in connection with her Motion for
Review. One report contains her treating physician’s criticism of
the medical panel’s report and the ALJ’s ruling. The other report is
largely composed of Scott’s surgeon’s notes about her post-
operation condition but contains one sentence in which the surgeon

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20120526-CA 3 2013 UT App 291
attributes Scott’s 2011 neck condition to her 2002 work accident.
Scott describes this new evidence as proof that her 2002 work
accident caused her 2011 condition. She does not dispute that she
submitted the evidence late; rather, she contends that the
Commission abused its discretion when it excluded such
“extremely helpful” evidence, regardless of its timeliness.
¶5 We fail to see how these two medical reports contain any
new or “extremely helpful” evidence. Both the Commission and
ALJ included in their findings the same two physicians’ opinions
that Scott’s 2011 neck condition was “medically caused by the
September 9, 2002 industrial accident.” In fact, these two
physicians’ opinions as to causation, which are in disagreement
with other medical opinions in the record, prompted the ALJ to
refer the issue of causation to a medical panel in the first place.
Accordingly, because this information was already in the record
presented to the Commission, the Commission’s exclusion of the
late-filed medical reports does not undermine the requirement that
it consider all of the evidence in making its determination, see
Resort Retainers v. Labor Comm’n, 2010 UT App 229, ¶ 29, 238 P.3d
1081. The Commission acted well within the bounds of its broad
discretion when it excluded these two reports. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 34A-2-802(1) (granting the Labor Commission the discretion to
conduct “its investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to
carry out justly the spirit of the chapter”); cf. Utah Admin. Code
R602-2-2(B) (“Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting
medical evidence, the [ALJ] may, in lieu of a hearing, re-submit the
new evidence to the panel for consideration and clarification.”);
Certified Bldg. Maint. v. Labor Comm’n, 2012 UT App 240, ¶ 15, 285
P.3d 831 (noting that rule R602-2-2(B) of the Utah Administrative
Code is “expressly permissive”).
II. Substantial Evidence
¶6 Scott contends that the Commission’s decision is not based
on substantial evidence. Specifically, she contends that the medical
evidence indicating that she consistently complained of neck pain

Scott v. Labor Commission
20120526-CA 4 2013 UT App 291
from 2002 to 2011, which culminated in her 2011 neck surgery,
demonstrates that her 2002 trauma caused her 2011 condition by
“triggering a progressively weakening and degenerative process.”
¶7 “We have no disagreement with [Scott’s] argument that it
would be unjust and impermissible for the Commission to
obdurately ignore clear, credible and uncontradicted evidence so
that its action is arbitrary and unreasonable,” but that is not what
occurred here. See Shipley v. C & W Contracting Co., 528 P.2d 153,
155 (Utah 1974). The Commission recognized the medical evidence
supporting Scott’s theory of causation that her “history of right-
sided neck and upper-back pain for which she received chiropractic
treatment” “shows a causal connection between the accident and
her [2011 neck condition].” Nonetheless, the Commission explained
that it was ultimately not convinced by this position “in light of the
medical evidence and the [medical] panel’s report,” which
described her “right-sided symptoms leading up to the [2011]
surgery [as being] in sharp contrast [to the left-sided symptoms]
she experienced following the [2002] accident.” The Commission
indicated that it was persuaded more by the medical panel’s report
and viewed the other medical evidence in a manner contrary to
Scott’s theory of causation. The Commission “properly considered
the differing” medical opinions and “resolved the[] differences”
against Scott. See Resort Retainers, 2010 UT App 229, ¶ 29. “The
record contains substantial evidence supporting the Commission’s
findings,” see id., and we will not overturn its findings simply
because “another conclusion from the evidence is permissible,” see
Hurley v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm'n, 767 P.2d 524, 526–27
(Utah 1988).
¶8 In conclusion, the Commission did not abuse its discretion
by excluding Scott’s late-filed medical evidence. And the
Commission’s decision to uphold the ALJ’s ruling is based on
substantial evidence. Accordingly, we decline to set aside the
Commission’s decision.