Rayner v. Rayner

2013 UT App 269
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
TANJA RODGERS RAYNER,
Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
PAUL THOMAS RAYNER,
Respondent and Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20120307-CA
Filed November 15, 2013
Second District Court, Farmington Department
The Honorable Michael G. Allphin
No. 104701766
John M. Webster, Attorney for Appellant
George K. Fadel, Attorney for Appellee
JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored this
Opinion, in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and
J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:
¶1 Paul Thomas Rayner (Husband) appeals the trial court’s
decree of divorce, challenging the trial court’s property distribution
and alimony award. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Tanja Rodgers Rayner (Wife) and Husband were married in
1981. They separated nearly thirty years later in January 2010, and
Wife filed a petition for divorce later that year. Husband had lost
his job in April 2008. After losing his job, he received only minimal
income working with a multi-level marketing firm. However,

Rayner v. Rayner
1. We acknowledge, as Wife notes on appeal, that the trial court did
not use the term “dissipate” in its ruling. However, the meaning of
the trial court’s ruling is clear.
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Husband and Wife had stock and multiple retirement accounts,
and Husband began liquidating some of these assets after he lost
his job and continued to do so during the parties’ separation.
¶3 After a bench trial, the trial court found Husband to be
underemployed and imputed to him an annual income of $40,000.
The trial court also found that Husband had dissipated the parties’
assets, spending $116,096 “on himself” during 2008, 2009, and
2010. The imputed income and the dissipated assets factored into1
the trial court’s ultimate alimony award and property distribution
that accompanied the decree of divorce.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶4 On appeal, Husband contends that the trial court exceeded
its discretion by misapplying the law and that its findings of
underemployment and dissipation are not supported by the
evidence. “The trial court in a divorce action is permitted
considerable discretion in adjusting the financial and property
interests of the parties, and its actions are entitled to a presumption
of validity.” Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 44, 299 P.3d 1079
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, we will
reverse if “(1) there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of
the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error; (2) the
evidence clearly preponderated against the finding; or (3) such a
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Furthermore, “we cannot affirm its determination when the trial
court abuses its discretion” by failing to enter “specific, detailed
findings supporting its financial determinations.” Hall v. Hall, 858
P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

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20120307-CA 3 2013 UT App 269
ANALYSIS
I. Imputed Income
¶5 Husband first contends that the trial court’s finding of
voluntary underemployment was unsupported by the evidence.
The trial court stated that the evidence concerning whether
Husband quit or was fired for cause was unclear. Therefore, the
trial court’s finding of underemployment focused on Husband’s
actions after losing his job. The trial court found that at the time his
job ended in April 2008, Husband had an annual salary of about
$88,000. Husband “initially made an attempt to find another job.”
He was “offered a job” in Nephi for about $40,000 a year, but “he
turned that down” because “he didn’t want to move” from his
home in Bountiful. After his initial efforts, Husband “didn’t make
any other efforts to find employment.” The trial court also found
that Husband “has the ability to work regardless of the health
concerns that he has.” The trial court found that the “few hundred
dollars a year” that Husband made from his multi-level marketing
work—“and sometimes go[ing] in the hole”—did not qualify as
reasonable employment. Based on Husband’s education and
ability, and the availability of the job in Nephi, the trial court
concluded that Husband was underemployed.
¶6 Husband argues that no evidence supports these findings.
He argues that the uncontroverted evidence instead requires the
conclusion that he was fired for cause, that he was not actually
offered the job in Nephi, that moving or commuting to Nephi was
not an option, that his numerous health problems prevent him
from working a rigorous schedule or using his left hand, and that
his multi-level marketing work provided a viable source of income
given his health restrictions.
¶7 “When determining the appropriate amount of alimony, a
trial court must make findings as to ‘the ability of the payor spouse
to provide support.’” Fish v. Fish, 2010 UT App 292, ¶ 14, 242 P.3d
787 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp.

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20120307-CA 4 2013 UT App 269
2010)). “In doing so, ‘[a] court may impute income to an
underemployed spouse.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT App 139, ¶ 16, 233 P.3d 836). “[T]he
imputation analysis . . . involves determining whether the [spouse]
is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed and, if so, how much
income ought to be imputed.” Busche v. Busche, 2012 UT App 16,
¶ 13, 272 P.3d 748. A spouse is “‘voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed’ when [he or she] intentionally chooses of his or
her own free will to become unemployed or underemployed.” Id.
¶ 16 (alteration in original) (citation and additional internal
quotation marks omitted).
¶8 In Busche, we recently explained what is required under the
first step of the imputation analysis to support a finding of
voluntary underemployment following the loss of a job. If the trial
court determines that a spouse has been involuntarily terminated,
the trial court “must then consider what the [spouse] has done in
the aftermath of termination to determine whether he or she has
become voluntarily underemployed by virtue of his or her failure
to then make reasonable efforts to obtain employment at a pay rate
comparable to that of the lost employment.” Id. ¶ 21. In addition to
considering the spouse’s efforts, the trial court must consider the
spouse’s “employment capacity and earnings potential.” Hall v.
Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1026 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Employment
capacity involves consideration of the spouse’s abilities and
limitations, qualifications, experience, and skills. Busche, 2012 UT
App 16, ¶¶ 21–22; Hall, 858 P.2d at 1026. An earning potential
determination involves comparison of the spouse’s current
earnings with his or her historical income, “the prevailing wages
for a person with his or her qualifications” and consideration of
whether there are jobs reasonably available “in the relevant market
for a person with the party’s qualifications and experience.” Busche,
2012 UT App 16, ¶¶ 21–23; Hall, 858 P.2d at 1026. In sum, “a
finding of voluntary underemployment must be based on evidence
that the party could be earning more with reasonable effort.”
Busche, 2012 UT App 16, ¶ 22.

Rayner v. Rayner
2. “Although this section of the Utah Code addresses imputation
for the purposes of child support, it is also relevant to imputation
in the alimony context.” Fish v. Fish, 2010 UT App 292, ¶ 14 n.5, 242
P.3d 787.
3. See Act of Feb. 7, 2008, ch. 3, § 1245, 2008 Utah Laws 48, 541–42;
Act of July 1, 2007, ch. 354, § 4, 2007 Utah Laws 2146, 2149.
20120307-CA 5 2013 UT App 269
¶9 “Should the court determine that the petitioner is indeed
voluntarily underemployed and that imputation is appropriate
under the circumstances, it may then proceed to refine the analysis
to arrive at a specific amount of income to be imputed.” Id. ¶ 23.
Under this second step of the analysis, the trial court must consider
the following statutory factors, which “closely align” with the
analysis under the first step:
If income is imputed to a [spouse], the income shall
be based upon employment potential and probable
earnings as derived from employment opportunities,
work history, occupation qualifications, and
prevailing earnings for persons of similar
backgrounds in the community, or the median
earning for persons in the same occupation in the
same geographical area as found in the statistics
maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(7)(b) (LexisNexis 2012).2
¶10 The Utah Code states that in contested cases, “[i]ncome may
not be imputed to a [spouse] unless . . . a hearing is held and the
judge . . . enters findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the
imputation.” Id. § 78B-12-203(7)(a). This statute was amended in
2007 and renumbered in 2008. The prior version stated that in3
contested cases, “[i]ncome may not be imputed to a [spouse] unless
. . . a hearing is held and a finding made that the [spouse] is
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.” Id. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a)

Rayner v. Rayner
4. While the current statute no longer refers explicitly to a finding
of voluntary unemployment or underemployment, Connell v.
Connell, 2010 UT App 139, ¶ 16 n.4, 233 P.3d 836, we conclude that
voluntary unemployment and underemployment remain relevant,
see Busche v. Busche, 2012 UT App 16, ¶ 16, 272 P.3d 748
(“Imputation is used when the obligor is believed to be concealing
income or to be shirking in his efforts to earn income.” (quoting
American Law Inst., Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution:
Analysis and Recommendations § 3.14(5) cmt. e(i) (2002))); Fish v. Fish,
2010 UT App 292, ¶¶ 14–17, 242 P.3d 787 (upholding a trial court’s
finding of underemployment under the current statute); Griffith v.
Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (“[T]he goal of
imputing income is to prevent parents from reducing their child
support or alimony by purposeful unemployment or
underemployment.” (emphasis added)), aff’d, 1999 UT 78, 985 P.2d
255.
20120307-CA 6 2013 UT App 269
(Supp. 2006). By replacing the language requiring “a finding . . .4
that the [spouse] is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed,”
id., with language requiring the judge to “enter[] findings of fact as
to the evidentiary basis for the imputation,” id. § 78B-12-203(7)(a)
(2012), we read the statute as emphasizing the detailed findings of
fact necessary to support a decision to impute income, as well as
implicitly recognizing that whether a party is voluntarily
underemployed or unemployed is really an ultimate fact or a legal
conclusion which turns on the subsidiary facts found by the trial
court. “Imputation is troubling when the obligor is charged with
obligations that he may not be able to pay, even with the best of
efforts.” Busche, 2012 UT App 16, ¶ 17 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Indeed, in the alimony context, the
imputation analysis is a component of determining the obligor’s
ability to pay and the recipient spouse’s ability to support himself
or herself. Fish, 2010 UT App 292, ¶¶ 14, 22; Willey v. Willey, 866
P.2d 547, 554 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Imputation “cannot be
premised upon mere conjecture; instead, it demands a careful and
precise assessment requiring detailed findings.” Willey, 866 P.2d at
554. Therefore, the trial court must enter not just a finding of

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20120307-CA 7 2013 UT App 269
voluntary unemployment or underemployment but specific,
detailed findings “as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation,”
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(7)(a). See Fish, 2010 UT App 292,
¶¶ 20, 22 (remanding for additional findings on whether income
should be imputed and how much); Willey, 866 P.2d at 554 (same);
Hall, 858 P.2d at 1024–27 (same). But see Mancil v. Smith, 2000 UT
App 378, ¶¶ 20–21, 18 P.3d 509 (stating, in considering the prior
version of the statute, that requiring the trial court to make “explicit
findings on each of the factors” “is too strict” a reading of the
statute, at least when the findings can be necessarily implied or are
based on undisputed evidence).
¶11 “Findings are adequate only if they are sufficiently detailed
and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.” Hall,
858 P.2d at 1021 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
accord Fish, 2010 UT App 292, ¶ 20. “The trial court’s decision to
impute income may nonetheless be affirmed if the failure to have
made the missing findings can be viewed as harmless error.” Hall,
858 P.2d at 1025. “One method is to show that the undisputed
evidence clearly establishes the factor or factors on which findings
are missing.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Mancil, 2000 UT App 378, ¶ 21 (concluding that specific
findings on the statutory imputation factors were not necessary
when the evidence was not in dispute). “Furthermore, even given
controverted evidence, we could affirm the trial court’s decision to
impute income, absent outright expression of the statutorily
mandated finding, if the absent findings can reasonably be
implied.” Hall, 858 P.2d at 1025. “Unstated findings can be implied
if it is reasonable to assume that the trial court actually considered
the controverted evidence and necessarily made a finding to
resolve the controversy, but simply failed to record the factual
determination it made.” Id.; see Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, ¶ 15, 984
P.2d 987 (determining that some of the statutory factors required
in the imputation analysis were “necessarily implied” by the
evidence). “Findings may not be implied, however, when the
ambiguity of the facts makes such an assumption unreasonable.”

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20120307-CA 8 2013 UT App 269
Hall, 858 P.2d at 1025 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). For example, “we will not imply any missing finding
where there is a matrix of possible factual findings and we cannot
ascertain the trial court’s actual findings.” Id. at 1025–26 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶12 Husband argues both that the evidence was insufficient to
support the underemployment determination and that the trial
court abused its discretion by disregarding the imputation analysis
required by Busche and the statute. However, we are unable to
review Husband’s arguments due to the inadequacy of the trial
court’s findings. “‘[W]here the inadequacy of the trial court’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law results in our inability to
ascertain the basis of the trial court’s decision, [we are] prevented
from effectively reviewing the trial court’s decision and may
remand for the entry of more-detailed findings.’” Allen v. Ciokewicz,
2012 UT App 162, ¶ 42, 280 P.3d 425 (second alteration in original)
(quoting Interstate Income Props., Inc. v. La Jolla Loans, Inc., 2011 UT
App 188, ¶ 12, 257 P.3d 1073). We follow that course here.
¶13 We cannot say that “the undisputed evidence clearly
establishes the factor or factors on which findings are missing.” See
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Nor can we
reasonably infer the missing findings from the record before us. See
id. The trial court included findings on Husband’s minimal efforts
to search for a job following his termination and Husband’s
ultimate decision to work with a low-paying multi-level marketing
company. However, the trial court’s findings of Husband’s
employment capacity are sparse. It stated that Husband had
degrees “in the computer field” and had the ability to work
“regardless of the health concerns that he has.” Extensive evidence
was presented at trial that Husband suffered from significant
health problems that prevented him from maintaining rigorous or
stressful employment or employment with a restrictive schedule.
The only contradictory testimony provided at trial was that Wife
saw Husband doing physical labor in March 2011. The trial court
may have determined that Husband’s testimony was not credible.

Rayner v. Rayner
20120307-CA 9 2013 UT App 269
On the other hand, it could have concluded that the testimony was
credible but that the health limitations did not preclude certain
types of employment in the fields of computers or teaching, in
which he had previously worked. The trial court never identified
which types of employment for which Husband was qualified and
able to do.
¶14 The trial court’s findings on earning potential are equally
sparse. The trial court stated that Husband, who lived with Wife in
Bountiful at the time, was offered a job in Nephi. Although
Husband did testify that he was offered a few jobs, including the
one in Nephi, he later clarified in response to further questioning
by the trial court that he had discussed the jobs with potential
employers but did not apply and was not actually offered any jobs.
He also testified that he considered teaching computer science
but that the University of Utah was not hiring, and while the
University of Phoenix occasionally had part-time positions
available, the pay was too low. In its findings, the trial court
mentioned only the job in Nephi, and it discussed the job in Nephi
in the context of Husband’s job search efforts and in calculating the
amount of salary to impute. The trial court never entered a finding
as to whether the job in Nephi was reasonably available in spite of
the distance from Husband’s home and Husband’s health
limitations or, alternatively, whether it was merely illustrative of
jobs likely to be available to Husband in other areas of Utah. Nor
did the trial court determine whether other appropriate jobs were
reasonably available. Finally, the trial court never stated that
Husband’s underemployment was voluntary.
¶15 While the trial court’s subsidiary findings on Husband’s job
search efforts may contribute to a conclusion of voluntary
underemployment, Husband’s employment capacity and earning
potential are necessary elements of that analysis. Given the
inadequacy of the trial court’s findings on these elements, we are
unable to review the merits of the trial court’s decision to impute
income to Husband. We therefore reverse and remand for the entry

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20120307-CA 10 2013 UT App 269
of adequately detailed findings on the relevant factors and for such
recalculations or redeterminations as may then be in order.
II. Dissipation
¶16 Husband next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the trial court’s finding that Husband dissipated marital
assets. In the alternative, he argues that, at most, the evidence
supports only a finding that he spent $29,364 of the marital assets
on non-family expenses and investments. Husband also argues that
the trial court abused its discretion by not making adequate
findings and by misapplying the law on the issue of dissipation.
¶17 Wife counters that Husband did not preserve a challenge to
the trial court’s ruling on dissipation. “[I]n order to preserve an
issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to the trial court in
such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that
issue.” 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a trial
court’s ruling need not be preserved in civil cases. See Utah R. Civ.
P. 52(b); In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 60, 201 P.3d 985 (stating that a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence need not be preserved,
but a challenge to the adequacy of findings must be). But as with
Husband’s challenge to the trial court’s imputation of income, we
are “prevented from effectively reviewing the trial court’s
decision” regarding dissipation given the inadequacy of the trial
court’s findings. See Allen v. Ciokewicz, 2012 UT App 162, ¶ 42, 280
P.3d 425 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶18 Following the loss of Husband’s job, Husband liquidated
$289,909 from stock and retirement accounts during 2008, 2009, and
2010. The trial court found that Husband “spent a lot of money on
himself, on trips, on entertainment[,] on doing things that were not
by way of family expenses.” The trial court determined that it was
“reasonable . . . to just assume that it took $88,047”—Husband’s
average annual salary for the five years before he lost his job—to

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20120307-CA 11 2013 UT App 269
meet the family’s expenses. The trial court calculated the shortfall
between the assumed family expenses and Husband’s income (for
2008) or imputed income (for 2009 and 2010). It then took the
difference between the amount Husband liquidated each year and
the shortfall for that year. The trial court concluded that any
liquidated marital assets used to meet the shortfall between actual
or imputed income and the assumed family expenses were spent
on legitimate family expenses. But the trial court concluded
without further explanation that any liquidated assets exceeding
the shortfall were dissipated. The trial court’s final calculation of
the dissipated assets was $116,096. The court then gave Wife a
credit for half of this amount in distributing the marital property.
After factoring that credit into Wife’s share of the remaining
marital property, the trial court awarded Wife the marital home, all
of Husband’s tax shelter annuity plan, half of Husband’s retirement
account, and a judgment against Husband for $12,343. We now
turn to the law governing dissipation.
¶19 “Section 30-3-5(1) of the Utah Code permits courts to issue
‘equitable orders’ relating to marital property in divorce cases.”
Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 47, 299 P.3d 1079. Generally, each
party is presumed to be entitled to half of the marital property. Id.
This presumption may be overcome in “exceptional
circumstances.” Id. ¶ 48 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). “Further, ‘the marital estate is [generally] valued at the
time of the divorce decree or trial.’” Id. ¶ 49 (alteration in original)
(quoting Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 2011 UT App 161, ¶ 39, 257 P.3d 478).
However, a trial court has broad discretion to deviate from this
general rule when circumstances warrant:
“[W]here one party has dissipated an asset, hidden
its value or otherwise acted obstructively, the trial
court may, in the exercise of its equitable powers,
value a marital asset at some time other than the time
the decree is entered, such as at separation,” “or may
otherwise hold one party accountable to the other for
the dissipation of marital assets.”

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20120307-CA 12 2013 UT App 269
Id. (quoting Parker v. Parker, 2000 UT App 30, ¶ 13, 996 P.2d 565;
Thomas v. Thomas, 1999 UT App 239, ¶ 19, 987 P.2d 603). Utah case
law suggests a number of factors that may be relevant to
determining whether a party should be held accountable for the
dissipation of marital assets: how the money was spent, including
whether funds were used to pay legitimate marital expenses or
individual expenses, Parker, 2000 UT App 30, ¶¶ 13, 15; Thomas,
1999 UT App 239, ¶ 20; Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 433
(Utah Ct. App. 1994); Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 480 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988); the parties’ historical practices, Thomas, 1999 UT
App 239, ¶ 20; the magnitude of any depletion, Shepherd, 876 P.2d
at 433; the timing of the challenged actions in relation to the
separation and divorce, id.; and any obstructive efforts that hinder
the valuation of the assets, Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶¶ 49, 53; Andrus v.
Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, ¶ 13, 169 P.3d 754. After an “initial
showing of apparent dissipation” by one party, the burden shifts
to the other party “to show that the funds were not dissipated, but
were used for some legitimate marital purpose.” Parker, 2000 UT
App 30, ¶¶ 13, 15.
¶20 When a court finds that a spouse has dissipated marital
assets, the court should determine the amount of dissipated assets
and calculate the value of the marital property as though the assets
remained. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶¶ 49, 53. “As a result, when the
court conducts its equitable distribution of the marital property, the
other spouse should receive a credit for his or her share of the
assets that were dissipated.” Id. ¶ 49. But “when a spouse’s
behavior prevents the court from determining the precise amount
of dissipated assets, the court should estimate, to the best of its
ability, the upper limit of the amount of assets that the spouse may
have dissipated.” Id. ¶ 53.
¶21 Because the principle of dissipation represents a deviation
from the general rule, its use “must be supported by sufficiently
detailed findings of fact that explain the trial court’s basis for such
deviation.” Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 262–63 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993); accord Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 2011 UT App 161, ¶ 39, 257

Rayner v. Rayner
5. We note that Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, 299 P.3d 1079, was
issued after the trial court had ruled in the present case, and thus
the trial court did not have the benefit of this guidance when it
entered its findings.
20120307-CA 13 2013 UT App 269
P.3d 478; see Andersen, 757 P.2d at 479–80 (remanding for additional
findings on the issue of dissipation); Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050,
1051–52 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (same).
¶22 Here, the trial court’s findings are inadequate to explain its
deviation from the general rules governing the valuation of marital
property. The parties did not dispute that the assets were
liquidated and spent. But the evidence addressing the use of the
liquidated assets was disputed, and subsidiary findings cannot be
reasonably implied. See Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993). The trial court did not explain why it concluded that
the liquidation and spending of the assets qualified as dissipation.
The trial court stated only that Husband had “spent a lot of money
on himself, on trips, on entertainment[,] on doing things that were
not by way of family expenses.” This finding does not provide
“sufficiently detailed” support for the trial court’s conclusion. See
Rappleye, 855 P.2d at 262–63. Furthermore, rather than calculating
the amount of assets actually dissipated, the trial court based its
valuation on an assumption of legitimate family expenses. A trial
court may “estimate, to the best of its ability, the upper limit of the
amount of assets that the spouse may have dissipated.” Goggin,
2013 UT 16, ¶ 49. But such an approach is appropriate only “when
a spouse’s behavior prevents the court from determining the
precise amount of dissipated assets.” Id. ¶ 53; see also Andrus, 2007
UT App 291, ¶ 13. The trial court did not enter any findings
suggesting that Husband’s behavior in any way prevented it from
determining the precise amount of dissipated assets. In fact, as the5
trial court acknowledged, extensive testimony and exhibits were
presented regarding how the liquidated funds were spent. The trial
court stated, “There were many documents filed and statement[s]
as to what income and expenses were. There was much that would
have taken a forensic accountant to analyze.” When insufficient

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20120307-CA 14 2013 UT App 269
evidence is presented to the court to support a finding of
dissipation, the general rules governing the valuation of marital
property apply. See Parker, 2000 UT App 30, ¶¶ 13, 15 (explaining
the burdens of production and persuasion attending a claim of
dissipation). However, if sufficient evidence is presented to the
court to support a finding of dissipation, the trial court must
explain any deviation from the general rule with “sufficiently
detailed findings.” See Rappleye, 855 P.2d at 262–63.
¶23 We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to enter
more detailed findings determining whether the liquidated assets
were in fact dissipated and what the precise amount of any
dissipated assets was or why the amount of any dissipated assets
must be estimated. We also direct the trial court to enter any
recalculations and redeterminations as may then be in order, such
as an updated division of the marital estate, including redivision of
the marital home, Husband’s annuity plan, and Husband’s
retirement account.
CONCLUSION
¶24 Because the trial court’s findings are inadequate, we are
unable to effectively review the trial court’s decision to impute
$40,000 in annual income to Husband for purposes of calculating
alimony and to include $116,096 as dissipated assets in its valuation
of the marital property. “Accordingly, we remand for more
detailed findings without restriction to any corrections or
modifications the trial court deems appropriate.” See Baum v. Hayes,
2008 UT App 371, ¶ 16, 196 P.3d 612.