Farmington City v. Lake

2013 UT App 144
_________________________________________________________
THE U TAH COURT OF A PPEALS
FARMINGTON C ITY ,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
W ADE LAKE ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Per Curiam Decision
No. 20130325‐CA
Filed June 6, 2013
Second District, Farmington Department
The Honorable David R. Hamilton
No. 125700041
Wade Lake, Appellant Pro Se
Troy S. Rawlings and J. Craig Bott, Attorneys for
Appellee
Before J UDGES ORME , R OTH, and C HRISTIANSEN.
PER CURIAM:
¶1 	Wade Lake appeals his conviction of driving without a valid
driver license, an infraction, following a trial de novo in the district
court on appeal from a conviction originating in the Davis County
Justice Court. This case is before the court on a sua sponte motion
for summary disposition.
¶2 	When a case originates in a justice court, a defendant may
appeal the judgment and conviction from the justice court and
obtain a trial de novo in the district court. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78A‐7‐118(1) (LexisNexis 2012) (providing that a defendant is
entitled to a trial de novo in district court if the defendant files a
notice of appeal within thirty days after sentencing by the justice

Farmington City v. Lake
20130325‐CA 	2013 UT App 144	2
court). Utah Code section 78A‐7‐118(8) states, “The decision of the
district court [following a trial de novo] is final and may not be
appealed unless the district court rules on the constitutionality of
a statute or ordinance.” Id. § 78A‐7‐118(8). By enacting section
78A‐7‐118(8), 	“the 	Utah 	Legislature 	. 	. 	. 	specifically 	and
intentionally limited the issues that may be appealed from a district
court’s judgment.” State v. Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 276 (Utah Ct. App.
1998). Accordingly, “absent an issue regarding the constitutionality
of a statute or ordinance, the decision of the district court is final
and this court has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal thereof.” Id. at
277– 78. Our “appellate jurisdiction is limited to only those issues
attacking the validity or constitutionality of an ordinance or
statute.” Id. at 277.
¶3 	In 	this 	appeal, 	our 	jurisdiction 	is 	limited 	by 	section
78A‐7‐118(8) to a review of any district court ruling on the
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance. At the conclusion of the
trial de novo, the district court ruled “[t]hat the [driver license]
statute in itself is not offensive to the Constitution.” The district
court also determined “that there is nothing offensive to the
constitution that occurred in terms of the facts nor the involved
statute.” Farmington City concedes that the district court ruled on
the constitutionality of the driver license statute in response to
arguments raised by Lake. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 53‐3‐
202(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2010) (“A person may not drive a motor
vehicle on a highway in this state unless the person is granted the
privilege to operate a motor vehicle by being licensed as a driver .
. . under this chapter.”). Accordingly, while we have no jurisdiction
over other claims Lake raised, we have jurisdiction to consider
Lake’s argument that the right to travel upon public highways
cannot be restricted by a state statute requiring a driver license.
¶4 	This argument has been repeatedly rejected and does not
merit plenary consideration. See, e.g., Wisden v. Salina City, 709 P.2d
371, 372 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) (stating all persons are subject to
state regulation of use of motor vehicles); see also State v. Stevens,
718 P.2d 398, 399 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (stating state regulation

Farmington City v. Lake
20130325‐CA 	2013 UT App 144	3
of the use of motor vehicles does not violate constitutional rights).
Lake’s challenge to the State’s constitutional authority to enact and
enforce traffic laws is without merit. Even case law principally
relied upon by Lake recognizes that the right to travel on public
highways may be regulated by the state. See Thompson v. Smith, 154
S.E. 579, 583 (Va. 1930).
¶5 	Affirmed.