State v. Mangum

1. The aggravated assault statute has since been amended. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (LexisNexis 2012).
2013 UT App 292
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
JAMIE NICHOLE MANGUM,
Defendant and Appellant.
Per Curiam Decision
No. 20120346-CA
Filed December 12, 2013
Third District Court, West Jordan Department
The Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck
No. 101401678
Debra M. Nelson and Wesley J. Howard, Attorneys
for Appellant
Brian L. Tarbet and Ryan D. Tenney, Attorneys
for Appellee
Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, CAROLYN B. MCHUGH, and
STEPHEN L. ROTH.
PER CURIAM:
¶1 Jamie Nichole Mangum appeals from her conviction of
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
103 (LexisNexis 2008). We affirm.1
¶2 Mangum asserts that the evidence was insufficient to
establish that she used a dangerous weapon and stabbed the victim
(Victim) in the back. In reviewing a jury verdict, an appellate court

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20120346-CA 2 2013 UT App 292
looks at the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn in
the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT
67, ¶ 40, 52 P.3d 1194. Additionally, appellate courts will generally
not reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. Id. Rather, “[w]hen the
evidence presented is conflicting or disputed, the jury serves as the
exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the weight
to be given particular evidence.” State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984
(Utah 1993). “[A]n appellate court can rely on the presumption that
the jury disbelieved the evidence in conflict with the jury verdict
and find that there is evidence sufficient to support the jury’s
[verdict].” State v. Gardner, 2007 UT 70, ¶ 25, 167 P.3d 1074.
¶3 There was sufficient evidence presented to support the
jury’s verdict. Victim testified about the altercation with Mangum
and testified that Mangum stabbed her in the back. Evidence was
presented showing the stab wound between Victim’s spine and
scapula. Victim also testified that she saw something shiny in
Mangum’s hand and thought that Mangum was attempting to stab
her again after the initial blow. A witness testified that he heard
Victim scream “she stabbed me” during the altercation.
Additionally, Mangum’s ex-husband testified that Mangum called
him after the incident and admitted to stabbing someone. This
evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
¶4 At trial, Mangum denied stabbing Victim and denied telling
her ex-husband that she had done so. However, contradictory
evidence is not sufficient to overturn a jury verdict. State v. Lucero,
2012 UT App 202, ¶ 13, 283 P.3d 594. Rather, the jury determines
which evidence to believe when conflicting evidence is presented.
Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, ¶ 40.
¶5 Mangum also argues that the State failed to present evidence
to show that even if Mangum stabbed Victim, she actually intended
to do serious bodily harm. She asserts that evidence of specific
intent to injure is required under State v. Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, 285
P.3d 1183. Although Hutchings involved the same version of the
aggravated assault statute that applied to Mangum when she was

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20120346-CA 3 2013 UT App 292
charged, the case does not apply to Mangum’s circumstances
because she was charged under a different section of the statute
than was at issue in Hutchings.
¶6 The statute in effect at the time Mangum was charged stated,
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he
commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and
he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily
injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting
to a violation of Subsection (1)(a), uses
a dangerous weapon . . . or other
means or force likely to produce death
or serious bodily injury.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1) (LexisNexis 2008). A violation of
subsection (1)(a) is a second degree felony. Id. § 76-5-103(2). A
violation of subsection (1)(b) is a third degree felony. Id. § 76-5-
103(3).
¶7 The two subsections are clearly separate variants of the
offense of aggravated assault, setting forth different elements and
different punishments. Accordingly, the State was not required to
prove elements of both variants to support a conviction for
aggravated assault based on the use of a dangerous weapon. See
State v. Ekstrom, 2013 UT App 271, ¶ 12. Our supreme court held in
Hutchings that under subsection (1)(a) specific intent to cause injury
must be shown rather than just the intent to commit an act that
results in injury. 2012 UT 50, ¶ 14. Mangum, however, was charged
and convicted under subsection (1)(b), which required the State to
prove that, under circumstances not amounting to intentionally
causing serious bodily harm to another, Mangum used a dangerous
weapon to commit assault. Subsection (1)(b) was not at issue in
Hutchings. Accordingly, Hutchings does not apply to the instant

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20120346-CA 4 2013 UT App 292
case and there was no requirement to show specific intent in order
to support Mangum’s conviction.
¶8 Affirmed.