In re I.L. (T.N. v. State)

1. The Honorable Pamela T. Greenwood, Senior Judge, sat by
special assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah Code
Jud. Admin. R. 11-201(6).
2014 UT App 129
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF I.L., A PERSON UNDER
EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
T.N.,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee.
Per Curiam Decision
No. 20140331-CA
Filed June 12, 2014
Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Mark W. May
No. 1088912
Brent Salazar-Hall, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and John M. Peterson, Attorneys
for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem
Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME AND MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN,
and SENIOR JUDGE PAMELA T. GREENWOOD.1
PER CURIAM:
¶1 T.N. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights.
She asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the

In re I.L.
20140331-CA 2 2014 UT App 129
grounds for terminating her parental rights and the determination
that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate her parental
rights.
¶2 “[I]n order to overturn the juvenile court’s decision [to
terminate a person’s parental rights,] ‘the result must be against the
clear weight of the evidence or leave the appellate court with a firm
and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.’” In re B.R.,
2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435 (citation omitted). We “review the
juvenile court’s factual findings based upon the clearly erroneous
standard.” In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ¶ 11, 21 P.3d 680. A finding
of fact is clearly erroneous only when, in light of the evidence
supporting the finding, it is against the clear weight of the
evidence. See id. Further, we give the juvenile court a “‘wide
latitude of discretion as to the judgments arrived at’ based upon
not only the court’s opportunity to judge credibility firsthand, but
also based on the juvenile court judge’s ‘special training, experience
and interest in this field.’” Id. (citations omitted). Finally, “[w]hen
a foundation for the court’s decision exists in the evidence, an
appellate court may not engage in a reweighing of the evidence.”
In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12.
¶3 Mother asserts that there was insufficient evidence to
support the determination that she was an unfit parent. We
disagree. The evidence in the record supports the juvenile court’s
determination. The unchallenged findings demonstrate that Mother
has significant, long-term mental health issues that resulted in her
losing her parental rights to five other children and are unlikely to
be resolved. Further, these mental health issues “severely impair
her ability to adequately parent” and limit “her ability to learn new
parenting skills.” Thus, Mother’s mental health issues render her
unable to care for the immediate needs of her child. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-6-508(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2012). Further, Mother is
currently incarcerated and awaiting trial after being charged with
the murder of I.L.’s father. Thus, at the time of the termination
proceeding, I.L. had already been deprived of a normal home for
six months, and trial had yet to be scheduled. Cf. id. § 78A-6-

In re I.L.
20140331-CA 3 2014 UT App 129
508(2)(e). Under the totality of circumstances, the juvenile court
correctly determined that Mother was unfit.
¶4 Mother next asserts that there was insufficient evidence to
support the juvenile court’s determination that it was in the best
interest of I.L. to terminate Mother’s parental rights. As stated
above, due to Mother’s mental health issues and her incarceration
related to the alleged murder of I.L.’s father, Mother is not in a
position to parent I.L., now or in the foreseeable future, and it is
unknown if and when she would be able to parent I.L. On the other
hand, I.L.’s foster parents love her, provide for her needs, have
established a bond with her, and wish to adopt her. Further, the
juvenile court found that I.L. “would benefit from the stability and
permanency an adoption would bring.” Thus, the record supports
the juvenile court’s determination that it is in I.L.’s best interest to
terminate Mother’s parental rights.
¶5 Affirmed.