In re M.C. and A.J. (A.J. v. State)

1. The Honorable Pamela T. Greenwood, Senior Judge, sat by
special appointment as authorized by law. See generally Utah Code
Jud. Admin. R. 11-201(6).
2014 UT App 105
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF M.C. AND A.J., PERSONS UNDER
EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
A.J.,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee.
Per Curiam Decision
No. 20140103-CA
Filed May 8, 2014
Second District Juvenile Court, Ogden Department
The Honorable Jeffrey J. Noland
No. 1066491
Carol Mortensen, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and John M. Peterson, Attorneys
for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem
Before JUDGES J. FREDERIC VOROS JR., JOHN A. PEARCE, and
SENIOR JUDGE PAMELA T. GREENWOOD.1
PER CURIAM:
¶1 A.J. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights.
We affirm.

In re M.C.
20140103-CA 2 2014 UT App 105
¶2 Mother first asserts that the juvenile court erred in allowing
the guardian ad litem to exceed the scope of direct examination in
cross-examining a Division of Child and Family Services’ (DCFS)
caseworker. Mother implies that the entirety of the testimony
elicited from the caseworker by the guardian ad litem should be
disregarded. However, the transcript shows that Mother made
only one objection to the questioning. Mother objected to the
guardian ad litem’s question concerning the condition of the
children when the caseworker first became involved with the case,
arguing that the guardian ad litem was exceeding the scope of
direct examination. The juvenile court denied the objection, stating
that it would allow the guardian to proceed. Mother did not object
to any other questions or lines of inquiry.
¶3 Mother’s single objection was insufficient to preserve
objections to other questions or lines of inquiry presented by the
guardian ad litem. See State v. Schwenke, 2009 UT App 345,
¶¶ 19–20, 222 P.3d 768 (stating that because an issue can be
preserved only by raising it in such a manner as to allow the trial
court to act on it, the defendant’s prior objection to an unrelated
question several transcript pages earlier was insufficient to
preserve an issue for appeal). Moreover, the transcript shows that
the State asked a very similar question only minutes earlier.
Accordingly, the question did not exceed the scope of the direct
examination. Therefore, the question was proper and the objection
was properly denied.
¶4 Next, Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred in
determining that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate
Mother’s parental rights. “[I]n order to overturn the juvenile
court’s decision [to terminate a person’s parental rights,] ‘the result
must be against the clear weight of the evidence or leave the
appellate court with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake
has been made.’” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435 (citation
omitted). A juvenile court has broad discretion regarding
judgments based on the juvenile court’s specialized experience and
training, as well as its ability to judge credibility firsthand. See In re

In re M.C.
20140103-CA 3 2014 UT App 105
E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ¶ 11, 21 P.3d 680. Accordingly, “[w]hen a
foundation for the court’s decision exists in the evidence, an
appellate court may not engage in a reweighing of the evidence.”
In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12.
¶5 The evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s
determination that it was in the children’s best interests to
terminate Mother’s parental rights. Mother had failed to comply
with most aspects of her service plan, including those dealing with
her drug use and her pattern of involving herself in abusive
relationships. Further, at the time of trial, Mother was in prison for
an indeterminate amount of time based, in part, on Mother’s
assault of her own mother in front of the children. Thus, because of
Mother’s prison sentence and her need to obtain help for the issues
that led to the children’s removal, she was not going to be in a
position to parent the children for some time.
¶6 Meanwhile, the children were living in a stable environment
with their grandparents, who provided for all of their needs. The
children have strong bonds with their grandparents, who have
been the children’s caregivers for a majority of their lives. The
grandparents wish to adopt the children to give them a sense of
permanency and stability. Finally, while the juvenile court made no
specific findings concerning whether granting permanent custody
would be a better option than adoption, the juvenile court clearly
considered the issue, as it specifically questioned the DCFS
caseworker about termination of parental rights versus permanent
custody prior to making its determination. Based on the evidence
presented at trial, we cannot say that the juvenile court erred in
making that determination. Accordingly, there exists sufficient
evidence to support the juvenile court’s determination that it was
in the children’s best interests to terminate Mother’s parental
rights.
¶7 Affirmed.