State v. Levasseur

2020 UT App 118
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH
Appellee,
v.
C HAD R OLAND L EV ASSEUR ,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20190299-CA
Filed August 13, 2020
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Amber M. Mettler
No. 171912673
Teresa L. Welch, Wendy Brown, Maren E. Larson,
and Heidi Buchi, Attorneys for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and Jonathan S. Bauer,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE JILL M. POHLMAN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES K ATE A PPLEBY and R YAN M. HARRIS concurred.
POHLMAN, Judge:
¶1 	Chad Roland LeVasseur appeals his conviction on one
count of second-degree-felony insurance fraud. He argues that
the evidence was insufficient to convict him. We affirm.

State v. LeVasseur
20190299-CA 	2 	2020 UT App 118
BACKGROUND1
¶2 	On the night of March 27, 2016, LeVasseur and his best
friend at the time (Friend) were “driving around, just hanging
out” in Provo, Utah. After they separated, Friend went home,
but 	received 	a 	phone 	call 	from 	LeVasseur 	“around
midnight-ish” as she pulled into her driveway. In that phone
call, LeVasseur related that “he had been in an accident,” and
Friend “offered to go help him.” Because she “didn’t know
exactly how to get” to LeVasseur’s location, she called him for
additional directions as she was en route.
¶3 	When Friend arrived at the scene, LeVasseur’s car was
“parked by the curb in pieces kind of,” with “impact damage to
the left front.” LeVasseur was the only person there. After Friend
helped LeVasseur “pick[] everything up” off the side of the road,
LeVasseur, acting “[a] little stressed out” and “a little worried,”
told her that the accident occurred as he “was making a drift
video [2] and he lost control,” causing him to hit a concrete
barrier. LeVasseur showed Friend the video, which depicted him
“going up the road, turning,” when the camera “fell onto the
floor.” While the video did not show the crash itself, Friend was
1. “On appeal, we review the record facts in a light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict and recite the facts accordingly.
We present conflicting evidence only as necessary to understand
issues raised on appeal.” State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶ 3 n.2, 361
P.3d 104 (cleaned up).
2. 	See 	Drifting, 	Merriam-Webster.com, 	https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/drifting 	[https://perma.cc/5CF4-HFWD]
(defining 	“drifting” 	as 	“the 	act 	or 	activity 	of 	steering 	an
automobile 	so 	that 	it 	makes 	a 	controlled 	skid 	sideways
through a turn with the front wheels pointed in a direction
opposite to that of the turn”).

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able to “hear him crash into the barrier” before the video
stopped.
¶4 	Once the two began “talking about what he was going to
do,” LeVasseur said that he “didn’t have full coverage” on his
car, mentioning that “he needed to switch it before we did
anything else.” LeVasseur then called his car insurance company
(Insurance Company) to make changes to his policy, asking that
his comprehensive deductible be decreased from $2,000 to $500
and that collision coverage be added with a $500 deductible.
That call took place at approximately 12:25 a.m. on March 28,
with the policy changes “locked in” at nearly the same time.
¶5 	After calling Insurance Company, LeVasseur “waited a
little while” before calling the police to report the accident,
which Friend attributed to LeVasseur’s desire to “show time
between everything happening.” While waiting, LeVasseur told
Friend he was going to tell the police that, upon coming to the
corner, he swerved to miss a deer and crashed. LeVasseur
wanted Friend to say that she had not seen the crash but had
been following “a little behind.”
¶6 	LeVasseur called the police at 12:57 a.m., and an officer
(Officer) responded around 1:00 a.m. LeVasseur told Officer that
“a deer had run out in front of him and that he had swerved to
avoid” 	it, 	causing 	the 	crash. 	Friend, 	wanting 	to 	support
LeVasseur, told Officer she had not seen the crash, which was
true, and she had been following behind him at the time, which
was 	not 	true. 	Officer 	completed 	a 	report, 	which 	included
LeVasseur’s statement about the deer.
¶7 	Shortly before 2:00 a.m., LeVasseur reported the accident
to Insurance Company and made a claim on his policy for it. He
reported that the time of loss was 1:00 a.m. The claim report also
included Friend’s name and phone number. Because of the
timing of the policy changes and the claim, Insurance Company

State v. LeVasseur
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flagged the claim as potentially fraudulent and referred it to one
of the company’s investigators (Investigator).
¶8 	As 	part 	of 	the 	investigation, 	Investigator 	obtained
LeVasseur’s cell phone call log for March 27 and 28. The phone
log showed phone calls between Friend and LeVasseur at 12:11
a.m., 12:25 a.m., and 12:30 a.m. It also showed calls placed to
Insurance Company at 12:19 a.m., 1:22 a.m., and 1:41 a.m.
¶9 	Investigator also interviewed Friend some nine months
after the accident. Friend told Investigator that she had “lied to
the 	police” 	about 	the 	night’s 	events 	and 	that, 	rather 	than
swerving to avoid a deer, LeVasseur had been making a drift
video at the time of the accident. She also told Investigator that
she was present for the policy-change phone call and that the
accident preceded the call.
¶10 	Insurance 	Company 	ultimately 	estimated 	the 	total
damage 	to 	LeVasseur’s 	car 	as 	$3,536.97, 	minus 	the 	$500
deductible, 	and 	LeVasseur 	additionally 	claimed 	medical
damages of $4,515.08. But Insurance Company did not pay the
claim.
¶11 	The 	State 	charged 	LeVasseur 	with 	one 	count 	of
committing a fraudulent insurance act, claiming that LeVasseur
submitted the claim knowing it was fraudulent. See generally
Utah 	Code 	Ann. 	§ 	76-6-521 	(LexisNexis 	2017).3 	The 	case
proceeded to a jury trial.
3. The State charged LeVasseur under section 76-6-521(1)(b)(i) of
the Utah Code, which provided at the time that “[a] person
commits a fraudulent insurance act if that person with intent to
defraud . . . presents . . . any oral . . . statement or representation
as part of or in support of a claim for payment or other benefit
pursuant to an insurance policy, certificate, or contract . . .
(continued…)

State v. LeVasseur
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¶12 	At trial, the main issue was whether LeVasseur provided
a “statement or representation knowing that the statement or
representation 	contains 	false 	or 	fraudulent 	information
concerning any fact material” when filing his insurance claim—
specifically, whether LeVasseur knowingly misrepresented the
circumstances surrounding his accident. See id. § 76-6-521(1).
Three witnesses testified for the State to the events described
above: Investigator, Officer, and Friend.
¶13 	During 	his 	testimony, 	Investigator 	described, 	among
other things, the reasons LeVasseur’s claim was flagged as
potentially fraudulent, the extent of his investigatory efforts, and
his interactions with both LeVasseur and Friend in relation to
the claim. Investigator also testified about his observations of
LeVasseur’s vehicle, stating that it appeared to be specially
outfitted for drifting and that his vanity license plate matched a
website address for a site dedicated to drifting.
¶14 	In conjunction with Investigator’s testimony, the audio
recordings of the policy-change phone call and the claim-report
phone call were played for the jury. In particular, during the first
few seconds of the policy-change phone call, LeVasseur can be
heard describing what seems to have been the accident to
someone, 	stating 	that 	he 	“hopped 	it” 	and 	“whacked 	into”
(…continued)
knowing that the statement or representation contains false or
fraudulent information concerning any fact or thing material to
the 	claim.” 	Utah 	Code 	Ann. 	§ 	76-6-521(1)(b)(i)(A), 	(1)(b)(ii)
(LexisNexis 2017). And because the value LeVasseur attempted
to claim on his policy exceeded $5,000, it was charged as a
second-degree felony. See id. §§ 76-6-521(2)(b), 76-10-1801(1)(d)
(providing that a violation is a second-degree felony if the value
of the “property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be
obtained is or exceeds $5,000”).

State v. LeVasseur
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something. The State also introduced the phone call log, which
showed the timing of calls LeVasseur placed to Friend and
Insurance Company.
¶15 	After the State rested, LeVasseur moved for a directed
verdict on two grounds. First, he argued that Friend’s testimony
was inherently improbable based on perceived discrepancies in
the 	evidence 	between 	the 	phone 	call 	timeline 	and 	Friend’s
testimony about which calls she was present for. Second, he
argued 	that, 	without 	Friend’s 	testimony, 	the 	evidence 	was
insufficient to show that he “fabricated” information.
¶16 	The 	district 	court 	denied 	the 	motion. 	The 	court first
explained that it did not find Friend’s testimony to be inherently
improbable, and that, in its view, the potential discrepancies in
Friend’s testimony presented “a credibility question . . . that’s
best left to the jury.” In this respect, the court noted that the
jurors would be 	instructed that they “can disbelieve all or
disbelieve part of” Friend’s testimony. The court then concluded
that the State had met its burden of proof and that “a reasonable
jury could . . . convict [LeVasseur] based on the evidence
presented.”
¶17 	The 	jury 	convicted 	LeVasseur 	as 	charged. 	LeVasseur
timely appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶18 	LeVasseur argues that the district court erred by denying
his 	motion 	for 	directed 	verdict, 	claiming 	that 	the 	evidence
supporting his conviction was insufficient. We review a district
court’s ultimate ruling on a motion for directed verdict for
correctness. State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, ¶ 21, 345 P.3d 1168. But
we will not “reverse a jury verdict if we conclude that some
evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the
elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable

State v. LeVasseur
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doubt.” State v. Rivera, 2019 UT App 188, ¶ 19, 455 P.3d 112
(cleaned up).
ANALYSIS
¶19 	LeVasseur 	challenges 	the 	sufficiency 	of 	the 	evidence
supporting his conviction on two grounds. First, he claims that
Friend’s 	testimony 	was 	“too 	inherently 	improbable” 	to 	be
considered by the jury. Second, he asserts that the verdict was
“based on speculation” and unreasonable inferences and the
evidence therefore was not sufficient to support the verdict.
I. Inherent Improbability
¶20 	LeVasseur argues that Friend’s testimony was inherently
improbable and therefore could not support his conviction.
Citing inconsistencies and contradictions in Friend’s testimony,
he contends that Friend’s statements and testimony regarding
“the 	events 	and 	timing 	of 	the 	car 	crash 	were 	materially
inconsistent, patently false, and lacked corroboration.”
¶21 	A court must “ordinarily accept the jury’s determination
of witness credibility.” State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶ 16, 210
P.3d 288; see also State v. Cady, 2018 UT App 8, ¶ 23, 414 P.3d 974
(“There is perhaps no more axiomatic statement when reviewing
jury verdicts than this: The choice between conflicting testimony
is 	within 	the 	province 	of 	the 	jury.” 	(cleaned 	up)). 	But 	“a
conviction not based on substantial reliable evidence cannot
stand,” Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶ 14 (cleaned up), and “when the
witness’s testimony is inherently improbable, the court may
choose to disregard it,” id. ¶ 16; see also id. ¶ 18 (stating that “the
court 	may 	choose 	to 	exercise 	its 	discretion 	to 	disregard
inconsistent witness testimony only when the court is convinced
that the credibility of the witness is so weak that no reasonable
jury 	could 	find 	the 	defendant 	guilty 	beyond 	a 	reasonable
doubt”).

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¶22 	“[W]itness testimony is inherently improbable and may
likewise be disregarded if it is (1) physically impossible or
(2) apparently 	false.” 	Id. 	¶ 	16. 	“Testimony 	is 	physically
impossible when what the witness claims happened could not
have possibly occurred.” Id. ¶ 17. Testimony is apparently false
“if its falsity is apparent, without any resort to inferences or
deductions,” or it is “incredibly dubious.” Id. ¶¶ 17–18 (cleaned
up).
¶23 	LeVasseur challenges Friend’s testimony as apparently
false. Availability of relief under this theory is narrow. State v.
Skinner, 	2020 	UT 	App 	3, 	¶ 	31, 	457 	P.3d 	421 	(explaining
the “narrowness” of the inherent improbability doctrine); State
v. Rivera, 2019 UT App 188, ¶ 23 n.6, 455 P.3d 112 (“A case
which 	actually 	falls 	within 	the 	Robbins–Prater 	rubric 	is
exceedingly rare.”). Our supreme court has explained that when
the apparent falsity prong is invoked, a district court may
“reevaluate the jury’s credibility determinations only in those
instances where (1) there are material inconsistencies in the
testimony and (2) there is no other circumstantial 	or direct
evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶ 19.
Indeed, in Robbins, “[i]t was the inconsistencies in the child’s
testimony plus the patently false statements the child made
plus the lack of any corroboration that allowed [the supreme
court] 	to 	conclude 	that 	insufficient 	evidence 	supported
Robbins’s conviction.” State v. Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶ 38, 392 P.3d
398. Thus, LeVasseur’s claim will “necessarily fail where any
evidence corroborates [Friend’s] testimony.” See Skinner, 2020
UT App 3, ¶ 31.
¶24 	Here, 	the 	district 	court 	denied 	LeVasseur’s 	directed
verdict motion because it determined that Friend’s testimony
was not inherently improbable and that the inconsistencies and
contradictions identified by LeVasseur presented a “credibility
question . . . that’s best left to the jury.” We conclude the district
court did not abuse its discretion in declining to find Friend’s

State v. LeVasseur
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testimony inherently improbable and to disregard it on that
basis. See Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶ 18.
¶25 	To begin with, LeVasseur is correct that, in providing two
different versions of the accident’s events, Friend’s testimony
contained inconsistencies. But we disagree that, without more,
the inconsistencies were of a kind that would have allowed the
district court to disregard Friend’s testimony. See id. ¶¶ 18–19.
Indeed, 	the 	inconsistency 	argument 	made 	by 	LeVasseur 	is
similar to the inconsistency argument our supreme court rejected
in Prater.
¶26 	There, 	the 	appellant 	argued 	that 	three 	witnesses’
testimonies 	were 	inherently 	improbable 	because 	their
testimonies “changed substantially” after accepting deals with
the State. Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶ 30. For example, the “jury learned
that 	[the 	three 	witnesses] 	all 	made 	statements 	to 	police
shortly 	after 	the 	shooting 	that 	contradicted 	their 	trial
testimony.” Id. ¶ 39. But in rejecting the appellant’s inherent
improbability argument, the supreme court found it significant
that “each witness admitted at trial that he or she initially lied to
police” and that one of the witnesses in particular testified “that
she 	withheld 	information 	at 	the 	preliminary 	hearing 	only
because she was afraid” of retaliation. Id. The court explained
that the fact that the three witnesses “den[ied] their involvement
[in the crime] when initially interviewed by the police does not
run 	so 	counter 	to 	human 	experience 	that 	it 	renders 	their
testimony 	inherently 	improbable.” 	Id. 	Rather, 	the 	court
determined, “[t]he question of which version of their stories was
more credible is the type of question we routinely require juries
to answer.” Id.
¶27 	Here, as LeVasseur asserts, Friend originally reported to
Officer that she was following LeVasseur at the time of the
accident, then came upon him afterward. But at trial, Friend
testified that she had not been following LeVasseur at the time of

State v. LeVasseur
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the accident and instead was pulling into her driveway when he
called her about the crash. But like the witnesses in Prater, Friend
testified that she lied to Officer when she told him that she had
been following LeVasseur immediately before the crash. She also
provided an explanation for her lie, testifying that at the time,
LeVasseur was her “best friend,” that the lie was “what [her]
best friend . . . wanted [her] to do,” and that she therefore “went
ahead” with the lie because she “wanted to defend [her] best
friend.” And she explained that she later told the truth to
Investigator because she “didn’t want to keep covering it with a
lie” and that she “just wanted the truth to be out there because
[she] didn’t want to make it worse.”
¶28 	In our view, 	it 	“does not run so 	counter to human
experience” that a person initially would lie to police about
events surrounding a car accident at her best friend’s request,
motivated by a desire to protect him. See id. As in Prater, we
think that, given the entirety of Friend’s testimony about the
varying accounts, the inconsistencies identified are not of a kind
to render Friend’s testimony inherently improbable. Rather, we
agree with the district court that the “question of which version
of [Friend’s] stories was more credible is the type of question”
best left to the jury to answer. See id.
¶29 	Moreover, LeVasseur’s inherent improbability challenge
fails for the additional reason that there was other evidence
corroborating 	Friend’s 	testimony 	that 	LeVasseur 	knowingly
submitted a fraudulent insurance claim. See Robbins, 2009 UT 23,
¶ 19 (“The existence of any additional evidence supporting the
verdict prevents the judge from reconsidering the witness’s
credibility.”); Skinner, 2020 UT App 3, ¶¶ 31, 34 (stating that
“under Robbins and Prater, an inherent improbability claim will
necessarily fail where any evidence corroborates the witness’s
testimony,” 	and 	explaining 	that 	“[c]orroborating 	evidence
sufficient to defeat a Robbins claim does not have to corroborate
the witness’s account across the board, in every particular,” but

State v. LeVasseur
20190299-CA 	11 	2020 UT App 118
instead “just has to provide a second source of evidence for at
least some of the details of the witness’s story”).
¶30 	For example, the jury had before it the phone log of calls
LeVasseur 	placed 	the 	night 	of 	the 	accident, 	as 	well 	as
Investigator’s 	testimony 	about 	the 	logs, 	which 	corroborated
Friend’s testimony that LeVasseur informed her of the accident
before calling Insurance Company to increase his insurance
coverage. 	The 	recordings 	of 	his 	various 	phone 	calls 	with
Insurance Company were also admitted; in particular, during
the first seconds of the original phone call to increase coverage,
LeVasseur 	can 	be 	heard 	making 	statements 	that 	could 	be
understood as a description of the accident, stating that he
“hopped it” and “whacked into” something.
¶31 	Testimony 	about 	LeVasseur’s 	vehicle, 	while
circumstantial, also supported Friend’s testimony that LeVasseur
crashed while making a drift video (as opposed to avoiding a
deer); 	Investigator 	testified 	that 	LeVasseur’s 	vehicle 	was
specially outfitted for drifting and that his vanity license plate
matched a website address for a site dedicated to drifting. And
the circumstantial evidence surrounding the timing of the phone
calls to increase coverage, to report the accident to the police,
and to make a claim with Insurance Company—all occurring in
the middle of the night within a two-hour period—also fairly
supported the aspects of Friend’s testimony that suggested the
accident preceded LeVasseur’s call to increase his insurance
coverage.4
4. LeVasseur also argues that Friend’s testimony is inherently
improbable because it is patently false, contending that her
testimony about the timeline of events was contradicted by the
cell phone data and her testimony about that data. However,
because we have concluded that aspects of Friend’s testimony
(continued…)

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¶32 	For 	these 	reasons, 	the 	inconsistencies 	in 	Friend’s
testimony did not render it “so weak” as to afford the district
court the discretion to reject Friend’s testimony as inherently
improbable. See Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶¶ 18–19. LeVasseur’s
inherent improbability challenge therefore fails.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶33 	LeVasseur additionally challenges the overall sufficiency
of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. Specifically, he
claims 	that 	the 	State’s 	evidence 	“did 	not 	prove 	that 	[he]
knowingly 	provided 	false 	or 	fraudulent 	information 	to
Insurance [Company] regarding the timing and specifics of the
crash.”
¶34 	“On 	a 	sufficiency 	of 	the 	evidence 	claim 	we 	give
substantial deference to the jury,” and the operative question is
“simply whether the jury’s verdict is reasonable in light of all of
the evidence taken cumulatively, under a standard of review
that yields deference to all reasonable inferences supporting the
jury’s verdict.” State v. Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶¶ 18, 24, 349 P.3d
664; see also Mackin v. State, 2016 UT 47, ¶ 29, 387 P.3d 986
(stating 	that 	“the 	question” 	on 	a 	sufficiency 	challenge 	“is
whether the evidence was so lacking that no reasonable jury
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”
(cleaned up)); Salt Lake City v. Carrera, 2015 UT 73, ¶ 11, 358 P.3d
1067 (recognizing that a guilty verdict may be based on direct or
circumstantial evidence). “A jury’s inference is reasonable unless
it 	falls 	to 	a 	level 	of 	inconsistency 	or 	incredibility 	that 	no
reasonable jury could accept.” Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶ 18 (cleaned
(…continued)
were corroborated by other evidence, we do not address this
point further. See State v. Skinner, 2020 UT App 3, ¶¶ 31, 34, 457
P.3d 421.

State v. LeVasseur
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up). We thus will affirm the district court’s denial of LeVasseur’s
directed verdict motion and the jury’s verdict so long as “some
evidence 	exists” 	from 	which 	a 	jury 	could 	find 	beyond 	a
reasonable doubt that LeVasseur committed an act of second-
degree-felony insurance fraud. See State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10,
¶ 27, 345 P.3d 1168 (cleaned up).
¶35 	As 	noted 	above, 	to 	obtain 	a 	conviction 	for
second-degree-felony insurance fraud, the State was required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that in making his insurance
claim, LeVasseur, with intent to defraud, presented a “statement
or representation” knowing that it contained “false or fraudulent
information 	concerning 	any 	fact 	or 	thing 	material” 	to 	his
insurance 	claim. 	See 	Utah 	Code 	Ann. 	§ 	76-6-521(1)(b)(i)(A),
(1)(b)(ii) 	(LexisNexis 	2017); 	see 	also 	id. 	§§ 	76-6-521(2)(b),
76-10-1801(1)(d) (providing that a violation is a second-degree
felony if the value of the “property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000”). “A person engages
in conduct . . . knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is
aware 	of 	the 	nature 	of 	his 	conduct 	or 	the 	existing
circumstances.” Id. § 76-2-103(2).
¶36 	Here, 	we 	readily 	conclude 	that 	there 	was 	sufficient
evidence 	from 	which 	the 	jury 	could 	have 	determined 	that
LeVasseur knowingly committed insurance fraud through his
assertions about the circumstances of the accident. As discussed
above, Friend testified that despite what she initially told Officer,
LeVasseur called her around midnight to tell her he had been in
an 	accident, 	that 	LeVasseur 	told 	her 	the 	accident 	occurred
during 	his 	attempt 	to 	make 	a 	drifting 	video, 	and 	that 	he
increased his coverage after the accident had already occurred.
Nevertheless, Investigator testified (and the recording of the
claim 	corroborated) 	that 	in 	making 	his 	insurance 	claim,
LeVasseur 	informed 	Insurance 	Company 	that 	the 	accident
occurred about a half an hour after he called to increase his

State v. LeVasseur
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coverage. Additionally, other circumstantial evidence supported
the version of events Friend testified to and, specifically, that
LeVasseur knew at the time he made his insurance claim that the
accident 	had 	occurred 	before 	he 	increased 	his 	coverage,
including: LeVasseur’s phone log, the recordings of the relevant
phone calls (particularly the policy-change phone call, in which
LeVasseur can initially be heard describing what could have
been 	the 	accident), 	the 	evidence 	surrounding 	LeVasseur’s
drifting activities, and the overall timing of the night’s events.
¶37 	Taken together, Friend’s testimony along with the other
circumstantial 	evidence 	constituted 	sufficient 	evidence 	from
which the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
LeVasseur 	was 	aware 	that 	the 	assertions 	he 	made 	in 	his
insurance 	claim 	surrounding 	the 	timing 	and 	details 	of 	the
accident were false. See Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, ¶ 27; Ashcraft, 2015
UT 	5, 	¶¶ 	18, 	24; 	see 	also 	Utah 	Code 	Ann. 	§§ 	76-2-103(2),
76-6-521(1)(b). See generally State v. Whitaker, 2016 UT App 104,
¶ 10, 	374 	P.3d 	56 	(recognizing 	that, 	because 	“proof 	of 	a
defendant’s intent is rarely susceptible of direct proof, . . . the
prosecution usually must rely on a combination of direct and
circumstantial 	evidence 	to 	establish” 	it 	(cleaned 	up)).
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err
when it denied LeVasseur’s motion for directed verdict.
CONCLUSION
¶38 	We affirm LeVasseur’s conviction. The district court did
not err by rejecting LeVasseur’s inherent improbability challenge
to Friend’s testimony. And in light of the evidence supporting
LeVasseur’s guilt, we conclude that the district court did not err
by denying LeVasseur’s directed verdict motion.